Alok Yadav v. State of NCT of Delhi

13. Further, Section 6 of the POCSO Act prescribes punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault committed upon a child. The said provision reads as follows: ―6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.— (1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death. (2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.‖

14. Lastly, Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, being the presumptive provisions relevant to the adjudication of the present case, are also required to be considered. The said provisions read as under: ―29. Presumption as to certain offences. Where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under sections 3, 5, 7 and section 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be unless the contrary is proved.‖ ―30. Presumption of culpable mental state. (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. (2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. Explanation.– In this section, ―culpable mental state‖ includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.‖ Age of the Victim

15. Firstly, insofar as the age of the victim is concerned, this Court notes that the prosecution has led evidence to establish that the victim was a minor at the relevant time. PW-3, Dr. Pramod Kumar Mishra, Principal/In-charge, Composite Ucch Prathmic Vidyalya, Bairi, Ganesh Pur, Shiksha Chhetra Jahangir Ganj, had produced the school admission register and proved the entry relating to the victim‘s date of birth as 30.11.2007. The learned Trial Court has rightly recorded that on the basis of the said testimony, the date of birth of the victim stands proved, and that the offence in question was committed during the period 2017 to 2018, and therefore, the victim was only about 10 to 11 years of age at the relevant time. Significantly, the testimony of PW-3 has remained unchallenged, since the accused persons did not cross-examine the said witness on any aspect, despite opportunity given nor was any argument was raised to dispute either the authenticity of the school records or the fact of the victim being a minor at the time of alleged incident.

16. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has duly proved that the victim was a child within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act at the time of the commission of the offences. Thus, the provisions of the POCSO Act stand fully attracted in the present case. Therefore, in this regard the findings of the learned Trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. Appreciation of Prosecution Evidence

17. In the above backdrop, this Court finds that it has been a consistent case of the prosecution, as evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, that in August 2017, the victim child, along with the co-accused/mother ‗K‘, her father (PW-4), and her other siblings, had come to Delhi and had started living in a rented accommodation at Jasola, Sarita Vihar. The biological father of the prosecutrix had started working as security guard while the coaccused/mother ‗K‘ had joined Apollo Hospital, Delhi. Further, as alleged, the accused/appellant Alok had played an instrumental role in securing employment for both of them in Delhi, and he used to reside in the same building in Delhi as that of the family of the victim.

18. PW-1, the victim child, who was examined by the learned Trial Court, has deposed that the appellant Alok used to often visit the house of the victim, both when her father (PW-4) used to be present in the house and in his absence. However, insofar as the alleged incidents are concerned, the victim child has deposed that the same used to take place in the absence of her father, when he used to be at his place of work. She has specifically deposed that the appellant used to remove her clothes, touch her private parts and insert his penis into her vagina. She has also deposed that upon her protesting to such acts, the appellant used to threaten her by saying that her father and brother would be killed if she disclosed about these incidents to anyone. Pertinently, she has also highlighted the role of the co-accused/mother ‗K‘, in facilitating the commission of the said offence. In her testimony, she has categorically stated that the co-accused ‗K‘ used to silence her voice whenever she raised an alarm, beat her and instead asked her to let the the appellant do whatever he was doing, saying that ―ye sab nahi hoga to ghar ka kharch kaise chalega‖. She has further deposed that the appellant used to rape her during the day time as well as in the night, regardless of whether her mother was awake or asleep. She also testified that the co-accused ‗K‘ used to sleep beside the appellant, and the appellant used to sleep between her and the co-accused ‗K‘. She also stated that she had disclosed these incidents to her grandmother, bua and chacha and thereafter, she was brought to Delhi for lodging the FIR. In her cross-examination, she has clarified that on the said bed, four people used to sleep and the sequence of the same was – the victim, appellant Alok, co-accused ‗K‘, and the victim‘s brother. She also clarified that her father had taken her to his village in October 2018.

19. Having considered the testimony of PW-1, the testimony of PW-2, i.e. the victim‘s grandmother, reflects that she was the first person who had been informed of the alleged incidents by the victim. She has deposed that her son (PW-4), along with his wife (co-accused ‗K‘) and two children including the victim, had shifted to Delhi in August 2017. PW-2 has stated that she was seriously ill since November 2017 and was diagnosed with cancer in February 2019, whereafter she remained continuously ill and had to be operated upon twice. In the meantime, in October 2018, the victim had been sent to her maternal grandmother‘s home first, after which she was brought to the home of PW-2 i.e. her paternal grandmother. PW-2 has deposed that her medical situation remained critical till November– December 2019, as she was undergoing chemotherapy; and thereafter, when she had asked the victim child to return to Delhi at the residence of her parents, the victim had informed her of the alleged incidents of commission of sexual assault upon her by the appellant Alok and co-accused ‗K‘. Thereafter, PW-2 had called the victim‘s father and informed him about the details disclosed by the victim. As deposed by PW-2, it was pursuant thereto that she along with her husband (PW-6), the victim (PW-1), and the victim‘s father (PW-4), had reached Delhi on 18.01.2020 and reported the incident to the police.

20. At this stage, it would be material to take note of the testimony of the grandfather of the victim, who was examined as PW-6 before the Trial Court. In his testimony, he has narrated the sequence of events, which corroborates the version of his wife, i.e. the victim‘s grandmother. He has specifically deposed that he had brought the victim child from the house of her maternal grandmother, to his home, and that his wife i.e. PW-2 had been informed by the victim of the acts committed by the appellant Alok as well as the co-accused ‗K‘s role therein. Furthermore, as deposed by him, they had informed the victim‘s father about the facts disclosed by the victim child and thereafter, four of them had come to Delhi to lodge the FIR in question.

21. Now, the fourth material witness, whose testimony is to be considered, is PW-4 i.e. the father of the victim child. He is also the complainant in the case, at whose instance the FIR was registered. He has supported the prosecution‘s case and has deposed that he was informed by his mother (i.e. PW-2) that the victim child had disclosed to her that she had been sexually abused by the appellant, in the presence of the co-accused ‗K‘. Thereafter, he had come to Delhi along with his parents and the victim child and had got the FIR registered.

22. Thus, the broad facts and allegations, as clearly emerging from the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW-6 are that: ● The appellant was closely associated with the family of the victim who had won their trust as he had been instrumental in getting employment to the parents of the victim, lived in the same building, and frequently visited the house of the victim. ● The appellant was having consensual sexual relations with the victim‘s mother (co-accused ‗K‘), and that the victim‘s mother and the appellant used to sleep beside her on the same bed, with the appellant sleeping between the victim and co-accused ‗K‘. ● The victim (PW-1) has categorically alleged that the appellant repeatedly committed penetrative sexual assault on her, at her home in Delhi, whenever her father was away for work. ● The victim has further deposed that her mother (co-accused ‗K‘), facilitated the commission of offence by silencing her, beating her when she resisted, and telling her to let the appellant do as he wished since otherwise, they would not be able to meet household expenses. ● The victim left Delhi in October 2018; first stayed with her maternal grandmother, and thereafter was brought to the house of her paternal grandparents. ● During this period, her grandmother (PW-2) was seriously ill and was undergoing treatment for cancer; later, when the grandmother asked the victim to return to her parents‘ house in Delhi, the victim disclosed the incidents of sexual assault committed upon her by the accused persons. ● The victim‘s grandmother (PW-2) subsequently disclosed the incidents to her husband i.e. victim‘s grandfather (PW-6), who corroborated in his testimony that PW-2 had informed him of the disclosures made by the victim. ● Both grandparents thereafter informed the victim‘s father (PW- 4), following which all three of them brought the victim to Delhi on 18.01.2020 and got the FIR registered.

23. The above-noted prosecution witnesses were cross-examined at length, and several questions were put to them to impeach their testimony. However, despite some minor contradictions, their testimonies have remained firm and consistent on the material aspects of the prosecution‘s case.

24. The victim, both in her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. as well as in her testimony recorded before the learned Trial Court, which is considerably detailed, has remained categorical and consistent that she was subjected to repeated sexual abuse over a period of time by the appellant Alok. She has also consistently alleged that her mother ‗K‘, was fully aware of such acts being committed by the present appellant, yet instead of intervening, she chose to scold and beat her whenever she protested.

25. Thus, in view of the testimonies discussed above, a prima facie case stands established by the prosecution. Consequently, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act would be attracted against the appellant herein, shifting the burden upon him to rebut the same with cogent material/evidence. Defense of Accused

26. The accused persons, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the allegations levelled against them. Co-accused ‗K‘, in her statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., alleged that PW-6, i.e. the victim‘s grandfather, had been insisting that she enter into sexual relations with him and that, upon her refusal, she had been falsely implicated in the present case. In contrast, the present appellant Alok stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was in a consensual sexual relationship with co-accused ‗K‘, and that her husband (PW-4) was aware of the same, owing to which he had falsely implicated him.

27. However, this Court notes that during the cross-examination of PW-4 (victim‘s father), he had categorically denied the suggestion put to him by the defense counsel that the appellant Alok had been falsely implicated on account of any alleged intimate relationship between him and co-accused ‗K‘. Further, insofar as the allegations levelled by co-accused ‗K‘ against PW-6 are concerned, this Court also notes that no such suggestion was ever put to PW-6 during his cross-examination. Thus, the defence sought to be raised by the accused persons is clearly unsupported by any material brought on record. This Court also notes that the accused persons had adopted mutually contradictory stands before the learned Trial Court. While co-accused ‗K‘ attempted to attribute false implication in the present case to the conduct of PW-6, the present appellant attributed the same to the alleged matrimonial discord arising out of his purported relationship with co-accused ‗K‘. In this Court‘s opinion, these inconsistent defences, taken by the accused persons inter se, materially weaken the credibility of their case. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant Alok did not lead any defence evidence in support of his case.

28. In contrast, the statements of the victim have remained consistent on all material particulars/aspects throughout the proceedings and are also corroborated by the testimonies of PW-2, PW-4, and PW-6 regarding the details of the incidents of the sexual assault, disclosed by the victim and the surrounding circumstances. No cogent evidence was led by the appellant to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. Apart from bare denial, no substantive defence was raised, nor was any defence witness examined in support of the case set up by the appellant.

29. The learned counsel for the appellant herein has contended that the victim child had failed to disclose the alleged incidents at the earliest possible opportunity. However, in the opinion of this Court, the delay in this disclosure does not affect the credibility of the prosecution‘s case. At the relevant time, the victim was barely around 10-11 years of age, living in an environment where the very person expected to protect her i.e. her own mother was instead facilitating the appellant in committing the offence in question. In such circumstances, it would be wholly unrealistic to expect a child of such tender age to muster the courage to promptly disclose the repeated sexual abuse she was subjected to. Her eventual disclosure to her grandmother and thereafter to other family members, when she found a safe environment away from the accused persons, appears to be both natural and credible. Thus, the delayed disclosure of incidents of sexual assault made by the victim child cannot be treated as an infirmity in the prosecution‘s case.

30. In addition, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the delay of more than a year in registration of FIR makes the prosecution‘s case doubtful. This Court however finds that the delay has been satisfactorily explained in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. It stands established that PW-2, the grandmother of the victim, to whom the victim first disclosed the incidents, was herself seriously ill, suffering from cancer, and undergoing surgeries and chemotherapy during the relevant period. PW-6, the grandfather of the victim, was primarily occupied in taking care of her. The complainant PW-4 (victim‘s father) was wholly unaware of the incidents of sexual assault until he was informed by PW-2. PW-2 was informed about the incidents by the victim child as soon as her medical condition had improved, and especially when the victim was asked to return to her parents‘ house in Delhi. Thereafter, the present FIR came to be registered.

31. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that delay in disclosure and delay in registration of FIR, particularly in cases of sexual assault upon children, must be considered in the light of the sensitivities involved. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar: (2017) 2 SCC 51, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has observed as under: ―30…..At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the realities of life as well. Various studies show that in more than 80% cases of such abuses, perpetrators have acquaintance with the victims who are not strangers. The danger is more within than outside. Most of the time, acquaintance rapes, when the culprit is a family member, are not even reported for various reasons, not difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is the fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor which many times prevents such victims or their families to lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of criminal justice system extremely intimidating coupled with absence of victim protection mechanism…‖

32. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and considering the family dynamics, fear and trauma which the victim must have endured, and her vulnerable age, this Court finds that the delay in registration of the FIR is fully explained and does not in any way corrode the credibility of the prosecution case.

33. Another contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the victim had materially improved her statement regarding the bed on which she used to sleep with the appellant and co-accused ‗K‘. It has been argued that she had initially described it as a single bed and had later clarified it to be a double bed. This Court finds that such a discrepancy is minor and insignificant in nature. The testimony of a child witness cannot be expected to be accurate in such minute details, especially when she was recounting traumatic events from an impressionable age. At that age, it is highly probable that she would not have known or understood the distinction between a single and a double bed. What is material is that she has consistently deposed that she used to sleep on the same bed with the appellant and co-accused mother ‗K‘, when the appellant used to commit sexual assault upon her. When weighed against the consistent, cogent, and categorical testimony of the victim, coupled with the corroborative statements of the grandparents and father, such minor discrepancies pale into insignificance. The learned Trial Court has, therefore, rightly rejected this contention of the appellant, and this Court finds no reason to take a different view.

34. Furthermore, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that there is no medical evidence in this case to support the allegations of sexual assault. However, it is material to note that the absence of any medical evidence, such as injuries on the private parts of the victim, is explained by the fact that the victim had disclosed the incidents much later, i.e. more than a year after they had taken place, for the reasons already noted above, to her grandmother, and the FIR was eventually registered in January 2020. By that stage, it was neither possible nor reasonable to expect any medical evidence of injuries etc. to be present. This Court is also of the view that when consistent ocular testimony of the victim child is available, lack of medical evidence can be no ground to discredit her version [Ref: Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1610].

35. Equally relevant is the settled legal principle that conviction on the sole testimony of the victim is sustainable, provided her evidence is of sterling quality, free from material inconsistencies or inherent improbabilities [Ref: State NCT of Delhi v. Pankaj Chaudhary: (2019) 11 SCC 575]. It is also trite law that minor inconsistencies, especially in the testimony of a child victim of sexual assault, do not affect the substratum of the prosecution‘s case. [Ref: State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh: (1996) 2 SCC 384; Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 176]. Conclusion: Case Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

36. In light of the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that the evidence, both oral and documentary, clearly establishes that the victim was a child of tender age at the relevant time and that she was repeatedly subjected to penetrative sexual assault by the present appellant Alok over a considerable period of time. To reiterate, the victim child has consistently deposed that whenever her father used to leave for work, the appellant would commit penetrative sexual assault upon her against her wishes, and would threaten her with dire consequences if she disclosed the incidents to anyone. Her testimony on material particulars has remained clear, cogent, and unshaken throughout the course of trial. The co-accused ‗K‘, mother of the victim child, who was expected to protect and care for the child, instead facilitated the commission of the offences by the appellant. Her conviction has already been upheld by this Court.

37. Therefore, the consistent version of the victim regarding the acts committed by the appellant, coupled with the surrounding circumstances and the testimonies of PW-2, PW-4, and PW-6, clearly establishes that the victim child was subjected to repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault while she was only about 10–11 years of age.

38. It is pertinent to note that once the prosecution had laid the foundational facts by proving the age of the victim, the commission of the sexual acts, and the involvement of the appellant, the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act necessarily came into operation, as already discussed hereinabove. The burden thus shifted upon the appellant to rebut the said presumptions by leading cogent evidence or furnishing a credible explanation. However, no material was brought on record by the appellant to probabilise his defence or to weaken the prosecution case. No defence evidence was led, nor was any circumstance established which could rebut the statutory presumptions operating against him.

39. In this backdrop, this Court is of the considered view that the essential ingredients of the offences alleged stand duly established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim inspires confidence, is natural and trustworthy, and finds adequate corroboration from the surrounding circumstances as well as the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. The minor discrepancies pointed out by the defence are insignificant in nature and do not affect the core of the prosecution‘s case. Thus, this Court finds that the charges for offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act and Section 376AB of IPC are proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant.

40. As regards the quantum of sentence, this Court notes that while the minimum prescribed punishment for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is twenty years and the maximum is imprisonment for life, the learned Trial Court has awarded a sentence of twenty-five years‘ of rigorous imprisonment to the appellant as well as to the coaccused ‗K‘. While doing so, the learned Trial Court has observed that the gravity of the acts committed had caused deep alarm in society and irreparable trauma to the victim; and that, in the interest of justice, a balance has to be maintained between the reformative and deterrent theories of punishment. The learned Trial Court has also emphasized that the extent of punishment must depend on the atrocity of the crime, the conduct of the offenders, and the helpless state of the victim, and that appropriate punishment should reflect not only the rights of the accused but also the rights of the victim and society at large, thereby conveying the community‘s abhorrence of such crimes.

41. This Court is in agreement with the aforesaid observations. Considering the nature of the allegations and the fact that the minor victim child was subjected to repeated sexual assault within the supposed safety of her own home, with the active participation of her mother, no leniency is warranted in the matter while considering the quantum of sentence. The punishment awarded by the learned Trial Court is therefore just, appropriate, and commensurate with the gravity of the offences proved against the appellant.

42. In view of the foregoing observations, the impugned judgment of conviction as well as order on sentence is upheld.

43. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

44. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith. DR.

SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J MAY 25, 2026/TD/RB