Reliance Generalinsurance Co Ltd v. Meena Katiyar & Ors

4. Deduction towards Personal Expenses ¼th

5. Multiplier 11

6. Loss of Dependency Rs.59,01,984/-

7. Loss of Love and Affection Rs.1,00,000/-

8. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000/-

9. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000/-

10. Loss of Estate Rs.10,000/- Total Compensation Rs.61,36,984/- Less: 20% towards contributory negligence Rs.12,27,397/- Final Compensation Awarded Rs.49,09,587/- Interest 7.5% p.a. Submissions on behalf of appellant

11. Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company contended that the Tribunalerred in assessing contributorynegligence of the deceased only to the extent of 20%, despite the admitted factual position that the deceased had collided with the offending tractor-trolley from behind. Reliance was placed upontheclaim petition as well as the testimony of PW-3 [eye-witness], who had deposed that the deceased was travelling behind theoffending tractor-trolley carryingbricksand that the tractortrolley had suddenlyapplied brakes while taking a turn, resulting in the deceased’s vehicle colliding with the offending vehicle from behind.

12. It was submitted that the testimony of PW-3 [eye-witness] regardingthetractor-trolley movingat a speed of 50–60 kmph could not be accepted at face value, since it is common knowledge that the maximum speed of a tractor is ordinarily not more than 30 kmph and attachmentofa trolley loaded with bricks would further reduceits speed. According to the appellant/Insurance Company, the fact that the deceased’s vehicle struck the tractor-trolley from behind clearly established that the deceased was driving at excessive speed and had failed to maintain “sufficient distance” from the vehicle moving ahead.

13. Reliance was placed upon Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, which mandates that the driver of a vehicle moving behind anothervehicle shallmaintain “sufficient distance” so as to avoid collision in the event thevehicle ahead suddenly slows downor stops. It was contended that the principle of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the facts of the present case and the circumstances led to the only reasonable inference that the deceased himself had substantially contributed towardstheoccurrenceof theaccident. Reliance was further placed upon thedecision ofthe SupremeCourt in Nishan Singh & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 765 to contend that contributorynegligence to theextent of at least 50% ought to have been attributed to the deceased.

14. Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company distinguished the decisions relied upon on behalf of respondent nos.[1] to 4 [claimants], namely Archit Sainiv. Oriental InsuranceCo. Ltd. [2018]1 S.C.R. 626 and Sushma vs Nitin Ganapati Rangole & Ors. 2024 INSC 706, contendingthat in those matters, the offending vehicles were parked in themiddle of the road without indicators, whereasin the presentcasethe tractor-trolley was admittedly moving ahead of the deceased’s vehicle.

15. As regards liability, counselfor theappellant/Insurance Company submitted that recovery rights ought to have been granted in favour of the appellant/Insurance Company since respondent no.5/driver-cumowner had failed to establish that he possessed a valid and effective driving licence. It was contended that respondent no.5/driver-cumowner, after filing written statement, stopped appearing before the Tribunal and was proceeded ex parte. Reliance was placed upon the testimony of R3W[1] from the Licensing Authority, Farrukhabad, to submit that the records pertaining to the driving licence produced by respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner were not traceable and an FIR had been registered regarding missing records. According to appellant, the burden to prove validity of the driving licence was upon respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner andadverseinferenceought to have been drawn against him.

16. It was further submitted that the offending vehicle was a tractor attachedwith a trolley carryingbricks and was therefore being used for ‘commercial purposes’ rather than ‘agricultural purposes’. Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company contended that only the tractor stood insured under the policy and not the attached trolley. It was submitted that attachment ofa trolley required separateinsurancecoverageand use of the tractor-trolley for carryingbricksamounted to violation of policy conditions.

17. In supportof the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed upon the decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan (2007) 7 SCC 56, and Dhondubaiv. HanmantappaBandappa Gandigude 2023 SCC OnLine SC 2387. It was contended that the decision in Fahim Ahmad v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 14 SCC 148, relied upon on behalf of respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner was distinguishable, since in the present case attachment of the trolley with thetractor was admitted and undisputed. It was also contended that the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Chinnamma (2004) 8 SCC 697, would not apply,as in the said case the tractor was being used for carriageof vegetables constituting agricultural produce, whereas in thepresentcasethe tractor-trolley was carryingbricks, which could not be treated as an ‘agricultural purpose’. Accordingly, it was submitted that the appellant/Insurance Company ought to have been granted recovery rights against respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner and the compensation payableby theappellant/InsuranceCompany deserved to be reduced proportionately on accountofhigher contributory negligence attributable to the deceased. Submissions made on behalf of respondent nos.1-4/claimants

18. Counselfor respondentnos.[1] to 4/claimants opposed the appeal and submitted that the challenge raised by the appellant/Insurance Company was essentially confined to the findings on contributory negligence and refusalto grantrecoveryrights. It was contended that no interference was warranted with the impugned award insofar as respondent nos.[1] to 4/claimants were concerned.

19. As regards contributory negligence, it was submitted that the appellant/InsuranceCompany hadneither led any independent evidence nor produced any documentarymaterialto substantiate the plea that the deceased was negligent. According to claimants, the entire plea of contributory negligence rested merely upon suggestions put during cross-examination, which by themselves could not constitute evidence.

20. Reliance was placed upon the testimony of PW-3 [eye-witness], who had deposed thattheoffending tractor-trolley had abruptly applied brakes whileattemptingto takea turn, which led to the collision. It was contended that the appellant/ Insurance Company was selectively emphasizingthefact that the collision had occurred from behind while ignoringtheevidence regarding “sudden braking” and “abrupt turning” by the offending vehicle.

21. Counselfor respondentnos.[1] to 4 further submitted that the site plan demonstrated that the accident had occurred in the middle of the road and corroborated the version of PW-3 [eye-witness]. It was also pointed out that the FIR and chargesheet filed by the police authorities remained unchallenged and the appellant/Insurance Company had not even summoned the Investigating Officer for examination.

22. Reliance was placed upon the decisions in Archit Saini and Another v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd & Ors. (supra), Sushma and Others v. Nitin Ganpati & Ors (supra), Prabhavathi & Ors. v The Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation 2025 INSC 293 and Dheeraj Gupta v. Ajay Kumar & Anr @ Bharati AXA General Insurance Co. Ltd. 2024:DHC:1963, to contend that negligence could not be inferred merely because the collision had occurred from behind andthattheoverallfacts and circumstances of the accident were required to be assessed.

23. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, counsel for respondent nos.[1] to 4 further contended that the deduction of 20% towardscontributorynegligence itselfwas unwarrantedand unsupported by evidence on record. It was submitted that mere existence of a statutoryobligation to maintain safedistancecould not, by itself, lead to a presumption of negligence on the part of the deceased in absence of cogent evidence. According to the claimants, the deduction towards contributorynegligence had resultedin unjust reductionofcompensation payable to the legal heirs of the deceased.

24. On the aspect of quantum, counsel for respondent nos.[1] to 4 submitted thattheTribunalhadcorrectlyappreciatedtheevidenceled by theclaimants, includingthesalary recordsand testimonyof PW-4, while assessing the income of the deceased and computing compensation. It was further submitted that despite all family members being entitled to consortium, only a lump sum amount had been awarded under the said head.

25. It was also submitted that the claimants had lost their sole breadwinnerin the year 2010 andhad been deprived ofcompensation for a considerable period due to the pendency of proceedings. In these circumstances, the award of interest did not warrant any interference.

26. Counsel for respondent nos.[1] to 4 further stated that even in absence of cross-objections, this Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction in motor accident cases, is empowered to award just compensation where the facts of the case so warrant. Submissions made on behalf of respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner

27. Counselappearingon behalfof respondentno.5/driver-cum-owner opposedtheappealand submitted that no ground for interference with theimpugned awardwas made out insofar as refusal to grant recovery rights was concerned. It was contended that the appellant/Insurance Company hadprimarilyraised twoobjections, namely, that respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner wasnot holding a valid driving licence and that thetractor-trolley was being used for ‘commercial purposes’ while only the tractor stood insured.

28. On the issue of driving licence, counsel for respondent no.5 submitted that the driving licence had duly been produced on record beforethe Tribunal. It was contended thatappellant/InsuranceCompany had not taken anyspecificplea in its written statement alleging that the licence was fake and had also failed to lead cogent evidence to establish the same. Reliance was placed upon the testimonies of R3W[1] [Amit Rastogi, Clerk from the Licensing Authority, Farrukhabad] and R3W[2] [Naresh Kumar, DeputyManager ofthe appellant/Insurance Company].

29. It was further submitted that the report of the Assistant Regional Transport Officer [ARTO]did not declare the driving licence to be fake, but merely recorded that several original records pertaining to driving licences were missingand that FIR No.334/2013 under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC] had been registered in that regard. Accordingto respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner, mere non-availability of records could not lead to the conclusion that the licence itself was ‘fake’ or ‘invalid’. It was contended thattheTribunal,uponappreciation of evidence, had rightly concluded thattheappellant/InsuranceCompany had failed to substantiate its defence regarding breach of policy conditions on account of fake driving licence.

30. As regards theplea thatonly the tractor stoodinsured and not the attached trolley, counsel for respondent no.5 submitted that the appellant/InsuranceCompany hadfailed to specifically plead and prove violationofpolicy conditions. It was contended that except for a vague defence in thewritten statement, neither any specific issue was framed nor any evidenceled by the appellant/Insurance Company to establish that the tractor was being used in violation of the insurance policy.

31. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Fahim Ahmad v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), to contend that theinsureris required not onlyto plead breach of policy conditions but also substantiate the same through positive evidence. It was submitted that in the said decision, involving a tractor-trolley carrying sand, the Supreme Court had rejected the plea of breach in absence of cogent proof.

32. Counsel for respondent no.5 further relied upon the decision of this Courtin New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. SanjayTyagiand Others (supra), wherein it was held that mere attachment of a trolley with a tractor would not amount to violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy where the tractor was insured for ‘agricultural purposes’. Reliancewas also placed upon the decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9019.

33. It was further contended thatthe reliance placed by the appellant uponOrientalInsurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan (supra)was misplaced, since the said decision pertained to gratuitous passengers and was distinguishableon facts. It was submittedthat the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinnamma and Others (supra) referred to in Brij Mohan (supra), had itself been considered in Fahim Ahmed (supra), wherein the SupremeCourtobservedthata tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer the definition of a ‘goods carriage’ depending upon the facts of each case.

34. Accordingly, it was submitted thatno ground existed for grant of recovery rights in favour of the appellant/Insurance Company and the impugned award did not warrant interference insofar as respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner was concerned. Analysis

35. The issues which havebeen raised by counsel for parties and which require this Court’s assessment: i) first, the issueof contributorynegligence assessed at 20% with respect to the deceased; ii) second, the defence of theinsurer regarding the attachment of the trolley to the tractor loaded with bricks; iii) third, the lack of a valid and effective driving licence. Each of these issues are discussed hereunder in some detail.

I. Contributory Negligence

36. Contributory negligence, in tort law, contemplates a situation wherea person’s ownnegligence has materially contributed to the harm suffered, thereby warranting apportionment of liability to the extent of such negligence.

37. The accident occurred between theoffendingvehicle i.e. a tractortrolley carryingbricks, admittedly moving ahead of deceased’s vehicle, and allegedly applyingbrakes whiletakinga turn,resultingin deceased’s vehicle colliding from behind. Rear-end collisions can be divided into two categories-first, wherean abandoned/stationaryvehicleis parkedon the road without indication, lighting or warning signs, and the impacted/following vehicle crashes into the rear end, being unable to estimatethattheoffendingvehicle is abandoned/stationary; and second, wherethere is flowing traffic and the vehicle in front suddenly applies brakes.In the latter case, thematterhas to beassessedwith regard to the duty ofthe personfollowing the vehicle to maintain a ‘safe distance’ in order to avoid a collision.

38. Considering that the facts of the present case fall within the second category, the decisions of this Court, the Supreme Court and somefrom other international jurisdictions, in this context, are briefly discussed hereunder: a) Rajpal v. Dharampal 2012 SCC Online Del 31: This Courtwas dealingwith an accident which occurred dueto the offending vehicle coming at a high speed, overtaking the two-wheeler scooter, and suddenly applied brakes. The Tribunal held that even though the accident had occurred on account of “sudden application of brakes”, the two-wheeler rider had also contributed to the accident since he was not in full controlofthe vehicle. Ratio ofnegligence was accordingly assessed as 70:30. b) Nishan Singh & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.

The SupremeCourtdealt with theissueof a moving vehicle in a rear-end collision. The decision of the Supreme Court’s continues to holdsthefield with regard to rear-end collision.A Maruti car dashed against a truck moving ahead of it. Claimants alleged that the truck driver “suddenly applied brakes” being in the centre of the road but bringing it to the right side as a result of which the Maruti car collided. The Tribunalrecordedthe testimony of the driver of the car, who stated thathewas at a distanceofabout 10 to 14 feet. In these circumstances,theissuearose as to whether the said distance was “sufficient” to avoid a collision in a case of sudden braking. The Tribunal, and thereafter the High Court, held that the Maruti car had been driven in a rash and negligent manner, which was the cause of accident resulting in fatality. The Supreme Court emphasized on Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations 1989, which obligates the vehicle following the truck to maintain a “safe distance”. The Supreme Court noted that the expression “sufficient distance” has not been defined and therefore, thethumbrule would be ‘at least a safe distance of 2 to 3 seconds gap in ideal conditions’. This would allow the driver of the vehicle behind to respond and avert a collision. Thedistance of “10 to 15 feet” was held not to be a ‘safe distance’. The Tribunal had also noted that there was no evidence to indicatethat thedriver ofthetruck suddenlyapplied brakes in themiddle of the road, which was endorsed by theHigh Court. Though, theclaim was dismissed, theCourtproceeded to grant limited relief under Section 140 of the MV Act. c) S. Mohammed Hakkim v. NationalInsuranceCompanyLtd. & Ors. 2025 INSC 905: The Supreme Court was dealing with an accident wherein a motorcycle carrying two occupants collided with the vehicle ahead, which had suddenly applied brakes, resulting in amputation of the left leg of one of the occupants. The Tribunalas well as the High Court affirmed that the accident had occurred dueto thesudden stoppageof thecar and, relying on Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations 1989, imposed contributorynegligence of 20% for failure to maintain a “safe distance”. The Supreme Court noted that the root cause of the accident was the “sudden braking” by the car driver. It was the responsibility ofthesaid driver to provide warning or signals to vehicles moving behind on the road. The percentage of contributory negligence was, therefore, increased. d) Rouse v. Squires 1973 QB 889: The Courtof Appeal in England was dealing with a collision where a lorry skidded into a jack-knife position, obstructing thecentre lane of a three-lane carriageway of a motorway. A motor car beingdriven in the centre lane collided with a lorry and came to a halt with its rear lights switched on. Another lorry driver, who had been following, parked with the hand brakeengaged in the near side lane. Yet another lorry driver, who was approachingthespot, did not realisethat the vehicles were stationary, and though he braked, could not avoid colliding with theparkedlorry, resultingin a fatal accident. In relation to such chain reaction accidents, the Court of appeal relied on Harvey v. Road HaulageExecutive [1952]1 KB 120 and Barber v. British Road Services, reported in the Times, November 18, 1964. The Court held: “if a driver so negligentlymanageshis vehicle so as to cause it to obstruct the highway and constitute a danger to other users including those who are driving fast and not keeping a proper lookout, but not those who deliberately or recklessly drive into the obstruction, then the first driver’s negligence can be held to have contributed to the causation of an accident of which the immediate cause was the negligent driving of the vehicle is because of the presence of the obstruction collides with it or with some other vehicle or some other person.” (emphasisadded) The Court held that the lorry driver who ultimately collided had not initiatedthedangeroussituationbut had failed to take adequate steps to cope with an already existing danger. Accordingly, 75% of the blame was put on his shoulders as against 25% to the third-party driver. The third-party driver was thefirst lorry which ended up across twolanes ofthe road way creating a risk. The Court held that: “where the party guilty of the prior negligence has created a dangerous situation and the danger is still continuing to a substantial degree at the time of the accident and the accident would not have happened but for this continuing danger, he is responsible for the accident as well as the party who was subsequently negligent.” (emphasis added) The Court, therefore, effectively held that an initial negligent act creating a dangerous obstruction continues to attract liability so long as the danger remainsan effective causeof the accident. A subsequentnegligent act does not break the chain of causation unlessit is wholly independentandunforeseeable. e) Flynn v. Bus Átha Cliath [2012] IEHC 398: The Irish High Court held that “sudden braking” is not negligent, where scientific evidence establishes an imminent danger requiring an immediate response. The victim was thrown to the ground when the bus driver braked sharply to avoid a child. Video evidence showed that, as the bus approached, two children were standing at a bus stop on the oppositesideof the road and one of them attempted to cross theroad in thepathofthe bus. Since, therehad been no reason to anticipate such manoeuvre, even at the level of a bare possibility, but there arose an immediate necessity to react appropriately once it occurred, “sudden braking” was warranted. The Court held that: “the courts cannot apply a counsel of perfection. The duty of care expected of a driver is a high standard, but it is still to be measured by the reactions and expectations of reasonable men and women’ and observed that ‘in making decisions in emergencies, the Court must bear in mind that detached reflection and the weighing of various options is not to be expected and certainly not required where a human life is to be saved.” The Court ultimately held that the bus driver had reacted correctly to a potential hazard to life and, was, therefore, not responsible for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. f) Leslie O'Donnell v. Smith and Royal & Sun Alliance PLC [2018] SC EDIN 68: In this decision of theScotland PersonalInjuryCourtrendered in December 2018, the matter related to a motorcyclist travelling on a highway with the respondent’s car moving ahead. Whileattemptingto overtake the car, the driver of the car slowed down and braked rather abruptly.The motorcyclist also braked hardbut was unableto avoid a collision, resulting in injury. Submissions were advanced to the effect that there were no strict rules governingthedistanceto be maintained by a following vehicle, nor could negligence automatically be inferred merely becausea vehicle collided with the rear side of another. Contributorynegligence was urged by the respondent car driver. The Court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the motorcyclist had been travelling too close to the car and, rather, had been maintaining a distance of approximately 50-60 metres, which was considered reasonable. On theissueof contributory negligence, the Court held that thepreponderance of blame would still lie upon the car driver. The Court found the car driver to be in breach of duty by abruptly stopping due to apprehension about the motorcycle overtaking the vehicle. There had been no justification for such sharp braking, and the manoeuvre was found to be inappropriate. The Highway Code advised steady driving without sudden changes in speed or direction and, accordingly, theprimary negligence was attributed to the car driver. The assessment was based on the rule of “stopping distances” in theHighway Code. The apportionment resulted in a 20% reduction in the award of damages. Effectively, the Court held that “theduty of a following driver is to maintain a manner and position of driving enabling response to reasonably anticipated traffic exigencies”. However, where a reasonable distance is maintained and the lead vehicle performs an unexpected emergency stop, contributory negligence cannot be presumed in the absence of evidence demonstratingthat thefollowingvehicle had been too close or driven imprudently. g) Rules of the Road Regulations 1989 Reference may also be made to both Rules 23 and 24 of the Rules of the Road Regulations 1989, the former being a duty on the following vehicle to maintain “sufficient distance” and thelatter being on the vehicle ahead to avoid “abruptbraking” unless for safety reasons. For ease of reference said rules are extracted as under: “Rule 23 “23. Distance from vehicles in front.-The driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.” Rule 24 “24. Abrupt brake.- No driver of a vehicle shall apply brake abruptly unless it is necessary to do so for safety reasons.” Assessment in the present case

39. The issue requiring consideration is whether the finding of 20% contributory negligence attributed to the deceased in the impugned award warrants interference.

40. At the outset, the evidentiary position assumes significance. PW-1/wife of the deceased, though admittedly not an eye witness, consistently deposed in her affidavit [Exhibit PW1/A] that the offending tractor carrying bricks, while moving ahead of the deceased’s vehicle, suddenly took a left turn and applied brakes withoutany indication, as a consequence of which the deceased had no sufficient time to react and collided with the offending vehicle from behind. Theversion of PW-1/wife of the deceased substantially derives corroboration from the testimony of PW-3/Vinod Chand Katiyar, who was treated by the Tribunal as the sole eye-witness.

41. PW-3/eye-witness specifically deposed that he had met the deceased at Dharuhera Bus Stand and was following him for some distance on his scooter when he witnessed the occurrence. His testimony records that the tractor-trolley laden with bricks was travelling ahead of the deceased’s vehicle and suddenly applied brakes in order to take a turn, resulting in the deceased’s vehicle colliding with the trolley from behind. Significantly, in crossexamination, PW-3/eye-witness denied the suggestion that the deceased was driving at a speed of 80–90 kmph, and no contrary material was produced by the insurer [appellant herein] to substantiate excessive speed. Equally material is the fact that PW- 3/eye-witness candidly stated that he could not say whether the tractor owner had signalled by hand before turning, which demonstrates absence of embellishment and lends credibility to his testimony.

42. The Tribunalitselfaccepted PW-3/eye-witness to be a reliable witness, specifically recordingthathis testimonyremained free from contradiction, explained his presence at the site, and stood corroboratedby thecriminalrecord including the FIR and site plan. Consequently, the foundational factual finding regarding the offending vehicle/tractor-trolley having suddenly slowed down or braked while negotiating a turn cannot be lightly displaced.

43. The siteplan also depictstheplaceofoccurrenceon NH-8 near theHP Petrol Pump and theturningpoint,and broadly corroborates that the accident occurred while both vehicles were moving in the samedirection oftravel. Importantly, thesiteplan does notindicatea case of a stationary or parked vehicle obstructing the carriageway. Therefore, the present case is distinguishable from those where a stationary vehicle was left negligently parked on the road without indicators. Rather, the facts indicate a moving tractor-trolley ahead and a moving car behind, where the collision occurred in the backdrop of a sudden attempt to turn.

44. In this factual setting, the principles governing rear-end collisions require cautious application. In Raj Pal & Ors. v. Dharampal & Ors. (supra), this Court held that a collision from behind cannotautomatically result in an inference of sole negligence on the part of the following vehicle and that surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the vehicle ahead, are required to beassessed. Thus, the mere fact that deceased’s vehicle struck thetractor-trolley from behind cannot, by itself, conclude the issue of negligence. At the same time, Nishan Singh & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors (supra) recognizes the duty of a vehicle following another to maintain “sufficient distance” so as to account for foreseeable slowing down or stopping of the vehicle ahead. The principle underlying the judgment is that the following vehicle must retain “sufficient control” to avoid collision. However, thedecision does not lay down an absolute rule that every rear-end collision ipso facto establishes exclusive negligence of the rear vehicle irrespective of the conduct of the lead vehicle.

45. The present facts indicatecompetingobligations on both sides. On the one hand, theoffending tractor-trolley, admittedlyladen with bricks, is alleged to havesuddenlyapplied brakeswhileattemptingto turn, thereby attracting concern regarding abrupt braking and safe turningmanoeuvre. On theother hand, thecollision from behind also suggests thatthedeceased may not havemaintainedsuch distance or controlas wouldhaveenabled him to avoid impact after the tractor slowed down.

46. The approachadopted by the Tribunal appears to reflect this balanced position. TheTribunalconsciouslyconsidered both Rule 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, concerning maintenance of “sufficient distance” by the vehicle behind, and Rule 24, which restrainsabrupt braking except for safety reasons. Having accepted the claimant’s version regarding sudden braking by the offending vehicle, the Tribunal nonetheless held that the deceased, being the followingvehicle, was also expectedto maintain “sufficient reaction distance”. The findingof contributorynegligence was thus notbased merely on the factum of rear impact, but upon the combined circumstances surrounding the occurrence.

47. The Supreme Court in S. Mohammed Hakkim v. National Insurance CompanyLtd. (supra)has reiterated that in road accidents involvingsequentialvehicular conduct, negligence may legitimately be apportionedwheretheconduct ofboth vehicles contributes to the occurrence. The Court recognized that “sudden braking” by one vehicle and inability of the vehicle behind to sufficiently react may together justify attribution of contributory negligence rather than complete exoneration of either side. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaidprinciples,the impugned award does not appear to suffer from perversity in attributing 20% contributory negligence to the deceased.

II. Tractor-Trolley

48. There is definitional difference between ‘tractor’ and a ‘goods carriage’. While Section 2 (44) of the MV Act defines ‘tractor’ as: “Section 2(44) (44) “tractor” means a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load (other than equipment used for the purpose of propulsion); but excludes a road-roller;” Section 2 (14) defines ‘goods carriages’ as under: “Section 2(14) (14) “goods carriage” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods;” ‘Trailer’ on the other handis defined under Section 2 (46) as under: “Section 2(46) (46) “trailer” meansany vehicle, other than a semitrailer and a side-car, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle;”

49. In the present case, the insurer has raised a defence that the insurancepolicy pertains only to a tractor, whereas the trolley attached to the tactor, and being laden with bricks, gives a valid defence to the insurance company for breach of policy conditions under Section 147 read with Section 149 (2)(a)(i)(a) of the MV Act. In this regard, it will be instructiveto traversethrough thedecisions oftheSupremeCourtand this Court in a chronological manner, as under: a) National Insurance Company Limited v. V. Chinnnama

The Court was dealing with a deceased, who had purchased five bags of vegetables, loaded them in a trailer connected to a tractorand, upon seeing an oncoming bus, could not control his vehicle, fell down and suffered injuries. Insurance Company disputed its liability on thegroundthatthe deceased was travelling in the said tractor as a paid passenger. In this context, theCourtnotedthatthetractor was not even a goods carriage and, therefore, in context of Section 147 of the MV Act, the provisionapplicable to a goods vehicle would not be triggered. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

Thus, a tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer the definition of “goods carriage” contained in Section 2(14) of the said Act.” The Supreme Court held that merely because the tractor was carrying sand would not mean that it was being used for a ‘commercial purpose’ rather than ‘agricultural purpose’. e) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sanjay Tyagi 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1339: The Coordinate Bench of this Court, while dealing with an accident with a tractor carrying a trolley and the plea of the InsuranceCompanythat therewas a breach of thepolicy, noted that the insurance policy was a comprehensive policy for ‘agriculturalpurpose’ and thatthe tractor, withoutequipment, is actually ofno use. Theterm ‘agriculturalpurpose’ denotes a wide amplitude; it is not only the tractor simpliciter that is insured, rather it is insured for ‘agricultural purposes’, which covers the trolley as well. f) Dhondubaiv.HanmantappaBandappaGandigude 2023SCC OnLine SC 2387: The SupremeCourtwas dealingwith a tractor-trolley collision and the Insurance Company’s plea that only the tractor was insured. TheCourt noted in thefollowingparagraphsas under:

The SupremeCourtdealt with a case where the deceased was travellingin a tractor and trailer as a coolie for unloadingsoil. The High Court enhanced compensation while fastening liability upon the Insurance Company. Insurance company appealed, the Supreme Court noted that it was clear that the tractor, which was insured, was the cause of the accident and that the accident was not caused solely because of a standalonetrailer. The principalcauseofthe accident was a tractor and, in sequence of events, the trailer overturned. The Court relied upon certain judgments to note that ultimately the root causeof the accident is thetractor, which was insured, and this fact could not be lost sight of. The Court further noted: “Moreover, this Court is duty bound to be mindful of the ground realities of our nation and cannot let practicality be overshadowed by technicality”. The Court further noted as under: “13. In Dhondubai (supra), the Court stated: ‘5. In a matter of the present nature, the law is well settled that when a tractor and trailer are involved, both the tractor as well as the trailer are required to be insured. Therefore, in a normal circumstance, when the appellant/claimant was travelling in the trailer which was not insured, the liability on the Insurance Company cannot be fastened and to that extent the High Court was justified.

14. To our mind, the learned Judges in Dhondubhai (supra)did not lay down an absolute principle of law, but taking note of Oriental InsuranceCo. Limited v. Brij Mohan, (2007) 7 SCC 56, it was ordered that the ‘respondent-Insurance Companyshallpay the amountawarded by the High Courtas compensationwith the accrued interest and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.’ A decision by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Kadapa District v. Koduru Bhagyamma, 2007 SCC OnLine AP 830 is relevant: ‘1. This case has come before this Court on a reference made by a learned Single Judge of this Court as it was contended before the learned Single Judge by the appellant that as the trailer in which the deceased was travelling was not insured, although it was attached to the tractor which was insured, therefore no liability could be fastened upon the insurer. xxx

13. Now on analysis of these judgments and the provisions of law which have been quoted above, we feel that the law has been correctly appreciated by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Gunti Devaiah v. Vaka Peddi Reddy (supra) and the reasons given by him are sufficient to hold that under the Motor Vehicles Act no separate insurance is contemplated for a trailer and when the trailer is attached to the tractor which is insured, it becomes the part of the tractor. We reproduce the Para 26 of the said judgment as under: “Theword “vehicle” mentioned in Section 147 is co-relatable to the word motor vehicles, which is stipulated in Section 146. Therefore, the expression vehicle wherever appearing in Chapter X(XI) has to be only read as motor vehicle. The principle of claim for compensation in accidents arising out of the use of the motor vehicle is based on tortuous liability and the negligence of the driver of the motor vehicle is a sine quo non for maintaining a claim under the provisions of the Act. Inasmuch as the trailer by itself cannot be driven and it has to be carried or towed with a motor vehicle namely a tractor or a like self-propelled vehicles. Therefore, the question of driving the trailer in a rash and negligent manner would not arise. It is only the prime mover or the motor vehicle which controls movement of the tractor and in case of the negligence driving of the trailer or the motor vehicle, the owner of the vehicle and its insurer alone will be made liable for payment of compensation. But, since the trailer is attached can it be said that trailer should also be independently insured so as to avoid the liability of compensation in case of rash and negligent driving by the driver. That contingency would not arise, as it is only a vehicle and not a motor vehicle. It may be for tax purposes, it is treated as a goods vehicle. But, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, no separate insurance is contemplated. When the trailer is attached to the tractor it becomes a tractor-trailer. There is no provision requiring the trailer to be separately insured to cover the third party risk. The reasons are obvious that it cannot be driven by the driver as in the case of motor vehicles or tractors. Thus, a separate distinction has been drawn between the motor vehicle and a vehicle i.e., visible in all the definitions and more especially in Chapter XI. The same situation also persists in Chapter X in case of no fault liability wherein it has been stated that whether a death or a permanent disability of any person has been resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles and there is no reference to vehicle as such. This aspect was never considered in any of the decisions relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for the Insurance Company and also for other side.” (underlined in original; emphasis supplied by us through the bold highlight) The Court distinguished the decision in Dhondubai (supra) while observingthatit did not lay down an absolute principle of law. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in Kadapa District v Koduru Bhagyamma (supra) was relied upon. i) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmla 2025 SCC OnLine Del 10698: In this decision by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, which related to a tractor being driven by the owner along with a trolley carrying packets of chana, the Insurance Company pleaded that thatthetrailer was not covered under the policy. However, noting the decision of the Supreme Court in Honnamma (supra), the Court held that the limitation of liability under the insurance policy relates to the use of the tractor for drawing more trailers than permitted by law. Therefore, theInsurance Company was liable to compensate theclaimants. Thelimitation ofliability under insurancepolicy in the present casethatcaseis akin to thelimitation considered in Honnamma (supra). Assessment in the present case

50. After an assessment of all these decisions, in the opinion of this Court, relying upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Honnamma(supra), which places the issue of causation of an accident upon the tractor itself, the aspect of the trailer stands separated, while observingthat the trailer was no entity as a stand-alone motor vehicle. The focus was on theprincipalcauseofthe accident, namely, the tractor pulling/hauling/moving the trailer, and therefore, the accident is considered to have been caused by the tractor.

51. This Court, therefore, defers to the categorical opinion of the SupremeCourt in this regard and, in fact, notes thatthis proposition had previously been considered in Kadapa District (supra) by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and in Sanjay Tyagi (supra) by this Court.

52. The fundamentalissuerequiring appreciation is that, admittedly, the tractor is insured. In the present case, there is nothing in the insurancepolicy placed on record to indicatethat the tractor was insured only for ‘agriculturalpurposes’. However, for thesake of assessment, it shall be assumed that the insurance policy covers the tractor for ‘agricultural purposes’. The moving vehicle or motor vehicle is, therefore, the tractor, which is defined under Section 2(44) of the MV Act, and in fact states that the vehicle is “not itself constructed to carry any load”. A trailer, to the contrary, as defined under Section 2(46) of the MV Act, is merely a ‘vehicle’ and not a ‘motor vehicle’, which is “drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle”.

53. The SupremeCourtin Dhondubai (supra)statesthat, as a general rule, a tractor and trailer are both required to be insured; however, it restricts the same to “normal circumstances” where the trailer was not insured. In Honnamma (supra), the Supreme Court clearly noted that Dhondubai (supra) did not lay down an absolute principle of law. The drivingon theroad is by a motor vehicle, namely, the motorised vehicle which is in motion,and theaccident is caused due to the alleged braking of that vehicle. Whether a trailer is attached to it or not, and whether it is separately insuredor not, wouldnot make any difference, in the opinion of this Court, since the negligence, if any, has to be attributed to the entiretractor-trolley unit being driven by a personand cannotbe severed between the tractor and the trailer.

54. Essentially, the trolley/trailer not being separately insured cannot be held to be the cause of the accident. It so happens that the trolley/trailer is attached to a motorised vehicle which, due to its movement on the road, becomes the cause of an accident. The trolley/trailer has no independent identity as a motorised vehicle on the road unless it is left abandoned or detached from the motorised vehicle and is involved in a situationinvolvinga rear-end collision with another vehicle. However, this is not a case of a stationary vehicle left abandoned, butratherofa movingvehicle, indeed a motor vehicle in the form of a ‘tractor’, which is alleged to have caused the accident by ‘abrupt braking’ and a ‘sudden turn’.

55. Insurance companies have often attempted to introduce the distinction between a tractor and trolley/trailer into the controversy. However, in the opinion of this Court, the Supreme Court has now provideda determinative opinion, and the Courts henceforth would be expected to align with the said opinion, unless a different view is taken subsequently.

56. The fact that the trolley was carryingbricksor not wouldnot be an issue in a case of “sudden braking”. However, it could assume significance where Section 147 of the MV Act comes into play with regard to the tractor being used for carrying goods and, therefore, the insurance not extending to a ‘goods vehicle’.

57. The principalcauseofthe accident is the movement of the tractor on the road, involved in ‘abrupt braking’ and ‘sudden turn’. In the opinionofthis Court, the carriage of the trolley, together with whatever contents it carried, would not fall within the scope of a successful insurance defence. Accordingly, the plea of the insurance company in this regard is not sustainable.

58. The issue of the principal cause is exemplified in the decision in Honnamma (supra), particularly in paragraph 12, as also in chainreaction collisions as discussed in the English decision in Rouse v. Squires (supra). In fact, Rousev. Squires (supra) was relied upon by the SupremeCourt in KarnatakaStateRoad TransportCorporation v. K.V. Sakeena, (1996) 3 SCC 446.

III. Fake Driving Licence

59. Further, appellant/Insurance Company prays for recovery rights against the respondent no.5/driver-cum-owner of offending vehicle, on thebasis that he did not possess a valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident.

60. In responseto aforesaid, respondentno.5/driver-cum-owner stated that said driving licence had been duly produced on record, and that appellant/InsuranceCompany neither took any specific plea as regards thelicense being fake in its written statement norled any cogent evidence in this regard.

61. Appellant/InsuranceCompany's plea was based on the testimony of clerk from Licensing Authority Farrukhabad, Uttar Pradesh [R3W1], who stated that records pertaining to the driving licence produced by respondent no. 5/driver-cum-owner were not traceable and a FIR had been registered regarding said missing records. For ease of reference, statement of R3W[1] is extracted as under: “The ARTO has given this letter to me and I do not know anything aboutthe DL in question. The FIR is registered by Predecessor of present ARTO. xxxxx 1 do not know whether the non availability of originalrecord of DL is for the reason mentioned in the complaint given to the police.”

62. Since drivinglicense could not be verified by Licensing Authority Farrukhabad,UttarPradesh, appellant/Insurance Company contended that thedrivinglicence produced by respondentno. 5/driver-cum-owner could not be considered genuine. Accordingly, what needs to be examined is whether mere non-availability of records with Licensing Authority would, by itself, lead to a conclusion that the driving license was ‘fake’ or ‘invalid’.

63. The Tribunal, vide impugned award, concluded that Insurance Company had failed to substantiate its defence regarding breach of policy conditions on the ground that the driving license was fake.

64. With respect to fake driving licenses and defences available to appellant/Insurance Company on the said ground, reference may be made to certain decisions of the Supreme Court, as under: a) Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. National Insurance Company Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC 217: The SupremeCourt in the said case was dealing with an insurer's plea for exoneration under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the MV Act, relatingto breach of conditionsconcerningthedrivinglicence, on theallegation that the driver was holding a fake driving license. The Courtrelied uponthedecisions made by the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru, 2003 3 SCC 338 and NationalInsuranceCo. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, 2004 3 SCC 297, wherein it was held that “mere absence of a valid driving license, possession of fake or invalid driving licence, or disqualification of driver, would not constitute valid defences available to Insurance Company against the insured or third parties”. InsuranceCompany, in such cases, was required to establish that the insured was guilty of negligence. and had failed to exercise reasonablecarein complyingwith thepolicy conditions relating to use of insured vehicle by a duly licensed driver. The Court, therefore, held as under:

9. As regards the contention that the driver of the vehicle was not duly licensed as he possessed a fake licence, it may be noted that neither Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the 1988 Act nor the “Driver Clause” in the subject insurance policy provide that the owner of the insured vehicle must, as a rule, get the driving licence of the person employed as a driver for the said vehicle verified and checked with the Transport Authorities concerned. Generally, and as a matter of course, no person employing a driver would undertake such a verification exercise and would be satisfied with the production of a licence issued by a seemingly competent authority, the validity of which has not expired. It would be wholly impracticable for every person employing a driver to expect the Transport Authority concerned to verify and confirm whether the driving licence produced by that driver is a valid and genuine one, subject to just exceptions. In fact, no such mandatory condition is provided in any car insurance policy and it is not open to the petitioner Insurance Company, which also did not prescribe such a stringent condition, to cite the failure of the deceased vehicle owner to get Ujay Pal's driving licence checked with the RTO as a reason to disclaim liability under the insurance policy.”

65. Yet again, theSupremeCourt, emphasised that insurance policy did not containany stipulationrequiringa compulsory driving test to be conducted beforeemployinga driver to drive the insured vehicle, while referring to the “driver clause in the Insurance Policy”. Therefore, the contention raised by theInsuranceCompany that the vehicle owner did not conduct due diligence while employing the said person as a driver, by insisting upon a condition which was neither prescribed under the statute nor under the insurance policy, cannot be sustained. While advertingto Swaran Singh(supra)and Lehru (supra), theCourt further held as under:

(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.

(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. ………

19. As already pointed out supra, once a seemingly valid driving licence is produced by a person employed to drive a vehicle, unless such licence is demonstrably fake on the face of it, warranting any sensible employer to make inquiries as to its genuineness, or when the period of the licence has already expired, or there is some other reason to entertain a genuine doubt as to its validity, the burden is upon the insurance company to prove that there was a failure on the part of the vehicle owner in carrying out due diligence apropos such driving licence before employing that person to drive the vehicle.”

66. The Supreme Court has, therefore, categorically laid down the legal position with respect to the defences available to Insurance Company in order to succeed on theground that the driving license held by driver was fake. Firstly, theburden lies upon Insurance Company to establish that the insured was guilty of negligence, and had failed to exercise reasonable care in complying with the condition of insurance policy relatingto use of the vehicle by a duly licensed driver; secondly, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to manner in which such burden must be discharged, and the same will depend on the facts of each case; thirdly, even if the breach is established or proved, the same must be so fundamental so as to have contributed to the cause of the accident; fourthly, thequestionofwhether owner had taken reasonable care to verify the drivinglicence, has to be determined on a case-to-case basis; fifthly, as a matter of general principle, where a seemingly valid drivinglicence is produced, unless the same is demonstratably fake on theface of it, has expired or any other reason, or the employer has been intimated that license is fake, or is otherwise propelled by a specific clauseof theinsurancepolicy to havelicenseverified, the burden would be upon InsuranceCompanyto provethat insured failed in carrying out the due diligence process.

67. Accordingly, thefactorswhich could betaken into consideration, as general guidelines, to apply in cases involving a plea of “fake driving license” can be formulated as under: i. Whether thedriving licence was demonstratably fake, on the face of it? ii. Whether thelicense seemed, on theface of it, to haveexpired? iii. Whether thedriver had been engaged by the owner/employer for a substantial period of time, and, during said period had given any occasion to owner/employer to doubt his driving skills? iv. Whether there existed an easily accessible manner by which employer could verify driving license of driver, including through online platforms such as Parivahan Application instituted by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH)? v. Whether the license was valid at the time the driver entered employment, but subsequently expiredand was notrenewed in time, and whether the owner/employer failed to insist upon such renewal before assigning driving duties to driver? vi. Whether InsuranceCompanydischarged its burdenofproofby establishing that driving licence was fake on the basis of official records,and notmerely by relyingupon theabsenceor lack of verification by owner/employer arising out of administrative and processual deficiencies within transport authorities?

68. The aforesaid list of factors is merely illustrative and not exhaustive, and only indicates some of the situations that may arise whereInsuranceCompanyraisesa defence on the basis ofa fake driving license. Assessment of the present case

69. In the present case, there is nothing on record to state that the driving licence produced by respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner was “fake”. Further, Insurance Company neither took any specific plea as regards thelicense being fake in its written statementnor led any cogent evidence in this regard. ContentionofInsuranceCompany wastherefore, solely based on testimony of R3W[1], stating that he did not know anythingabout thedrivinglicense in question, which is not the same as stating that the said licence was fake or invalid. R3W[1], further stated that FIR No. 334/2016 had been registered under Section 409 of IPC, pertainingto missingrecordsofvarious driving licenses, not specific to thedrivinglicence produced by respondent no.5/ driver-cum-owner. In fact, copy of driving license produced, clearly shows that it was valid from 16th April2003to 14th August 2020.In view of aforesaid and since theaccident in questionoccurred on 15th August2010,it can be said that the plea of appellant/Insurance Company of defence of breach of insurance policy, may not be merited. Conclusion

70. Applyingtheaforesaidprinciples to the facts of the present case, appellant has failed to establish the contentions raised by it.

71. A plea was raised by counsel for the Insurance Company, with regard to therateof interest. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon thejudgment of theSupremeCourtin KaushnumaBegum (Smt.)& Ors. v. New India AssuranceCo. Ltd. & Ors., (2001)2 SCC 9 wherein, while interpretingthepowersofthe Tribunalunder Section 171 of the MV Act to award simpleintereston compensation from the date of institution of the claim petition, it was observed that the rate of interest awarded by nationalisedbankson fixed deposits oughtto serve as the guiding factor while determiningtherateofinterest payableon compensation amounts.

72. In the facts of the present case, since the long-term fixed deposit rates offered by nationalised banksduring the year 2010, i.e. the year of filing of the claim petition, werebetween 7% and 7.75% per annum, the interest awarded on thecompensation granted in the impugned award is correct @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

73. Vide order dated 23rd February 2015, the Court had directed depositof50% of theawarded amountalongwith proportionate interest to be deposited beforetheTribunaland released to the claimants, as per disbursal directions contained in the impugned award

74. Accordingly, this Appeal stands dismissed.

75. In view of dismissal of appeal, balance amount shall also be disbursed as per directions passed by the Tribunal.

76. Pending applications (if any) are rendered as infructuous.

77. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to the appellant.

78. Judgement be uploaded to the website of this Court.

JUDGE MAY 29, 2026/tk/ya