Sarfraz Ahmed v. Rajjani Kumari & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 18 May 2026 · 2026:DHC:4787

Sachin Datta

CONT.CAS(C) 621/2025

2026:DHC:4787

civil petition_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that UCO Bank wilfully disobeyed its order by delaying payment of fixed deposit amounts despite a succession certificate, directing payment of interest and costs to the petitioner in contempt proceedings.

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CONT.CAS(C) 621/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 18.05.2026 SARFRAZ AHMED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Satvik Varma (Sr. Adv.) along with Mr. Shantanu Parmar, Mr. Navjot Kumar, Mr. Balram, Advs.

VERSUS

RAJJANI KUMARI & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sarfaraz Khan, Ms. Rajrani Kumari, Advs. for UCO Bank.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL)

JUDGMENT

1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner alleging wilful disobedience/ non-compliance of the directions contained in the judgment/ order dated 24.02.2025 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 16096/2023.

2. The matter has a chequered history. The petitioner’s late father, Sh. Jalil Ahmed, opened two Fixed Deposits with UCO Bank under its “Kuber Yojana Deposit Scheme” bearing FDR Nos. 930742 and 932480 respectively. Sh. Jalil Ahmed passed away on 09.10.2004.

3. The petitioner obtained a Succession Certificate dated 18.05.2023, under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 from the Court of the Ld. ACJ, Saket Courts, New Delhi vide judgment dated 06.03.2023, passed in Succession Petition No. 25/2021, explicitly authorising the collection of these two FDR balances.

4. The petitioner submitted the requisite forms and documents to the Senior Manager. Concededly, while the savings account balance was disbursed, the bank failed to release the FDR amounts, as a result of which the petitioner was compelled to issue a legal demand notice and subsequently file W.P.(C) 16096/2023. The said W.P.(C) 16096/2023 was disposed of vide judgment/order dated 24.02.2025, of which contempt is alleged in the present proceedings.

5. In W.P.(C) 16096/2023 the UCO Bank initially took the stand that the FDRs were of the year 2001-02, the Bank could not find any record pertaining to those FDRs and an apprehension was also made that there was every likelihood that the amount under the said FDRs might have already been released on the date of maturity. The said stand is recorded in Paragraph-12 of the aforesaid judgment/order dated 24.02.2025 as under:-

6. This Court noticed that the aforesaid stand was inconsistent with the statement made by the concerned official of the UCO Bank in Succession Proceedings. The same is recorded in Paragraph-13 of the said judgment which reads as under:-

7. Considering the circumstances, the UCO Bank was directed to take requisite steps in terms of the aforesaid Succession Certificate and permitted the petitioner to meet with the Branch Head at Nizamuddin (West) branch of the respondent Bank along with the concerned FDRs.

8. It transpires that even after the aforesaid order was passed, the Bank did not release the amount and the petitioner was compelled to file the present contempt petition. It is only after filing of the contempt petition that certain sums were released to the petitioner.

9. It is the case of the petitioner that the sum released by the bank is deficient inasmuch as after the original date of maturity only simple interest @ 6% p.a. has been paid by the bank.

10. Vide order dated 12.03.2026, passed in the present proceedings, the bank was directed to file its calculation claims setting out the manner in which the interest payable to the petitioner has been calculated. The bank was also directed to place on record its policy in terms of which the petitioner’s entitlement for the period post-maturity date of the FDR has been computed at the rate of 6% p.a. The said policy has been placed on record. This Court has perused the policy.

11. Considering the explicit terms of the policy, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. In any event, the same is beyond the scope of the present proceedings.

12. For the purpose of these proceedings, it is relevant to note that even after the petitioner obtained the Succession Certificate, the bank was recalcitrant in expeditiously releasing the amount to the petitioner. The petitioner had to initiate multiple litigations including W.P.(C) 16096/2023 (which culminated in judgment dated 24.02.2025) as also the present Contempt Petition, for the release of its legitimate dues.

13. Admittedly, the Succession Certificate was granted to the petitioner on 18.05.2023 whereas the amount was released to the petitioner only on 10.03.2025. There is no justification for the delay between the aforesaid period i.e. (18.05.2023 to 10.03.2025) for releasing the amount to the petitioner.

14. It is also quite evident that the delay in releasing the amount during the said period resulted in infraction/disobedience of the orders passed in Succession Case No 25/2021, notwithstanding the explicit statement of the concerned officials of the UCO Bank in the said proceedings.

15. The legal position is well settled that the respondent cannot be permitted to enjoy the fruits of such wilful disobedience and the petitioner is required to be compensated for the same. In this regard, reference may be made to the following judgments:

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(i) DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622:

“17. The principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well settled. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji [(1984) 4 SCC 216 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 587 : (1985) 1 SCR 598] this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that “the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)”.

18. The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by civil courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn [(1985)

1 All ER 211] Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed: “I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the court should be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done

19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [AIR 1975 Mad 270: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Cal 220: (1986) 90 CWN 342]. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. [AIR 1975 Mad 270: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order.. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach of the law. If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequences of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.”

20. In Sujit Pal [AIR 1986 Cal 220: (1986) 90 CWN 342] a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.

(ii) Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai, (2023) 17

SCC 545 “81. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in SBI v. Vijay Mallya [SBI v. Vijay Mallya, (2024) 12 SCC 85: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 826], in clear terms said that apart from punishing the contemnor for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the Court so that any advantage secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified. The approach may require the Court to issue directions either for reversal of the transactions in question by declaring said transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to see that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him. xxx xxx xxx

89. Thus, although Section 52 of the 1882 Act does not render a transfer pendente lite void yet the court while exercising contempt jurisdiction may be justified to pass directions either for reversal of the transactions in question by declaring the said transactions to be void or proceed to pass appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or anyone claiming under him. xxx xxx xxx

117. We may summarise our final conclusion as under:….

117.3. Although the transfer of the suit property pendente lite may not be termed as void ab initio yet when the court is looking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the court can definitely declare such transactions to be void in order to maintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing the contemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified. This may include issue of directions either for reversal of the transactions by declaring such transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the authorities concerned to ensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue to ensure to the advantage of the contemnor or any one claiming under him”.

(iii) Anuradha Sharma v. Tis Hazari Courts, 2012 SCC OnLine Del

3881: “17.[1] The period of delay in release of money by the District Court is of eight (8) months and eleven (11) days. Therefore, the petitioner is granted simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum for the said period on the sum of Rs. 1,12,50,000/- per annum. This relief is premised on the rationale that, firstly no litigant can suffer by an act of court, and secondly, the court even in contempt jurisdiction, in a limited manner, has the power to reverse the aggravation which takes places during the period the order of the court, in respect of which, contempt is initiated, lies unimplemented. The real value of money, having regard to the state of the economy, is depreciating each day. Therefore, the only manner in which this wrong can be reversed is by granting interest to the petitioner

16. Considering the circumstances, the following directions are issued:-. [See following judgments where status quo ante was restored: Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 622; C. Elumalai v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj (2009) 4 SCC 213; Sita Ram Sahu v. Smt. Lalpari Devi 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 711 and Chiranji Lal v. Ajay Kumar Sood (1997) 11 SCC 336]. This payment would be made to the petitioner within four weeks from today. The ultimate burden will of course be on the State, as this amount would have to be included in the Court budget.” i. For the period 18.05.2023 (the date on which the Succession Certificate was issued) and 10.03.2025 (the date on which the amount came to be belatedly released by the bank), the respondent shall pay to the petitioner an additional interest at the rate of 6% p.a. on the aggregate amount which became payable to the petitioner as of 18.05.2023. ii. Considering that the petitioner had to initiate multiple proceedings for realization of the amount, the costs/ litigation expenses of Rs. 1,00,000/- shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner. iii. Let the aforesaid amount be disbursed within a period of 15 days from today.

17. In view of the aforesaid directions and subject to compliance thereto, this Court is refraining from taking action against the concerned officials of the Bank for committing willful disobedience of judicial orders.

18. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.

SACHIN DATTA, J MAY 18, 2026/uk/ss

Sarfraz Ahmed v. Rajjani Kumari & Anr.

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