Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
1. DIWAKAR PANDEY S/o Late Shri Nageshwar Prasad Pandey, R/o 172, Patparganj Village, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, New Delhi-110091.....Appellant No.1
2. ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA S/o Late Shri Gopal Ji Mishra 36 Block Shani Mandir, Main Road, Trilok Puri, East Delhi110091...Appellant No.2 Through: Mr Rohit Priya Ranjan, Advocate (DHCLSC), Mr. Gaurav Agrawal and Ms. Aayushi, Advocates.
VERSUS
SHREE ADYA KATYAYANI SHAKTIPEETH MANDIR TRUST Cchattarpur, New Delhi-110074.....Respondent Through: Mr. Mritunjay Kr. Singh, Mr. Saikat Khatua, Mr. Mukesh Singh Rawat & Mr. Ayush Mahajan, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
JUDGMENT
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. The present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟), has been filed on behalf of the Appellants assailing the impugned Judgment and decree dated 30.04.2024, whereby their Application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was dismissed and consequently, the Suit filed by them seeking Declaration, Recovery of arrears of salary and Damages, was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, as being barred by limitation.
2. The Appellants/Plaintiffs had instituted Civil Suit bearing CS DJ No.132/2020 seeking Declaration, Recovery of arrears of salary and Damages.
3. The facts in brief, are that the Plaintiffs were the Pujaris/Archaks of Adya Katyayani Shakti Peeth Mandir famously known as Chhatarpur Mandir. Appellant No.1 joined the services of the Mandir in the year 1990 at an initial wage of Rs.150/- per month, while Appellant No.2 joined in the year 1993 at an initial wage of Rs.350/- per month. They performed their duties diligently and devoted themselves to the service and betterment of the Mandir.
4. The Defendant is a Trust created in the year 1980, to manage the affairs of the Adya Katyayani Shakti Peeth Mandir and also oversee its dayto-day functioning. The Plaintiffs, in their capacity as Pujaris, were governed by strict terms of service, whereby they were prohibited from performing private puja archana or havan, at the residences of devotees. They were also not permitted to accept dakshina from the devotees and had no source of income other than the wages paid by the Defendant.
5. The Plaintiffs and the other Pujaris approached the Defendant on several occasions and brought their grievances to its notice; however, the Defendant maintained a callous attitude towards their concerns.
6. In the year 1997, the Plaintiffs, along with the other Pujaris and Karamcharis, formed an Association by the name of the Adya Katyayani Shakti Peeth Mandir Employees Welfare Association. The Association raised demands relating to service benefits, including minimum wages, insurance and loan facilities, leave rules and liberty to perform Puja outside the Mandir, through a Demand Letter dated 03.10.1997. However, the demands raised by the Association were rejected outrightly.
7. In the meanwhile, the Defendant Trust introduced a Sevadar Form and directed the Plaintiffs and the other Pujaris and Karamcharis, employed with the Trust, to fill the same. The Form prescribed new conditions of service, and stipulated that the Pujaris and Karamcharis were rendering voluntary service to the Temple, and that the Temple Trust would have the sole discretion to remove any Sevak from service in case of any abnormality in his conduct.
8. The Plaintiffs opposed the introduction of the Sevadar Form on the ground that their livelihood was dependent upon their employment with the Mandir and that if compelled to sign the Form, they would lose their livelihood and be constrained to lead a meagre life.
9. The Plaintiffs further asserted that, as an act of vengeance for their refusal to sign the Sevadar Form and accept the new service conditions, the Defendant engaged goons and hooligans to pressurise them and the other Pujaris and Karamcharis, to sign the Form. They were beaten up, assaulted and forcibly removed from the Mandir premises by these hired hooligans. The Goondas also entered the house of the Plaintiffs and other employees, assaulted them and obtained their signatures on blank papers. They also extended threats of killing them or abducting them from the Mandir premises and dropping them at different places.
10. A Public Notice dated 03.07.1998, was affixed on the wall of the Mandir, whereby the entry of the Plaintiffs and others, into the Mandir premises was prohibited. Thereafter, by way of a verbal Order dated 04.07.1998, the Mandir Trust illegally and arbitrarily removed 73 Pujaris and workers and discontinued their services.
11. The Plaintiffs had also instituted a Civil Suit for Declaration and Damages against the Defendant, in the year 1997. However, they were induced by the Defendant to withdraw the Suit on the assurance that the dispute would be settled amicably, which was never done. Plaintiff No.2 also made a Complaint, pursuant to which FIR No.828/1998 was registered at Police Station Mehrauli.
12. The Plaintiffs thereafter, filed W.P.(C) No.4390/1998 before this Court, which was disposed of vide Order dated 21.07.2009, with a direction to the Petitioners to submit a representation to the Mandir Trust, within four weeks. The Mandir Trust was directed to decide the representation, within 12 weeks.
13. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Petitioners submitted their representation to the Mandir Trust, which was rejected, vide Reply dated 10.11.2011.
14. The Association thereafter preferred LPA No.586/2014 against the Order dated 21.07.2009 passed in W.P.(C) No.4390/1998, which was dismissed vide Order dated 24.08.2015.
15. Subsequently, the Petitioners filed SLP(C) No.25053/2018 before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide Order dated 07.05.2019, while liberty was granted to the Petitioners and the Welfare Association, to pursue the alternate remedies as available to them in law.
16. The Plaintiffs thereafter, instituted the present Suit on 24.02.2020, seeking reinstatement in their employment, arrears of salary with effect from 04.07.1998 along with interest @ 18% per annum, Damages of Rs.60,00,000/- and litigation expenses of Rs.1,00,000/-.
17. An Application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking exclusion of the time spent in pursuing the proceedings before this Court and the Supreme Court, was also filed.
18. The learned District Judge, in the impugned Order dated 30.04.2024, observed that for claiming exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Plaintiffs were required to establish that the earlier proceedings had been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence, which was found to be wanting in the case of the Plaintiffs.
19. It was held that the Plaintiffs had failed to prosecute the proceedings with due diligence, since there had been delays at various stages and even the SLP had been filed after an unexplained delay of 949 days.
20. The Plaintiffs were, therefore, held not entitled to exclusion of the period spent in the earlier proceedings. Consequently, the Suit was held to be barred by limitation and the Plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, vide the impugned Order dated 30.04.2024.
21. Aggrieved by the impugned Order, the Plaintiffs have preferred the present Regular First Appeal.
22. The grounds of challenge are that the learned District Judge failed to appreciate that the Appellants had pursued their remedies in good faith and with due diligence. They had initially instituted a Civil Suit for Declaration and Damages in the year 1997, which was subsequently withdrawn.
23. Thereafter, on account of the harassment, assault and wrongful confinement suffered by them, FIR No.828/1998 was registered at Police Station Mehrauli against the Defendant.
24. The Appellants subsequently filed W.P.(C) No.4390/1998, which was disposed of vide Order dated 21.07.2009. The Order dated 21.07.2009 was thereafter, challenged by way of LPA No.586/2014, which was dismissed on 24.08.2015. The Appellants subsequently approached the Supreme Court by way of SLP(C) No.25053/2018, which was dismissed vide Order dated 07.05.2019.
25. It is contended that the aforesaid chronology of proceedings, demonstrates that the Appellants had continuously pursued their remedies in good faith and with due diligence, and that the present Civil Suit was thereafter, instituted in the year 2020.
26. It is further contended that while dismissing the SLP, the Supreme Court had expressly permitted the Appellants to pursue the alternate remedies available to them in law. The said direction clearly permitted the Appellants, as on the date of the Order, to avail the appropriate alternate remedy. Therefore, the learned District Judge ought not to have dismissed the Suit as barred by limitation.
27. The learned District Judge, thus, fell in error in dismissing the Application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and consequently rejecting the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, as barred by limitation. Submissions heard and the record perused.
28. The short question which arises for consideration is whether the Appellants are entitled to exclusion of the period spent in pursuing the earlier proceedings, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and consequently, whether the Plaint could have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, as being barred by limitation.
29. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, contemplates exclusion of the period during which the Plaintiff had been prosecuting another civil proceeding, with due diligence and in good faith, against the Defendant, in respect of the same matter in issue, before a Court which was unable to entertain the proceeding, on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of a like nature. The requirements of due diligence and good faith are cumulative and must coexist, for seeking exclusion of time under the said provision.
30. In the present case, the cause of action for seeking reinstatement and arrears of salary arose way back in 1998, when the services of the Plaintiffs were discontinued by the Defendant Trust. The present Suit seeking reinstatement, arrears of salary with effect from 04.07.1998, Damages and other ancillary reliefs, was instituted only on 24.02.2020. The Suit was, therefore, ex facie beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
31. The Appellants seek to contend that the successive proceedings pursued by them demonstrate due diligence and good faith. However, the mere institution of proceedings at different stages cannot, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963; what is required to be established is that the remedy was pursued continuously, bona fide and with due care and attention.
32. In the present case, W.P.(C) No.4390/1998 was disposed of vide Order dated 21.07.2009, pursuant to which the representation made by the Appellants was rejected on 10.11.2011. However, LPA No.586/2014 came to be preferred only in the year 2014. There is no explanation for the intervening period. The aforesaid conduct, therefore, does not reflect the due diligence required for claiming exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
33. Not only this, the absence of due diligence is further evident from the fact that SLP(C) No.25053/2018 was filed after an unexplained delay of 949 days. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the SLP vide Order dated 07.05.2019, specifically noticed the said delay and further found no merit in the Petition. The chronology of proceedings, therefore, instead of establishing continuous and diligent prosecution, reflects prolonged and unexplained intervals at successive stages.
34. The contention of the Appellants that the Supreme Court had granted them liberty to pursue the alternate remedies available in law, is also of no assistance to them. The liberty to pursue the remedies “as are available in law” cannot be construed as extending the period of limitation or reviving a remedy which had already become barred by time. The learned District Judge rightly observed that the cause of action arose way back in 1998, while the Suit has been filed after more than two decades.
35. Furthermore, the Appellants cannot derive any benefit from the earlier round of litigation, as the reliefs sought in the proceedings before this Court and the Supreme Court were different from those claimed in the present Suit. The mere pendency or prosecution of the said proceedings, therefore, cannot justify exclusion of the entire intervening period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly when the Appellants have failed to establish continuous bona fide prosecution with due diligence and good faith.
36. In Narne Rama Murthy v. Ravula Somasundaram, (2005) 6 SCC 614, the Supreme Court observed that where limitation is a pure question of law and the bar is apparent from the pleadings themselves, it is the duty of the Court to decide the question of limitation at the outset, even in the absence of a plea by the Defendant. It is only where limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the Suit does not appear to be barred on the face of the pleadings, that an issue is required to be framed and proved.
37. In the present case, the reliefs of reinstatement and arrears of salary are founded upon the cause of action which arose in the year 1998, when the Plaintiffs, as per their own averments, were removed from their posts of pujaris by the Defendant Trust. The present Suit was instituted only on 24.02.2020 and was, therefore, patently barred by limitation.
38. The Appellants having failed to establish due diligence and good faith in pursuing the earlier proceedings, are not entitled to exclusion of the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
39. The learned District Judge, therefore, rightly dismissed the Application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and rejected the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC as being barred by limitation.
40. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby dismissed.
41. The pending Application(s) is also disposed of.
JUDGE JULY 31, 2026