Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 19.05.2026
MAHAVIR SINGH & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta and Mr. Akash Jandial, Advocates
Through: Mr. Essenese Obhan, Ms. Ayesha Guhathakurta and Ms. Ananya Roshyan, Advocates
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLI CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CS (COMM) 995/2018 titled G4S PLC & Anr. vs. Mahavir Singh & Anr., whereby relief of permanent injunction was granted in favour of the Respondent (i.e., the plaintiff in the suit) and damages of ₹15,00,000/- were awarded against the Appellants (i.e., the defendants). Signing Date:27.05.2026 16:29
2. The application, CM APPL. 16867/2026 has been filed, seeking condonation of the delay of 688 days in filing the accompanying appeal. The grounds for condonation are set out at paragraph 5 onwards of the application, which reads as follows:
3. In addition to the aforesaid grounds urged in the application, it is stated that the Appellant was unaware that his counsel had stopped appearing on his behalf in the Execution proceedings, which, to the Appellant’s knowledge, were listed on 21.08.2025 and 11.12.2025.
4. Before we decide the application for condonation of delay, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.1, wherein it was held that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be construed in a manner consistent with the object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, namely, expeditious disposal of commercial disputes. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period of 60 days for filing an appeal should be granted only by way of exception and not as a matter of course. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as follows:
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches. ……
65. Apart from this, there is a long delay of 131 days beyond the 60-day period provided for filing an appeal under Section 13(1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act. There is no explanation worth the name contained in the condonation of delay application, beyond the usual file-pushing and administrative exigency. This appeal is therefore dismissed.”
5. In our considered opinion, the grounds urged by the Appellants in CM APPL 16876/2026 do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay, much less a inordinate delay of 688 days. The statutory period for filing an appeal is 60 days and the inordinate delay of 688 days cannot be condoned on the grounds set out in the application. The averments in the application show that the Appellant took a conscious decision to not file an appeal, to avoid the deposit of the decretal amount. The grounds set out in the application show that the Appellants consciously chose not to prefer an Signing appeal within time. The execution proceedings were instituted on 21.10.2024, in which the Appellants also participated and prolonged the said proceedings. The explanation offered for the delay is, therefore, neither satisfactory nor justified. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay alone.
6. With respect to the challenge in the appeal on merits, the same is limited to award of damages of Rs. 15 lakhs and there is no challenge to the decree of permanent injunction.
7. We may note that the suit itself had been instituted in 2018, and though the initial order of interim injunction was granted vide order dated 09.07.2018, restraining the appellant from using the infringing marks “C4S” and “ ”, which is undeniably deceptively similar to Respondent’ marks “G4S” and “ ”. However, the appellant failed to comply with the interim injunction, which led to the filing of two contempt petitions. It was only much later, in the year 2023, that the appellant complied with the interim injunction order of the year 2018. The Appellant was an employee of the Respondent company and after resigning commenced business using a near identical trademark, which demonstrates dishonest adoption of the impugned mark.
8. Learned counsel for the Appellants states that the Appellants, without admitting liability and to show bona fides, changed their corporate name to CS[5] Secured Solutions Pvt. Ltd., removed the impugned marks, changed employee uniforms, PAN, modified website references, and applied for the Signing statutory modifications as well. An affidavit of compliance was filed on 23.05.2022, and the undertaking was recorded in the Ld. Single Judge dated 25.05.2023. He states that despite such compliance, the learned Single Judge, vide judgment dated 23.02.2024, awarded damages of Rs. 15 lakhs without framing issues or conducting a trial. He states that Appellant employees approximately 250 guards and is therefore a small enterprise.
9. We note that the suit had remained pending since 2018 and that the undertaking to change its name was furnished by the Appellants only after nearly four years of litigation, and after two [‘2’] contempt applications had been filed by the Respondent/plaintiff alleging continued violation of the injunction order. The Respondent submitted a statement of actual legal costs quantified at Rs. 32 lakhs. However, the learned Single Judge after taking into account the gross turnover of the Appellant of Rs. 3 crores for the AY 2022-23, awarded nominal damages of Rs. 15 lakhs to the Respondent/plaintiff for the wrongful use of the impugned mark for nearly five years. No separate order for costs was passed by the learned Single Judge.
10. In our considered opinion the award of nominal damages of Rs. 15 lakhs was warranted in the facts of this case as the adoption of the impugned mark by an ex-employee is clearly dishonest and aimed at riding over the goodwill and reputation of the Respondent’s mark. Learned Single Judge has referred to the relevant facts at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order for determining the award of damages at Rs. 15 lakhs. We find Signing no ground for interfering in the said award of damages which are nominal considering that the Appellant continued using the deceptively similar mark from 2018 to 2023 and profited from the same.
11. We are informed that the Appellants have, to date, not paid the said amount of Rs. 15 lakhs. We also note that no interest has been awarded on the aforesaid amount and therefore the Appellant is not suffering any disadvantage for not making the said payment. The decree was passed on 23.02.2024 and has not been satisfied till date.
12. Accordingly, the Appellants are directed to pay the sum of Rs. 15 lakhs within a period of two [‘2’] weeks from today. In the event of failure to do so, the Appellants shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the said amount of Rs. 15 lakhs, with effect from 23.02.2024.
13. The decree shall stand modified to the extent of the aforesaid directions. The registry is directed to draw up a modified decree in accordance with this order.
14. The appeal is dismissed on merits and for delay.
15. All pending applications stand disposed of.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J