Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
MOHD AMAN RANA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikas Sharma, Advocate
Through: Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar, APP for the State with Ms. Amisha Dahiya, Advocate
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 12.10.2023 [hereafter „impugned order‟], passed in by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (SC-POCSO), North East, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [hereafter „Sessions Court‟], in SC NO. 275/2023, arising out of FIR No. 462/2023, registered at Police Station New UsmanPur, Delhi, for commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter „IPC‟] and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [hereafter „POCSO Act‟], vide which the petitioner herein had been declared a „proclaimed offender‟ under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter „Cr.P.C.‟].
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 13.06.2023, at about 8:30 PM, the complainant had sent her 8-year-old daughter, „A‟, to a nearby shop to buy salt. Shortly thereafter, the child returned crying and informed her family members that while she was on her way to the shop, co-accused Roshan, who lives nearby, had called her inside her house. It is alleged that when Roshan went to the kitchen, the present petitioner pulled down the child‟s pyjama, touched her private parts and thereafter made her sit on his lap after removing his pants. When the child started crying, Roshan allegedly slapped her. The victim had later reported the incident to her, and subsequently, the present FIR came to be registered.
3. On 20.06.2023, the petitioner‟s application seeking anticipatory bail was rejected by the learned Sessions Court. Thereafter, on an application moved by the Investigating Officer (I.O.), Non-Bailable Warrants (NBWs) were issued against the petitioner vide order dated 08.08.2023, returnable on 18.08.2023. On 18.08.2023, the learned Sessions Court issued process against the petitioner under Section 82 of Cr.P.C., returnable on 26.09.2023.
4. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a second anticipatory bail application before the learned Sessions Court on 28.08.2023. On 12.10.2023, after recording the statement of the concerned process server, the learned Sessions Court declared the petitioner a proclaimed offender by way of the impugned order. The petitioner thereafter moved an application seeking cancellation of the process issued under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. However, both the second anticipatory bail application as well as the application seeking cancellation of the process issued under Section 82 Cr.P.C. were dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2023.
5. Aggrieved by the order dated 12.10.2023 declaring him a proclaimed offender, the petitioner initially filed W.P. (Crl.) NO. 3791/2023 before this Court. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 21.12.2023, with liberty granted to the petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy by filing a revision petition against the impugned order. Pursuant thereto, the present petition has been filed.
6. The operation of the impugned order was stayed by this Court on the first date of hearing, i.e., 09.01.2024. However, upon dismissal of the anticipatory bail application filed by the petitioner before this Court on 11.09.2024, the interim order passed in the present petition was also withdrawn vide order dated 11.09.2024.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the learned Sessions Court erred in passing the impugned order declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender. It is argued that the order is contrary to the mandate of Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C., as the petitioner had not been charged with any of the offences specified therein and, therefore, could not have been declared a proclaimed offender within the meaning of the provision. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Court wrongly concluded that the petitioner was absconding and deliberately avoiding his appearance before the Court. The learned counsel argues that the petitioner was in fact pursuing legal remedies available to him by filing anticipatory bail applications, and merely seeking such protection cannot be construed as evasion of the process of law. It is also submitted that the application filed by the petitioner seeking cancellation of the proclamation was decided along with his second anticipatory bail application vide order dated 07.11.2023. The learned counsel contends that the learned Sessions Court failed to properly consider the chronology of events. While process under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. was issued on 18.08.2023 and the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender on 12.10.2023, the petitioner had already filed his second anticipatory bail application on 28.08.2023, which remained pending on the date of the passing of impugned order. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing remedies available to him under law and cannot be said to have absconded or evaded the judicial process. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside.
8. Conversely, the learned APP appearing for the State opposes the present petition and argues that the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature. It is stated that after the petitioner‟s first anticipatory bail application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court, several raids were conducted by the police at the address provided by him; however, he could not be found there and no information regarding his whereabouts was available. It is further submitted that in view of the petitioner‟s non-availability, NBWs were issued against him vide order dated 08.08.2023. Despite further efforts by the police, the petitioner could not be traced, following which proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. were initiated on 18.08.2023. The learned APP argues that the proclamation under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. was duly executed by affixation and public announcement directing the petitioner to appear before the learned Sessions Court on 26.09.2023. However, the petitioner failed to appear, and consequently, after recording the statement of the concerned process server, the learned Sessions Court declared him a proclaimed offender vide order dated 12.10.2023. It is therefore prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioner as well as the State, and has perused the material available on record.
10. In the present petition, the petitioner has raised two-fold contentions. Firstly, it is submitted that at the time when the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender, his application for anticipatory bail was pending before the learned Sessions Court and, therefore, it cannot be inferred that he was deliberately evading the process of law. Secondly, it is contended that in view of Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C., the petitioner could not have been declared a „proclaimed offender‟, as the offences alleged against him do not fall within the categories of offences specified under the said provision.
11. In the present case, this Court notes that the FIR was registered against the petitioner on 14.06.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application seeking anticipatory bail, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court on 20.06.2023. As reflected in the Status Report, several raids were thereafter conducted by the police on 03.07.2023, 10.07.2023, 22.07.2023, 28.07.2023, 07.08.2023, 16.08.2023 and 17.08.2023. However, despite such efforts, the petitioner could not be located either at the address available with the police or at any other known place. The Status Report further records that the petitioner‟s wife expressed her inability to inform the police about his whereabouts.
12. In these circumstances, NBWs were issued against the petitioner by the learned Sessions Court on 08.08.2023. Subsequently, proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. were initiated against him on 18.08.2023. The statement of the concerned process server was thereafter recorded and the petitioner was ultimately declared a proclaimed offender vide order dated 12.10.2023. It is also an admitted position that the petitioner had filed a second anticipatory bail application before the learned Sessions Court on 28.08.2023, by which time the process under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. had already been issued against him.
13. It is pertinent to note that the proclamation issued under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. was returnable on 26.09.2023, thereby granting the petitioner an opportunity to appear before the learned Sessions Court prior to the said date. However, instead of appearing before the Court, the petitioner chose to pursue his second anticipatory bail application filed on 28.08.2023. Thereafter, vide order dated 07.11.2023, the learned Sessions Court rejected both the second anticipatory bail application as well as the application seeking setting aside of the order declaring him a proclaimed offender, and directed the police to take appropriate steps under Section 174A of IPC.
14. It is the petitioner‟s contention that since he had filed his second application for anticipatory bail and the same was pending before the learned Sessions Court, the order declaring him a proclaimed offender ought not to have been passed, as he was neither absconding nor evading the process of law. The said contention, however, is unmerited in view of the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar: (2024) 12 SCC 382, wherein it has been held that filing an application for anticipatory bail through an advocate does not constitute an appearance before the Court for a person against whom proceedings under Sections 82/83 of Cr.P.C. are being initiated. The relevant observations are as under:
24. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court that filing of an anticipatory bail through an advocate would not and could not be treated as appearance before a court by a person against whom such proceedings, as mentioned above are instituted.
29. ……Pending the application for anticipatory bail, in the absence of an interim protection, if a police officer can arrest the accused concerned how can it be contented that the court which issued summons on account of non-obedience to comply with its order for appearance and then issuing warrant of arrest cannot proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr.PC, merely because of the pendency of an application for anticipatory bail. If the said position is accepted the same would be adopted as a ruse to escape from the impact and consequences of issuance of warrant for arrest and also from the issuance of proclamation under Section 82, Cr.PC, by filing successive applications for anticipatory bail. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any statutory prohibition and further, taking note of the position of law which enables a police officer to arrest the applicant for anticipatory bail if pending an application for anticipatory bail the matter is adjourned but no interim order was passed. We have no hesitation to answer the question posed for consideration in the negative. In other words, it is made clear that in the absence of any interim order, pendency of an application for anticipatory bail shall not bar the Trial Court in issuing/proceeding with steps for proclamation and in taking steps under Section 83, Cr.PC, in accordance with law.”
15. Thus, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the mere filing of an anticipatory bail application cannot operate as a bar to the initiation or continuation of proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. If such a proposition was to be accepted, it would enable accused persons, against whom NBWs have already been issued and proceedings under Section 82(1) of Cr.P.C. have been initiated, to repeatedly file successive anticipatory bail applications only to delay or evade arrest, and thereafter contend that the proclamation proceedings are invalid. Permitting such a course would defeat the very purpose of proclamation proceedings and allow the process of law to be misused. Accordingly, the mere filing or pendency of an anticipatory bail application cannot be treated as a valid ground to restrain the learned Sessions Court from proceeding in accordance with law under Section 82 of Cr.P.C.
16. Thus, on this ground, no relief is made out in favour of the petitioner.
17. The second contention raised by the petitioner is that he has been chargesheeted for offences punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and that the offences alleged against him do not fall within the categories of offences specified under Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C. On this basis, it is argued that the petitioner could not have been declared a proclaimed offender.
18. Before examining this contention, it would be apposite to refer to the legal position governing the initiation of proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. Section 82 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
19. A plain reading of the above provision shows that Section 82 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to issue a proclamation against a person who is absconding or concealing himself so that a warrant issued against him cannot be executed. The use of terms ‘reason to believe’ in the sub-section (1) of the Section 82 Cr.P.C, suggests that the concerned Magistrate must be subjectively satisfied that the person concerned has absconded or has concealed himself. The provision also prescribes the manner in which such proclamation is to be published. Sub-section (4) further provides that in cases where the accused is charged with certain specified serious offences under the IPC, and fails to appear despite the proclamation, the Court may declare such person a “proclaimed offender” after making such inquiry as it deems fit.
20. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sanjay Bhandari v. State (NCT of Delhi): 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10203 observed that where a proclamation has been issued against a person accused of an offence other than those specifically enumerated under Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C., such a person would be treated as a „proclaimed person‟ and not as a „proclaimed offender‟. The relevant portion of the decision is extracted hereunder:
21. The aforesaid judgment was followed by another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Avinash Singh v. State: 2026:DHC:35, wherein it was held as under:
22. Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C. specifically enumerates certain offences under the IPC in respect of which an absconding person may be declared a proclaimed offender. Admittedly, Section 376 of IPC or Section 6 of the POCSO Act do not find mention among the offences specified under Section 82(4) of Cr.P.C.
23. In light of the settled legal position, and the decision in Sanjay Bhandari (supra), the impugned order dated 12.10.2023, which declared the petitioner a „proclaimed offender‟ is set aside/modified to the extent that the petitioner be declared as a „proclaimed person‟.
24. However, this modification shall not interfere with any action taken or liable to be taken against the petitioner, for failure to appear in pursuance of the proclamation issued under Section 82 of Cr.P.C., as a proclaimed person.
25. In above terms, the present petition alongwith pending application is disposed of.
26. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith. DR.
SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J APRIL 04, 2026/ TD/rb