Ved Prakash v. M/s Gay Dry Cleaners & Anr.

10. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had failed to consider the testimony of RW-1, who had clearly deposed during her cross-examination dated 14.11.2018 that the possession of the tenanted premises was with M/s Wardrobe Dry-Cleaner since the year 2014. The relevant portion of the said cross-examination is reproduced as under: - “…The owner of the property no. 439 is Sh. Ved Prakash petitioner herein. The possession of the property is with M/s Wardrobe Dry- Cleaner since 2014. I am not aware about the rent being paid by the tenant to the petitioner. Before 2014 the property no. 439 was lying vacant. I have never visited the property personally. The shop is adjoining to my shop.” It was submitted that the observations of the learned ARC qua letting out of the said property few months prior to filing the eviction petition reflects non-application of mind. It was further submitted that the learned ARC failed to take into consideration the settled proposition of law that in the event of the landlord exercising his option to choose a particular premise on the ground of its suitability, the said decision of the landlord cannot be interfered by a tenant, as long as the decision appears to be a reasoned one.

11. Learned counsel, in support of the aforesaid, had placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan[1], and particularly on the following paragraph(s): -

4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellant's claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances.

5. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs. We set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller directing eviction of the respondent from the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The respondent is given four months' time to vacate the premises subject to filing of the usual undertaking within four weeks from today.”

12. It was further contended that the learned ARC had wrongly arrived at the conclusion qua the requirement of the Petitioner being bona fide, solely on the basis of the preponderance of the probabilities and erroneous consideration of the facts which were irrelevant for the purposes of adjudication of the eviction petition. It was further contended that the learned ARC had wrongly considered that the shop No. 440, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, was available with the Petitioner at the time of sale, i.e., on 22.08.2014, but the said property was sold on the ground of necessity of funds to raise for the purposes of raising construction in Property No. 279-A, Masjid Moth, New Delhi.

13. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had wrongly observed that since no document was placed on record to demonstrate whether any construction was raised on the Property No. 279-A, there was a serious doubt qua bona fide requirement of the Petitioner. It was submitted that Property No. 440 had already been sold by the Petitioner in the year 2014, and the same was also not disputed by the Respondents. It was further submitted that at the time of filing of the eviction petition, Property No. 440 was not available with the Petitioner. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied on the testimony of RW-1 during her cross-examination dated 14.11.2018, wherein it was deposed by RW-1 that Property No. 440 was purchased by Mr. Amit Kumar Sethi, four years back, from the Petitioner. Relevant portion of the said cross-examination is reproduced as under: - “…Who is the owner of the property no. 440?

14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, had submitted that even if another property was let out to another tenant, the said fact would not disentitle the Petitioner from seeking eviction of the Respondents from the tenanted premises. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had authorised his son, Mr. Naveen Atri, to let out Property No. 435 and utilise the rental income therefrom for his sustenance. It was further contended that the Petitioner cannot be expected to snatch away the source of livelihood from one of his sons, in order to provide accommodation to another son, and therefore, the argument of Property No. 435 being available with the Petitioner as an alternate accommodation is unsustainable.

15. Learned counsel had relied on the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Anil Kumar Jain v. Subhash Chand Chawla alias Subhash Chander Chawla 2, and particularly on the following paragraphs to submit that that the concept of alternative suitable accommodation is a relative and objective concept, and the same cannot be applied subjectively: -

37. More so, as held in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini20 & Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors.21, it is not for the tenant to dictate the landlord much less the Court, for substitute its views with those of the landlord for choosing the available premises instead of the subject premises by projecting something, which, according to the landlord himself, is not reasonably suitable for him. Seeking eviction of a tenant from his own premises merely because he had/ has other premises with himself cannot amount to the landlord “… …creating an artificial scarcity for himself and his family members…..”, when there were sufficient reasons for him to seek eviction of the subject premises beyond the requirements enshrined in the DRC Act. Similarly, dismissing the Eviction Petition of the landlord merely because no amendment was carried out by him with respect to another premises available with him, when the same was in Middle Circle, Connaught Place and not where the subject premises was situated, was also beyond the requirements enshrined in the DRC Act. 38. As borne out from the aforesaid, the landlord was indeed able not only to show but also substantiate that he had bona fide requirement for the subject premises, and that he was sincere and honest, as also that the alternative accommodations available with him were not reasonably suitable for the purpose for which he was seeking eviction of the tenant from the subject premises. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the findings rendered by the learned RC are not based on a plausible opinion as they run contrary to the tenets of the DRC Act.”

16. It was further submitted that in the present case, landlord-tenant relationship and the bona fide requirement of the Petitioner for his son, who was operating his real estate business from the First Floor of Property NO. 439, was not in dispute, and the only issue was with respect to availability of alternate suitable accommodation. It was further argued that the Petitioner cannot be expected to take possession from a tenant in an ongoing tenancy, as it would cause hardship and great financial loss to his other son.

17. It was further argued by learned counsel for the Petitioner that Property Nos. 435, 436 and 439 were in occupation of different tenants at the time of filing of the eviction petition, however, the mere fact that tenancy qua the said shops kept changing from time to time during the pendency of the eviction petition does not prohibit the Petitioner from seeking eviction of the Respondents from the tenanted premises and the Petitioner cannot be expected to disrupt the income being incurred from the said tenancies.

18. Learned counsel had further placed reliance upon the following judgment(s): i. Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan[3], Para(s) 10, 11, 13 and 16; ii. Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh[4], Para(s) 16 to 18 and 23 to 25; iii. Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta[5], Para(s) 2 to 8, 20 to 24.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

19. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents submitted that the learned ARC, while passing the impugned judgment, had rightly held that the Petitioner had mentioned only one ground in the eviction petition, which had necessitated shifting of the real estate business being run by his son, and that was inadequate income generation. It was further submitted that the Petitioner in his cross-examination dated 05.05.2018 had deposed as under: - “…I do not know about the income of Shri Jatinder Atri and never asked about the earnings of any of my sons.” It was submitted that the Petitioner had not even deposed about the income of his son and had rather evaded the issue, and thus, the plea taken by 2025 INSC 271 the Petitioner, with respect to less income being generated by his son, was seriously doubtful.

20. It was further contended that the Petitioner had further deposed that his son, Mr. Jatinder Atri, was running his office from the first floor for the last many years, and thus, there were no changes in the circumstances, as had been mentioned by the Petitioner, which compelled the Petitioner to look for an alternative office/accommodation for his son, and thus, the bona fide need of the Petitioner appeared to be doubtful.

21. It was further submitted that the Petitioner did not disclose in the eviction petition the alternate properties available with him, being Property No. 279, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, admeasuring 160 sq. yd., being a fourstorey building, and Property No. 279-A, as both of these properties were situated on the main road and the same could have been used for commercial purposes.

22. It was further submitted that Property No. 435 was earlier let out to Surbhi Caterers, and upon the said tenant vacating the said shop, the Petitioner admittedly regained vacant possession of the same. It was further contended that instead of utilizing the said shop for the alleged bona fide requirement, the Petitioner had re-let the same to another tenant, Mr. Sureen Dewan, vide lease deed dated 04.01.2016. It was further submitted that the eviction petition was filed on 07.05.2016, i.e., four months after the said shop was re-let to Mr. Sureen Dewan, and thus, the Petitioner had conspicuously failed to disclose any specific time frame as to when the alleged bona fide requirement for his son arose and had such bona fide need genuinely existed, the Petitioner would not have let out another commercial property, prior to filing the present petition.

23. It was further submitted that the lease deed dated 04.01.2016 qua Property No. 435 expired on 31.07.2016, meaning thereby that the said shop would have become available to the Petitioner within 3 months of filing the eviction petition. It was further submitted that despite the aforesaid, the Petitioner had deliberately chosen to institute the eviction proceedings, and the same casts a serious doubt on the genuineness and immediacy of the bona fide requirement.

24. Learned counsel for the Respondents further drew attention of this Court to the cross-examination dated 05.05.2018 of the Petitioner, which reads as under: - “…I do not know the name of the tenant who is occupying the property No.435, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I cannot say as to when it was inducted as a tenant in the said portion

Chinese food shop in property No.435. I do not remember since when the Chinese food corner is being run.” It was contended that the said testimony of the Petitioner demonstrates that the Petitioner had given evasive and non-committal answers and had failed to categorically deny that after filing of the present petition, the said shop was again let out to a new tenant who is presently running a Chinese food restaurant from the said shop.

25. It was contended that the Petitioner, in the eviction petition, failed to disclose the existence of other Property Nos. 435, 436, 437, 439 and 440, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The details regarding these properties surfaced only after the Respondents had filed their leave to defend application before the learned ARC. It was argued that suppression of material facts is fatal to a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, as the landlord is required to make full disclosure regarding availability of alternate accommodations.

26. It was further submitted that the subject premises had ground floor, first floor and second floor, however, the Petitioner had only stated his requirement for the ground floor for the alleged bona fide need of his son. The Petitioner had remained silent as to how the first and second floors of the subject premises would have been utilized in case eviction was granted.

27. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had also filed an eviction petition qua Property No. 437, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, and the said petition was dismissed vide order dated 31.10.2019 by the learned ARC. It was further contended that thereafter the Petitioner allegedly secured possession of the said property from the tenants, by paying them a substantial amount.

28. Attention of this Court was drawn to the cross-examination of the Petitioner dated 09.04.2018 wherein it was stated as under: - “I do not remember as to when the three concrete cement tank, iron jal and tin shade on the second floor were constructed by the respondent. I do not remember the name of the advocate to whom I had got served the notice dated 01.06.1987. The said notice was sent by Regd. A.D. Post. I do not know from which post office the said notice was sent. Vol. It was posted by my advocate. It is wrong to suggest that no notice dated 01.06.1987 was ever sent to the respondent. It is wrong to suggest that no rent agreement dated 30.01.1987 was ever executed between the parties. It is wrong to suggest that no lease deed dated 18.07.1987 was entered into between the parties. It is wrong to suggest that it was never agreed between the parties that the rent would be increased by 10% and after every five years a fresh lease deed would be executed. It is wrong to suggest that the tenancy was orally created. It is wrong to suggest that the respondents did not carry out any modification in the premises let out to them.”

29. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the Cross-Examination of the Petitioner dated 05.05.2018, wherein it was stated as under: - “I have been issuing rent receipts in respect of shop no. 436 to Sh. Navin Atree. (Vol- Since, many years, he has not been paying rent to me). I have not filed any such rent receipt on the record of present petition. I do not remember that Sh. Jitender Atree has started his office of real estate since beginning at 439 Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I do not remember Sh. Jitender Atree has his office at any other place or not. The area of no. 435 is approximately 33 sq.mtr., no. 436 & 439 are about 31-31.[5] sq.mtr. each, no. 440 I do not know the area. I do not know the area of shop no. 437 &438. I do not about the area of the first floor of 439. Again said it may be about 20-22 sq.mtr. It is wrong to suggest that the first floor of property no. 439 is sufficient and suitable for the purposes of the office of Sh. Jitender Atree. It is wrong to suggest that the properties bearing no. 279 and 279-A Masjid Moth are also sufficient and suitable for the office of real estate business. It is wrong to suggest that Sh. Jitender Atree is earning handsomely from his business. It is wrong to suggest that for an office of real estate it is not necessary that the office should be on ground floor only. It is wrong to suggest that no premises are required for the office of Sh. Jitender Atree. It is wrong to suggest that I had been calling upon the respondents to increase the rent about Rs.25,000/- per month. It is wrong to suggest that property no. 79, masjid moth is lying vacant in my possession. It is wrong to suggest that no premises are required by me as mentioned in the petition. It is wrong to suggest that I had been letting out different properties from time to time as I did not require any premises for Jitender Atree. It is wrong to suggest that Sh Jitender Atree has no intention of shifting his office from the first floor of property no. 439. It is wrong to suggest that my petition is false and malafide. It is wrong to suggest that shop no. 436 has always been let out by me from time to time. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely.”

30. Reliance was further placed on the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sh. Sanket Behari Mittal v. Sh. Subhash Chand Gupta[6] and particularly on the following paragraph(s): - “18. Further, no doubt, as held in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) the landlord is the best judge of his needs, it has also been held therein that the need urged by the landlord must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural, and the like. In fact, as also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand[7] and Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde[8], should there 2026:DHC:156 arise any suspicion/ doubt in the mind of the Court as to the genuineness of the bona fide requirement urged by the landlord, the burden is upon the landlord to clear all such doubts. Clearly, the landlord herein has not been able to discharge the said burden.”

31. Learned counsel for the Respondents had further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kanta Gupta v. Goverdhan Dass Daga (Deceased) Thr Lrs[7] and particularly on the following paragraph(s):

32. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had rightly dismissed the eviction petition, mentioning that a landlord is bound to give satisfactory explanation for not occupying any other premises belonging to him that have fallen vacant shortly before a petition for recovery of possession is filed. It was submitted that the Petitioner had failed to give satisfactory explanation regarding such properties, and hence the present petition is liable to be dismissed.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

33. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the records.

34. Learned ARC while dismissing the eviction petition filed on behalf of the Petitioner, observed as under: - “Bonafide Need Of The Petitioners/Alternative suitable accommodation Both of said ingredients are taken up together being interrelated as filing of petition despite having suitable alternative accommodation itself creates doubt on the bonafides of the petitioner. As per respondent, the petitioner has various other commercial properties i.e. 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth and the properties bearing no.435, 436, 439 and 440, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth. Counsel for respondent has submitted that as per petitioner his son Jatinder Atri is working from the first floor of property no. 439 and since the office is at first floor, hence he is not able to generate good income. The Counsel has submitted that business of property dealing is unlike any retail business which is effected by the visibility/access from the road. It is submitted that real estate business is consultancy based and depends upon the goodwill of the consultant and the efforts made by him. It is submitted that only a generic ground has been raised regarding low income due to working from the first floor. It is submitted that moreover it is not mentioned since when the said need was felt/arose for shifting the office of Naveen Atri as number of properties were let out and even sold few months prior to filing the petition and even during the pendency of the petition. I have considered the submissions. Indeed property consultancy business is not a retail business, nonetheless, the said ground itself does not debar the petitioner to shift his son to a ground floor premises as ground floor premises are better suited for any business as compared to the first floor. However, there appears substance in the other submissions of the Counsel for respondent. Reasons for same are discussed in succeeding paras. The petitioner has mentioned only one ground which has necessitated shifting of business of his son i.e. inadequate income generation. However, in his cross examination PW[1] has deposed that "I do not know about the income of Sh. Jitender Atri. I never asked about the earnings of any of my sons." Thus, petitioner has not even deposed about the income of his son/deficiency in the same and has rather evaded the issue. Thus, the pleading of petitioner regarding the low income of his son due to running of business from the first floor is seriously doubtful. Moreover^ petitioner has deposed that his son Jitender Atri is having his office on the first floor for last many years. He has even deposed that Jitender Atri is his eldest son and always been in the business of real estate. PW[2] Jatinder Atri has specifically deposed that "I am doing the real estate business since 2011-12. I am doing the real estate business from 439, first floor, Masjid Moth, New Delhi 110049 since inception of the business till now". Therefore, it is clear that Jitender Atri has been running his business from the first floor since long back but no change of circumstances have been mentioned that compelled the petitioner to look for alternative office for his son. As pointed out by the Counsel for respondent, no time frame have been mentioned during which the income of Jitender Atri nose dived, nor it is the case of petitioner that Jitender Atri was not having good income from day one due to running his office from the first floor. Accordingly, the cause on the basis of which the bonafide need has been pleaded appears doubtful. As far as the alternative properties are concerned, the respondent has claimed property no. 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth as commercial but on the other hand petitioner has claimed the same as residential only. However, during her cross examination RWl deposed that "it is correct that the family of Mr. Ved Prakash is residing in the properties 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth. It is correct that both the properties are occupied and. not lying vacant." Thus, irrespective of status of said properties, respondent has admitted non -availability of same. Therefore, said properties cannot be considered as a suitable alternative accommodation u/s 14(1) (e) of DRC Act. In regard to the other properties, it is alleged by the respondent that the property no. 435 was let out to Surbhi Caterers and the petitioner was put back in the vacant possession thereof and the petitioner has re-let the property to another tenant. On the other hand, the petitioner has claimed that the said shop is under tenancy of Sureen Dewa vide lease deed dated 04.01.2016. I have considered the submissions and evidence of both parties on said issue. However, even if the statement of petitioner is considered as true same creates a doubt on the bonafides of petitioner. As per petitioner, his son requires the suit premises since he is unable to generate sufficient income from his business as it is being run from first floor. As pointed out earlier, no time frame has been mentioned when such bonafide requirement was felt or arose. Same is crucial as the petition was filed on 07.05.2016 i.e. after about four months of letting out the aforesaid shop. Thus, if the bonafide need for the suit premises was there the petitioner would not have let out his other property on rent. Moreover, the lease deed shows that the lease was to expire on 31.07.2016. Thus, said shop would have been available to the petitioner within three months of filing the present petition. Yet petitioner chose to file the present petition. Even otherwise, during his cross examination PW l has deposed "7 do not know the name of the tenant who is occupying the property no.435, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I cannot say as to when it was inducted as a tenant in the said portion.

A I do not remember. Q. Do you know anything about Hangchuaa's Chinese Food Corner? A I cannot read the name in english. However, there is some chinese food shop in property no.435. I do not remember since when the Chinese food corner is being run". Thus, the petitioner has given evasive answers and has failed to affirmatively depose that petitioner has not let out the property to a new tenant who is now running a restaurant of Chinese Food as claimed by the respondent. Thus, it is doubtful whether the property no.435 did not became available to the petitioner after filing of the present petition. In regard to property no.436, the respondent has claimed that same was let out in 2015 but was vacated in or around October, November, 2016 and petitioner got the vacant possession of the said property. As per respondent, the petitioner re-let the property to a new tenant who was carrying business in the name of Ms Riyaz Chicken Corner. However, even said tenant vacated the property in or around April, 2017 and thereafter petitioner re-let said house to a new tenant who is running a business under the name Ms Akib Chicken Point. On the other hand, petitioner has not specifically disputed the said letting out and has rather stated that said shop is in his name but is under the tenancy of his son Naveen Atri who has sub-letted it further with his consent. I have considered the pleadings and evidence in regard to said shop. Firstly, the petitioner has not filed a single document regarding the alleged tenancy to his son Navin Atri. Secondly, by the conduct of petitioner, said pleading appear improbable because generally a man treats his son alike. Thus, if the petitioner is allowing his other sons to use his properties gratuitously then it is highly doubtful as to why he will let out his property to one of his sons. More so, petitioner has claimed that his family consists of his wife and three sons including Navin Atri thereby implying that all of the sons are part of his family and that Navin Atri is not separate from his family. Thirdly, during his cross examination the petitioner has deposed that since many years Navin Atri has not been paying rent to him. This fact further creates doubt in the claim of petitioner that he has consented to further sub-letting by his tenant when the tenant himself was not paying rent to him. Fourthly, even if the said contention of petitioner is deemed to be correct still the petitioner has stated that his son Navin Atri sub let the property further with "his consent". This shows that despite the existence of bonafide requirement of his other son the petitioner allowed the further subletting of his ground floor properties. This fact creates serious doubt in the bonafide requirement of the petitioner for his son and goes to the root of the matter. Further, respondent has claimed availability of shop no.439 with the petitioner stating that same was earlier let out in 2013 and then in beginning of 2014 and even recently it has been let out to a tenant who is running dry cleaning business from there under name of "Wardrobe". On the other hand, petitioner has claimed that said shop is under the possession of Jyoti Fabricare Services Limited vide lease agreement dt. 03.08.2015. I have considered the submissions and the evidence in regard to said shop. Firstly the petitioner has failed to prove the said lease agreement as the original was never produced. Secondly, even if said agreement is considered, same is of 03.08.2015 i.e. nine months prior to filing the present petition. As pointed out earlier no time frame has been mentioned by the petitioner as to when the need for the suit premises arose. Even in the replication there is no averment that there was no need for the suit premises when the aforesaid agreement was executed. Thus, letting out of other properties few months before filing of the petition cast a shadow of doubt on the bonafides of petitioner. The respondent has further referred to shop no.440 being sold by petitioner to Sh.Amit Kumar Sethi about three years ago and handing over the vacant possession of the complete property at the time of sale deed. On the other hand, the petitioner has deposed that vide sale deed dated 22.08.2014 he sold the said shop to Amit Sethi as he was in need of money for the construction of house no. 279A. I have considered the submissions and the pleadings regarding said shop. As pointed out earlier no time frame have been mentioned by the petitioner when the need for suit premises arose. The copy of aforesaid sale deed filed by the petitioner himself shows that the physical vacant possession was delivered by the petitioner to the vendee. Thus, the said property was available to the petitioner at the time of the sale. The petitioner has tried to explain the same on theground of necessity for funds to raise construction of 279A. However, during his evidence petitioner has not even mentioned about said fact in his affidavit of evidence. No document have been filed to show that any construction whatsoever was raised on property no. 279A after execution of the aforesaid sale deed. Thus, petitioner has failed to lead any documentary or even oral evidence in support of aforesaid pleading. During his cross examination petitioner even failed to tell the area of the plot on which property no.27A, Masjid Moth has been constructed. Thus, it is seriously doubtful as to whether such construction was raised after the sale of the aforesaid shop. Thus, bonafides of petitioner gets further shrouded by more doubts. A landlord is bound to give satisfactory explanation for not occupying any other premises belonging to him that have fallen vacant shortly before a petition for recovery of possession is filed or while it is pending (P. S. Devgun v. S. P. Walia 1975 RLR (Note 71) 63; Satyapal v. Smt Parsani Devi 1974 RCR 508). However, in the present case, the petitioner-landlord failed to give satisfactory explanations regarding such properties. Therefore, in view of aforesaid discussion, the second and third ingredients of section 14(1) (e) of DRC Act could not be proved by the petitioner. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition of the petitioner is dismissed.” (Emphasis Supplied)

35. Although, the Petitioner in his submissions before this Court had given the status of other properties, which has been mentioned hereinbefore, but at the time of filing of the eviction petition, no details were given by him, however, the same were disclosed by him in the reply to the leave to defend application.

36. It is pertinent to note that an application seeking leave to defend was preferred by the present Respondents before the learned ARC, and vide order dated 24.07.2017 leave to defend was granted by the learned ARC, by observing as under: -

37. Thus, it is a matter of record that the sole ground for filing the eviction petition with regard to the tenanted premises was that the same was required for the office of the son of Petitioner, Mr. Jatinder Atri, who was working on the first floor of Property No. 439, admeasuring approximately 22 metres, and since the same was situated on the first floor, he was not able to generate good income. Learned counsel for the Petitioner had argued that the learned ARC erred in observing that the said requirement was not bona fide, as the Petitioner in his cross-examination or otherwise was not able to demonstrate as to when the need for the Petitioner’s son had arisen prior to filing of the petition. It was contended that the eviction petition is always filed in praesenti, and therefore there was no requirement for the Petitioner to demonstrate as to when the need for his son’s office to be on the ground floor had arisen.

38. There is no doubt that the eviction petition is filed in praesenti and the need for bona fide requirement can arise at any stage before filing of the eviction petition, however, once a specific stand has been taken by the Petitioner for the purposes of filing of the eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, then the burden to prove the same would fall upon the Petitioner. It had come on record that the Petitioner’s son, Mr. Jatinder Atri, for whose benefit the tenanted premises was sought, had been engaged in the profession of property dealing since the year 2011–2012. It is also matter of record that he has been running his office from Property No. 439, First Floor, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, since the very inception of his business, till the filing of the present petition. In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Petitioner to show that the ground for which eviction was sought was a genuine one.

39. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rahabhar Productions (P) Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon[8], had observed and held as under: -

40. In the present case, the observations of the learned ARC with respect to the fact that in his cross-examination the Petitioner had feigned ignorance with regard to the income of his son, as well as other evasive answers, clearly points out that the ground taken in the eviction petition was not genuine. The petitioner could not explain the circumstances which were put to him during cross-examination, and therefore, the bona fide requirement is doubtful. Coupled with the fact that despite Property No. 435 being available with the Petitioner, 4 months before filing of the eviction petition, the Petitioner could not give any satisfactory explanation as to why the said shop was not utilised by his son Mr. Jatinder Atri for running his office. It has also come on record that the lease of the said shop was to expire on 31.07.2016, and therefore, the same would have been available to the Petitioner within 3 months of filing of the eviction petition, but again, no reasonable explanation could be given by the Petitioner as to why the same was not suitable for the Petitioner’s son’s office.

41. Similarly, with respect to Property No. 436, it was stated by the Petitioner that the same had been let out in the year 2015 and was vacated in or around October - November, 2016, and subsequently the Petitioner regained possession of the said property. However, the Respondent specifically averred that the Petitioner thereafter, had re-let the said property to successive tenants, i.e., M/s Riyaz Chicken Corner and subsequently to M/s Akib Chicken Point. The Petitioner, instead of disputing the said position, took an inconsistent stand that tenancy qua the said property was in the name of his son, who had further sub-let the same with his consent. In absence of any documentary proof of such alleged tenancy, coupled with the admission that no rent had been paid by his son for several years, the said plea was rightly rejected by the learned ARC. It was correctly concluded that despite availability of alternate premises, the Petitioner permitted further sub-letting, which undermined the plea of bona fide requirement.

42. With respect to Property No. 439, the Respondent asserted that the said property had been let out to a tenant running a dry-cleaning business under the name of “Wardrobe”. The Petitioner, on the other hand, had claimed that the said property was leased out to “Jyoti Fabricare Services Limited” vide lease agreement dated 03.08.2015. However, the Petitioner failed to place on record the original lease agreement before the learned ARC. Even otherwise, the said property was let out by the Petitioner nine months prior to the filing of the eviction petition, and there was no averment as to when the alleged need for the subject premises arose. In these circumstances, the learned ARC rightly observed that letting out of the said property, shortly before filing of the eviction petition, casted a serious doubt on the bona fide requirement of the Petitioner.

43. With respect to Property No. 440, the Respondent had argued that the same was sold by the Petitioner to Sh. Amit Kumar Sethi and the vacant possession of the said property was handed over at the time of execution of the sale deed. It was further contended that despite the said property being available with the Petitioner, the same was not utilised for his son, Mr. Jatinder Atri’s requirement. In these circumstances, the time frame for the alleged need becomes crucial. Per contra, it was argued by the Petitioner that he was constrained to sell the said property for raising funds for construction of Property No. 279-A. It is pertinent to note that no evidence, either documentary or oral, was placed on record before the learned ARC to demonstrate that any construction was carried out by the Petitioner, after execution of the said sale deed. In these circumstances, the learned ARC had rightly concluded that the Petitioner had failed to lead any evidence in support of the said contentions, thereby again casting serious doubts on the bona fide requirement.

44. The finding of the learned ARC with respect to not specifying the time period during which the need for a separate office arose, has to be examined in the aforesaid background, particularly in light of the premises being available to the Petitioner shortly before the filing of the petition and thereafter.

45. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.9, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua10, held that the scope of interference by this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, is limited. Such jurisdiction is confined to examining whether the impugned order suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record. The Revisional Court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view, unless the impugned order is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or vitiated by material impropriety. In the absence of such infirmities, there remains narrow scope for interference with the impugned order.

46. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, no interference with the impugned order dated 31.10.2019 passed by the learned ARC is called for, and the same is accordingly upheld.

47. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is dismissed and disposed of accordingly.

48. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

49. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA (JUDGE) APRIL 08, 2026/sn/db