Dr. Mirza Najamuddin Beg v. Jyoti Duggal

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958[1], challenging the Order dated 11.12.2023[2], passed by the learned ARC-01 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi[3], in Eviction Petition bearing No. 132/2022 (RC-ARC 467/2022) titled “Dr. Mirza Najamuddin Beg v. Jyoti Duggal”.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that the learned ARC has committed a manifest error in granting leave to defend. He submits that the learned ARC has proceeded on conjectures while dealing with the issue of alternate accommodation and has failed to appreciate that no triable issue, as contemplated DRC Act Impugned Order learned ARC under Section 25B of the DRC Act, arose on the pleadings.

3. He further contends that the observations made by the learned ARC regarding the alleged availability of alternate accommodation are not founded on any substantive material and that the learned ARC has proceeded merely on the basis of bald assertions made in the leave to defend application.

4. He also submits that the learned ARC ought to have examined whether the alleged accommodation was, in fact, available to the Petitioner and whether the same constituted a reasonably suitable alternative so as to disentitle him from seeking eviction.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent supports the Impugned Order and submits that the Respondent had disclosed sufficient material to raise a bona fide triable issue regarding the availability of alternate accommodation.

6. He submits that once such a triable issue arose from the pleadings and the material placed before the learned ARC, grant of leave to defend was the only course open and no interference is warranted in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

7. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and, with their assistance, perused the material available on record, including the Impugned Order.

8. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

9. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.4, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh[5], and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[6], has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

10. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.7, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover[8].

11. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:

12. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.