Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 24.07.2026
46676/2022 (Delay of 75 days in filing the rejoinder), CM
RAJESH KUMAR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sahil Monga, Mr. Nitin Kumar, Ms. Rudrakshi Gautam and Mr. Vipul, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Vivek B. Saharya, Mr. Nishant and Mr. Mohd. Ameer, Advocates.
JUDGMENT
1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958[1], seeks to assail the Order dated 06.07.2020[2] passed by the learned ACJ-cum-ARC (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi[3] in an Eviction petition, being E-78036/2016, titled “Sh. Jagesh & Others v. Sh. Rajesh Kumar”, with respect to the tenanted premises bearing Municipal No. 1013, Ward No. 3, Katra Ghee, Tilak Bazar, Phatak Hafiz Khan, New Delhi[4]. DRC Act Impugned Order learned ARC subject premises SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner restricts the challenge to the Impugned Order on two grounds viz., firstly, that the Respondents 1, 2 and 4 were not the landlords of the subject premises and therefore could not have instituted the eviction proceedings against the Petitioner and secondly, that certain subsequent events, namely, the sale of two residential properties, in 2012 and 2014 respectively, prior to the institution of the eviction proceedings and the acquisition of another residential property during the pendency of the proceedings in 2017, demolish the Respondents’ plea of bona fide requirement.
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, elaborating the aforesaid first limb, contends that the relationship of landlord and tenant, if any, existed only between the husband of Respondent No.3, namely, Mr. Suresh Kumar, and the Petitioner and consequently with Respondent No.3, being the legal representative of Mr. Suresh, and not with Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4.
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Sale deed, in respect of the subject premises, relied upon by the Respondents reflects only the name of one Mr. Suresh Kumar and does not establish any title in favour of Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4.
5. It is further submitted that Respondent No.3 did not step into the witness box to establish the alleged ownership of Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4, nor was any Power of Attorney executed by her in favour of the witnesses who deposed on behalf of the Respondents. It is, therefore, contended that the Respondents failed to establish either their ownership or their status as landlords.
6. Further, on the second limb of the challenge, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that two residential properties situated in the vicinity of the tenanted premises were sold by the Respondents shortly before the institution of the eviction petition, while another residential property came to be acquired during the pendency of the proceedings.
7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, accordingly contends that these subsequent events demonstrate that the Respondents had sufficient alternate accommodation and that the plea of bona fide requirement no longer survives.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents supports the Impugned Order. He submits that the learned ARC has exhaustively considered the question of ownership and landlord-tenant relationship and has rightly held that, for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord is only required to establish a title better than that of the tenant.
9. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel places reliance upon the judicial precedents referred to by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order itself. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order is reproduced in Paragraph 22 herein below.
10. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submits that, insofar as the plea with respect to alleged subsequent events regrading the sale and purchase of properties is concerned, the same neither formed part of the leave to defend Application filed by the Petitioner nor constitutes such exceptional circumstances as would warrant interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
11. Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that, in any event, the said properties were neither suitable nor sufficient to dislodge the Respondents’ bona fide requirement. ANALYSIS:
12. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material available on record.
13. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
14. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh[6], and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[7], has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
15. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover[9].
16. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
2024:DHC:9322 2025:DHC:11285 therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:
17. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.
19. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
20. Adverting now to the first limb of the challenge, this Court finds no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned ARC. The learned ARC has considered the relevant sale deed, the partition deed and the documents placed on record while arriving at the conclusion that the Respondents had established a title superior to that of the Petitioner.
21. The learned ARC has also recorded that the relationship of Respondent No.3 with the remaining Respondents was never specifically disputed by the Petitioner.
22. At this juncture, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Order, being Paragraph Nos. 16 to 20. The same read as under:
19. Regarding the contention of the respondent that the present petition is bad for mis-joinder of necessary party, as a single petition cannot be filed by the petitioner jointly claiming to be owner of different portions, it is well settled proposition of law that even a co-owner can demand eviction of the tenanted premises. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment in case titled as M/s. India Umberella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. Vs. Bhagabandel Agarwalla (dead) by LRs & Ors., AIR 2004 Supreme Court 1321, decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it was held that “one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principal is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed inspite of their disagreement.” In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court specifically on the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the judgment filed on behalf of the respondent, which is on mis-joinder of necessary or proper parties under Specific Relief Act does not hold water.
20. Further, in the instant case, the co-owners have filed the present petition for eviction and there is no impediment to the same as the 'tenanted premises' is a single unit, being under tenancy of a single tenant. With this background, the ownership of petitioners over the 'tenanted premises' as well as existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioners and the respondent stands established.
23. A perusal of the aforesaid discussion leaves little room for doubt that the learned ARC has undertaken a detailed examination of the issue of ownership as well as the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. The findings recorded are founded upon the material placed on record, the admissions made by the Petitioner and the settled legal position that, for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord is only required to establish a title superior to that of the tenant.
24. This Court finds no jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity in the said findings warranting interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
25. The second limb of the challenge pertains to the alleged sale of two residential properties in the years 2012 and 2014 and the subsequent acquisition of another residential property in 2017 during the pendency of the proceedings.
26. This Court takes note of the fact that, admittedly, none of these aspects formed part of the leave to defend Application before the learned ARC. Equally, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the Petitioner as to why these facts could not have been brought to the notice of the learned ARC at the appropriate stage.
27. Even otherwise, the suitability and relevance of the said properties raise disputed questions of fact which cannot be examined for the first time in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
28. While this Court is conscious of the fact that, in an appropriate case, it may take note of subsequent events where they have a direct and material bearing on the relief sought, however such jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly.
29. In the facts of the present case, the alleged subsequent events neither formed part of the leave to defend Application before the learned ARC nor are they of such an exceptional character as would justify reopening the findings recorded by the learned ARC.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, illegality or material irregularity in the Impugned Order warranting interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
31. Accordingly, the present Revision Petition is devoid of merit and is, therefore, dismissed.
32. The present Revision Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. JULY 24, 2026/lp/DJ