MS REVATI CEMENTS PVT. LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR

Delhi High Court · 29 May 2026 · 2026:DHC:5046
Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
W.P.(C) 7871/2026
2026:DHC:1605
administrative petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed a writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction, holding that the dominant cause of action arising outside Delhi precludes jurisdiction despite the Revisional Authority being located in Delhi.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 7871/2026 & CM APPL. 38059/2026
Date of Decision: 26.05.2026 IN THE MATTER OF:
MS REVATI CEMENTS PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Harsh Pathak, Ms. Shaveta Mahajan, Mr. Mohit Choubey, Mr. Aditya Nema, Advs.
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhishek Gupta, CGSC along with Mr. Kumar Kartikeya, Mr. Dhananjay Singh, Mr. Chanakya Kene, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
J U D G E M E N T
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT

1. The instant petition is for the following reliefs: “a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing Respondent No.1 to take up, register and consider the Petitioner’s Revision Application dated 08.05.2026, filed under Section 30 of the MMDR Act, 1957 read with Rules 35 and 36 of the MCR, 2016, against the order dated 02.04.2026 passed by Respondent No.2; b) Direct Respondent No.1 to consider and decide the Petitioner’s Stay Application and Application for Urgent Hearing in a time-bound manner, as may be deemed fit by this Hon’ble Court; c) Direct Respondent No.1 to decide the pending Revision Application expeditiously and within such time as may be fixed by this Hon’ble Court; d) Pass any other or further order(s) which this Hon’ble Court may deem KUMAR KAURAV fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”

2. The Petitioner claims to be the holder of a mining lease for limestone situated in District Satna, Madhya Pradesh.

3. The facts of the case would indicate that aggrieved by the order dated 02.04.2026 declaring the lease as lapsed, the petitioner preferred a revision application before Revisional Authority under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

4. Mr. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, however, contends that as of now, his petition is confined to the directions to the Revisional Authority to decide the revision application with due expedition. He also submits that even his application for stay has remained pending for a considerable period of time. He further submits that the operational mine was closed after six years from the date of issuance of the notice. The same, according to Mr. Pathak is causing great prejudice to the petitioner.

5. The mine in question is admittedly situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the entire dispute substantially pertains to the said mine. The sole reason to approach this Court is that the Revisional Authority is situated in Delhi.

6. The Court, however, finds that merely on account of the Revisional Authority having been situated within the jurisdiction of this Court should not be the sole reason to entertain the writ petition. The material, integral and essential part of cause of action remains outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The prayer which has been sought in the instant writ petition can also be considered by the jurisdictional High Court.

7. The sole reason urged by the Petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is that Respondent No. 1, being a Public Sector Undertaking with its Zonal Office situated at Delhi, issued the Show Cause Notice and the impugned Termination Order from its Delhi office. The underlying subject matter of the contract, however, pertains entirely to LPG transportation operations in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.

8. This Court in The Indure Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi,[1] took note of the decisions in Shristi Udaipur Hotels v. Housing and Urban Development Corp.,[2] Riddhima Singh v. Central Board of Secondary Education,[3] Smt. Manjira Devi Ayurveda Medical College and Hospital v. Uttarakhand University of Ayurveda and Ors.,[4] Michael Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. National Medical Commission and Ors.,[5] which declare that the situs of the head office/registered office of the respondent, does not determine whether the Court has the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition.

9. The Court in The Indure Pvt. Ltd. importantly noted, at para. 36:

“36. A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision of an authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for the said decision lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make this High Court a mini-pan- India Superior Court exercising jurisdiction over all events which take place throughout this Country. There is no gainsaying with the proposition that every High Court is competent to adjudicate upon a lis which arises from events or actions taking place within its territory. Merely because the ultimate order, which is based on events taking place outside Delhi and takes cognizance of actions outside of Delhi, is passed within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition ought not be entertained by this Court.”

2026:DHC:1605.

10. On the issue of a claimant approaching this Court on the sole-ground of the respondent-authority, being situated within the jurisdiction of this Court, it was observed at para. 37-38:

“37. Naturally, being the capital of the Country, various authorities and bodies having pan-India jurisdiction would be located within the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the decision making authority happens to be in Delhi, ought not to be the sole reason to entertain a lis in this Court. The decision, no doubt, may be passed in the national capital, but it is usually against persons situated outside Delhi; and even more importantly, for actions which took place beyond the borders of this Court. The act of giving a hearing in Delhi, or the passing of an order in Delhi, is merely a result of a body/authority being situated in the national capital, it has nothing to do with the lis, the offending action, the legal injury or the foundational facts on the basis of which action is being taken. 38. The case-law cited above, makes repeated reference to “dominant facts”, and facts which are “material, essential and integral” to the lis in question. In most cases, the fact that the order is passed, or the head office is located, or that opportunity of hearing was afforded, within the jurisdiction of this Court is completely immaterial, non-essential, and non- integral to the dispute in question. Any of the aforenoted three aspects could very well have taken place in another part of the Country, it is for the sole reason that Delhi is the national capital, that, in most cases these factors get connected to the jurisdiction of this Court. From another lens, it may be seen that regardless of what the underlying facts or legal injury/infringement may be, the order impugned would, in an overwhelming number of cases be passed from Delhi. If this be the case, can this constant factum, which shall remain present in each case, be considered a “dominant fact” or a “material, essential and integral” fact? The answer must be in the negative.”

11. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the substance of a matter must be adjudged, and not the unchanging constant which is present in every petition against a state-authority, to arrive at a conclusion on whether to entertain a petition in the context of territorial jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. At para. 42 this Court observed: “42. It is the substance of the matter which the Court must consider in determining the connection with Delhi. An order being passed by an authority in Delhi is an unchanging constant. This static/uniform facet, which is unmoved by the nature of the lis, ought not to determine where territorial jurisdiction would lie.”

12. The Division Bench of this Court in M/s Vedanta Ltd. v. Nominated Authority Ministry of Coal, Govt. of India and Ors.[6] has held as under:-

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“41. In Sterling Agro Industries Ltd v. Union of India and Others, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3162, the Full Bench of this Court has held that even if a minuscule part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of a High Court, a writ would be maintainable before that High Court, however that part of cause of action must constitute a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action as laid down in Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 11 SCC 335. It was further held that the location of the appellate or revisional authority alone would not constitute forum convenience as it will vary from case to case and depend upon the lis in question. Therefore, it was held that while exercising the writ jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum convenience and the nature of cause of action are required to be scrutinized by the High Court depending on the factual matrix of each case. ... 46. Therefore, material, essential and dominant cause of action has not arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and, accordingly, the submission of the Appellant that this Court ought to have exercised jurisdiction on the basis of issuance of SCN-III within the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. By issuing SCN-III, no order has been passed and accordingly forum convenience would be in the jurisdictional High Court where the Tribunal is situated. 47. In view of the above, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Impugned Orders. Hence, the Appeal filed by Vedanta being LPA No. 83/2026 along with the pending applications deserves to be dismissed.”

13. The Court finds that the entire genesis of the dispute lies outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The part of cause of action may have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, however, the same should not be the reason to entertain the writ petition.

14. The action which has been taken in Delhi relates to the substance of the cause which lies in outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

15. In view of the above, petition stands dismissed. Liberty is, however, granted in favour of the petitioner to approach the jurisdictional High Court to agitate the instant lis, if so advised.

16. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. MAY 29, 2026/SH/ksr