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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
SANJAY PIPLANI .....Appellant
Through: In person (through VC)
Through: Mr. Gaurav Mirza, Mr. Kaveesh Nair, Mr. Arnav Chopra, Advs.
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
1. The present appeal has been preferred under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 assailing the order dated 09.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in CS (OS) NO. 442/2025.
2. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge, while noticing alleged non-compliance of the earlier order dated 11.07.2025, directed issuance of notice in contempt proceedings against the Appellant and deferred consideration of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC till compliance with the earlier order.
3. Along with the appeal, the Appellant has filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 105 days in filing the present appeal.
4. We have heard the Appellant, appearing in person, and have perused the record.
5. The explanation furnished in the application for condonation of delay is, broadly, that the Appellant had been pursuing review proceedings as well as proceedings before the Supreme Court and that, upon dismissal of the review petition, the present appeal came to be instituted.
6. The principles governing condonation of delay are well settled. Though courts ordinarily adopt a liberal approach while considering applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the applicant is nevertheless required to disclose a bonafide and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay.
7. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Supreme Court emphasized that the expression “sufficient cause” ought to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Equally, however, it remains settled that liberal construction cannot substitute the requirement of a cogent explanation accounting for the delay.
8. In the present case, the impugned order was passed on 09.12.2025 and admittedly remained within the knowledge of the Appellant. However, except broadly referring to pendency of review proceedings and proceedings before the Supreme Court, the application does not furnish any satisfactory explanation as to why the appeal could not have been instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. We are therefore not persuaded to condone the delay of 105 days in filing the present appeal.
9. Even otherwise, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal itself is not maintainable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. The said provision undoubtedly preserves the remedy of an intra-court appeal against judgments rendered by a learned Single Judge. However, the expression ‘judgment’ occurring therein has consistently received a restricted and purposive interpretation. It is well settled that every interlocutory or procedural order would not qualify as a ‘judgment’ amenable to appellate scrutiny under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. Only such orders which conclusively determine rights of parties, decide matters of moment, or visit the party concerned with serious civil consequences can be treated as appealable judgments. Orders which are merely procedural in nature, regulate the course of proceedings, or defer adjudication without finally determining any substantive right do not fall within the ambit of Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act.
10. Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC provides for an appeal against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order XXXIX of the CPC. However, the maintainability of such appeal must necessarily be examined with reference to the true nature and substance of the impugned order and not merely the form in which the proceedings are described.
11. A plain reading of the impugned order demonstrates that the learned Single Judge has neither finally adjudicated the application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC nor modified, vacated or confirmed any interim injunction. The learned Single Judge has merely deferred consideration of the said application while directing issuance of notice in contempt proceedings in view of alleged non-compliance of the earlier order dated 11.07.2025.
12. The impugned order is, therefore, essentially procedural and interlocutory in character.
13. It is well settled that not every interlocutory order passed in the course of proceedings under Order XXXIX CPC becomes appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC. What is appealable is an order which substantially affects rights of parties by granting, refusing, varying or vacating interim relief.
14. The Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 8, while interpreting the scope of intra-court appeals, held that purely procedural or interlocutory orders which do not decide matters of moment or affect valuable rights of parties would not constitute appealable judgments. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder:
15. In the present case, the impugned order neither determines any substantive right of the parties nor adjudicates the application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC on merits. The learned Single Judge has only postponed consideration thereof pending compliance with the earlier order.
16. Equally, insofar as issuance of notice in contempt proceedings is concerned, the legal position is no longer res integra.
17. In Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 399, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that an order merely initiating contempt proceedings or issuing notice therein is not appealable. The Court summarized the legal position in the following terms: “11…
I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt…”
18. The impugned order, in the present case, merely directs issuance of notice in contempt proceedings and does not impose punishment or finally determine any issue relating to contempt.
19. In substance therefore, the appeal seeks to assail a purely interlocutory and procedural order which neither adjudicates rights under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC nor constitutes an appealable order under the law governing contempt jurisdiction.
20. We are therefore of the considered view that: i. the Appellant has failed to disclose sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 105 days in filing the appeal; and ii. in any event, the impugned order does not constitute an appealable order under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act.
21. Accordingly, present application seeking condonation of delay as well as the present appeal are dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY (JUDGE)
RENU BHATNAGAR (JUDGE) MAY 14, 2026