Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
ARUN KUMAR & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Kshitiz Jain and Mr. Rohan Chandra, Advocates
Through: Mr. Gaurav Mishra, CGSC for UOI with Mr. Sumit Ranjan, Advocates
JUDGMENT
1. By way of the present application, the applicant/ appellant seeks condonation of delay of 85 days in filing the appeal.
2. For the reasons stated in the application, it is allowed and the delay of 85 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
3. The application is disposed of accordingly.
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, against the judgment dated 02.04.2025, passed bythe Railway Claims Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”) in Claim Application No. OA/II(u)/DLI/275/2024.
2. The brief facts of the case, as set out in the claim application are that one Sh. Puran Lal (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) had purchased a journey ticket for travelling from Shahjahanpur Railway Station to Bareilly Railway Station on 13.03.2020. During the course of the journey, he accidentally fell from the running train near Bareilly Railway Station and sustained fatal injuries. It was the appellants’ case that the journey ticket was not recovered during the inquest proceedings since the same had been lost in the accident.
3. Vide the impugned judgment, the Tribunal dismissed the claim application holding that the appellants had failed to establish that the deceased was a bona fide passenger or that his death occurred in an “untoward incident” within the meaning of Sections 123(c) and 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Tribunal has ignored the unrebutted testimony of Arun Kumar (AW-1), son of the deceased, who deposed that the deceased had undertaken the journey from Shahjahanpur to Bareilly and that the journey ticket had been lost in the accident. Learned counsel further submits that the testimony of Vinod (AW-2), who categorically deposed that he had accompanied the deceased to Shahjahanpur Railway Station, witnessed him purchasing the journey ticket and boarding the train, remained intact. It is argued that the mere fact that this witness had not disclosed the aforesaid facts to the police immediately after the incident could not be a ground to discard his testimony, particularly when he consistently maintained his version.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that no journey ticket was recovered from the person of the deceased during the jamatalashi proceedings. It is submitted that the DRM Report records that the deceased was found lying near the shunting line and the investigation did not reveal that he was travelling by any train. It is, therefore, contended that the deceased sustained injuries due to his own negligence while crossing the railway track near the shunting line and that the case does not fall within the ambit of an “untoward incident” as contemplated under Sections 123(c) and 124-A of the Act.
6. This Court has heard the arguments addressed by learned counsels for the parties also perused the material on record.
7. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the deceased was a bonafide passenger. The Tribunal answered the issue against the appellants primarily on the ground that no journey ticket was recovered during the jamatalashi and that the claim of purchase of the ticket rested upon the evidence of the claimants.
8. The evidence led by the appellants, when appreciated in its entirety, supports the case set up by the appellants in their claim application. ArunKumar (AW-1), the son of the deceased, consistently stated in his affidavit that his father had purchased a journey ticket from Shahjahanpur to Bareilly and had boarded the train. Though he fairly admitted during crossexamination that he had not personally witnessed the purchase of the ticket or the boarding of the train, he also clarified that he received information from the GRP regarding the incident. More importantly, Vinod (AW-2), deposed in his affidavit that he had accompanied the deceased to Shahjahanpur Railway Station and he witnessed the purchase of the railway ticket. During cross-examination, although he admitted that these facts had not been disclosed by him to the police or the family members earlier, he remained firm on the material aspect that the deceased had purchased the ticket in his presence. The mere fact that the witness did not disclose these facts at the earliest would not, by itself, render his entire testimony liable to be discarded, particularly when nothing has been elicited to establish any motive for falsely supporting the claim.
9. The DRM Report also proceeds principally on the basis that no railway ticket was recovered and that the deceased was allegedly proceeding to Bareilly by road. Such a conclusion, despite the subsequent evidence led before the Tribunal explaining the circumstances in which the ticket was not recovered and producing a witness who had seen the deceased purchase the ticket and board the train, cannot be validated. In these circumstances, mere non-recovery of the ticket cannot be treated as conclusive proof that the deceased was not a bona fide passenger.
10. The issue is no longer res integra. In “Union of India v. Rina Devi”1, the Supreme Court held that mere absence or non-recovery of a journey ticket does not negative the claim that the victim was a bona fide passenger. Once the claimant places before the Tribunal relevant facts giving rise to a reasonable inference of bona fide travel, the burden shifts upon the Railways to rebut the same by leading cogent evidence. In the present case, except relying upon the non-recovery of the ticket and the conclusions recorded in the DRM Report, the respondent has not produced any evidence to dislodge the appellants' version. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the deceased ought to be treated as a bona fide passenger.
11. The next question is whether the death of the deceased occurred on account of an “untoward incident” within the meaning of Section 123(c) read with Section 124-A of the Act. The Tribunal accepted the case of the respondent that the deceased had suffered injuries due to his own negligence while crossing the railway track “near the shunting line”.
12. The GD Entry records that an unknown person had been found lying near OHE Pole Nos. BE 1063 - BE 1065, adjacent to Shunt Signal No. 74. Likewise, the inquest proceedings record the condition of the body and the articles found during jamatalashi, but do not contain any finding that the deceased was not travelling by train. None of these documents records that any witness had seen the deceased crossing the railway track or that he had been run over while trespassing. The finding of self-negligence is, therefore, founded on inference rather than direct evidence.
13. Merely because the body was found “near the shunting line” cannot lead to the conclusion that the deceased was not a railway passenger or that he was attempting to cross the railway track. It also cannot be overlooked that the place where the body was found was not at such a distance from the railway station as to completely rule out the possibility of the deceased accidentally falling from a passenger train. In this regard, it is also apposite to note that Section 2(31) of the Act defines the expression “railway” in an inclusive manner so as to encompass, inter alia, “all lines of rails, sidings, or yards, or branches used for the purposes of, or in connection with, a railway”. The respondent has failed to produce any material showing the exact movement of the relevant train or establishing that the deceased died due to his own negligence.
14. In “Rajvati & Ors. v. Union of India”2, this Court considered a similar contention where the Tribunal had inferred trespass merely because the body of the deceased was found in the “railway yard”. Rejecting the said approach, it was held that the location of the body in the yard could not, by itself, negate the possibility of an accidental fall from a running train. This Court further observed that the definition of “railway” under Section 2(31) of the Act includes railway yards, and in the absence of any independent eyewitness or cogent evidence establishing trespass, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the claimants. Similarly, in “Surjeet Kaur &Ors. v. Union of India”3, this Court held that where the contemporaneous record established railway movement and there was no direct evidence of trespass, the conclusion that the deceased had become a victim of his own negligence was purely inferential and could not defeat a claim under the beneficial provisions of the Railways Act.
15. The law on this aspect is equally well settled. In Rina Devi (supra) the Supreme Court has categorically held: “We are unable to uphold the view that negligence of the victim can be a ground to deny compensation. The concept of 'self-inflicted injury' would require intention to inflict such injury and mere negligence of the victim is not enough. Compensation can be denied only if the case falls within one of the exceptions contained in the proviso to Section 124-A.”
16. There is no material to suggest suicide, attempted suicide, selfinflicted injury, criminal act, intoxication or insanity. Consequently, even assuming that the deceased was negligent while travelling, such negligence,
2026 SCC OnLine Del 3240 by itself, would not disentitle the appellants from claiming compensation under the beneficial provisions of the Act.
17. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the death of the deceased occurred in an untoward incident within the meaning of Sections 123(c) and 124-A of the Act.
18. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal, which is requested to assess the amount of compensation payable to the appellants in accordance with law and direct the authorities concerned to disburse the same within two months from the receipt of a copy of this order. For this purpose, the matter be listed before the Tribunal at the first instance on 18.08.2026.
19. The appeal is allowed and disposed of in the above terms.
20. A copy of this judgment be communicated to the learned Tribunal.
JUDGE JULY 30, 2026