Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 19.05.2026
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Syed Abdul Haseeb, CGSC with Ms. Narreen Khatoon, GP, Mr. Syed Abdur Rahman and Mr. Muhammad Aamir Khan, Advs.
Through: Mr. Kirtiman Singh, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ashish Prasad, Ms. Mukta Datta, Mr. Atri Roy Chaudhary and
Mr. Harish Jain, Advs.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA TEJAS KARIA, J. (Oral)
JUDGMENT
1. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the order dated 22.12.2025 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(CRL) 4257/2025 (“Writ Petition”), whereby the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent was disposed of with a direction to Appellant No. 2 to consider the Respondent’s application for renewal of Passport afresh, in accordance with law, without insisting upon a court-specified validity period.
2. The Respondent filed the Writ Petition seeking direction to Appellant No. 2 for renewing the Passport for ten years as per Rule 12 of the Passport Rules, 1980 (“Rules”).
3. The Respondent is an accused in Summons Case being COMA NO. 259/2024, which is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram (“JFMC”) based on a complaint filed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gurugram under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Forest Act,
1927. The said proceedings before the learned JFMC have been stayed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
4. The Respondent contended in the Writ Petition that Appellant No. 2 renewed the Respondent’s Passport for a period of one (1) year instead of ten (10) years, as mandated under the Passports Act, 1967 (“Act”) read with the Rules by placing reliance on notification No. G.S.R 570(E) dated 25.08.1993 (“Notification”) issued by Appellant No. 1. According to the Respondent, the Notification issued under Section 22(a) of the Act puts obligation on the Court to decide the tenure of issuance / renewal of a Passport of a person, who is accused in a pending criminal proceeding although the Act and the Rules are silent on such power.
5. The Respondent relied upon the decision in Kaushalya Devi v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., CRL.M.C. 3166/2025, wherein it has been held that the Notification does not bind the Courts inasmuch as it goes beyond the parent statute by imposing obligation on the Courts to decide the tenure of issuance / renewal of the Passport when the Act read with the Rules do not prescribe such a requirement.
6. The learned JMFC vide orders dated 27.08.2025 and 01.10.2025 granted ‘No Objection’ to the Respondent for renewing his Passport and has permitted the Respondent to travel abroad. Further, the learned JFMC directed Appellant No. 2 to renew the Respondent’s Passport ‘as per rules’.
7. The learned Single Judge in the Impugned Order observed that this Court in Kaushalya Devi (supra) has already held that neither the Act nor the Rules provide for a requirement to obtain a specific direction from the competent Court prescribing the tenure for renewal of a Passport on the ground that the Respondent is an accused in a pending criminal proceeding. Therefore, it was held that Appellant No. 2 cannot insist upon a courtspecified validity period for renewal.
8. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the learned JFMC has taken the same view upon a request made by the Respondent that the Court has no authority to direct renewal of a Passport for any specified tenure and the Passport authorities are required to act in accordance with the applicable rules.
9. The Impugned Order also records that the Respondent has been granted bail and there is no restriction on his travel. In any event, the learned JFMC has granted ‘No Objection’ for renewal of the Respondent’s Passport and also granted permission to travel abroad. Accordingly, relying upon Kaushalya Devi (supra), the Writ Petition was disposed of with a direction to Appellant No. 2 to consider the Respondent’s application for renewal of the Passport afresh, in accordance with law, without insisting upon a courtspecified validity period.
10. The Appellants have challenged the Impugned Order on the ground that the same is contrary to public policy and the Notification. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the Notification, in conjunction with Section 22 of the Act, confers discretionary powers upon the Court to evaluate the validity of Passport, while considering the needs of the accused in relation to the trial. It was further submitted that if the Court opts not to exercise this power, the Passport will be issued for a period of one (1) year.
11. The learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that for issuance of Passport for more than one (1) year, it is mandatorily required for the Court to ascertain the tenure, for which the Passport should be issued as per the discretion of the Court.
12. The learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that Section 22 of the Act empowers the Central Government to grant exemption to any individual or class of individuals from enforcement of any provision of the Act or the Rules by issuing a notification in accordance with the prescribed conditions, and in exercise of such power, the Notification has been issued, which provides for the requirement for permission from the Court with regard to the conditions that govern the validity of Passport.
13. Learned counsel for the Appellants further submitted that, although a Passport ordinarily remains valid for a period of ten (10) years from the date of its issue, where any person or class of persons is granted an exemption, the entitlement to such passport stands regulated by the specific terms and conditions contained in the relevant exemption notification. It was contended that, once such exemption is invoked to relax the statutory embargo contained in Section 6(2)(f) of the Act, the validity of the passport may lawfully be curtailed in accordance with the conditions so prescribed.
14. Learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that Section 7 of the Act empowers the Passport Authority to issue a Passport for a period shorter than the prescribed duration, thereby indicating that validity for ten (10) years is not an immutable mandate but the general rule, subject to statutory exceptions. It was further contended that the Notification, read conjointly with Section 22 of the Act, makes it incumbent upon the Court to determine the period of validity of the Passport.
15. Learned counsel for the Appellants further placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India & Anr., Neutral Citation: 2025:INSC:1476, wherein it was observed that the Notification recognizes that persons facing criminal proceedings are not to be regarded as absolutely disentitled to a Passport. Rather, such persons may obtain a Passport, notwithstanding Section 6(2)(f) of the Act, where the concerned criminal court has applied its mind and passed an order with respect to the issuance or use of the Passport, and the applicant furnishes an undertaking to appear before the Court as and when required. It was also observed that, where the Court specifies the period for which the passport is to be issued, the Passport Authority is bound to honour the same; however, where no such period is stipulated, the Notification provides default rules, including issuance for a shorter period, ordinarily one (1) year, in appropriate cases.
16. On the aforesaid basis, learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that, in the absence of any stipulation by the learned JFMC, the default rule would operate, and the passport could be issued only for a period of one (1) year. It was, accordingly, prayed that the Impugned Order be set aside.
17. In response, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that, in view of the law laid down in Kaushalya Devi (supra), there is no requirement in law for the Court to specify the duration for which the passport is to be renewed. It was further submitted that the decision in Mahesh Kumar (supra) does not lay down that, in the absence of such specification by the Court, the passport can be issued only for one (1) year.
18. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that, vide email dated 29.01.2026, Appellant No. 2 informed the Respondent that his case would be considered afresh pursuant to the Impugned Order and called upon him to submit a fresh application for renewal of the passport and comply with the requisite formalities. It was contended that, in view of the said communication, Appellant No. 2 had accepted the Impugned Order and, therefore, could not now assail the same in the present Appeal.
19. We have heard the learned Counsel for the Parties.
20. The statutory framework of the Act and the Rules that is relevant for this Appeal are as under: Sections 6, 7 and 22 of the Act:
Government or the passport authority which issues the passport: Provided that the total life of a diplomatic or an official passport shall be ten years from the date of its issue. [(7) The passport for Haj pilgrims shall be valid for a period of eight month from the date of issue.]”
21. The Notification relied upon by the Appellants provides that: “G.S.R. 570(E). – In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 22 of the Passports Act 1967 (15 of 1967) and in suppression of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of External Affairs No. G.S.R. 298(E), dated the 14th April, 1976, the Central Government, being of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest to do so, hereby exempts citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by them are pending before a criminal court in India and who produce orders from the court concerned permitting them to depart from India, from the operation of the provisions of Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the said Act, subject to the following conditions, namely:- (a) the passport to be issued to every such citizen shall be issued—
(i) for the period specified in order of the court referred to above, if the court specifies a period for which the passport has to be issued; or
(ii) if no period either for the issue of the passport or for the travel abroad is specified in such order, the passport shall be issued for a period of one year;
(iii) if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period less than one year, but does not specify the period validity of the passport, the passport shall be issued for one year; or
(iv) if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period exceeding one year, and does not specify the validity of the passport, then the passport shall be issued for the period of travel abroad specified in the order. (b) any passport issued in terms of (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above can be further renewed for one year at a time, provided the applicant has not travelled abroad for the period sanctioned by the court; and no period further than, in the meantime, the order of the court is not cancelled or modified;
(c) any passport issued in terms of (a) (i) above can be further renewed on the basis of a fresh court order specifying a further period of validity of the passport or specifying a period for travel abroad;
(d) the said citizen shall give an undertaking in writing to the passport issuing authority that he shall, if required by the court concerned, appear before it at any time during the continuance in force of the passport so issued.”
22. The Appellants have assailed the Impugned Order principally on the ground that, in the absence of any period being specified by the Court before which the criminal proceedings are pending, Appellant No. 2 lacks the authority to renew the Passport for a period exceeding one (1) year.
23. This Court, in Kaushalya Devi (supra), has held that the Notification does not bind the Courts and that, once the Court has declined to curtail the Respondent’s right and has left the matter to be governed by the statutory framework, Appellant No. 2 is required to apply the law as it stands, without importing any constraint regarding the duration of extension of the Passport by placing reliance upon the Notification.
24. Accordingly, since the learned JFMC has granted ‘No Objection’ to the renewal of the Respondent’s Passport, has permitted the Respondent to travel abroad, and has directed Appellant No. 2 to renew the Passport in accordance with the Rules, the stand of the Appellants that no power exists to renew the Passport beyond a period of one (1) year is wholly misconceived.
25. Section 6(2)(f) of the Act stipulates that the Passport Authority shall refuse to issue a Passport where proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant are pending before a criminal court in India.
26. Section 7 of the Act provides that a Passport shall be issued for such duration as may be prescribed, subject to the proviso that a Passport may be issued for a shorter period than the prescribed period where the Passport Authority, for reasons to be communicated in writing to the applicant, considers it appropriate so to do.
27. Section 22 of the Act provides that the Central Government may, by notification, exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder, where it is of the opinion that such exemption is necessary or expedient in the public interest.
28. Rule 12 of the Rules provides that an ordinary Passport shall ordinarily be valid for a period of ten (10) years from the date of its issue. Consequently, a Passport issued under Section 7 of the Act would ordinarily be valid for a period of ten (10) years, unless the Passport Authority, for reasons to be communicated in writing to the applicant, considers it fit to issue the same for a shorter duration.
29. By virtue of the Notification, citizens of India against whom criminal proceedings are pending before a criminal court in India, and who produce an order of the concerned Court permitting them to depart from India, stand exempted from the operation of Section 6(2)(f) of the Act, subject to the conditions specified therein. One such condition is that, where the Court specifies the period for which the Passport is to be issued, the Passport shall be issued for the period so specified. The Notification further provides that, where no period for the issuance of the Passport is specified in the Court’s order, the Passport shall be issued for a period of one (1) year.
30. This Court in Kaushalya Devi (supra) has held that: “9. The Passports Act, 1967 is a complete code that governs the issuance, denial, impounding, and renewal of passports. Section 6(2)(f) of the Act empowers the Passport Authority to refuse issuance or renewal of a passport where criminal proceedings are pending against the applicant, unless the Court has granted permission to travel. The said provision reads as follows: “6. Refusal of passports, travel documents, etc.— (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the passport authority shall refuse to issue a passport or travel document for visiting any foreign country under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 5 on any one or more of the following grounds, and on no other ground, namely:— xxx … xxx … xxx (f) that proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant are pending before a criminal court in India;”
10. The afore-noted provision focuses entirely on the permissibility of travel, not on the duration of the passport to be granted. However, by way of the notification dated 25th August, 1993, the Government has exempted the operation of the afore-noted provision for citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of an offence alleged who have been committed by them are pending before a Criminal Court in India. For availing this exemption, citizens are required to produce orders from the Court concerned permitting them to depart from India. The insistence on specific directions from the Court for determining the duration of a passport is neither premised in the parent statute nor supported by any Rules framed thereunder. The Passports Act does not contain any provision that empowers the Court to adjudicate on such administrative matters.
11. While the notification dated 25th August, 1993 purports to be issued under Section 22(a) of the Passports Act, it cannot be read as imposing binding conditions on the Court. Section 22(a) merely empowers the Central Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of the provisions of the Passports Act or any Rule framed thereunder. It does not empower the Government to impose a new regime of conditions for passport issuance where the parent statute is silent. The notification, in essence, goes beyond exemption and creates a positive obligation on Courts to specify validity periods and imposes contingent restrictions where no such requirement exists under the statute.
12. The practice of requiring a Court order specifying the duration of the renewed passport is, at best, an internal administrative measure, and cannot be read as having the force of law. The Court’s role in the passport issuance or renewal process is limited to ensuring that the individual seeking a passport has not been prohibited from leaving the country under specific orders of the Court, such as bail conditions. However, beyond this, the Court is not required to intervene in determining the duration of a passport’s validity. In the present case, the Trial Court discharged its limited judicial function in accordance with law by declining to impose any embargo on the renewal of passport and requiring the Petitioner to seek prior leave to travel as per the statute. The interpretation placed by the Passport Authorities on the 1993 notification, as requiring a court-specified validity period, is plainly inconsistent with the Passports Act. The power to determine such administrative details, particularly the validity period, remains exclusively with the Passport Authorities under the Passports Act and the Rules framed thereunder and is not dependent on judicial directives unless the Court has itself curtailed the rights of the individual.
13. It is well established that delegated legislation cannot transgress the limits of the enabling statute. The Supreme Court in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India, observed that “a delegated legislation or a subordinate legislation must conform exactly to the power granted.”. In Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Others, the Supreme Court reiterated held that while rules and notifications issued under delegated authority may be presumed valid, they must not override or supplement the parent Act. A notification cannot be treated as a source of substantive obligations unless the statute itself clearly permits such delegation.
14. The notification effectively introduces a regime where Courts are expected to pronounce on the period of passport validity, and if they refrain from doing so, the citizen’s entitlement is curtailed to one year, regardless of the circumstances. This is wholly inconsistent with the legislative scheme of the Passports Act. If Parliament had intended that Courts determine the term of validity for a passport where criminal proceedings are pending, it would have clearly articulated so under the Act. In its current form, the notification seeks to insert by executive fiat what the legislature has consciously omitted. It is a settled principle that delegated legislation cannot supplement primary law where the statute is silent.
15. The notification cannot be treated as binding on Courts or interpreted as modifying the scheme of the Act. The order of the Trial Court in the present case has, in fact, correctly recognised this position. By stating that there is no objection to the Petitioner applying for renewal “as per rules,” the Court has rightly left it to the Passport Authority to decide the matter in accordance with the law. There is no warrant for reading into this order any implied limitation or default tenure of one year. Once the Court has declined to restrict the Petitioner’s right and left the matter to the statutory framework, the Passport Office must apply the law as it stands and consider the Petitioner’s application without invoking any artificial constraint introduced by the 1993 notification.
16. This Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to clarify that notification may serve as a general administrative guideline, it cannot override the provisions of the parent statute, nor can it impose any obligation upon the Courts to pronounce on the tenure of a passport. The judicial function is to assess whether a person ought to be restrained from travelling abroad on account of pending proceedings. If the Court imposes no such restriction, and merely states that travel abroad shall require prior permission, the Passport Authority must proceed in accordance with law, treating the application for renewal on its merits. The validity period of the passport is to be governed by the Passports Act and the Passport Rules, not by the absence of a court-imposed tenure.”
31. In view of the foregoing, it is not mandatory for the Court to specify the duration for renewal of the Passport since the Notification cannot override the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Where the Court has not imposed any restriction in regard to the duration for renewal of the Passport, the Passport Authority is obliged to consider the application for renewal in accordance with law and on its own merits, and the period of validity shall be governed by the Act and the Rules.
32. The Supreme Court in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) has observed that: “On a plain reading, GSR 570(E) does two things. First, it recognises that persons facing criminal proceedings are not to be treated as absolutely disentitled to a passport. Instead, it permits such persons to obtain a passport, notwithstanding Section 6(2)(f), where the concerned criminal court has applied its mind and passed an order in relation to issuance or use of the passport and where the applicant furnishes an undertaking to appear before the court as and when required. Secondly, it structures the exercise of that exemption by tying the validity and use of the passport to the terms of the court's order. Thus, where the court specifies a period for which the passport is to be issued, the passport authority must honour that period. Where the court does not stipulate any period, the notification provides default rules, including issuance for a shorter period, ordinarily one year, in appropriate cases. What the notification does not do is to create a new substantive bar beyond Section 6(2)(f), or to insist that the criminal court must, in every case, grant a prior blanket permission to “depart from India” for specified dates as a jurisdictional precondition to the very issue or re-issue of a passport.”
33. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the Appellants to argue that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed that where the Court has not specified any period, the renewal can only be for a period of one (1) year is also misconceived as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has only recorded the provisions of the Notification by stating that in appropriate case, the Passport Authority has power to issue the Passport for a shorter duration as well.
34. In view of the above, the decision in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) does not lay down that, in the absence of a court-specified period, the Passport Authority is denuded of the power to renew a Passport for a period exceeding one (1) year. The legal position, as enunciated in Kaushalya Devi (supra), is unequivocal that where the Court has not specified any duration, the renewal of the Passport must be considered strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
35. The Impugned Order, likewise, proceeds on the basis of the law laid down in Kaushalya Devi (supra) and correctly holds that the Respondent’s Passport is liable to be renewed in accordance with law, without insistence upon any court-specified period of validity. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the Impugned Order correctly reiterates the position in law and warrants no interference.
36. Accordingly, the present Appeal dismissed.
37. Since we find that the Appeal was entirely misconceived, we deem it appropriate to impose a cost of Rs. 20,000 to be paid to the Delhi High Court Bar Clerks’ Association, A/c No.15530100006282, IFSC Code: UCBA0001553, UCO Bank, Delhi High Court.
TEJAS KARIA, J DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ MAY 19, 2026 ap/sms