P.P. Singh v. Akhil Taneja and Ors.

16. It is stated that the suit property has several right-holders, who had inter-se disputes amongst themselves, which had led, inter alia, to the filing of an Execution Petition bearing No. 1001/2018 titled ‘R.P. Gupta v V.R. Group Finance Company’, before the Court of Ms. Ambika Singh, District Judge-01, Saket Court (South District), Delhi, seeking execution of settlement deed dated 04.06.2018 and consent decree dated 05.06.2018.

17. It is stated that the aforesaid ATS-1 bears the imprimatur of the aforesaid Executing Court, and that during the course of the said Execution proceedings, the statements of the defendant nos.[1] to 7 were duly recorded on 21.08.2025, wherein they undertook to remain bound by the terms thereof.

18. The aforesaid ATS-1 provides that the entire process of conveyance, including the execution of the sale deed, payment of consideration, and withdrawal of pending litigations, shall be carried out under the aegis and supervision of the Executing Court through a phased, step-by-step process set out in Clause 5 of the ATS-1.

19. It is further stated that on the strength of ATS-1 defendant no.1 had further entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 25.08.2025 [hereinafter ‘ATS-2’] with the plaintiff to sell the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 21,11,00,000/-. The aforesaid ATS-2 expressly records that the terms and conditions stipulated in the ATS-1 form an integral part thereof, and are binding upon the parties of the ATS-2.

20. It is the case of the plaintiff that after making the payment of a sum of Rs.4,25,00,000/- as part sale consideration for the suit property, he was waiting for the defendants to come forward and execute the Sale Deed in terms of ATS-2. It is further stated that a Demand Draft bearing no. 68757 dated 06.09.2025 to the tune of Rs.2,00,00,000/- which was handed over to defendant no.3, has already been encashed on 04.12.2025.

21. The plaintiff states that on 19.01.2026, during the course of the proceedings before the Executing Court, it was submitted on behalf of defendant no.7, the Decree Holder therein, that a Conveyance Deed in favour of the third party/purchaser would be executed shortly, whereupon, the said execution proceedings would be withdrawn.

22. Immediately upon learning of the aforesaid developments, the plaintiff issued a Public Notice dated 20.01.2026. The plaintiff also addressed a letter dated 20.01.2026 to defendant no. 8/Sub-Registrar, inter alia calling upon defendant no. 8 not to execute any Sale Deed in respect of the Suit Property in favour of any third party.

23. It is in this backdrop that the plaintiff has filed the present suit on 21.01.2026, and sought the following reliefs: “a) To pass a Decree of SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE in respect of the Memorandum of Understanding/ Agreement dated 25.08.2025, in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Nos. 1 to 7 thereby directing the Defendant No.1 to 7 to execute the Sale Deed in respect of suit property i.e. B-7/20, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi-110029 in favour of the Plaintiff and present themselves before the concerned Sub-Registrar, New Delhi / Defendant No.8 for the registration of the Sale Deed and also to hand over the actual physical possession of the said suit property b) To pass a Decree of PERMANENT INJUNCTION in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants, their legal heirs successors legal representatives administrators, executors, nominees and assigns or anybody acting on their behalf, thereby restraining them from transferring selling, alienating, subletting parting with possession or creating any third party interest in respect of whole or any part of the suit property bearing no. B-7 /20 Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi-110029”

24. When the suit was listed for the first time on 23.01.2026, this Court was apprised by the defendants that the sale deed has already been executed with regard to the suit property, in respect of which the plaintiff seeks specific performance of the agreement to sell.

25. In view of the aforesaid development, the plaintiff filed an application bearing IA No. 3594/2026 under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, seeking impleadment of subsequent purchasers of the suit property as defendant nos. 9 to 11; and also filed the instant application seeking leave to amend prayer clause (a) of the plaint, and substituting it with the following: a) To pass a Decree of SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE in respect of the Memorandum of Understanding/ Agreements dated 14.08.2025 and 25.08.2025, in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Nos. 1 to 7 thereby directing the Defendant No.1 to 7 to execute the Sale Deed in respect of suit property i.e. B- 7/20, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi-110029 in favour of the Plaintiff and present themselves before the concerned Sub-Registrar, New Delhi / Defendant No.8 for the registration of the Sale Deed and also to hand over the actual physical possession of the said suit property.

31. Furthermore, through the present application, the plaintiff seeks to incorporate the following reliefs: “b[1]) To pass a Decree of DECLARATION in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants, their legal heirs, successors, legal representatives, administrators, executors, nominees and assignors or anybody acting on their behalf, thereby, declaring the Sale Deed dated 08.01.2026 bearing Registration No. 2026/8/I/229 inBookNo.1, Volume No.4456, Page No.139 to 166 dated13.01.2026, executed before the Sub- No.‟s 2 to 7 in favour of Defendant No.‟s 9 to 11 as null and void; b[2]) To pass a Decree of DECLARATION in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants, their legal heirs, successors, legal representatives, administrators, executors, nominees and assignors or anybody acting on their behalf, thereby, declaring the Sale Deed dated 08.01.2026 bearing Registration No. 2026/8/I/230 in Book No.1, Volume No.4456, Page No.167 to 194 dated13.01.2026, executed before the Sub- No.‟s 2 to 7 in favour of Defendant No.‟s 9 to 11 as null and void; or in the alternative to b[3]) To direct the Defendant No.9 to 11 to execute the Sale Deed in respect of suit property i.e. B-7/20, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi-110029 in favour of the Plaintiff in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement dated 25.08.2025 and present themselves before the concerned Sub- Sale Deed and also to hand over the actual physical possession of the said suit property;”

26. In addition to amending the prayer clause, the plaintiff also seeks to amend the pleadings by, inter alia, inserting paragraph 3(va) into the plaint. The said para is reproduced below: “3(va) Accordingly, Defendant No. 1 assigned his rights in the Agreement to Sell dated 14.08.2025 in favour of the Plaintiff. In fact it was the Plaintiff who facilitated the execution of this agreement since the consideration of Rs. 2 crores was facilitated by him only through his known sources. Defendants 2 to 7 consented to the said assignment and agreed to receive the balance sale consideration also from Plaintiff and thereby execute the final sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff in place of Defendant no. 1, in terms of ATS dated 14.08.2025. Thus, the Plaintiff being the representative in interest of the Defendant No. 1 is entitled to seek specific performance of the Agreement to Sell dated 14.08.2025 from the Defendants No. 2 to 7”

27. Mr. Sandeep Sethi, learned Senior Counsel for defendant nos. 2 to 7, Mr. Pawanjit Singh Bindra, learned Senior Counsel for defendant no. 1 and Mr. Abhimanyu Mahajan, learned counsel for the proposed defendant nos. 9 to 11, during the course of hearing, made an oral prayer contending that the suit is not maintainable and should be rejected at the threshold. The said contention and the submissions of the learned counsels in this regard, shall be dealt with later in the Order.

28. Mr. Sethi also contended that even if the plaintiff’s proposed amendments are taken on demurrer, the suit fails to disclose any cause of action against the original vendors. He submits that there is a complete absence of privity of contract, as defendant nos. 2 to 7 are not parties to theATS-2.

29. Per contra, Mr.Jayant K Mehta and Ms. Vibha Mahajan, learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submit that in case of a conflict between an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and Order 7 Rule 11 CPC (the oral prayer made by the defendants herein), the former must be decided first.

30. Furthermore, they contend that the amendments sought are for the effective and proper adjudication of the case as certain events have cropped up subsequently to the filing of the instant suit which the plaintiff was unaware of.

31. To substantiate the contention of the plaintiff, they place reliance on the decision of this Court in Neera Misra v. Rakesh Chandra Misra, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4882.

32. With regard to the maintainability of the suit, the contentions and the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsels shall be dealt with at a later stage in the instant Order.

33. Having heard the learned counsels of the parties and perusing the material on record, apt would it be to consider the position in law for allowing or rejecting a prayer for amendment of the plaint especially at the threshold stage wherein the defendants contend that the suit itself is not maintainable.

34. Advantageous it would be to delve upon the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with an application for amendment, as were culled out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders &Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons. (2009) 10 SCC 84 after examining various judicial pronouncements, which reads thus: “Factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with applications for amendments

63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.” (emphasis supplied)

35. The law is well settled that the Court must be liberal in granting the prayer for amendment if it is of the view that if such amendment is not allowed, a party who has prayed for such amendment, shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is equally well settled that it is always open to the Court to allow an amendment if it is of the view that allowing of an amendment shall really sub-serve the ultimate cause of justice and avoid further litigation. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited &Anr. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed the following: “71.10 Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed.

71.11 Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issue in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.”

36. Applying the aforesaid legal principles to the factual matrix of the present case, it is evident that the amendment sought by the plaintiff has been necessitated by altered circumstances coming to the fore during pendency of the suit. At the time of institution, the plaintiff's case was confined to seeking specific performance of ATS-2. It was only during the course of the initial hearing that the learned counsels for the defendants apprised the Court that the suit property had already been alienated in favour of the proposed defendant nos. 9 to 11 vide sale deeds dated 08.01. 2026.The plaintiff was admittedly unaware of this transaction at the time of instituting the suit. The proposed amendments including the specific performance of ATS-1, therefore, merely seek to mould the reliefs to address this subsequent development and do not fundamentally alter the nature, character, or the underlying cause of action of the suit, which remains essentially one for specific performance. Refusing this amendment would not only prejudice the plaintiff but would inevitably lead to a multiplicity of proceedings, forcing the plaintiff to file a separate suit to challenge the subsequent conveyance, which is contrary to the very spirit of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

37. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the present suit is at a nascent stage and has not yet been formally registered. Consequently, allowing the amendments at this threshold will not occasion any prejudice to the defendants. Notably, the defendants have failed to point out any specific prejudice that they would suffer if the amendment is allowed; rather, Mr. Sethi chose to premise his arguments predominantly on the basis of demurrer, essentially confining the challenge to the maintainability of the suit at the threshold.

38. Insofar as the insertion of paragraph 3(va) is concerned, a perusal of the proposed pleading reveals that it is manifestly clarificatory in its scope and ambit. The plaintiff, by way of this amendment, merely seeks to elucidate the assignment of rights by defendant No. 1 and the consequent privity established with defendant nos. 2 to 7. Such amplification of facts serves primarily to substantiate the plaintiff's locus standi as a representative-in-interest within the contours of Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is trite law that an amendment which merely adds flesh to the existing pleadings, without displacing the plaintiff's original case or introducing a completely new cause of action, ought to be permitted. The fundamental character of the suit, being one for specific performance, remains wholly unaltered.

39. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman and Anr. V. Mohd. Ruldu and Ors. (2012) 11 SCC 341 wherein the Court observed the following: “17. In Pankaja v. Yellapa[1] this Court held that if the granting of an amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation, the same should be allowed. In the same decision, it was further held that an amendment seeking declaration of title shall not introduce a different relief when the necessary factual basis had already been laid down in the plaint in regard to the title.

18. We reiterate that all amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties should be allowed if it does not change the basic nature of the suit. A change in the nature of relief claimed shall not be considered as a change in the nature of suit and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interests of doing full and complete justice between the parties.”

40. Furthermore, regarding the defendants' oral prayer for rejection of the plaint on grounds of maintainability and lack of privity of contract with the original vendors, this Court finds merit in the plaintiff's submission that an application for amendment must ordinarily be considered before adjudicating upon a plea for rejection of the plaint. Beneficial it would be to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Kumar Mehlawat v. Naresh Gupta 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9645 wherein it was observed that an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC has to be considered first even if filed after an application under Order 7 Rule11 CPC. The relevant portion of the judgment read thus: “4.Though in the memorandum of the petition the thrust of the counsel for the petitioner/defendant is that the application under Order 6 Rule 17 should not have been considered when the arguments on the application under Order 7 Rule 11 had been heard but the counsel for the petitioner/defendant agrees that the settled principle of law is that an application under Order 6 Rule 17even if filed after an application under Order 7 Rule 11 or before the order on the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is pronounced, has to be considered first.”

41. Likewise, this Court in Wasudhir Foundation V. C. Lal &Sons, 1991 SCC OnLine Del 569 observed as follows: “5. This is the righteous path And, if this be so is it not necessary, in the ends of justice, to extend the beneficial legal principles ensconced in Order 6 rule 17 More so, when one hardly discerns anything in Order 7 rule 11 which may lead one to take the view that it takes away the power of the court to allow amendment or places hurdles in performance of its duty? After all what is the effect of Order 7 rule 11? It is, if I understand correctly, that the plaintiff would not be precluded from filing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. If he so desires see Order 7 Rule 13. If such be the effect, why not permit the amendment of the plaint so as to remove the defect and prevent the operation of the Rule? Why make him first invite the rejection of the plaint, then allow him to file a fresh suit at the expense of delay and heavy costs? Why not straightaway allow him to amend the plaint, remove the defect and permit him, thereby, to proceed with the same suit? Why this rigmarole?

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

7. The ouster of Order 6 rule 17 will throttle the very life line of Order 7 rule 11. Instead of promoting, it would defeat the ends of justice. I refuse to be a party to such an approach.

9. Order 6 rule 17 is thus held to be neither restricted nor controlled by Order 7 rule 11.”

42. The merits of the plaintiff's claim, the interplay between ATS-1 and ATS-2, and the issue of privity are matters that require examination at an appropriate stage and cannot be a ground to shut out a bona fide amendment at the pre-trial stage. Adopting a liberal approach as mandated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra), allowing the amendment is imperative to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of the real controversy between all necessary and proper parties.

43. In view of the above IA 5985/2026 is allowed.

44. The amended plaint placed on record, inadvertently does not incorporate the entire amendments allowed to be so incorporated.

45. Let fresh amended plaint be filed by the plaintiff within two weeks. I.A. 3594/2026 (under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking impleadment of proposed defendant nos.9, 10 and 11 as defendants)

46. The present application has been filed seeking impleadment of proposed defendant nos.9, 10 and 11 as defendants.

47. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed.

48. Let amended memo of parties be filed within two weeks.

49. The application stands disposed of. CS (OS) 73/2026

50. The amended plaint having been taken on record and the subsequent purchasers having been impleaded as defendant nos. 9 to 11, the main suit is now taken up for consideration. As the factual matrix of the present controversy has already been adverted to in the preceding paragraphs while disposing of the application for amendment of plaint bearing no. IA 5985/2026, the same is not being repeated herein for the sake of brevity.

51. At the very threshold, before the issuance of formal summons in the suit, Mr. Sethi, appearing on behalf of defendant nos. 2 to 7, raises preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the suit on the following grounds: (i). The plaintiff lacks privity of contract with defendant Nos. 2 to 7, as they are not parties to ATS-2. Consequently, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for specific performance against defendant nos. 2 to[7]. (ii). No agency is created by the agreement-seller/defendant no. 1 in favour of the agreement-purchaser/plaintiff by merely entering into a sub-agreement/ATS-2. (iii). ATS-1 was determinable in nature and did not entitle defendant no. 1 or plaintiff to relief of specific performance under any circumstance. (iv). ATS-1 had expired on 30.10.2025 while ATS-2 had expired on 15.10.2025 in terms of their Clause 10 and Clause 5, respectively. Therefore, no cause of action arose on 19.01.2026 as purported by the plaintiff.

52. To substantiate his contentions, he places reliance on the following judgments:

(i) Dahiben v. ArvindbhaiKalyanjiBhanusali (Gajra) through

LRs (2020) SCC 366.

(ii) Ravinder Singh v. Saresh Chand Punj Alias Suresh Chand

(iii) T.D. Vivek Kumar and Anr. v. Ranbir Chaudhary 2023 SCC

53. Mr. Bindra, who appears for defendant no. 1, submits that the expiration of ATS-1 was on 30.10.2025 while, expiration of ATS-2 was on 15.10.2025. The plaintiff was well aware of the timelines and owing to his failure to make the payments on or before 15.10.2025, defendant no. 1 has suffered losses amounting to Rs. 6,36,00,000/-. He further submits that ATS-2 is only a further sale and there is no assignment or nomination by defendant no. 1 to the plaintiff.

54. Mr. Abhimanyu Mahajan, representing defendant nos. 9 to 11, relies upon the framework of ATS-1 and ATS-2 to contend that there is a complete absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the actual owners. He submits that the plaintiff is merely an agreement holder of an ATS holder, and the execution of ATS-2 does not in any manner create an agency or assign rights under ATS-1.

55. Per contra, Mr. Mehta argues that submissions advanced by defendant nos. 1 to 11 seeking rejection of the plaint are legally untenable and premature at this stage, inasmuch as the same seek to embark on a minitrial at the stage of issuance of summons, which is impermissible in law.

56. He submits that ATS-1 was not determinable and conferred enforceable rights on defendant no. 1 and plaintiff. Clause 15 of ATS-1 specifically employs the phraseology „unavoidable circumstances such as force majeure‟ for non-performance. Further, the very question of determinability of ATS-1 can be decided only after trial.

57. Mr. Mehta submits that plaintiff derives his rights not only under ATS-2 but also as a nominee of defendant no. 1 under Clause 17 of ATS-1. The plaintiff is accordingly the representative-in-interest of defendant No. 1 within the meaning of Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

58. He further argues that defendant nos. 2 to 7 were at all times aware of and acknowledged ATS-2, and that they had received part sale consideration from the plaintiff to the tune of Rs. 4,25,00,000/-, out of which Rs. 2,00,00,000/- stands enchased in the account of defendant no. 3.

59. In response to the submission of Mr. Sethi, with regard to the expiration of both the ATS due to efflux of time, Mr. Mehta contends that time is not the essence of a contract for specific performance of immovable properties. Further, Clause 10 of ATS-1 nowhere provides that ATS-1 had to be performed on or before 30.10.2025.

60. He submits that the parties were in fact continuing to perform the terms of ATS-1 as late as 16.12.2025 and 17.12.2025, when the draft sale deed and draft application for appointment of the Local Commissioner were shared by one Mr. D. Hasija, Advocate, with the counsel for the plaintiff.

61. He further submits that the proposed defendant nos. 9 to 11 are not bona fide purchasers, as they had complete knowledge of the pending execution proceedings before the Ld. ADJ, Saket Court, as well as the fact that defendant no. 1 had entered into an Agreement to Sell with the plaintiff. This is evident from Recital T of the Sale Deeds dated 08.01.2026 executed in their favour.

62. To substantiate his contentions, he places reliance on the following decisions:

(i) Jairaj Developers Through its Partners Mr. Ankur Arora v.

(ii) Om Prakash Bhola v. Brokers & Brokers P. Ltd. & Anr. 2007

63. Ms. Vibha Mahajan contends that no notice of termination was ever received by the plaintiff from any of the defendants, and that the oral contentions now raised by the defendants regarding termination of the ATS are a pure afterthought.

64. Elaborating on her submissions, Ms. Mahajan submits that no intimation of the alleged cancellation of ATS-1, or of the fresh sale deeds dated 08.01.2026 executed in favour of the proposed defendant nos. 9 to 11, was given to the Executing Court, and that the execution proceedings were withdrawn simpliciter on 24.01.2026.

65. She also places reliance on Rita Solomon and Others. v. The Republic of Italy and Another 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8779 to contend that under Order VII Rule 11(a), a plaint can only be rejected if it fails to state a cause of action on its face, and the Court cannot dismiss a suit prematurely just because it believes the claim is factually weak or legally unfounded, as assessing the actual merits is strictly reserved for trial.

66. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the elaborate submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties, and also carefully perused the averments made in the amended plaint, the specific covenants of ATS-1 and ATS-2, and the judicial precedents relied upon by both sides.

67. The short question that falls for consideration at this preliminary stage is whether the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold for want of cause of action and lack of privity of contract, or whether the contentions raised by the defendants are mixed questions of fact and law warranting trial.

68. The legal position governing the scope of inquiry under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is well-settled. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512, the Court must strictly read the plaint averments in their entirety to ascertain if a cause of action exists, without venturing into the merits of the defense or conducting an elaborate inquiry into doubtful questions of law or fact. The relevant paras from the said decision, reads thus: “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. Cause of action

140. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. For the aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence.

151. In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown. In Vijai Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh [AIR 1962 SC 941: 1962 All LJ 634] this Court held: (AIR pp. 943-44, para 9) “By the express terms of Rule 5 clause (d), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him.”

69. The above principle was recently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. V. Mahaveer Lunia and Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208 in the following terms: “8. The position of law is that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped. At this preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims. If any triable issues arise from the pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected. Keeping in mind this settled principle of law, we proceed to examine whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.”

70. Likewise, the Division Bench of this court in the case of Krishan Kumar Vats v. Shri Shobha Ram Vats & Ors. 2025 DHC 10981 DB has reaffirmed that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is to be exercised only where the plaint, on a meaningful reading, discloses no cause of action whatsoever and that such reading does not empower the Court to embark upon a factfinding exercise or to render determinations on disputed questions of fact. The relevant extract from the said decision, reads thus:

71. It is also well settled that while considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court has to only go by the various averments made in the plaint to find out as to whether it discloses the cause of action or not, and not to judge the issue based on the rival contentions made by the defendant in his pleadings. In other words, the disclosure of cause of action by the plaintiff in the plaint, has to be found out from the standpoint of plaintiff as set out in the plaint, and not from the point of view of the defendant as projected by him in his defence.

72. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of Rita Solomon (supra), wherein the division bench of this court observed as follows:

73. Turning to the contentions raised by Mr. Sethi and Mr. Mahajan, on behalf of the defendants, that the plaintiff has no privity of contract with the actual owners i.e. defendant nos. 2 to 7, therefore, the suit is not maintainable, this Court is unable to accept this contention at this stage. The plaintiff in para 3(va) of the amended plaint has specifically pleaded that defendant No. 1 assigned his rights under ATS-1 in favour of the plaintiff with the knowledge and consent of defendant nos. 2 to 7. Further, the sale consideration flowed from the plaintiff's sources directly to defendant nos. 2 to 7. These are substantive averments going to the root of the plaintiff's claim under Section 15(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which cannot be brushed aside at the stage of issuance of summons and must be left for adjudication at trial. Besides that, Clause 17 of ATS-1 specifically provides that sale deed shall be executed in favour of the nominee of defendant no.1. Even ATS-2 contains Clause 4 which also categorically states that ATS-1 is an integral part of ATS-2. Prima facie, the said two clauses of ATS-1 and ATS-2 also lend some support to the averments contained in para 3(va) of the amended plaint, the true meaning and import of which, may still remain a question for future deliberation at an appropriate stage of the suit.

74. It was further contended by Mr. Sethi that ATS-1 is determinable in nature by virtue of Clause 15 and therefore, the plaint ought to be rejected on the ground that no enforceable cause of action arises in terms of Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. This Court does not find merit in this contention at the pre-trial stage. Even assuming Clause 15 is capable of rendering ATS-1 determinable, the condition precedent for its invocation, namely, the occurrence of ‘unavoidable circumstances such as force majeure‟ is a question of fact, which can only be adjudicated after affording both parties a full opportunity to lead evidence at trial, and are wholly beyond the scope of an inquiry under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.

75. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision of Om Prakash Bhola (supra) wherein this Court upheld the refusal to reject a plaint based on the contract's alleged determinability; specifically analyzing a clause akin to Clause 15 relied upon by the defendants. The relevant extracts from the said decision reads thus: “3. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised before us and we are unable to accept the same. A bare reading of the aforesaid clause indicates that the aforesaid agreement can be cancelled when both the parties mutually decide and agree to determine the agreement. It is not stated therein that if only one of the parties decides to cancel the agreement, even then the agreement itself will come to an end. Besides the use of the words „unlikelihood‟ and „due to genuine and absolutely unavoidable reasons‟ would indicate that the aforesaid events must be proved and established by leading evidence and only thereupon a final finding regarding determination of the agreement can be made.

4. In that view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention that the aforesaid agreement to sell is per se not enforceable and that the contract is determinable as is sought to be submitted by the Counsel appearing for the appellant. We find no reasons to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.”

76. Furthermore, in a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.S. Manjunath and Others v. Moorasavirappa alias Muttanna Chennappa Batil, Since Deceased by His LRs and Others: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2378, it has been held that contracts which are terminable only for cause, particularly where termination is conditioned upon the existence of a breach, those contracts are not determinable in nature.

77. Adverting to the next contention raised by Mr. Sethi and Mr. Bindra that ATS-1 and ATS-2 stood terminated by efflux of time, this Court finds that under ATS-1 and ATS-2 there are no specific clauses providing for termination of said agreement by efflux of time. Rather, termination under ATS-1 is upon happening of certain events as mentioned in Clause 15 thereof, which is a question of fact.

78. Further, the parties’ own subsequent conduct including the sharing of a draft sale deed as late as 16.12.2025 and the draft application for appointment of a Local Commissioner on 17.12.2025, prima facie, lends credence to the plaintiff's submission that performance was being actively pursued well beyond the dates urged by the defendants. In this factual backdrop, at best, the question as to whether either of the two ATS stood terminated, due to efflux of time, or parties intended otherwise, is not amenable to resolution at the threshold stage and has to be left open for adjudication at trial.

79. This Court finds merit in the submission of Mr. Mehta that the proposed defendant nos. 9 to 11 are bona fide purchasers or not, is also a triable issue which requires deliberation by way of cogent evidence and has to be decided during the course of trial.

80. However, before parting, the decisions relied upon by the defendants may also be adverted to. The reliance placed on Dahiben (supra) is misplaced at this stage, as the said decision mandates rejection only when a plaint is manifestly vexatious or fails to disclose a cause of action. However, in the instant case, Clause 4 of ATS-2 explicitly provides that ATS-1 forms an integral part of ATS-2, and when read in conjunction with the plaintiff's averments regarding direct payments and the sharing of draft agreements in December 2025, prima facie, disclose a triable cause of action that requires adjudication on merits.

81. The decision in Ravinder Singh (supra) is also distinguishable. While that case dealt with a mere sub-agreement lacking privity, the plaintiff herein has specifically pleaded nomination in terms of Clause 17 of ATS-1 and direct financial transactions with the actual owners, thereby claiming privity.

82. Lastly, the reliance on T.D. Vivek Kumar (supra) concerning the determinability of contracts is unavailing. The bar in the present ATS-1 is expressly conditioned on ‘unavoidable circumstances such as force majeure‟, which necessitates evidentiary proof during a trial and cannot be presumed at the stage of issuance of summons.

83. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the amended plaint, when read meaningfully and as a whole, discloses a valid cause of action. The threshold objections raised by the defendants are deeply intertwined with questions of fact which necessitate a full-fledged trial warranting leading of evidence. The Court cannot conduct a mini-trial or dissect the merits of the defense at the stage of issuance of summons.

84. Consequently, the oral objection as to the maintainability of the suit seeking rejection of the plaint, is devoid of merit and is hereby rejected. The suit is held to be maintainable.

85. Accordingly, the plaint be registered as suit.

86. Issue summons to the defendants.

87. Mr. Vinayak Marwah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1 and Mr. Keshav Sehgal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant nos.[2] to 7, accept summons and waive formal service of summons. Likewise, Mr. Abhimanyu Mahajan, accepts summons on behalf of defendant nos.[9] to 11 and waives formal service of summons.

88. They submit that copy of the plaint, I.A.s and documents have been received by them.

89. Let written statement be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of summons.

90. On plaintiff taking steps, summons be issued to defendant no.8 by all permissible modes.

91. The summons shall indicate that written statement must be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of summons.

92. The defendants shall also file an affidavit of admission/denial of the documents filed by the plaintiff, failing which the written statement shall not be taken on record.

93. The plaintiff is at liberty to file replication thereto within thirty days after filing of the written statement. The replication shall be accompanied by affidavit of admission/denial in respect of the documents filed by the defendants, failing which the replication shall not be taken on record.

94. It is made clear that any unjustified denial of documents may lead to an order of costs against the concerned party.

95. Any party seeking inspection of documents may do so in accordance with the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.

96. List before the learned Joint Registrar for completion of service, pleadings, admission/denial of documents and marking of exhibits on 17.08.2026.

97. List before Court thereafter on a date assigned by the learned Joint I.A. 2037/2026 (under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 seeking ex-parte adinterim relief) I.A. 3559/2026 (under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC seeking ex-parte ad-interim relief)

98. Issue notice. Mr. Vinayak Marwah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1 accepts notice. Likewise, Mr. Keshav Sehgal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant nos. 2 to 7 accepts notice. Likewise, Mr. Abhimanyu Mahajan, accepts notice on behalf of defendant nos.[9] to 11.

99. Notice be issued to defendant no.8 by all permissible modes.

100. Let replies to the application be filed within a period of four weeks.

101. Rejoinders thereto, be filed before the next date.

102. List on 06.08.2026.

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J MAY 4, 2026/N.S. ASWAL