Alka Pahuja v. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee

15. On the selection of the Principal, it is submitted that the Petitioner was the senior-most eligible candidate and had served as Vice Principal of the School. It is contended that Ms. Thapar did not fulfil the prescribed eligibility requirements for promotion and that the DPC ought not to have proceeded when the DoE nominees had advised deferment for verification of the ACRs. Reliance is placed upon the Office Memorandum dated 8th February, 2002, as well as the order dated 6th September, 2016 passed by the DoE declining to accept the selection and advising the School to convene a fresh DPC. Further, the said order was not brought to the notice of this Court when W.P.(C) 3235/2016 was decided on 8th September, 2016. The past disputes between the Petitioner and the Management, including the complaint made by her against the then Chairman of the School, are relied upon to contend that her supersession was actuated by mala fides.

16. Counsel for the School and the DSGMC submit that the School is a minority educational institution established and administered by members of the Sikh community and has rightly been granted minority status by the NCMEI. The subsequent takeover of the management of the School by the DSGMC did not alter its minority character, but merely ensured continuity of its administration by members of the same minority community. Reliance is placed upon Article 30 of the Constitution to contend that minority educational institutions are entitled to establish and administer institutions of their choice. The Petitioner, having no legal right affected by the declaration of minority status, lacked locus to challenge the order of the NCMEI and was rightly denied impleadment before the Commission.

17. On the appointment of the Principal, it is submitted that the post is a selection post and not one governed solely by seniority. Seniority merely confers eligibility for consideration and does not create an enforceable right to promotion. It is contended that the DPC was duly constituted in accordance with Rule 96 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 [“DSE Rules”] and that the DoE nominees participated in the proceedings only in an advisory capacity, without possessing any veto over the decision of the Selection Committee. It is further submitted that, being an aided minority educational institution, the School was not required to obtain DoE’s prior approval under Rule 98 of the DSE Rules before appointing its Principal. The recommendation of the DPC having been approved by the Managing Committee by majority, the appointment of Ms. Thapar stood concluded. It is further contended that Ms. Thapar was selected on account of her merit, administrative experience and suitability to head a minority educational institution, and not merely because she belonged to the Sikh community. The allegations of mala fides and victimisation are denied.

18. On behalf of the DoE, it is submitted that the communication dated 1st August, 2017, which approved the promotion of Ms. Thapar, was issued in compliance with this Court’s order dated 8th September, 2016. Further, upon issuance of that communication, the earlier order dated 6th September, 2016 no longer survived and stood superseded, with the result that no independent relief could be founded upon that order thereafter. Issues for Determination

19. The following issues arise for determination: a. Whether any ground is made out for interference with the order dated 29th May, 2013, passed by the NCMEI, declaring the School to be a minority educational institution. b. Whether the DPC proceedings held on 5th March, 2016 and the appointment of Ms. Thapar as Principal are liable to be interfered with on the ground that the selection was contrary to the applicable statutory framework, or was otherwise arbitrary, unfair or vitiated by mala fides. c. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to enforcement of the DoE’s order dated 6th September, 2016, or to quashing of the subsequent communication dated 1st August, 2017. Analysis Minority Status of the School

20. Before examining the challenge on merits, it is necessary to consider whether the Petitioner ought to have pursued a remedy under the NCMEI Act. Section 11(f) of the Act vests NCMEI with the power to decide all questions relating to the minority status of an educational institution and to declare such status. Sections 12A and 12B provide appeals to NCMEI against specified orders passed by the competent authority, i.e., refusal of a no objection certificate and rejection of an application for grant of minority status. Neither provision, however, creates an appeal against an order by which NCMEI itself has granted minority status. The NCMEI Act also does not confer upon NCMEI a general power to review its final determination.

21. Section 12C of the NCMEI Act empowers the Commission to cancel minority status granted either by an authority or by NCMEI. That power is attracted where the constitution, aims and objects of the institution have subsequently been altered so as to efface its minority character, or where the institution has failed to admit students belonging to the minority community in the prescribed proportion. The Petitioner’s challenge rests on a different foundation. Her case is that the School was not established by the Sikh minority and was, therefore, ineligible to be declared a minority educational institution at its inception. Such a challenge is not founded on either of the circumstances contemplated by Section 12C. This position also finds support in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Harshpal Singh Negi v. St Marys School Safdarjung Enclave & Ors.1.

22. Section 12F of the NCMEI Act, while excluding the jurisdiction of other courts in respect of orders passed under Chapter IV thereof, expressly preserves the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Viewed in the context of the statutory scheme discussed above, the present petition cannot be declined on the ground that an appellate or other equally efficacious statutory remedy was available to the Petitioner. The order passed by the NCMEI is amenable to judicial review.

23. The scope of such review must, nevertheless, remain within settled limits. This Court does not sit in appeal over NCMEI’s determination or undertake a fresh adjudication of the minority character of the institution. Interference would be warranted only where NCMEI has acted without jurisdiction, disregarded material bearing upon the statutory requirements, proceeded upon an erroneous understanding of law, violated the requirements of procedural fairness, or reached a conclusion unsupported by the record.

24. The application before NCMEI was instituted on behalf of the School by the DSGMC on the assertion that the institution had been established and was being administered by members of the Sikh community. In support of that claim, affidavits of the Chairman of the School and another office bearer were placed on record.

NCMEI also verified the original certificate of affiliation issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education and the LPA 49/2025, decided on 22nd January, 2025. certificate of registration of the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Upon noting that the record so produced remained unrebutted, NCMEI, vide order dated 29th May, 2013, declared the School to be a minority educational institution within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the NCMEI Act.

25. The record placed before this Court provides a fuller context and supports the conclusion reached by NCMEI. This is not a case where an institution of unrelated or indeterminate origin was subsequently taken over by a minority body. The School established in Delhi traces its lineage to the Khalsa School at Sukho, in the erstwhile Rawalpindi District. The School magazine records that, following Partition, former members and persons closely associated with that institution met in Delhi in 1955-56 and resolved to revive it under the name “Sukho Khalsa School”. The choice of that name was deliberate and preserved its association with the earlier Khalsa institution. The School was recognised and admitted to grant-in-aid with effect from 1st May, 1956.

26. The record further shows that, when the School encountered serious financial constraints, its management approached the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. By a resolution dated 17th December, 1962, the Committee assumed management of the School and responsibility for its expenditure. The transfer of management did not impart a new or unrelated character to the institution. Rather, the administration of an existing Sikh educational institution passed to another body representing the same community.

27. Article 30(1) of the Constitution protects the right of a religious or linguistic minority to “establish and administer educational institutions of their choice”. The constitutional inquiry is one of substance. The Court must ascertain whether the institution owes its establishment to the minority community and continues to be administered by that community. Article 30(1) does not make the perpetual continuance of the original managing society, in the same juridical form, an indispensable condition for retaining minority character. A change in the agency through which the community administers the institution does not, by itself, efface its origin or institutional identity.

28. Nor do the receipt of governmental aid or the admission of students belonging to other communities detract from that character. Receipt of aid subjects the institution to permissible regulatory measures concerning educational standards, qualifications, service conditions and the proper utilisation of public funds. It does not divest the minority community of its constitutional right to administer the institution.[2] Equally, the certificate issued by the NCMEI does not create minority status from the date of its issuance; it merely recognises a status which inheres in the establishment and administration of the institution. The declaration is only a recognition of an existing factual and legal position, which necessarily existed antecedent to such declaration.[3]

29. The objection founded upon the earlier application filed by DSGMC in 2008 also does not persuade this Court to interfere. The earlier proceedings had been adjourned sine die in view of the pendency of connected proceedings before this Court. NCMEI, later, noted that the earlier petition, registered as Case No. 874/2008, was not in the format prescribed by it, whereas the subsequent petition, registered as Case NO. 2008/2011, was in the prescribed format. The earlier proceedings did not See: Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 386. See also: N. Ammad v. Manager, Emjay High School & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 674. culminate in any final adjudication on the School’s claim for minority status.

NCMEI expressly directed that the record of Case No. 874/2008 be tagged with the record of the later proceedings. The subsequent consideration was, therefore, neither a review of a concluded adjudication nor an attempt to reopen an issue that had attained finality.

30. The rejection of the Petitioner’s application for impleadment likewise calls for no interference. The Petitioner’s interest arose from the possible effect of the declaration of minority status upon her service and promotional claims. That interest, though sufficient to explain her concern, did not make her a necessary party to the adjudication of the constitutional character of the institution. The question before NCMEI could be effectively determined between the School and the concerned governmental authority. In any event, the Petitioner has been heard at length in the present proceedings, and the record relied upon by her has been duly considered. No prejudice, therefore, survives on account of her non-impleadment before NCMEI.

31. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 29th May, 2013 passed by NCMEI does not disclose any jurisdictional error, perversity or failure to consider a material circumstance warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Selection and Appointment of the Principal

32. The Recruitment Rules governing the post of Principal unequivocally classify it as a “selection” post. While promotion is prescribed as the primary mode of appointment, with direct recruitment contemplated only in its absence, the feeder cadre comprises Vice Principals and PGTs possessing the requisite qualifications and experience. The identification of a feeder cadre merely delineates the pool from which eligible candidates may be considered; it does not dilute the character of the post as one to be filled on the basis of selection, nor does it render seniority the determinative criterion.

33. Seniority entitled the Petitioner to be considered for promotion; it did not vest her with a right to appointment. In a selection post, the appointing authority is entitled to assess the comparative merit and suitability of the eligible candidates. Factors such as administrative competence, leadership qualities, institutional vision and the ability to advance the educational objectives of the School constitute legitimate and relevant considerations in determining the most suitable candidate to occupy the position of Principal.

34. As explained by the Supreme Court in Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose & Ors.4, the freedom of a minority educational institution to choose the person to be appointed as its Principal has always been recognised as a vital facet of its right to administer the institution. While the State may prescribe the qualifications and conditions of service for the post, and regulate service conditions to ensure educational standards and prevent maladministration, it cannot interfere with the management’s choice of the person to head the institution, so long as the prescribed qualifications are satisfied.

35. This autonomy is, however, not inconsistent with the requirement of fairness in the selection process. In Ivy C. da Conceicao v. State of Goa[5], the Supreme Court held that while a minority educational institution is free to select and appoint a Principal without being bound by seniority alone, its exercise of choice must be fair, non-discriminatory and rational. The power of judicial review extends to examining whether the appointment has been made fairly and reasonably, and whether an eligible candidate has been denied a fair procedure.

36. Thus, comparative assessment for the post of Principal is not a mechanical exercise. Administrative ability, leadership, discipline, institutional vision and suitability to further the School’s educational character cannot be reduced to arithmetical measurement. The Selection Committee must, therefore, enjoy a legitimate area of evaluative judgment. That discretion, however, must be structured by relevant record, criteria rationally connected with the office, and fair consideration of every eligible candidate. Judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the legality of the procedure, the relevance of the considerations taken into account, the existence of record supporting the decision, and the absence of arbitrariness, discrimination or mala fides. It does not extend to re-weighing the comparative merit of competing candidates.

37. Tested on these principles, the selection cannot be invalidated merely because the Petitioner was senior to Ms. Thapar. Seniority entitled the Petitioner to fair consideration; it did not entitle her to appointment as of right. The record shows that she fell within the zone of consideration, was called before the Selection Committee when the endorsement in the seniority list became contentious, and was afforded an opportunity to record her objection. The dispute regarding the incomplete ACRs, together with the rival explanations advanced by the Petitioner and the Management, was also noted in the proceedings.

38. The DoE nominees considered verification of those facts necessary and advised deferment of the meeting. Their advice deserved due consideration, particularly because responsibility for the incomplete ACRs was disputed, but it was not binding upon the Management. Rule 96(3A) of the DSE Rules provides that the Director’s nominees in the Selection Committee of an aided minority school act only as “advisers” and neither possess the power to vote nor actually control the selection. Rule 96(3B) further permits the Managing Committee to nominate additional members to the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee was, therefore, not precluded from proceeding merely because the DoE nominees favoured deferment.

39. The proceedings do not show that the Petitioner was declared ineligible or excluded from consideration because of the controversy surrounding the incomplete ACRs. The Selection Committee considered all eligible candidates and recorded reasons for preferring Ms. Thapar, including her administrative experience, handling of discipline and school affairs, service record, academic record and overall suitability to lead the institution.

40. Some of the reasons recorded by the Selection Committee, viewed in isolation, may carry limited comparative value. Ms. Thapar’s belonging to the Sikh community could not distinguish her from the Petitioner, who also belongs to that community. Nor would broad observations regarding academic record or compatibility with the institution, without supporting material, suffice by themselves. The minutes of the DPC meeting dated 5th March, 2026, however, show that the seniority list, ACRs, work and conduct reports, academic records, performance and track record of all eligible candidates were placed before the Selection Committee. The Committee regarded Ms. Thapar’s administrative experience and her handling of school affairs and discipline as particularly relevant to the office of Principal. These were germane considerations. Since the Recruitment Rules prescribe no marks, comparative chart or fixed criteria for assessing suitability, the absence of such tabulation does not, by itself, render the selection arbitrary.

41. The Court cannot determine whether the Petitioner’s seniority, experience or academic record deserved greater weight than the considerations which commended Ms. Thapar to the Selection Committee; that would amount to undertaking the selection afresh. Judicial review is confined to examining whether the decision rested on relevant record, followed a fair procedure, and was free from illegality, irrationality, discrimination or mala fides.

42. The Office Memorandum dated 8th February, 2002, relied upon by the Petitioner and in the DoE’s order dated 6th September, 2016, does not alter this position. It cannot be construed as eliminating the element of comparative assessment or as making seniority alone determinative of appointment to every selection post. Even if applicable to the School, it cannot override the Recruitment Rules, Rule 96 of the DSE Rules governing aided minority schools, or the protection afforded by Article 30(1) of the Constitution in relation to the choice of the Head of the institution.

43. The Petitioner has also relied upon her earlier disputes with the Management, the complaint made against the then Chairman of the School, and the disciplinary proceedings, to contend that the impugned selection was actuated by mala fides. These circumstances warranted careful scrutiny, but do not, by themselves, vitiate the selection. Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent and specific material. The decision was taken by a Selection Committee comprising several members, and the allegations concerning the former Chairman or earlier decisions of the Management do not establish that those who supported the recommendation of Ms. Thapar acted in concert for an extraneous purpose. A history of strained relations cannot substitute proof that the impugned decision was taken for a collateral or oblique purpose.

44. On the overall record, the Petitioner received fair consideration. Her candidature was not ignored, nor was she excluded because of the controversy regarding the incomplete ACRs. The Selection Committee preferred another eligible candidate on considerations relevant to the office of Principal. The Petitioner has failed to establish that the selection was a pretence, rested on demonstrably irrelevant or false considerations, or was otherwise arbitrary, discriminatory or vitiated by mala fides. No ground is, therefore, made out to interfere with the impugned selection. Validity and Effect of the Orders passed by the DoE

45. The order dated 6th September, 2016 proceeded on two principal assumptions: first, that the senior-most eligible candidate could not be superseded; and secondly, that the objection raised by the DoE nominees entitled it to withhold acceptance of the selection. Neither assumption accords with the applicable legal position.

46. The second proviso to Rule 98(2) of the DSE Rules excludes an aided minority school from the requirement of obtaining the Director’s approval for an appointment. Read together with Rule 96(3A), these provisions make it clear that the Director’s nominees act only in an advisory capacity and neither possess the power to vote nor actually control the selection. The Director cannot, therefore, exercise a veto over the Selection Committee’s assessment of the comparative suitability of eligible candidates.

47. The communication dated 1st August, 2017 represents the final decision of the DoE in relation to the selection. By that communication, the DoE approved the appointment of Ms. Thapar and permitted the consequential fixation of her pay. The earlier order dated 6th September, 2016 consequently stood superseded and ceased to have operative effect. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforce an administrative decision which has itself been withdrawn or superseded by the competent authority upon reconsideration of the governing legal position.

48. The order dated 11th November, 2016, passed by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA 557/2016, does not lead to a different conclusion. It neither set aside the order dated 8th September, 2016 passed in W.P.(C) 3235/2016 nor suspended its operation inter se the School and the DoE. It merely left it open to the Petitioner to work out the appropriate remedy available under law for redressal of her grievance and directed that any such proceedings be considered and decided without being influenced by any of the findings recorded or observations made in the order dated 8th September,

2016. That exercise has now been undertaken in the present proceedings.

49. The Petitioner’s contention that the order dated 6th September, 2016 was not brought to the notice of this Court when W.P.(C) 3235/2016 was decided on 8th September, 2016 likewise does not warrant further examination in these proceedings. The legality of the selection has been independently examined on the entire record before this Court, including the order dated 6th September, 2016, the proceedings of the DPC, and the Petitioner’s objections. Conclusion

50. For the reasons recorded above, no ground is made out to interfere with the order dated 29th May, 2013 passed by the NCMEI, the proceedings of the Selection Committee held on 5th March, 2016 and the consequential appointment of Ms. Thapar as Principal, or with the communication dated 1st August, 2017 issued by the DoE.

51. Consequently, W.P.(C) 5885/2013, W.P.(C) 465/2017 and W.P.(C) 8091/2017 are dismissed. Any pending applications also stand disposed of.

SANJEEV NARULA, J JULY 22, 2026