The Delhi High Court held that once a judgment is pronounced and signed, the court becomes functus officio and cannot stay or keep its own judgment in abeyance, dismissing the application seeking such relief and directing refund of amounts withdrawn against bank guarantees.
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RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 HIGH COURT OF DELHI RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 K K BANSAL .....Appellant Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv. with Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Mr. Naveen Nagarjuna, Mr. Ritik Raghuwanshi, Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Ms. Shreya Mansi James, Mr. Rishika Aggarwal and Mr. Anshu Tulsyan, Advs.
VERSUS
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NV.....Respondent Through: Mr. C M Lall, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Pravin Anand, Ms. Vaishali Mittal, Mr. Siddhant Chamola and Mr. Gursimran Singh Narula, Advs.
RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 RAJESH BANSAL .....Appellant Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv. with Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Mr. Naveen Nagarjuna, Mr. Ritik Raghuwanshi, Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Ms. Shreya Mansi James, Mr. Rishika Aggarwal and Mr. Anshu Tulsyan, Advs.
VERSUS
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N V .....Respondent Through: Mr. C M Lall, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Pravin Anand, Ms. Vaishali Mittal, Mr. Siddhant Chamola and Mr. Gursimran Singh Narula, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA ORDER (ORAL) 26.05.2026
CM APPL. 36039/2026 (Directions) in RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018
JUDGMENT
1. This application seeks a prayer which is foreign to the procedural law known to this Court.
2. The respondent, against whom RFA (OS) (Comm) 17/2018 and RFA (OS) (Comm) 18/2018 have been decided, seeks a decision from this Court to keep the judgment dated 18 May 2026 passed by this Court in abeyance for eight weeks.
3. We are unaware of any provision of law under which the court can pronounce an appellate judgment and decree and thereafter place its own judgment and decree in abeyance, though we are conscious that some Courts have been doing so in the past.
4. It is well settled that, on disposing of an appeal, the appellate court become functus officio. Its province thereafter is restricted only to re-examining the matter in review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, or to correct clerical or arithmetic mistakes under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
5. In Dwaraka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh[1], the Supreme Court clarified the position apropos Section 152 of the CPC thus:
“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise
of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even after passing of effective orders in the lis pending before them. No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order.” The Supreme Court has, therefore, clarified that, after passing of a judgement, decree or order, the Court, under the CPC, becomes functus officio, and that its province thereafter is restricted to reviewing the judgment, if the parameters of review jurisdiction are satisfied, or correcting clerical or arithmetical errors or omissions. Indiscriminate use of Section 151 of the CPC by Courts to tinker with judgments rendered by them, and in respect of which they have become functus officio, has been seriously criticized.
6. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “functus officio” as “having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority”. This definition has approvingly been cited, by the Supreme Court, in State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal[2] in which, apropos the stage at which a judicial authority becomes functus officio, it was held thus:
“28. We may first refer to the position with reference to civil courts. Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with judgment and decree. Rule 1 explains when a judgment is pronounced. Sub-rule (1) provides that the court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in an open court either at once, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the court shall fix a day for that purpose of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. Sub-rule (3) provides that the judgment may be pronounced by dictation in an open court to a shorthand writer [if the Judge is specially empowered in this behalf]. The proviso thereto provides that where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open court, the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall, after making such corrections as may be necessary, be signed by the Judge, bear the date on which it was pronounced and form a part of the record. Rule 3 provides that the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open court at the time of pronouncing it and when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152 or on review. Thus, where a judgment is reserved, mere dictation does not amount to pronouncement, but where the judgment is dictated in open court, that itself amounts to pronouncement. But even after such pronouncement by open court dictation, the Judge can make corrections before signing and dating the judgment. Therefore, a Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces, signs and dates the judgment (subject to Section 152 and power of review).” (Emphasis supplied)
Save and except for reviewing the decision, or correcting clerical or arithmetical errors, a judicial decision, once rendered, is no man’s land for the Court which renders it. The Court can do nothing with the judgment, including postponing the date from which it would take effect.
7. The functus officio principle, and the definition of the expression in Black’s Law Dictionary, were also cited by the Supreme Court in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Assn. v. Union of India[3], in which it was held:
“104. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (1997 Edn.) defines the term functus officio as: “A term applied to something which once has had a life and power, but which has become of no virtue whatsoever … One who has fulfilled his office or is out of office; an authority who has performed the act authorised so that the authority is exhausted.” 105. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines the term as follows: “Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. … an instrument, power, agency, etc. which has fulfilled the purpose of its creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect.” 106. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle of finality. Once a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority has rendered a decision, it is not open to her to revisit the decision and amend, correct, clarify, or reverse it (except in the exercise of the power of review, conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasi- judicial decision attains finality, it is subject to change only in proceedings before the appellate court. ***** 108. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa4, this Court recognised that Section 362 was based on the doctrine of functus officio : (SCC p. 175, para 10) “10. … The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court
becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error.”
109. The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide a clear point where the adjudicative process ends and to bring quietus to the dispute. Without it, decision-making bodies such as courts could endlessly revisit their decisions. With a definitive endpoint to a case before a court or quasi-judicial authority, parties are free to seek judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively, their rights are determined with finality. Similar considerations do not apply to decisions by the State which are based entirely on policy or expediency.” (Emphasis supplied)
8. At the very least, what the applicant seeks is a clarification that our judgment would take effect from a later date. Such a clarification cannot be provided by us, in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra.
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9. The matter may be viewed from an even more empirical angle. The applicant, effectively, is calling upon us to stay the operation of our own judgment for a particular period. This is completely impermissible. A Court cannot stay the operation of its own order. That power vests only with an Appellate Court, and is usually exercised only when the troika considerations of existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and the possibility or irreparable prejudice are cumulatively satisfied. It would be obviously paradoxical for a Court to hold that its own judgment is prima facie illegal.
10. Apparently aware that there is no provision of the CPC which permits it, this application, predictably, purports to have been filed under Section 151 of the CPC. Apropos Section 151, the Supreme Court has held in Tecnimont (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab[5], that Section 151 is not to be treated as a provision under which the Court can, even ex debito justitiae, fashion reliefs which are alien to the CPC:
“24. Similar limitation has always been read into the width of inherent powers acknowledged by provisions like Section 151 CPC (Civil Procedure Code, 1908) and Section 482 CrPC (Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) In Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj6, the discussion was as under: “28. As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 is intended to apply where the Code does not cover any particular procedural aspect, and interests of justice require the exercise of power to cover a particular situation. Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not contemplated by any law. 29. Considering the scope of Section 151, in Padam Sen v. State of U.P.7, this Court observed: ‘8. … The inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. … 9. … The inherent powers saved by Section 151 of
AIR 1961 SC 218 the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the court in deciding the cause before it. These powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses.
Specific powers have to be conferred on the courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party.’
30. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal[8], this Court held: ‘21. … that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature.’
31. In Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava[9] this Court reiterated that the inherent power of the court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code but that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. Section 151 however is not intended to create a new procedure or any new right or obligation.
32. In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee10 this Court observed: ‘4. … Under the inherent power of courts recognised by Section 151CPC, a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code….’ AIR 1962 SC 527 AIR 1966 SC 1899
11. Thus, where the CPC contains a provision which occupies the field, Section 151 cannot be employed to trespass outside the field so occupied. Order XLI of the CPC envisages stay of a judgment rendered by a Court only in appeal. There is no provision in the CPC, empowering a Court which has passed an appeal or a decree to stay its own order. Any stay, by the Court which passes the judgment or decree, of its own order, for any period of time, would amount to judicial usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Court, higher in the judicial hierarchy, before whom the judgment or decree may come up for examination.
12. We are, therefore, of the view that the reliance on Section 151 of the CPC is completely misconceived.
13. Mr. Lall has sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd.11.
14. This judgment is completely alien to the controversy at hand as it holds that an Appellate Court, while exercising LPA jurisdiction, should stay the order under challenge while admitting the appeal. In fact, if anything, this judgment would militate against the stand that Mr. Lall seeks to canvass as it recognises the fact that the power to stay vests in an Appellate Court, and not in the court which passes the judgment or decree of which stay is sought. (2002)10 SCC 493
15. We also note, significantly, that the impugned judgment does not even remotely seek to aver that there is any error apparent on the face of the record of our decision as would even make out a case for review thereof.
16. The application is, therefore, dismissed as not maintainable in law. CM APPL. 36038/2026 (Corrections) in RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 CM APPL. 36040/2026 (Corrections) in RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018
17. The appellant made deposit of ₹ 4.[5] crores consequent to order dated 20 September 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(Comm) 24/2016 and CS(Comm) 436/2017.
18. At the time of issuing notice in these appeals, this Court directed the respondent to withdraw the aforesaid amounts deposited by the appellant together with interest accrued thereon subject to the respondent furnishing an appropriate bank guarantee, for the said amount subject to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court.
19. Against bank guarantees, therefore, the respondent withdrew an amount of ₹ 4.[5] crores from the Registry of this Court.
20. By these applications, the appellant seeks refund of the amount in view of the fact that they have succeeded in the appeals.
21. Mr. Lall, on instructions, prays for eight weeks’ time to return the amounts to the appellant.
22. In that view of the matter, we allow these applications to the extent that the amounts withdrawn by the respondent against the bank guarantees would be returned to the appellant within a period of eight weeks from today.
23. On such return being taking place, the bank guarantee would be returned to the respondents.
24. The applications are disposed of.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. MAY 26, 2026
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