Full Text
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
SMT RITU TANEJA
W/O LATE PANKAJ TANEJA HOUSE NO. B-3/81, SAFDARJUNG
ENCLAVE, NEW DELHI - 110029 SH. KHUSHAAL TANEJA
S/O LATE PANKAJ TANEJA
ENCLAVE, NEW DELHI – 110029 .... PETITIONERS
(Through: Ms. Mouli Bhattacharjee, Advocate.)
THROUGH ITS DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 5, SHAM NATH MARG, DELHI-110054
EMAIL: standingcounsellgnctd@gmail.com MR. OM PRAKASH TANEJA
S/O LATE SHRI DATARAM TANEJA EMAIL: obtaneja5@gmail.com, omprakash10@gmail.com
MRS. SAVITRI TANEJA W/O MR. OM PRAKASH TANEJA
EMAIL: omprakashsavititaneja@gmail.com .... RESPONDENTS
KUMAR KAURAV
(Through: Ms Avni Singh, Panel Counsel-GNCTD with Mr Vaibhav
Sharma, Advocate for R-1.
Ms. Archana Gaur, DHCLSC, Ms. Ridhima Gaur, Mr. Deepu Kumar, Advocates for R-2 and 3.)
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JUDGMENT
2. The present petition has been instituted, challenging an order dated 28.08.2023 (hereinafter “Impugned Common Order”) passed by the Divisional Commissioner in Appeal Nos. 504/2022 and 505/2022 under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter “Senior Citizens Act”). By way of the Impugned Common Order, the Divisional Commissioner has allowed Appeal No. 504/2022 preferred by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and dismissed Appeal No. 505/2022 preferred by the Petitioners, thereby, directing the Petitioners to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the entire property, including the ground floor shop, property bearing no. B-3/81, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi, (hereinafter “Subject Property”) in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
3. Petitioner No. 1 was married to Late Mr. Pankaj Taneja on 11.09.2000. After their marriage, Petitioner No. 1 shifted to the first floor of the Subject Property. Subsequently, Late Mr. Taneja started running a grocery store on the first portion of the ground floor i.e. (veranda at ground floor) of the Subject Property.
4. It is the case of the Petitioners that the business and assets of the family were being managed collectively and that certain assurances were extended by Respondent No. 2 with regard to the distribution of properties amongst his sons. It is further averred that a registered Will dated 29.01.2021 was executed by Respondent No. 2, purportedly conferring rights in favour of the children of Petitioner No. 1.
5. Following the demise of Late Sh. Pankaj Taneja on 18.02.2020, disputes arose between the Petitioners and Respondents (in-laws). Thereafter, Respondents (in-laws) filed a complaint dated 09.11.2020 before the District Magistrate, Senior Citizens Act read with Rule 22(3)(1) of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 (hereinafter “Rules 2009”) framed thereunder, seeking eviction of the Petitioners from the Subject Property on account of ill treatment and non-maintenance.
6. Pursuant to the said complaint, an inquiry was conducted by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate and a report dated 08.12.2021 was submitted. Vide the said inquiry report, it was noted that the ownership of the Subject Property stood in the name of Respondent No. 2. Upon consideration of the material on record and the SDM’s inquiry report, the Maintenance Tribunal held that while no conclusive finding of harassment or maintenance neglect was established, the interference by the Petitioners in the ground floor portion adversely affected the senior citizens’ peaceful enjoyment of their property. Accordingly, the District Magistrate passed an order dated 12.04.2022, whereby, the complaint of the senior citizens’ was partly allowed and the Petitioners were directed to vacate the ground floor portion of the Subject Property.
7. Aggrieved by the said order, both parties preferred appeals before the Divisional Commissioner. The Respondents (in-laws), in Appeal No. 504/2022, contended that the relief granted by the Maintenance Tribunal (District Magistrate) was insufficient, and sought eviction of the Petitioners from the entire Subject Property, pressing that their right to reside peacefully could not be secured till the Petitioners continue to occupy any part of the premises. On the contrary, the Petitioners, in Appeal No. 505/2022, challenged the limited eviction directed by the Tribunal, reiterating their claim of a shared household, disputing allegations of ill-treatment, and asserting entitlement and claims over assets of the deceased husband.
8. Upon consideration of the rival appeals, the learned Divisional Commissioner held that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent as to render their continued cohabitation wholly untenable. It was further observed that the grievances urged by the Petitioners, insofar as they related to property rights, financial entitlements, and claims over the estate of the deceased, were matters that fell outside the purview and ambit of the Senior Citizens Act, and could not be adjudicated upon within the limited framework of proceedings thereunder. Accordingly, the Divisional Commissioner passed the Impugned Common Order, culminating in the direction for eviction of the Petitioners from the entire premises and further directing Respondents (in-laws) to submit original documents of Khirki Extension property as soon as the Petitioners vacate the Subject Property. Aggrieved by the Impugned Common Order, the Petitioners have approached this Court for setting aside of the said Impugned Common Order. Submissions
9. Ms. Mouli Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, has advanced the following submissions: a. After the demise of the Petitioner’s husband, Late Sh. Pankaj Taneja, the Respondents (in-laws) have been making continuous efforts to evict the Petitioners from the Subject Property, which is asserted to be her shared household. It is submitted that the Respondents are financially well-off, and have multiple immovable properties, bank accounts, and financial investments. Despite their sound financial condition, they have allegedly failed to provide any financial support to the Petitioners. b. The properties owned by father-in-law have been acquired from ancestral business and the Petitioner’s late husband had been contributing to the family business since his childhood and, therefore, had a legitimate share in such assets. Further, Respondent No. 2 and other family members have appropriated the benefits arising from Life Insurance Company (hereinafter „LIC‟) policies and other financial instruments standing in the name of the Petitioner’s deceased husband. The Petitioner No.1 asserts that she and her children, being the lawful heirs, are entitled to a rightful share in such financial benefits. c. Furthermore, the Petitioner No.1 submits that far from neglecting the Respondents, she has been a conscientious and attentive daughter-in-law, having personally tended to and cared for Respondent No. 3, who is stated to be suffering from a mental illness. She categorically denies each and every allegation of ill-treatment, neglect, and misconduct levelled against her, and asserts that she has at all times conducted herself with dignity towards the Respondents. It is further the case of the Petitioners that Respondent No. 2 and 3 have, with a view to coercing and harassing the Petitioners and engineering grounds for their forcible eviction from the Subject Property, filed multiple complaints before the police authorities, which are alleged to be false and frivolous.
10. Per contra, Ms. Archana Gaur learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, submitted as under: a. Respondents (in-laws) are the absolute owners of the Subject Property, being their self-acquired property, and have been subjected to continuous harassment and ill-treatment at the hand of the Petitioners. It is submitted that the Respondents had cordial relations with his late son and that the discord in the family arose solely due to the conduct of the Petitioner No.1, who allegedly caused mental distress to the deceased during his lifetime, and whose actions also resulted in severe emotional trauma to Respondent No. 3 leading to strained family relations and eventual separate living arrangements within the Subject Property. b. The Petitioner (daughter-in-law) is a MCD school Government teacher earning a substantial salary of more than 1 Lakh Rupees and is capable of maintaining herself and the Children. Further, all premiums in respect of insurance policies of Late Sh. Pankaj Taneja was paid by the Respondents (in-laws). Although the Petitioner has initiated civil proceedings claiming such benefits, the Respondent had expressed willingness to settle the matter subject to withdrawal of cases, which was not accepted by the Petitioner. It is contended that the shop constructed in the verandah of the ground floor obstructs air and sunlight, thereby, adversely affecting the living conditions of the senior citizens and rendering their residence unhealthy. c. Furthermore, the Respondents (in-laws) had purchased a property at Khirki Extension in the name of their late son, and after his demise, the Petitioner took possession of the same by breaking open the locks, no legal action was initiated by the Respondents in view of his intention to benefit his son’s family. Furthermore, the Respondents (in-laws) have acted fairly by offering to hand over the original documents of the Khirki Extension property as well as two plots in Faridabad to the Petitioner, subject to her vacating the Subject Property.
11. I have heard learned counsels appearing for both the parties and have perused the record. Analysis
12. Before proceeding to examine the facts of the present case, it would be apposite to delineate the legal framework governing the exercise of powers under the Senior Citizens Act, particularly in relation to eviction of children or legal heirs from property owned by senior citizens.
13. The object and purpose of the Senior Citizens Act is no longer res integra. The statute is a piece of beneficial and social welfare legislation, enacted with the avowed intent of ensuring that senior citizens are able to lead a life of dignity, security, and autonomy in the evening of their lives. The legislative scheme recognizes the increasing vulnerability of aged parents to neglect, abuse, and dispossession at the hands of their own children or relatives, and therefore provides for expeditious remedies, including eviction, to safeguard their life and property.
14. The Senior Citizens Act, read with the Rules framed in 2009, equips the District Magistrate and the Appellate Authority with sufficient jurisdiction to pass orders of eviction and such other directions as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of a given case. This jurisdiction is ordinarily invoked where a senior citizen is found to have been subjected to neglect, ill-treatment, or denial of maintenance, or where their right to reside in and enjoy their property peacefully stands threatened or obstructed. Importantly, the proceedings under the Act are designed to be summary in character, ensuring that senior citizens receive speedy and meaningful relief without being subjected to prolonged litigation.
15. It is well settled that proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act cannot be transmuted into a forum for the determination of intricate civil disputes pertaining to ownership, co-ownership, inheritance, or claims arising out of alleged ancestral property. Such issues fall squarely within the domain of competent civil Courts. The jurisdiction of the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act is circumscribed to the limited but significant objective of protecting senior citizens and ensuring that they are able to reside peacefully and securely in their own property without interference.
16. It is a settled and uncontested proposition of law that the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act are not equipped, nor indeed intended, to venture into the issues of complex civil disputes. Such matters demand careful examination of title, evidence, and competing legal rights, an exercise that must be undertaken before a competent civil Court.
17. The primary issue that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the Impugned Common Order directing eviction of the Petitioners from the entire Subject Property, in exercise of powers under the Senior Citizens Act, suffers from any illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. At the outset, it is not in dispute that Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are senior citizens and the recorded owners of the Subject Property. The Petitioners have not placed any material on record to dislodge or even prima facie impeach the ownership of Respondent no. 2 in proceedings of this summary nature.
18. The record further reveals that relations between the parties have become severely acrimonious. The existence of a hostile and embittered environment clearly indicates that the parties are unable to reside together under the same roof without constant friction. The material portion of the Impugned Common Order reads as under:
25. Even assuming that the Subject Property in the instant case answers share household description within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act, the Petitioners cannot assert an indefeasible right to continue in occupation of the very same premises in perpetuity. The right of residence is a protective right and not a proprietary one, and cannot be invoked to defeat the legitimate claim of senior citizens to secure peaceful enjoyment of their property. In circumstances where cohabitation has become wholly unworkable, the balance must tilt in favour of the senior citizens, while leaving it open to the Petitioners to avail appropriate remedies, including alternate accommodation, in accordance with law.
26. The Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja[2], authoritatively held that while a daughter-in-law has a statutory right of residence in a “shared household” under Sections 17 and 19 of the Domestic Violence Act, such right does not translate into any proprietary or ownership interest in the property belonging to the in-laws. The right of residence is a protective right, intended to secure shelter, and is subject to the balancing of competing rights, including the right of senior citizens to peacefully enjoy their property. It was further held that in appropriate cases, the Court may direct eviction of the daughter-in-law from the shared household, provided that suitable alternate accommodation or rent in lieu, thereof, is made available to her in terms of Section 19(1)(f) of the Domestic Violence Act.
27. Even otherwise, it is an admitted position by the petitioner that an alternative accommodation at Khirki Extension is in possession of the Petitioners, and that Respondent No. 2 has expressed willingness to hand over the documents of the same as well as other two plots in Faridabad, subject to vacation of the Subject Property. The same has been recorded in the Impugned Common Order and is extracted as under: