Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 08th APRIL, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF:
IN
VK SOOD PIL JV .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Karunesh Tandon, Mr. Sarthak Mittal, Mr. Prabin Mohan, Advs.
Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Standing Counsel of MCD with Ms Ankita Bhadouriya
& Mr Umesh Kumar, Advs
JUDGMENT
1. This is an Application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) on behalf of the Defendants seeking condonation of delay in filing the Chamber Appeal.
2. For the reasons stated in the Application, the delay in filing the Chamber Appeal is condoned.
3. The Application is disposed of. O.A. 43/2023
4. The challenge in this Appeal is to the Order dated 17.03.2023 by which the learned Joint Registrar refused to accept the Written Statement of the Defendant on record on the ground that it has been filed beyond the period of 120 days.
5. Material on record indicates that on receiving summons, Defendants appeared for the first time on 31.05.2022 and time was granted to file the Written Statement on the said date. The Written Statement was filed for the first time on 25.09.2022. However, the said Written Statement was kept in defect as it was not accompanied by the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents.
6. The Written Statement along with the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents ultimately came on record on 14.12.2022, which is beyond the maximum period provided under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the „Delhi High Court Rules‟).
7. Vide Order dated 17.03.2023, the learned Joint Registrar refused to accept the Written Statement filed by the Defendants, which was not accompanied by the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents on the date when it was filed and the Affidavit was filed only on 14.12.2022, which is beyond the prescribed period of 120 days under the Delhi High Court Rules.
8. Rule 2, 3 and 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court Rules which are relevant are reproduced as under:-
9. Rule 2 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court Rules mandates that the Written Statement should be filed within a period of 30 days. Rule 3 mandates that along with the Written Statement, the Defendant shall also file an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents without which the Written Statement shall not be taken on record. Rule 4 provides that if the Court is satisfied that the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the Written Statement within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the Written Statement by a further period not exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. Rule 4 also provides that in case the Defendant fails to provide an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents of the Plaintiff, the documents filed by the Plaintiff shall be deemed to be admitted.
10. Admittedly in the present case, the Written Statement has not been filed within 30 days and was filed only on 25.09.2022, which is 3 days before the 120 days period came to an end, i.e., 28.09.2022. An Application for condonation of delay in filing the Written Statement has been filed by the Defendants. Paragraph 2 to 4 of the said Application reads as under:-
11. The Defendants have also filed an Application for condonation of delay in re-filing the Written Statement. Paragraph 3 to 5 of the said Application reads as under:-
12. The short question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether a Written Statement which has been filed within 120 days, which is the maximum period stipulated under the Delhi High Court Rules, but is not supported by an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents, which have been filed subsequently and after the period of 120 days, can be taken on record or not.
13. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that a Written Statement without an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents is not a Written Statement at all in view of Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court Rules which makes the filing of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents mandatory along with Written Statement. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that permitting a Written Statement to come on record without of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents or allowing the of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents to be filed separately after 120 days period will render the provisions of Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court Rules completely otiose.
14. He further submits that in any event Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court Rules provides for the time limit of curing the defective pleadings. He states that assuming without admitting that the Written Statement sans of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents is only a defective pleading even then, Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court Rules provides that the defects must be cured within 30 days and since the defects in the present case were not cured within the 30 days time period, the Written Statement cannot be taken on record as they were filed without of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents within the time prescribed under the Delhi High Court Rules.
15. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff places reliance on the Judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Unilin Beheer B.V. v. Balaji Action Buildwell, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 12566, wherein the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has taken a view that under Rules 3 & 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court Rules permitting a Written Statement without of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents would render the word “shall” as otiose.
16. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the Defendants contends that the learned Joint Registrar has failed to appreciate that the Written Statement was filed on 25.09.2022, i.e within the prescribed period of 120 days. He states that the Affidavit of admission/denial of documents was filed on 14.12.2022. He contends that the rejoinder/replication has been filed to the Written Statement and, therefore, the Plaintiff has estopped from raising the ground that the Written Statement cannot be taken on record.
17. Learned Counsel for the Defendant places reliance on the Judgment passed by the co-ordinate Benches of this Court in COSCO International Pvt. Ltd. v Jagat Singh Dugar, 2022 SCC Online Del 1113; Neeraj Ahuja v AIPIL Zorro Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC Online Del 3479; and Shefali Kohli v Neena Chatrath, 2024 SCC Online Del 2752, to contend that Written Statement filed within 120 days cannot be considered as non-est if not accompanied by of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents.
18. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
19. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Unilin Beheer B.V (supra) has taken a view that a Written Statement filed without an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents cannot be taken on record at all. After quoting various provisions, the learned Single Judge in the said Judgment has held as under:
20. On the other hand, in the three Judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the Defendants, the co-ordinate Benches have taken a completely contrary view. In COSCO International Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the learned Single Judge, after observing the findings of the co-ordinate Bench in Unilin Beheer B.V (supra), has observed as under:
21. Similarly, in Neeraj Ahuja (supra), the learned Single Judge, after placing reliance on COSCO International Pvt. Ltd. (supra), has observed as under:
22. Similarly, in Shefali Kohli (supra) the co-ordinate Bench of this Court after placing reliance on COSCO International Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has held that a Written Statement without of an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents can be taken on record.
23. This Court is of the view that permitting Written Statement without an Affidavit of admission/denial of documents would render the word “shall” in Rule 3 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court Rules as otiose. It is well settled that meaning has to be given to every word in legislation. The legislation in Rule 3 has used the word “shall” making it mandatory. There is no reason to read the word “shall” as “may” as it goes against the spirit of Rules 2, 3 & 4 of the Delhi High Court Rules, the object of which is to ensure finally completion of pleadings. It is settled law that unless there are compelling reasons to read the word “shall” as “may” literal interpretation is the golden rule for interpreting the statute.
24. It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The Apex Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 has held that the words used in statutes cannot be treated to be surplusage or superfluous or redundant and must be given some meaning and weightage. It was observed by the Apex Court as under: “7.....It is a well-settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to documents as to statutes that, save for compelling necessity, the Court should not be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a document “and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use”. To reject words as insensible should be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on common sense that no author of a formal document intended to be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a meaning. The court must, as far as possible, avoid a construction which would render the words used by the author of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any part of the document and make it altogether inapplicable....” This view has consistently held the field and was recently reiterated in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622 and JSW Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kakinada Seaports Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 170.
25. It is also well settled that where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. But, if the provision is clear and explicit, it cannot be reduced to a nullity by reading into it a meaning which it does not carry. Further, a legislature does not waste words without any intention, and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance.
26. It is a well-settled principle of law that user of verbs “may” and “shall” in a statute is not a sure index for determining whether such statute is mandatory or directory in character. The Apex Court in Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, (2024) 20 SCC 85, has further elucidated the import and distinction between the terms “shall” and “may” as under: “24. Law is well-settled that user of the verbs “may” and “shall” in a statute is not a sure index for determining whether such statute is mandatory or directory in character. The legislative intent has to be gathered looking into other provisions of the enactment, which can throw light to guide one towards a proper determination. Although the legislature is often found to use “may”, “shall” or “must” interchangeably, ordinarily “may”, having an element of discretion, is directory whereas “shall” and “must” are used in the sense of a mandatory provision. Also, while the general impression is that “may” and “shall” are intended to have their natural meaning, it is the duty of the court to gather the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the entire statute, the section and the phrase/expression under consideration. A provision appearing to be directory in form could be mandatory in substance. The substance, rather than the form, being relevant, ultimately it is a matter of construction of the statute in question that is decisive.
25. It is also a well-accepted rule that interpretation must depend on the text and the context — the text representing the texture and the context giving it colour — and, that interpretation would be best, which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. While wearing the glasses of the statute-maker, the enactment has to be looked at as a whole and it needs to be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word means and whether it is designed to fit into the scheme of the entire enactment. While no part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. We draw inspiration for the above understanding of the manner of interpreting a statute from the decision of this Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. [RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424: (1987) 61 Comp Cas 663: AIR 1987 SC 1023]” (emphasis supplied)
27. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration. If the directions of the statute are mandatory, then strict compliance with the statutory terms is essential to the validity of administrative action. But if the language of the statute is directory only, then variation from its direction does not invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if the statutory direction is discretionary only, it may not provide an adequate standard for legislative action and the delegation. The Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5, considering the aforesaid position, has observed as under:
28. It scarcely needs reiteration that principles of judicial propriety and decorum mandate that where a Single Judge, while hearing a matter, is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, needed to be reconsidered, the appropriate course is to refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question.
29. Furthermore, to preserve judicial decorum, the Apex Court in Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247 has observed as under:
30. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26, has observed as under:
31. In view of the divergent views expressed by co-ordinate Benches of this Court on the issue in question, and having regard to the settled principle of judicial discipline that conflicting interpretations by Benches of equal strength ought to be authoritatively resolved by a Larger Bench, this Court considers it appropriate to refer the present issue for consideration by a Larger Bench.
32. The question that arises for determination is whether the filing of a Written Statement within the statutory period prescribed under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, but without being accompanied by an affidavit of admission/denial of documents, renders such filing non-est in law or whether the absence of such affidavit constitutes a curable defect, permitting the Written Statement to be taken on record upon subsequent compliance of filing an affidavit of admission/denial of documents.
33. In the event the Larger Bench holds that such Written Statement can be taken on record notwithstanding the delayed filing of the affidavit of admission/denial, the matter shall stand remitted to the learned Joint Defendants for the delay in filing the said affidavit. Conversely, if the Larger Bench holds that a Written Statement unaccompanied by the affidavit of admission/denial within the prescribed period cannot be taken on record, the impugned order of the learned Joint Registrar shall stand affirmed.
34. In view of conflicting orders of the co-ordinate Benches of this Court on the issue raised in the present case, an authoritative pronouncement is necessary so that there is uniformity in deciding such cases in this Court. This issue is arising frequently and, therefore, it is expedient that the same is put to rest on an urgent basis. Accordingly, let the matter be placed before the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench to decide the present issue SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J APRIL 08, 2026 Hsk/JR