Maj. Gen. Sanjeev Jain (Retd.) v. Central Public Works Department

Delhi High Court · 06 May 2026 · 2026:DHC:4642
Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
W.P.(C) 2673/2025 & CM APPL. 12753/2025
2026:DHC:4642
administrative petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the validity of imposing prior similar work experience as an eligibility condition for CPWD tenders, rejecting the petitioner’s claim that enlistment without such experience confers a vested right to participate in all tenders.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 2673/2025 & CM APPL. 12753/2025
Date of Decision: 06.05.2026 IN THE MATTER OF:
MAJ. GEN. SANJEEV JAIN (RETD.) .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Amrita Panda, Adv.
VERSUS
CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Farman Ali, CGSC, Ms. Usha Jamnal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
J U D G E M E N T
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT

1. The present petition has been preferred challenging the communication dated 07.06.2024 issued by the respondent, whereby, the requirement relating to prior execution of “similar works” has been made applicable to contractors already enlisted with the Central Public Works Department [“CPWD”] under Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules for Enlistment of Contractors in CPWD, 2022 [“Rules of 2022”].

KUMAR KAURAV

2. The facts of the present case would show that the petitioner, a retired Chief Engineer from the Western Command, Chandimandir, came to be enlisted as a CPWD contractor on 30.06.2023 under Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules of 2022, which permits enlistment of retired Government engineers without insisting upon prior work experience, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.

3. The petitioner submits that Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules of 2022 creates a distinct category in respect of retired government engineers and consciously exempts such persons from the requirement of prior construction experience, keeping in view the experience gained by them during the course of service under the Central Government, State Government or Public Sector Undertakings. It is submitted that the very basis of the petitioner’s enlistment is the experience acquired by him during his prolonged service under the Central Government.

4. For the sake of clarity, Rule 6.1.[7] of Rules of 2022 is extracted as under:- “6.1.[7] For retired Central Government/State Government/Central or State PSU engineers or architects seeking enlistment for the first time as individual, after one year of their retirement or voluntary retirement from service, enlistment can be considered in any class in Buildings & Roads category without work experience but with prescribed financial soundness, subject his holding a valid PPO in case of government servant and equivalent document in case of PSU employee. Such individuals applying for enlistment should neither be empanelled nor working as arbitrator or consultant in any Central/State Government Department or Public Sector Undertaking or Central/State Government Institution or Autonomous body. Based on initial scrutiny of required documents, provisional enlistment order valid for six months shall be issued with the approval of enlistment authority within one month of online application. Such provisional enlistment order shall be issued without referring the matter to Advisory committee. In case any misinformation is found in the documents submitted by applicant, during subsequent verification/scrutiny, the provisional enlistment shall be cancelled and the applicant shall be debarred for 2 years after issue of show cause notice. The enlistment authority may also initiate criminal case in case of any forgery by lodging FIR against the applicant through Member Secretary of the Advisory Committee.”

5. To substantiate the aforesaid submission, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to Rule 6.3.[5] of the Rules of 2022 as well as the prescribed application form appended to the Rules of 2022 as Annexure-II. He contends that a conjoint reading of the aforesaid rules would show that a banker certificate and valid PPO are the only documents required for enlistment under Rule 6.1.7, whereas details pertaining to previously executed works and completion certificates are required to be furnished by other categories of contractors seeking enlistment under the said Rules.

6. It is further the case of the petitioner that despite the petitioner having earlier been permitted to participate in various tenders floated by the respondent and even having been awarded a Letter of Acceptance dated 06.06.2024 in respect of one such tender, the respondent thereafter issued the communication dated 07.06.2024 modifying SOP No. 4/9 and Annexure-24 of the SOP for CPWD Works Manual, thereby making the condition relating to execution of “similar works” applicable to both CPWD enlisted and non-CPWD contractors alike.

7. The petitioner submits that his enlistment has been granted strictly in accordance with the Rules of 2022 and according to him, a cumulative reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that a retired government servant enlisted under Rule 6.1.[7] cannot be subjected to an additional requirement of prior construction experience for the purposes of participating in tenders floated by the respondent.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once the petitioner was granted enlistment under the prevailing framework, the eligibility conditions could not have been altered to his detriment during the subsistence of such enlistment. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court and Ors.[1]

9. The petitioner also submits that Rule 6.1.[7] has remained materially unchanged under the CPWD Rules of 2023 as well as the CPWD Rules of 2024 and, therefore, the exemption granted to retired engineers from furnishing prior work experience continues to subsist even under the subsequent framework. According to the petitioner, the action of the respondent in subsequently insisting upon fulfilment of the condition relating to similar work is arbitrary and contrary to the legitimate expectation of the petitioner and are contrary to the very scheme of enlistment contemplated under the aforesaid Rules.

10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has vehemently opposed the present petition and drawn the attention of this Court to the decision of this Court dated 30.08.2024 in Maj. Gen. Sanjeev Jain (Retd.) v. Central Public Works Department & Anr.,[2] [“earlier writ proceeding”], to contend that the controversy involved in the present lis stands squarely covered by the aforesaid decision rendered in the case of the same petitioner. It is further submitted that the issues sought to be raised in the present petition have already been considered and dealt with by this Court in the aforesaid proceedings.

11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, while responding to the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondent, submits that the communication dated 07.06.2024 containing the impugned condition was not even available for challenge in the earlier writ petition. She further submits that the adjudication in the earlier writ petition arose in a materially distinct factual backdrop and, therefore, the same would have no bearing on the adjudication of the present petition. It is further clarified that the challenge in the earlier writ petition was confined to the corrigendum dated 08.08.2024 and the controversy involved in the present proceedings was not conclusively adjudicated in the earlier writ proceedings.

12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.

13. On the issue as to whether the impugned communication dated 07.06.2024 had fallen for consideration in the earlier writ proceedings W.P.(C) 12054/2024; Order dt. 30.08.2024 instituted by the petitioner, it would be apposite to refer to the order dated 30.08.2024 passed by this Court in the earlier writ proceedings. The relevant observations made therein with regard to communication dated 07.06.2024 are reproduced as under:-

“7. Guided by these judgments, this Court must now determine whether the impugned tender conditions infringe upon any enforceable constitutional or legal rights of the Petitioner. Even though the Petitioner has impugned the communication dated 8th August, 2024, the requirement for „similar works‟ experience, which is now part of the tender conditions, originates from the letter issued by the Director General, CPWD, dated 7th June, 2024, which modifies SOP 4/9 to mandate that both CPWD and Non-CPWD contractors submit documents demonstrating eligibility for similar work experience. The said communication reads as follows:…. 8. The SOP 4/9 and Annexure-24 of SOP for CPWD manual which deals with applicability of similar works stands modified. Now, the CPWD enlisted as well as Non-CPWD contractors are required to submit their eligibility documents for similar work experience. 9. The language of the subject NIT makes it clear that all bidder including CPWD enlisted contractors, are required to meet specific eligibility criteria. Furthermore, the tender conditions in question, which are alleged to be changed by way of the impugned communication, read as follows: “1. Bidders who fulfill the following requirements shall be eligible to apply. Joint ventures are not accepted. [1(a)(i), 1(b), 1(c) & 1(d) are not applicable for CPWD enlisted contractors of appropriate class. 1(a) (ii) and 1(e)] are applicable for CPWD enlisted contractors also.” 10. In light of the above, it is thus established that the impugned communication, which is alleged to be a Corrigendum is actually only a clarification issued to all the tender participants making it clear to them that the requirement for completing „similar works‟ is also applicable to CPWD enlisted contractors.”
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14. A perusal of the aforesaid observations would show that while adjudicating the challenge to the corrigendum dated 08.08.2024 in earlier writ proceedings, this Court had also taken into consideration the communication dated 07.06.2024 and observed that the requirement relating to execution of similar works emanated from the said communication whereby SOP No. 4/9 and Annexure - 24 of the SOP for CPWD Manual stood modified. This Court had further observed that the corrigendum dated 08.08.2024 was merely clarificatory in nature and issued in furtherance of the communication impugned herein.

15. An even-handed assessment of the facts of the present case would show that the petitioner is essentially seeking to assail the eligibility condition imposed by the respondent in respect of a particular class of Notices Inviting Tenders [“NITs”], whereby contractors enlisted under Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules for Enlistment of Contractors in CPWD are also required to satisfy the condition relating to prior execution of “similar works”. Therefore, the short question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the respondent could validly impose such a condition notwithstanding the petitioner’s enlistment under the prevailing enlistment framework.

16. It is trite that the State, in exercise of its executive domain, is entitled to alter or modify policy measures in furtherance of administrative requirements and public interest. Mere departure from an earlier policy framework would not ipso facto render the subsequent action arbitrary or ultra vires.

17. The Supreme Court in Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal,[3] has reiterated the aforesaid legal position by holding that:-

“75. The State and its instrumentality has also power to change policy. The executive power is not limited to frame a particular policy. It has untrammelled power to change, rechange, adjust and readjust the policy taking into account the relevant and germane considerations. It is entirely in the discretion of the Government how a policy should be
shaped. It should not, however, be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”

18. The Supreme Court in Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India,[4] has held that in matters relating to formulation of conditions governing NITs and award of contracts, a greater degree of latitude is liable to be conceded to the tendering authority. Mere exclusion of a particular class of contractors from the prescribed eligibility framework would not, by itself, render such conditions arbitrary or discriminatory unless the same are shown to be manifestly arbitrary, mala fide or tailor-made to favour a particular class of contractors.

19. The Supreme Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,[5] has further observed that in contractual and tender matters, the employer must retain adequate flexibility in prescribing eligibility norms and the Courts would not sit in appeal over such conditions unless they are ex facie arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or vitiated by bias. In the facts of the present case, the stipulation relating to prior execution of “similar works” constitutes a reasonable eligibility condition intended to ensure that only technically competent and capable contractors undertake projects involving public funds and public interest.

20. In light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the condition relating to prior execution of “similar works”, cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory or dehors the governing tender framework merely because the petitioner was earlier granted enlistment without prior work experience. The requirement in question operates in a distinct sphere governing eligibility for a particular class of NITs and falls within the realm of contractual discretion of the tendering authority.

21. At this juncture, an incidental question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether enlistment of the petitioner as a CPWD contractor under Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules of 2022, would by itself confer a vested right to participate in all future NITs irrespective of the distinct eligibility conditions prescribed for the concerned works.

22. On perusal of Rules 6.1.7, 6.3.5, 11 and 12 of the Rules of 2022 relied upon by the petitioner, it emerges that the aforesaid provisions merely regulate the eligibility and procedure for enlistment as a CPWD contractor and permit a person falling within the ambit of Rule 6.1.[7] to obtain enlistment without prior construction experience. The said provisions, however, neither expressly nor impliedly stipulate that such enlistment would automatically exempt the contractor from satisfying the distinct eligibility conditions prescribed under a particular NIT or tender framework.

23. Moreover, the aforesaid provisions cannot be construed to mean that once a contractor stands enlisted under the Rules of 2022, the respondent is precluded from prescribing additional eligibility conditions having a reasonable nexus with the nature, technical complexity and financial magnitude of the work sought to be executed under a particular NIT. While enlistment determines the general eligibility of a contractor to be registered with the department, the tendering authority remains competent to prescribe further conditions relating to execution of similar works.

24. Further, the imposition of such a condition cannot be faulted merely because the petitioner had earlier been granted enlistment under Rule 6.1.[7] of the Rules of 2022. Enlistment by itself does not confer an absolute or vested right to participate in all future contracts or bids irrespective of the eligibility conditions governing a particular NIT. The same would necessarily depend upon the nature of the work sought to be executed and the corresponding technical and experiential requirements prescribed by the tendering authority in larger public interest.

25. It is also a settled position in law that in matters concerning tender, contractual and eligibility conditions, the State remains well within its domain to prescribe additional stipulations depending upon the nature and requirements of the work in question. The scope of judicial review in such matters remains limited and this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, would not ordinarily interfere with such conditions unless the same are shown to be manifestly arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory or in violation of any statutory or constitutional provision.

26. The contours of judicial review in tender, contractual and eligibility conditions matters now stand authoritatively settled by a catena of decisions, including Tata Cellular v. Union of India,[6] wherein the governing principles were summarised as under:-

“94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.”

27. Reference can also be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.,[7] Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India[8] and Airport Authority of India v. Centre for Aviation Policy, Safety & Research (CAPSR),[9] wherein it has consistently been held that the tendering authority, being the author of the tender documents, is the best judge of its requirements and interpretation of tender conditions. The Court, while exercising powers of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over commercial or contractual decisions taken by expert bodies and interference is warranted only where the tender conditions or the decision-making process are shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, perverse or actuated by bias.

28. The Supreme Court, through various judicial pronouncements, have

2022 SCC OnLine SC 1334 further emphasized that in matters involving technical and commercial considerations, Constitutional Courts must exercise a high degree of restraint and afford sufficient “play in the joints” to the tendering authority, particularly where the conditions prescribed are intended to secure technical competence, proper execution of public projects and protection of the public exchequer.

29. In light of the discussion hereinabove, this Court does not find any ground warranting interference with the impugned communication in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

30. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. Pending application also stands disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J MAY 6, 2026