Delhi Development Authority v. Mohd. Hakim Khan

13. Ms. Mukim’s contention is that the period of four years should be reckoned from the date when the complaint dated 27 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 was received by the DDA, as it was only on that date that the DDA acquired knowledge of the commission of the act of misconduct.

14. The Tribunal has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Mohd. Idris Ansari[5], which clearly holds that the period of four years is to be reckoned from the date when the event took place.

15. The relevant paragraphs from Mohd. Idris Ansari may be reproduced as under: “10. So far as the second type of cases are concerned the proof of grave misconduct on the part of the government servant concerned during his service tenure will have to be culled out by the revisional authority from the departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings which might have taken place during his service tenure or from departmental proceedings which may be initiated even after his retirement in such type of cases. But such departmental proceedings will have to comply with the requirements of Rule 43(b). Consequently a retired government servant can be found guilty of grave misconduct during his service career pursuant to the departmental proceedings conducted against him even after his retirement, but such proceedings could be initiated in connection with only such misconduct which might have taken place within 4 years of the initiation of such departmental proceedings against him. In the present case, the respondent retired on 31-1-1993 and the show-cause notice was issued on the ground of grave misconduct on 27-9-1993 and not on the ground that service record of the pensioner was not thoroughly satisfactory. It was issued by the State Government as sanctioning authority. It had, therefore, to be read with Rule 43(b). Such notice therefore, could cover any misconduct if committed within 4 years prior to 27-9-1993 meaning thereby it should have been committed during the period from 26-9-1989 up to 31-1-1993 when the respondent retired. Only in case of such a misconduct, departmental proceedings could have been initiated against the respondent under Rule 43(b). In such proceedings, if he was found guilty of misconduct he could have been properly proceeded against under Rule 139(a) and (b). On the facts of the present case it must be held, agreeing with the High Court that the notice dated 27-9-1993 invoking powers under Rule 139(a) and (b) was issued wholly on the ground of alleged past misconduct and was not based on the ground that service record of the respondent was not thoroughly satisfactory. So far as that ground was concerned, on a 1995 Supp (3) SCC 56 conjoint reading of Rule 43(b) and Rule 139(a) there is no escape from the conclusion that as the alleged misconduct was committed by the respondent prior to 4 years from the date on which the show-cause notice dated 27-9-1993 was issued, the appellant authority had no power to invoke Rule 139(a) and (b) against the respondent on the ground of proved misconduct. Consequently, it had to be held that proceedings under Rule 139 were wholly incompetent. The High Court was equally justified in quashing the final order dated 13-12-1993 as there is no proof of such a misconduct. No question of remanding the proceedings under Rule 139(a) and (b) would survive as the alleged grave misconduct could not be established in any departmental proceedings after the expiry of four years from 1986-87, as such proceedings would be clearly barred by Rule 43(b) proviso (a)(ii). Consequently the show-cause notice dated 27-9-1993 will have to be treated as stillborn and ineffective from its inception. Such a notice cannot be resorted to for supporting any fresh proceedings by way of remand. For all these reasons no case is made for our interference in this appeal. In the result appeal fails and is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.” (Emphasis supplied)

16. Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules,1950, which was under consideration in Mohd Idris Ansari, was pari materia with Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, and read thus:

6. Having given our anxious considerations to these rival contentions, we find that the decision of the High Court on the facts of the present case is unexceptionable. The earlier notice dated 17-7- 1993 by which fresh departmental proceedings were sought to be initiated was rightly quashed by the High Court as it was based on the alleged misconduct of the respondent during 1986-87 which was more than four years prior to the issue of the said notice. Such a notice seeking to initiate fresh departmental proceedings after the retirement of the respondent, was clearly hit by the proviso to sub-rule (b) of Rule 43 of the Rules. Rule 43(b) reads as under: “(b) The State Government further reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct; or to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on re-employment after retirement: Provided that — (a) such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment;

(i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the

(ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings; and

(iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place or places as the State Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to proceedings on which an order of dismissal from service may be made;”

17. The specific ground urged by Ms. Mukim before us, already stands advanced before a Division Bench of this Court and emphatically rejected, in MCD v. Bhagwan Dass[6].

18. In the judgment rendered in that case, authored by Dr. A.K. Sikri, J. (as he then was), the Division Bench of this Court has specifically held that the express words of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules could not be diluted by the Court. We may reproduce, in this context, paras 4 and 5 of the judgment as under:

19. We are, therefore, unable to fault the Tribunal in holding that the charge-sheet, having been issued to the respondent in respect of an event which took place more than four years prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet, the proceedings were vitiated ab initio.

20. The date of acquisition of knowledge of the event is irrelevant, as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court.

21. Ms. Mukim submits, at this juncture, that an FIR was lodged against the respondent on 21 December 2015.

22. We are completely at a loss as to how this is of any relevance. The period of four years, under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii), reckons from the date when the event constituting the misconduct took place. It does not commence either from the date of acquisition of knowledge of the event by the disciplinary authority, or from the date of institution of AIR 2006 SC 207 any criminal proceedings against him.

23. As a result, the writ petition is bereft of merit and is therefore, dismissed in limine.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. MAY 19, 2026