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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 10307/2026, CM APPLs. 47632/2026 & 47633/2026
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Akash Vajpai, CGSC
Through: Mr. Sourabh Ahuja and Mr. Keshav Singh, Advs.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
27.07.2026 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. The respondent was an accused in FIR 327/15 registered at PS Kharkhoda, District Sonipat, Haryana, under Sections 27/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959 read with Sections 302 and 306 of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was thereafter subjected to disciplinary proceedings following a chargesheet dated 9 September 2016 issued under the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980[1]. The disciplinary proceedings culminated in imposition, on the respondent, of the punishment of forfeiture of five years’ approved service with appropriate reduction in pay.
2. In the interregnum, following the registration of the FIR, criminal proceedings ensued, in which, by order dated 8 September 2022, the respondent was acquitted by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge[2], Sonipat.
3. The respondent, thereupon, addressed a representation to the petitioner, requesting that, as he stood acquitted in the criminal proceedings, the disciplinary proceedings against him be dropped. He invoked Rule 123 of the DPPAR.
4. The representation was rejected by the petitioners by order dated 30 September 2024, aggrieved by which the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal[4] by way of OA 4446/2024.
5. The Tribunal, by order dated 30 September 2024, has observed that the rejection of the respondent’s representation was not in the light of Rule 12 of the DPPAR read with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of UP[5] and the Full Bench of the Tribunal in Sukhdev Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi[6] and directed a fresh consideration of the case of the respondent in the light of Rule 12 of the DPPAR. “DPPAR”, hereinafter “the learned ADSJ” hereinafter
12. Action following judicial acquittal. – When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not unless – (a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or (b) in the opinion of the court, or on the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case disclose facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or (e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available. “the Tribunal”, hereinafter 1970 AIR 1302
6. This direction resulted in the passing of an order dated 29 May 2025, whereby the representation of the respondent was rejected and the punishment earlier awarded to him was reiterated.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent re-approached the Tribunal by way of OA 2767/2025. The Tribunal has, by judgment dated 24 March 2026, allowed the said OA.
8. The Union of India and the Delhi Police are before us in the present writ petition challenging the judgment dated 24 March 2026 passed by the Tribunal.
9. We have heard Mr. Akash Vajpai, learned CGSC for the petitioners and Mr. Saurav Ahuja, learned Counsel for the respondent.
10. As we have had occasion to observe in earlier decisions including Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Satyapal Singh Yadav[7], Rule 12 of the DPPAR prescribes a different paradigm, with respect to sustainability of disciplinary proceedings against officials of the Delhi Police, as distinct from other Government servants. There is an absolute prohibition, in Rule 12 of the DPPAR, on disciplinary proceedings against a Delhi Police officer who stands acquitted on the same charges in criminal proceedings, save and except in cases which fall within one of the enumerated clauses in the said Rule.
11. Mr. Vajpai seeks to pigeonhole the case of the petitioners in the 2025 SCC OnLine Del 452 present instance in clause (c) of Rule 12. He submits that, in so far as the charge of kidnapping is concerned, though no charge was framed against the respondent in that regard, the observations of the learned ADSJ as contained in paragraph 21 would satisfy the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 12. Para 21 of the judgment of the learned ADSJ read thus:
21. On 10.07.2015, Kuldeep, Chhota and one more person from Sonepat (name not known) came drunk in a Car at the shop of Ramphal since deceased as they were having some money transaction with the deceased. They kidnapped Ramphal (since deceased) in their Car to Jharoth village at the residence of Jai Bhagwan where they abused, assaulted the deceased and also teared his clothes due to which he felt humiliated but no complaint to this. Effect was moved at that point of time. He was saved by the intervention of a person who happened to be the neighbourer of accused named Jagminder. This incident was the seed of conspiracy on the basis of which mortgage deed was got effected from the deceased. Due to the aforesaid humiliation that deceased faced on l0.07.2015,'his brother since deceased decided that he would return the money to the accused Kuldeep as Kuldeep was associated with accused Chhota who happens to be quite notorious and involved in many criminal cases so he wanted to stay away from. any kind of·. problem and thus. ultimately decided to mortgage his land.
12. Having heard Mr. Bajpai and perused the record, we find ourselves unable to accept this submission.
13. Clause (c) of Rule 12 envisages a judgment by a Criminal Court to the effect that the offence was actually committed and suspicion rested upon the police officer concerned. There is no such finding by the Criminal Court, in so far as the allegation of kidnapping is concerned. In fact, no charge to that effect was even raised against the respondent. The observations in paragraph 14, therefore, cannot satisfy the requirement of a judgment that an offence of kidnapping had actually been committed by the respondent in which he was a justified suspect.
14. In far as the allegation under Section 306 of the IPC is concerned, the learned ASJ has specifically held that there was no evidence to bring the said charge home to the respondent.
15. That being so, we find no cause to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the case does not fall within one of the exceptions envisaged in clauses (a) to (e) of Rule 12 of the DPPAR. No occasion, therefore, arises for us to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, which is affirmed in its entirety.
16. The writ petition stands dismissed in limine with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. JULY 27, 2026