Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 970/2021, CM APPLs. 2620/2021, 10122/2021, 10838/2021, 53363/2022, 53364/2022, 53365/2022, 10526/2023, 10527/2023, 12863/2023 & 58225/2023
SANTOSH VITTHALRAO
INDRAKSHA & ORS. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Jay Savla, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Sameer Kumar and Mr. Vaibhav Pachauri, Advs.
Through: Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, CGSC with Mr. Kushagra Kumar and Mr. Amit Kumar Rana, Advs. for UOI
Mr. Jasmeet Singh, Mr. Mahinder Singh Hura, Mr. Saif Ali, Mr. Pushpendra S.
Bhadoriya, Mr. Vijay Sharma, Mr. Pranav Menon, Mr. Ajith Williyam S. and Mr. Saurav, Advs. for R-6, R-7, R-9 & R-11
Mr. M.K. Madan and Mr. Gunit Shah, Advs. for R-15
Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj and Ms. Sakshi Saugat, Advs. for R-10
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
02.04.2026 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. Respondents 6 to 161 were appointed as Technical Officers in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in 2015. They were promoted as Assistant Drug Controllers[2] on 1 May 2015.
2. As against this, the petitioners were appointed as ADCs by direct recruitment between the years 2016 and 2018.
3. On 8 April 2016, the official respondents drew up a provisional seniority list in which the petitioners were placed above the private respondents. The private respondents represented against the said seniority list. The representation was rejected on 25 June 2019. The private respondents thereafter petitioned the Central Administrative Tribunal[3] by way of OA 2001/2019, claiming that they were entitled to seniority above the petitioners as their appointment, on promotion, was prior to the date when the petitioners were appointed as direct recruits.
4. The petitioners, as the respondents before the Tribunal, contended on the other hand that they had been directly recruited against vacancies of 2014, at which time the private respondents were not even eligible for promotion and that, therefore, they were entitled to seniority over the private respondents.
5. The Tribunal has, by judgment dated 13 October 2020, allowed the private respondents’ OA and set aside the seniority list dated 8 April 2016. The Tribunal has held the private respondents to be “the private respondents” hereinafter “ADCs”, hereinafter entitled to seniority over the petitioners.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have approached this Court by means of the present writ petition.
7. We have heard Mr. Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned CGSC for the Union of India, Mr. Jasmeet Singh, Mr. M.K. Madan and Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, learned Counsel for the respondents at length.
8. Mr. Savla has taken us through the sequence of events in the present case. He points out that the petitioners were eligible for direct recruitment as ADCs in 2014 but that, as their selection was challenged by some of the private respondents before the Allahabad Bench and the Principal Bench of the Tribunal Allahabad Bench and before the High Court of Calcutta, there was a stay on their selection process, as a result of which their appointments got delayed. It was only after the stay was vacated by the Calcutta High Court that the selection process culminated in the appointments of the petitioners. He, therefore, invokes the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit, to contend that a party cannot be prejudiced by the act of Court. He also submits that, having themselves filed a misconceived petition challenging the petitioners’ selection, the private respondents cannot seek to take advantage of the said fact and claim seniority over the petitioners merely because the petitioners came to be appointed after “the Tribunal” hereinafter the private respondents.
9. Mr. Savla has also placed reliance on Office Memorandum[4] dated 4 March 2014, issued by the Department of Personnel and Training[5]. He has particularly drawn our attention to paragraphs 5 (a) to (e) and 7 of the said OM which may be reproduced thus:
10. Mr. Savla submits that the Tribunal has not, in the impugned judgment, taken sufficient note of the fact that the delay in appointment of the petitioners as direct recruit ADCs was only owing to the litigation which had been initiated by the respondents challenging their selection. The petitioners cannot, therefore, be put to prejudice for that reason.
11. Mr. Savla submits that, in these circumstances, the petitioners would be entitled to the benefit of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. N.R. Parmar[6], which granted seniority to direct recruits from the date when the vacancies against which they were appointed arose.
12. As such, he submits that there was no error in the seniority list dated 8 April 2016 and, therefore, the Tribunal erred in setting it aside.
13. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, we regret our inability to agree with the submissions of Mr. Savla.
14. The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit, to our mind, does not apply in a case such as this. The question is not as to the reason for the appointments of the petitioners as direct recruit ADCs having taken place after the private respondents were promoted as ADCs. The fact of the matter is that the petitioners were appointed as direct recruit ADCs only after the private respondents.
15. In such circumstances, the seniority can be determined only by one of two methods. In case the principle of quota rota applies, the law laid down in N.R. Parmar would have become relevant. N.R. Parmar, however, stands expressly overruled in K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro[7], which held that seniority would have to be determined on the basis of continuous officiation, thus:
16. In Meghachandra, the Supreme Court held, in categorical terms, that N.R. Parmar did not reflect the correct legal position. A limited protection for past cases was, however, thus provided in para 39 of the report, even while overruling N.R. Parmar:
Clearly, all that stands protected, in Meghachandra, are cases in which the inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees was already determined prior to the decision in Meghachandra. Otherwise, the decision in Meghachandra itself covered direct recruits, and promotees, appointed prior thereto.
17. No Parmar-based determination of inter se seniority among the petitioners and private respondents, in the present case, took place prior to the rendition of the judgment in Meghachandra.
18. In case quota rota does not apply, the only method by which seniority can be fixed is on the basis of continuous officiation based on the date of appointment, which is what Meghachandra sanctifies and approves.
19. We are aware of the fact that Meghachandra has been referred to a Larger Bench. However, the Supreme Court has held in Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference12 that, even where a judgment of the Supreme Court is referred to a Larger Bench, the courts lower in the judicial hierarchy have to continue to follow the law as it exists. As on date, therefore, Parmar stands overruled, and Meghachandra holds the field.
20. The OM dated 4 March 2014, on which Mr. Savla relies, opens with the following paragraph: “The undersigned is directed to refer to the subject mentioned above and to say that the fundamental principles of inter se seniority of direct recruits and promotees in Central Civil Services/posts were laid down in the Department of Personnel & Training (DOPT) Ο.Μ. No. 9/11/55-RPS dated 29.12.1959 which provided, inter alia, that the relative seniority of direct recruits and of promotees shall be determined according to the rotation of vacancies between direct recruits and promotees, which shall be based on the quotas of vacancies reserved for direct recruitment and promotion respectively, in the Recruitment Rules.”
21. A bare reading of the afore-extracted paragraph from the OM dated 4 March 2014 makes the legal position crystal clear. In case the Recruitment Rules13 provide for a quota between direct recruits and promotees, the N.R. Parmar principle was applicable at that time when that judgment was rendered and seniority would have to be fixed
22. In the present case, however, there is no inter se quota of direct recruits and promotees provided in the RRs. The RRs clearly holds that the post is to be filed 100% by promotion with direct recruits only being considered in the event of promotees not being available.
23. In the absence of any quota between direct recruits and promotes, the OM dated 4 March 2014 as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.R. Parmar would not apply.
24. Where the RRs envisages recruitment “100%” only by one method, with other methods of recruitment only provided as default options, the applicability of the quota-rota rule ipso facto stands ruled out. The existence of a quota is the sine qua non for the quota-rota rule to apply. N.R. Parmar, too, was rendered in the context of an existing 2:1 quota in that case for recruitment.
25. De hors Parmar and Meghachandra, too, therefore, as there is, in fact, (i) no quota provided for direct recruitment and promotion in the RRs and (ii) no provision, in the RRs, permitting grant of retrospective seniority to any category of appointees prior to the dates of their appointment, inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees would have to be determined on the basis of continuous officiation, i.e. with effect from the respective dates when they were appointed as ADCs.
26. Inasmuch as the respondents’ appointment as promotees was before the petitioners had been appointed as direct recruits, we are of the view that the Tribunal has committed no error in holding the respondents to be entitled to seniority over the petitioners.
27. Accordingly, no occasion arises for us to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Tribunal.
28. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. APRIL 2, 2026/aky/ss