Navjiwan Cloth House v. Sandeep Bajaj Karta of Inderjeet Bajaj HUF

1. The present Petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958[1] assails the Order dated 28.02.2026[2] passed by the Court of Learned ARC-02 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi[3] in the Eviction Petition, being RC ARC No. 803/2025[4], filed by the Respondent under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25(B) of the DRC Act, titled “Sandeep Bajaj Karta of Inderjeet Bajaj (HUF) v. DRC Act Impugned Order Learned ARC Eviction Petition Navjeewan Cloth House (Prop. Neeraj Kumar Gupta)”.

2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that the principal challenge raised by the Petitioner before the learned ARC was to the alleged bona fide requirement set up by the Respondent for his son, Mr. Vidhur Bajaj.

3. It is submitted that a specific plea had been taken that Mr. Vidhur Bajaj was already independently carrying on business from a timber shop situated at Kirti Nagar, Delhi and, therefore, the pleaded requirement for the tenanted premises was not bona fide.

4. Learned counsel further submits that the aforesaid plea had been specifically raised not only in the leave to defend application but was also reiterated in the rejoinder. However, the learned ARC has failed to advert to or consider the said contention while passing the Impugned Order.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submits that the learned ARC has duly considered the issue of bona fide requirement and has rightly held that Mr. Vidhur Bajaj cannot be expected to remain idle.

6. It is further submitted that the learned ARC has also considered the issue regarding his employment and business activities before arriving at the findings recorded in the Impugned Order.

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material placed on record.

8. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

9. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh[6], and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[7], has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

10. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover[9].

11. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:

2024:DHC:9322 2025:DHC:11285

12. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

13. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.