The Chief Executive Officer, Prasar Bharati v. Gunjan Varshney; The Chief Executive Officer, Prasar Bharati v. Srishti Shanker

3. You are request to submit No Dues Certificate to Scor Section from A&G and the concerned Library.

4. This issues with the approval of Competent Authority. Yours sincerely, [S.Muthukumar] Dy. Director Admn.(Scor)”

4. The respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal[1], challenging her termination, by way of OA 951/2015.

5. The Prasar Bharati advanced a preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction, contending that the Tribunal was coram non judice as it had no jurisdiction over the contractor through whom the respondent had been engaged.

6. Substantive replies on merits were also advanced by the Prasar Bharati.

7. The Tribunal passed two orders, the first on 2 May 2017 and the second on 10 July 2017. By the first order dated 2 May 2017, the Tribunal rejected the argument of want of jurisdiction and held that it had jurisdiction in the matter. Mr. Rajeev Sharma, learned Senior “the Tribunal”, hereinafter Counsel for the petitioners, very fairly submits that though he would still argue on principle that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, this issue stands decided against the petitioners by certain authorities of the Supreme Court and that, therefore, it did not survive for consideration on merits in the present writ petition. We, therefore, affirm the order dated 2 May 2017 passed by the Tribunal.

8. The real challenge before us is to the order dated 10 July 2017 which addressed the challenge raised by the respondent on merits.

9. The Tribunal, predicated on the following reasoning, proceeded to allow the OA:

10. Following the above reasoning, the Tribunal directed, in the concluding paragraph of the judgment thus:

11. Assailing the aforesaid order, the Prasar Bharati is before us in the present writ petition.

12. We have heard Mr. Rajeev Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the respondent, at length.

13. Mr. Sharma submits that the respondent’s termination was squarely in terms of Clause 6 of her contract of employment dated 22 July 2014 supra. The clause enabled the petitioners to terminate the services of the respondent at any time on giving one month’s notice without assigning reasons. The respondent’s contract was terminated as her services were no longer required. He submits that the Tribunal is signally in error in holding that such a termination had to be preceded by adherence to the principles of natural justice. This issue, he submits, is no longer res integra as it is covered by para 17 of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Satish Joshi[7], which reads thus:

14. The aforenoted enunciation of law in para 17 of Satish Joshi stands followed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Dr. 2013 (137) DRJ 548 (DB) Praveen Singh v. Dr. Ashish Goyal[8], from which para 14 is relevant:

15. Ergo, submits Mr. Sharma, the Tribunal was in error in setting aside the termination of the respondent and granting consequential relief.

16. Responding to Mr. Sharma’s submissions, Mr. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the respondent, has placed reliance on paras 3 and 7 of the contract of service of the respondent to submit that the contract was performance-driven. He submits that there was nothing at any time to indicate that the performance of the respondent was wanting. Rather, he has drawn our attention to the following e-mail addressed by the petitioner to the respondent on 7 August 2014: “FW: Minutes of the Meeting held on 27th June 2014 Gunjan Varshney <gunjan,varshney@focustvgroup.com> Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 8:49 PM To:”1811gunjan@gmail.com”1811gunjan@gmail.com Sent from my Windows Phone 2024 SCC Online Del 6993 From: ravindra joshi Sent; 04-08-2014 16:08 To: Gunjan Varshney Cc: Khyli Sardana; Amarpreet Sandhu; Priyank Pal; Hitu Mahanjan; Surajit D. Chaterjee; Jaganath Das; Harjit Singh; Ramswaroop Das; Shahsank Narayan, Tiwari; Chairman Positiv TV; Neeraj Sanan; avadhsharma@hotmail.com; Mukund Setlur; gargee bardoloi; Chief Subject: Re: Minutes of the Meeting held on 27th June 2014 Gunjan, that you and your team have consistently achieved and often exceeded your goals is highly commendable. We are fortunate to have such energetic and talented sales persons amidst us. Keep up the good work. Regards Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. From: Chief Sent: Monday, 4 August 2014 15:50 To: Gunjan Varshney Cc: Khyati Sardana; Amarpreet Sandhu; Priyanka Pal; Hitu Mahajan; Surajit D. Chatterjee; Jaganath Das; Harjit Singh; Ramswaroop Das; Shahsank Narayan, Tiwari; Chairman Positiv TV; Neeraj Sanan; avadhsharma@hotmail.com; Mukund Setlur; gargee bardoloi; Subject: Re: Minutes of the Meeting held on 27th June 2014 Congratulations and keep it coming again and again”

17. Mr. Bhattacharya would submit that, in such circumstances, the petitioner could not suddenly, even before the period of two years for which the respondent had initially been appointed on contract was over, terminate her by the laconic communication of 23 February

2015.

18. The Tribunal was, therefore, in his submission, correct in setting it aside.

19. We have considered the submissions of both sides.

20. The right of contractual employees to regularization stands recognized in several recent authorities of the Supreme Court and of this Court including Jaggo v. Union of India[9], Vinod Kumar v. Union of India10, Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad11, Dharam Singh v. State of UP12, Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand13, Pawan Kumar v. Union of India14, Pawan Sharma v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi15 and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Kalpana Sharma16. These, however, are all cases in which persons had worked on contract for long periods of time. In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that, even by dint of their continuous and uninterrupted service without complaint, a right to regularization enured in favour of the employees and has rejected any opposition to that principle on the ground that their appointments were not against sanctioned posts, or that they did not possess the requisite qualifications for the post, or that their services were no longer required. The only case in which the Supreme Court has held such employees to be liable to termination, is where their initial appointment on contract was illegal, in that it was made without any selection and through the back door. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the judgment of the Constitution Bench in

2025 SCC OnLIne Del 8313 Judgment dated 13 April 2026 passed in WP(C) 4646/2026 State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi17 was intended to deal only with surreptitious “back door appointments”, and not with candidates who had been appointed after a due process of selection or consideration.

21. This Court has recently, in its judgment in Pawan Sharma, followed the decisions in Jaggo and the judgments which followed it, and our decision stands affirmed by the Supreme Court by dismissal of the SLP preferred thereagainst vide order dated 14 May 2026.

22. The beneficial reach of Jaggo, the decisions following it, and Pawan Sharma cannot, however, extend to a case such as the present, where the respondent was engaged on contract only for one year, the contract specially contained a clause which enabled her contract to be terminated at any time without notice and, by a non-stigmatic order on the ground that her services were not required any further, her contract was terminated within a period of one year. If we are not to countenance even such a termination, it would mean that no employee could ever be taken on contract and that, if any employment took place on contract, it would never be terminated, irrespective of the length for which the contract subsisted, even by a non-stigmatic order, without strict adherence to the principles of natural justice.

23. We have also perused the reasoning of the Tribunal. With respect, it appears that the Tribunal has proceeded on abstract considerations, rather than on an interpretation of the legal position. Observations such as want of transparency in the decision of the

Prasar Bharati to continue or discontinue services of contractual engagees, scope of subjectivity in the appraisal system, absence of any transparent or legally valid system for regulating services of the Prasar Bharati employees, and the like, cannot be considerations on the basis of which the termination of the respondent’s services could be set aside.

24. Mr. Sharma has also pointed out that the Tribunal has erred on facts in holding that the appointment of the respondent was against a regular post. He submits that there was no regular post of Regional Sales Head in the Prasar Bharati and this was a post which was merely created for being filled by the respondent on contract basis.

25. In as much as the discontinuation of the respondent’s services was not stigmatic but only on the ground that her services were not required any further, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Tribunal that the termination had to be preceded by compliance to the principles of natural justice or audi alteram partem, much less issuing of a show cause notice, inviting a representation thereto and granting of an opportunity of personal hearing.

26. We are of the opinion that the impugned order of the Tribunal has proceeded more on equity than in law. While it is always desirable that the approach of a Court should be equitable, equity cannot be made the sole basis of a judicial decision, innocent of the law. Uninformed by law, equity would be an unruly horse.

27. In view of the fact that (i) the contract whereby the respondent’s services were engaged specifically provided that it could be terminated at any point without notice, (ii) the order of termination was passed within less than a year of the contract, and (iii) the order of termination was non-stigmatic in nature and terminated the respondent’s services on the ground that they were not required any further, we are unable to sustain the impugned judgment of the Tribunal to set aside the termination order dated 23 February 2015.

28. Resultantly, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is quashed and set aside.

29. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms with no orders as to costs. WP (C) 11383/2017

30. Srishti Shanker, the respondent in this writ petition, was engaged on contract as Output Editor on 5 April 2013 on a monthly remuneration of ₹ 1,35,000/-. The following clauses of her contractual appointment are relevant: “WHEREAS the First Party as an electronic media is broadcasting various programmes including news bulletins to inform, educate and entertain people.

WHEREAS the First Party proposes to engage Ms. Srishti Shanker as Output Editor the News & Current Affairs Wing of Doordarshan.

WHEREAS the Second Party has expressed her desire to provide the nature of services as stated above to the First Party under this Agreement. The Second Party has also represented that she possesses the professional capabilities to perform the above functions and such other functions as may be assigned to her under this agreement by the First Party from time to time. ***** Nature and Description of Engagement for services

1. Tenure: The contract will be valid for a period of two years and will take effect from 14th Feb 2013. The contract would automatically come to an end on the expiry of the two year period from 14th Feb 2013 unless specifically extended. *****

8. Termination of Contract: Any misconduct negligence / dereliction of duty on your part of the engages during the contract period shall lead to the termination of the contract. The contract could be terminated by either side by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof without assigning any reason.”

31. The period of two years envisaged in the contract dated 5 April 2013 expired in or around April 2015. Prior thereto, on 16 February 2015, the Prasar Bharti extended the contract of the respondent till 30 June 2015 on the same terms and conditions.

32. Mr. Rajeev Sharma submits that, thereafter, there was a Performance Appraisal Committee (PAC) set up in the Prasar Bharti to examine the performance of various contract employees and suggest rationalisation of their work.

33. Suggestions were advanced by the PAC in respect of all the contract employees. In respect of the respondent Srishti Shanker, it was suggested that she could be continued, but at a reduced remuneration of ₹ 95,000/-.

34. Following the said decision, on 20 August 2015, the Prasar Bharti offered continuation of the respondent’s service, but as Output Editor on a remuneration of ₹ 99,750/- per month with effect from 1 August 2015.

35. Thus, it is clear that there was no mid-term reduction of the respondent’s remuneration and that it was after the expiry of her extended period of contract on 30 June 2015 that the respondent was offered a fresh contract for two years with effect from 1 August 2015 as Output Editor, but on a reduced remuneration of ₹ 99,750/- in terms of the recommendations of the PAC.

36. The respondent chose to challenge the aforesaid communication dated 20 August 2015 before the Tribunal by way of OA 3165/2015 which, too, stands allowed by the impugned judgment. Unfortunately, the Tribunal has not dealt with the merits of the individual OAs.

37. The respondent’s OA has also been allowed on the basis of paras 31 to 33 of the impugned judgment, which already stand reproduced supra.

38. To our mind, the finding of the Tribunal cannot sustain either in law or on facts.

39. This is not even a case, unlike the case of Gunjan Varshney, where the respondent’s contract was curtailed mid-term. She was initially appointed on contract for two years as Output Editor at a remuneration of ₹ 1,35,000/- per month. That contract, on the same terms, was extended, on 16 February 2015, till 30 June 2015. The Prasar Bharti did not in any way interfere with the terms of either of these contracts. It was after the term of the second contract had come to an end that the respondent was offered a fresh contractual employment as Output Editor at a monthly remuneration of ₹ 99,750.

40. It was for the respondent, if she so choose, to accept or refuse the said offer. No occasion, however, arose for the respondent to challenge the offer before a Court.

41. It goes without saying that the Tribunal could not foist, on Prasar Bharti, the terms of the contract on which it chose to engage its employees.

42. The reasoning of the Tribunal, as contained in paras 31 to 33 of the impugned judgment, reproduced supra, does not even address this aspect. The factors noted in the said paragraphs are of no relevance, whatsoever, in examining the validity of the offer dated 20 August 2015 which was extended to Ms. Srishti Shanker, for engaging her as Output Editor at the rate of ₹ 99,750.

43. As a result, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was in error in allowing the OA of Srishti Shanker and setting aside the order dated 20 August 2015.

44. Resultantly, the impugned judgment, in so far as it allows OA 3165/2015, is quashed and set aside.

45. The OA itself would stand dismissed.

46. Applying the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit, however, we direct that no recovery should be made from the respondent on the basis of the present judgment.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

VINOD KUMAR, J. JULY 21, 2026/yg/dsn