Batliboi Ltd v. Kiran Sharma

14. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the existence of admitted suitable alternate accommodation at L-26, Kailash Colony, Delhi, had been totally ignored by the learned ARC. The Respondent during his cross-examination on 30.05.2022, had been confronted with the said accommodation and the Respondent had not been able to explain as to how the said accommodation was not available to him and the learned ARC had failed to consider the said aspect while rendering the impugned order. The relevant portion of the said cross-examination is reproduced as under: -

15. It was further argued that the Respondent, in paragraph 9 of his evidence by way of affidavit, had accepted that he is the co-owner and cosharer of the property at 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura. It was further pointed out that during the cross-examination of the Respondent, he was confronted with an alternate accommodation being L-26, Kailash Colony, Delhi, and thus, two alternate accommodations were available with the Respondent at the time of filing the eviction petition and the projected need was not bona fide. The relevant portion of the said affidavit is reproduced as under: -

16. Attention of this Court was drawn to the impugned order passed by the learned ARC, and particularly on the following paragraph(s): - “25. One of the contentions raised by the respondent is that the petitioner has an alternative accommodation available in the form of one property at 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi. It has been claimed by the respondent that petitioner has been using the said property and therefore, has an alternate accommodation available for their use in Delhi. The same is disputed and denied by the petitioner who has claimed that except for demised premises, the petitioner and his family members do not have any other property in Delhi. The petitioner has explained that the said property no. 42 was owned by some other person known to the petitioner and he has consented to allow the petitioner to use the said property as a correspondence address only. In crossexamination of PW[1] also, this fact has been duly explained by PW[1]. He has deposed “.... and one of my friends was living at 42, Birbal road and therefore, with his permission I had used the said address for my correspondence in India. (VOL. I authorized my advocate to search from property records to establish that I am not owner of 42, Birbal road at any point of time). My advocate never found any document in my name as owner of 42, Birbal Road, New Delhi”.

29. The respondent has also claimed that there is no bonafide requirement of the petitioner or his family members for the demised premises. It has been claimed that the bonafide requirement of the petitioner is projected to be the requirement for daughter of the petitioner to start her business as a qualified lawyer in India. It has been argued that the daughter of petitioner may be qualified as a lawyer to practice in Malaysia but whether her educational qualification is recognized for practicing as an advocate in India or not, has not been stated anywhere in the petition. It has been claimed that lawyers having foreign degrees are permitted to practice only for limited purpose and therefore the alleged bonafide requirement is not a true statement made by the petitioner.

30. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement stated by the petitioner is not in respect of his daughter’s requirement for a place to start her business in India. As the petition was instituted in the year 2015, it is possible that daughter of petitioner became qualified during pendency of the present petition and her requirement for the demised premises also arose during pendency of this petition, but the bonafide requirement, which is to be adjudicated upon is not the bonafide requirement of daughter of petitioner, rather the bonafide requirement as disclosed in the petition filed in the year 2015. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement disclosed by the petitioner is the requirement for a residential accommodation for the petitioner and his daughter in Delhi/India as they want to settle in Delhi. Further, the bonafide requirement claimed is on behalf of the brother and sister of the petitioner and their family members who require a place to stay when they visit India. It is on these grounds of bonafide requirement, that the present petition is to be tested.

32. This particular proposition of the petitioner that he and his daughter want to settle in Delhi, has not been challenged by the respondent anywhere during-trial. The respondent has not produced any material to show that the claim of the petitioner that he intends to shift along with his daughter to Delhi is not a genuine claim. Even in cross-examination of petitioner and his daughter i.e. PW[1] & PW[2], the respondent has not been able to establish that they do not intend to shift to Delhi and reside at the demised premises. As already noted above, availability of alternative accommodation has not been established by the respondent. Thus, the desire of the petitioner and his daughter to shift to Delhi is practically possible only if demised premises is vacated by the respondent. Furthermore, it is also the claim of respondent that legal notice dated 06.06.2012 issued by the petitioner clearly establishes his intention to evict the respondent for the purpose of increasing rent for the demised premises. This has also been put to the petitioner in his cross-examination and he has duly explained the demand for increased rate of rent in legal notice dated 06.06.2012. he has categorically stated that as shifting from Malaysia to Delhi would have approximately taken time of one year, therefore, the respondent was given the choice to renew tenancy at an increased rate of rent. He has deposed “Fresh tenancy at Rs. 1 lac was offered to the respondent only because it was not practical for me and my family to immediately shift from Malaysia to the suit Property and keeping in mind the time required for shifting i.e. approximately one year, fresh tenancy for that period was offered to the respondent. I cannot say now if approximately period of one year would still be required as on date to shift from Malaysia to the suit property. VOL. In case I get Possession, I will make full efforts to shift at the earliest”.”

17. It was argued that the learned ARC had also erred in accepting the alleged bona fide requirement of the Respondent, without any supporting evidence. During the course of the trial, the Respondent had sought to project a vague need of visiting Delhi occasionally, whereas the eviction petition had projected an entirely different case of permanently settling in Delhi. Instead of requiring the Respondent to substantiate the case as pleaded in the eviction petition, the learned ARC had suo moto accepted the alleged requirement of settling down in Delhi as genuine, despite there being complete absence of evidence on record to support such a claim.

18. It was argued that the impugned order was vitiated by complete absence of any discussion of the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the Respondent and his witnesses. The learned ARC had failed to analyse the evidence on record, and had instead proceeded on presumptions, unsupported by the trial record.

19. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the learned ARC had rejected the alleged OCI status of the Respondent and his daughter and in the absence of such status, neither the Respondent nor his daughter would have been legally entitled to carry on commercial activities in India, thereby rendering the alleged intention of shifting to Delhi wholly untenable.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

20. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the present petition had been filed by the Petitioner, on wholly frivolous and untenable grounds, with the sole intention to prolong the litigation between the parties and deprive the Respondent of the use and enjoyment of his own property. The Respondent is a senior citizen, aged about 71 years, and he had been struggling since 1997 in order to recover possession of the tenanted premises, for his bona fide residential requirements.

21. It was further contended that the Petitioner had himself admitted during his cross-examination dated 14.12.2022, that the tenanted premises had originally been taken on lease for residential purposes. It was further admitted that permission for commercial electricity connection was obtained only in the year 2015, long after the demise of the original landlady, i.e., Late Smt. Sumitra Devi Sharma on 20.07.1991, and thus, these admissions clearly demonstrated that the tenancy continued even after the death of the landlady, and that the Petitioner had misused the premises for commercial purposes contrary to the terms of tenancy. The relevant portion of the said crossexamination is reproduced as under: - “At this stage witness is shown rejoinder to reply to application seeking lead to defence dated 07.09.2015, to which witness admits his signature at point A and the said rejoinder is Ex. RWI/Pl. It is correct that there are electricity bill annexed with the rejoinder, which is already as marked as Ex. PWI/Dl (colly). Rakesh Bagga was the General Manager of the respondent company and has since then retired. It is correct that Ex. PWI/Dl is in the name of respondent company. (Vol. I did not recall the name due to lapse of time.) I do not know if the respondent company had taken permission/NOC from land lady or her legal heirs prior to taking electricity connection at the demised premises as per energization date of 19.06.2015 in Ex. PWI/Dl. In usual course the general manager of the respondent company would have ask for permission/NOC from the land lord.”

22. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had failed to lead complete evidence during the course of trial. The cross-examination of RW-1 revealed several material admissions, including that the Petitioner had not paid rent since the year 2007 and had been using the tenanted premises for commercial purposes, despite the tenancy being residential in nature. It was averred that the Petitioner had also admitted the site plan and failed to produce any document to substantiate the plea of adverse possession.

23. It was argued that the Petitioner admittedly entered the tenanted premises as a tenant, and therefore, could not raise a claim of adverse possession against the landlord, in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was contended that the settled principle of law that “once a tenant, always a tenant” squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

24. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the eviction petition filed by the Respondent before the learned ARC and particularly on the following portion: -

8. Details of accommodation available together with The property in question was let out by the mother of petitioner in the year 1976 at a particulars as regards ground area garden and out house, in any. (Plan to be attached) rate of 1150/- consisting of two bed room one dining cum —drawing room, one baths, one kitchen, one Servant room with W.C. However after the death of the mother of the petitioner in the year 20.07.1991, one front bed room with attached bath room is also in possession of the respondent. Now the tenant is holding over the entire built up property as per site plan attached as Annexure 1.

25. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the eviction petition, to contend that the Respondent had no other alternative residential accommodation available in India, or in Delhi, except the tenanted premises and that the Respondent, along with his daughter, intends to settle in Delhi. The relevant portion of the eviction petition is reproduced as under: - “That the petitioner has no other residential accommodation in India/Delhi except the suit property. The petitioner and his daughter namely Ms. Sarita wants to settle in Delhi and thus the petitioner requires the suit premises for his and family members bonafide residential use. The petitioner not only requires the suit property not only for his and his family but also for his brother and sister and their family members also who more often visit India and have no residence to stay except the suit premises. But due to non availability of their own residence, they have to stay at Hotel.”

26. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had taken inconsistent pleas with respect to the existence of alternative properties, allegedly available with the Respondent. The Petitioner had failed to place on record any documentary proof regarding the properties at Birbal Road or Kailash Colony, and such pleas had not even been taken in the leave to defend application or written statement. The said allegations were therefore clearly afterthoughts, raised only to delay the eviction proceedings.

27. It was further submitted that the Respondent had earlier initiated eviction proceedings being E-147/1997 under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, and the same was dismissed in default for non-prosecution, and not on merits. Therefore, the Respondent was fully entitled to institute fresh proceedings for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.

28. It was further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the Respondent had issued a legal notice dated 06.06.2012, demanding possession of the tenanted premises, which was replied by the Petitioner on 12.07.2012. In the said reply, the Petitioner had admitted that the entire property had been taken on rent by the Petitioner, thereby completely demolishing the subsequent plea of adverse possession as raised by the Petitioner. The relevant portion of the said reply is reproduced as under: -

29. It was further pointed out that a civil suit being CS No. 247/2014 had earlier been preferred by the Respondent, wherein vide order dated 02.02.2015 the learned Civil Court had categorically held that the learned Rent Controller had jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties. The relevant portion of the said order is reproduced as under: - “In these circumstances, plaintiff failed to place on record any facts which suggests that how the last admitted rent (by the plaintiff), @- Rs.1,150/- is increased and come to Rs,3,810/-. So, in these circumstances, from all the facts on record it can be safely concluded that as per the admission of the plaintiff the last paid rent appears to be Rs.1,150/-. It is also admitted fact by the plaintiff that the parties to the Suit are related to each other as landlord and tenant. It is also admitted by the plaintiff that the tenanted premises is situated in Delhi and was given on lease vide lease deed dated 02.11.1976. In these circumstances, I think the suit of the plaintiff comes within the purview of DRC Act and thus beyond the purview of the jurisdiction of this court. So, the suit of the plaintiff is barred in view of Sec.50 of DRC Act and thus plaint is rejected u/o 7 r 11 CPC. However, this expression is made on the basis of material of this case and in no way affects the case of the parties, if decided on merits, by the Rent Controller. File be consigned to Record Room.”

30. It was further submitted that the eviction petition had been adjudicated upon by the learned ARC after a complete trial, and a reasoned eviction order dated 27.04.2023, i.e., the impugned order, had been passed in favour of the Respondent, which shows that the Petitioner had failed to dislodge the Respondent’s case, even after a complete trial.

31. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the present petition is nothing, but an attempt of the Petitioner to prolong the litigation between the parties, and the dispute between the parties had already seen multiple rounds of litigation, including proceedings before this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, all of which had affirmed the jurisdiction of the learned ARC to adjudicate the matter.

32. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the impugned order, and particularly on the following paragraph(s), to contend that the learned ARC had rightly rejected the plea of adverse possession as raised by the Petitioner: -

33. It was further submitted that the learned ARC, after perusing the material available on record, had rightly disregarded the plea of the Petitioner with respect to availability of alternative accommodation. The relevant portion of the impugned order is reproduced as under: -

34. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that the bona fide requirement in the present case had to be examined on the basis of the pleadings contained in the eviction petition filed in the year 2015, and the requirement pleaded therein was not in respect of the daughter of the petitioner, but was specifically for residential accommodation for the Respondent and his daughter, who intended to settle in Delhi. Reliance was placed on the following portion of the impugned order: - “30. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement stated by the petitioner is not in respect of his daughter’s requirement for a place to start her business in India. As the petition was instituted in the year 2015, it is possible that daughter of petitioner became qualified during pendency of the present petition and her requirement for the demised premises also arose during pendency of this petition, but the bonafide requirement, which is to be adjudicated upon is not the bonafide requirement of daughter of petitioner, rather the bonafide requirement as disclosed in the petition filed in the year 2015. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement disclosed by the petitioner is the requirement for a residential accommodation for the petitioner and his daughter in Delhi/India as they want to settle in Delhi. Further, the bonafide requirement claimed is on behalf of the brother and sister of the petitioner and their family members who require a place to stay when they visit India. It is on these grounds of bonafide requirement, that the present petition is to be tested.”

35. Learned Senior Counsel had further drawn attention of this Court to the impugned order, and particularly on the following paragraph, to contend that the Petitioner had failed to place any material on record to demonstrate that the bone fide requirement, as stated by the Respondent, was not genuine: - “32. This particular proposition of the petitioner that he and his daughter want to settle in Delhi, has not been challenged by the respondent anywhere during trial. The respondent has not produced any material to show that the claim of the petitioner that he intends to shift along with his daughter to Delhi is not a genuine claim. Even in cross-examination of petitioner and his daughter i.e. PW[1] & PW[2], the respondent has not been able to establish that they do not intend to shift to Delhi and reside at the demised premises. As already noted above, availability of alternative accommodation has not been established by the respondent. Thus, the desire of the petitioner and his daughter to shift to Delhi is practically possible only if demised premises is vacated by the respondent. Furthermore, it is also the claim of respondent that legal notice dated 06.06.2012 issued by the petitioner clearly establishes his intention to evict the respondent for the purpose of increasing rent for the demised premises. This has also been put to the petitioner in his cross-examination and he has duly explained the demand for increased rate of rent in legal notice dated 06.06.2012. he has categorically stated that as shifting from Malaysia to Delhi would have approximately taken time of one year, therefore, the respondent was given the choice to renew tenancy at an increased rate of rent. He has deposed “Fresh tenancy at Rs. 1 lac was offered to the respondent only because it was not practical for me and my family to immediately shift from Malaysia to the suit Property and keeping in mind the time required for shifting i.e. approximately one year, fresh tenancy for that period was offered to the respondent. I cannot say now if approximately period of one year would still be required as on date to shift from Malaysia to the suit property. VOL. In case I get Possession, I will make full efforts to shift at the earliest”.”

36. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the evidence by way of affidavit of PW-2, i.e., Ms. Sarita Sharma, and particularly on the following paragraph(s): -

testimony of PW-2, clearly established the bona fide requirement as pleaded in the eviction petition. It was submitted that PW-2 had clearly deposed that she intended to utilize the tenanted premises for her personal, as well as professional requirements, and that despite having their own property in India, she and the Respondent were compelled to stay in hotels during their visits, thereby incurring substantial expenses.

REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

37. Learned Senior Counsel further drew the attention of this Court to the Bachelor of Law degree of Ms. Sarita Sharma, to contend that she had obtained the said degree on 29.06.2007, i.e., much prior to the institution of the eviction petition in the year 2015. It was further submitted that the professional qualification of Ms. Sarita Sharma was well within the knowledge of the Respondent at the time of filing of the eviction petition, and it was not a case where such development had arisen during the pendency of the proceedings and the requirement arising from her professional background could not have been be said to be a subsequent development.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

38. Heard learned Senior Counsels for the parties and perused the records.

39. One of the primary contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner was that the Respondent could not prove the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises. It had been contended that the bona fide requirement by the Respondent was projected to be for his daughter, to start her venture, as a qualified lawyer in India, which is not possible in view of the prevalent rules of the Bar Council of India, whereby the lawyers having foreign degrees are permitted to practice in India for limited purpose and that too on a reciprocal basis. It was similarly contended that the Respondent had proved the evidence of only two visits to India, which was done to pursue the litigation and in absence of any other evidence to demonstrate that the Respondent or his daughter was regularly visiting India, the very basis of bona fide requirement disappears.

40. Another contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner was that prior to filing of the eviction petition, the Respondent had issued a legal notice dated 06.06.2012 demanding a rent of INR 1,00,000/-, and therefore, the so-called bona fide requirement for his daughter is again not believable. It would be apposite to refer to the cross-examination dated 30.05.2022 of the Respondent, and the relevant portion of the same is reproduced as under: - “Witness is shown para 17 of legal notice dated 06.06.2012, Ex. PW 1/15

41. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to a portion of the evidence by way of affidavit filed on behalf of PW-2, Ms. Sarita Sharma, daughter of the Respondent herein. The relevant portion(s) of the said affidavit are reproduced as under: - “6. I also want to use my ancestral property for my personal as well as for my professional requirements and the tenant has no right to interfere in the bonafide need of the landlord and his family. It is further stated that whenever I visited India I was constrained to remain in hotels only and having to spend large sums of money on stay despite our property in India.

7. I say that with the advent of technology and requirements, I want to explore the possibility of setting up a law office/firm/consultancy business in Delhi because I am a professionally qualified lawyer. The setting up of a law office/firm/consultancy premises in Delhi can only happen while residing there as this requires substantial time and effort and connections and renovation in setting up the office in the premises. However, without the eviction of the tenant the same cannot happen. To set up the same I would be required to live in Delhi which is a costly affair now as I will have to remain in a hotel as the property is still not vacated by the respondent tenant.

8. It is stated that I have acquired Overseas Citizen of India (“OCI”) status and that as an OCI holder who obtained a foreign law degree, I would be able practice law but with riders as per Bar Council of Delhi. However there is no bar to set up a consultancy in the premises either by any authority or any law against the owner/landlord in the suit premises.

9. I say that I am lawyer by profession who has obtained a Law degree from a foreign university and am a person of Indian origin has been allowed by the Bar Council of India to practice subject to certain terms

10. I say that since all these preparations require long term stay in India which is quite expensive as the Petitioner and I are constrained to stay in hotels and thus the same is not feasible.”

42. The cross-examination dated 31.05.2022 of the said witness, for the sake of completeness, is reproduced as under: - “31.05.2022 PW-2 Statement of Ms. Sarita Sharma, aged about 37 years, R/o 15, Jalan SS21/13, Damansara Utama, Petaling Jaya, 47400, Selangor, Malaysia. (recalled for cross examination after 30.05.2022) On SA XXXXXXX by Sh. Rambhakt Aggarwal, i/b Ms. Megha Mukherjee, Adv. for respondent. I am aware of the contents of my affidavit. The address as mentioned in my affidavit is not my permanent address. I am not owner of any residential property in Malaysia. Vol. I live in a mortgaged residential property in Malaysia presently. My present address in Malaysia is B-13 A-3 A, Viva Residency, 378, Jalan Ipoh, 51200 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The ownership documents of this property in Malaysia reflects my name as mortgagor of the said property and the bank as the mortgagee.

India and I already answered that I will travel back and forth to cater to both clients- sets. Witness is shown the para 7 of her affidavit.

43. The Bar Council of India has come out with rules regarding Entry, Rules and Regulations of Foreign Lawyers and Law firms in India, and the press release dated 19.03.2023, which would make a useful reference in the present case, is reproduced as under: -

44. The aforesaid press release would demonstrate that foreign lawyers, except for those practising before Courts, which would require reciprocity, are otherwise permitted to function and advise their clients about Foreign laws and International laws. As per the aforesaid document, they would also be permitted to render advisory work about such laws for their foreign clients. In these circumstances, the contention on behalf of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that under no circumstances could the daughter of Respondent work in India is completely untenable. The contention on behalf of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that daughter of the Respondent is not dependent upon him and therefore there is no bona fide requirement for her to use the tenanted premises for her work is again not acceptable.

45. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner drew attention of this Court to the cross-examination dated 30.05.2022 of PW-1/Mr. Kiran Sharma, wherein he admitted that the need at the time of filing of petition in the year 2015, was for his brother, his sister and himself and not his daughter specifically. He further deposed that he could not remember if his daughter was a practicing advocate or not in the year 2015. In these circumstance, attention of this Court was drawn to the law degree of the daughter of the Respondent dated 29.06.2007, and therefore, it was contended that at that relevant point of time, when the eviction petition was filed, the daughter of the Respondent was admittedly a law graduate, and still, there was no mention of her requirement to come to India and practice law, however, in the cross examination of the said date it was further recorded as under: - “Qns. What was the reason that your daughter wanted to shift her practice from Malaysia to India? Ans. Earlier my daughter has gained a lot of experience in Malaysia by working with law firm and subsequently with banks. With her experience, specifically in last 5-6 years, she feels a possibility of expanding her profession in India as India is one of the upcoming economy in the world. Vol. She is presently not practicing in India. She is working as a consultant in India. My daughter has come to India 2-3 times in between 2018 to 2020. Vol. She has not come as a consultant only.”

46. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent, in the eviction petition, had taken the following stand(s): - “That the petitioner has no other residential accommodation in India/Delhi except the suit property. The petitioner and his daughter namely Ms. Sarita wants to settle in Delhi and thus the petitioner requires the suit premises for his and family members bonafide residential use. The petitioner not only requires the suit property not only for his and his family but also for his brother and sister and their family members also who more often visit India and have no residence to stay except the suit premises. But due to non availability of their own residence, they have to stay at Hotel. The need of the petitioner for suit premises for residential premises is bonafide as he and other relatives have no other residential Property other than the suit premises. That if the respondent is evicted it would not suffer any hardship because it being a Public Limited Company. The petitioner issued a legal notice dated 06.06.2012 through their counsel for the termination of lease deed dated 02.11.1976 which is annexed as Annexure-10. The legal notice issued on behalf of the petitioner was duly received by the respondent who replied the same vide reply dated 12.07.2012. The copy of reply given by the respondent is annexed as Annexure 11. The contention and intention of the respondent were very clear and were against the interest of the petitioner as expected which clearly shows the bad intention of the respondent towards the interest of the property of petitioner. That the respondent paid the rent till 1997 and since then the respondent has not paid any rent. Moreover the petitioner required the premise for his bonafide personal and family need as he has no other residential property in Delhi or in India and the family of the petitioner used to come to Delhi being Indian but are constrained to remain in Hotel or at some other place which causes harassment and mental torture on the part of respondent since last so many years.”

47. Thus, the requirement of the tenanted premise for his daughter was also pleaded by the Respondent, although, not specifically with regard to her professional requirements. Thus, the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that the aforesaid could not have been taken into consideration, without a formal amendment, is not acceptable. The fact remains that if the daughter of the Respondent has to come to India, the requirement of the subject premises would still be in existence. Even otherwise, the learned ARC while disposing of the petition had categorically observed as under: - “30. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement stated by the petitioner is not in respect of his daughter’s requirement for a place to start her business in India. As the petition was instituted in the year 2015, it is possible that daughter of petitioner became qualified during pendency of the present petition and her requirement for the demised premises also arose during pendency of this petition, but the bonafide requirement, which is to be adjudicated upon is not the bonafide requirement of daughter of petitioner, rather the bonafide requirement as disclosed in the petition filed in the year 2015. In the present petition, the bonafide requirement disclosed by the petitioner is the requirement for a residential accommodation for the petitioner and his daughter in Delhi/India as they want to settle in Delhi. Further, the bonafide requirement claimed is on behalf of the brother and sister of the petitioner and their family members who require a place to stay when they visit India. It is on these grounds of bonafide requirement, that the present petition is to be tested.” (emphasis supplied)

48. With respect to the aforesaid bona fide requirement of the Respondent and his family, it had been contended by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondent in his cross-examination dated 30.05.2022, had admitted that whenever he visits India, he necessarily does not visit Delhi. It was further pointed out that the brother of the Respondent, Mr. Ajay Sharma, and his sister, Ms. Usha Sharma, both did not appear before the learned ARC to lead the evidence to show that the requirement, as pleaded by their brother, i.e., the Respondent, was a genuine and bona fide. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner has further placed reliance upon the copy of the passport of the Respondent, to contend that the Respondent has no intention to stay in India. During the course of the proceedings, the Respondent had also placed on record immigration stamps showing the Respondent’s entry into India, as well as multiple Visas. The aforesaid contention was dealt by the learned ARC in the following manner: -

accommodation in Delhi. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the petitioner or his family members would have anticipated their bonafide requirement for the demised premises, that arose in the year 2015, prior to 2015 and thus would have saved evidence of their regular visits like hotel bills etc. to be used in petition of this nature. Furthermore, it is admitted by the respondent that one portion of the demised premises was retained for use of deceased mother of the petitioner. In cross examination of PW-1 he has categorically stated that he used to stay in that portion of the demised premises during his visits to Delhi from 1976 to 1991, Only thereafter, did the need arise for hotel accommodations as the respondent trespassed into that portion of the demised premises also. Hence, even if it is assumed to be correct that the petitioner and his family members are mere irregular visitors to Delhi, it does not negate the bonafide requirement for the demised premises for the petitioner and his family to shift their residential base from Malaysia to Delhi.” The relevant part of the cross-examination dated 30.05.2022, which is relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, in which the Respondent had answered to the following effect: - “…After 1998 when I visited India, I did visit Delhi. On every trip to India, I do not visit Delhi. I do not recall when I visited Delhi after 1997.” The Respondent had, although, said that he does not remember any visit to India after the year 1997, but the fact remains that his crossexamination is of 30.05.2022 and he was admittedly present in India at that time.

49. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to judgments passed by learned Benches of this Court, in respect of bona fide requirement of a landlord who was residing abroad and was desirous to come and stay in his premises situated in India. The said judgments are as under: i. Hi-Bred (India) (P) Ltd. v. Ravi Kumar[1]; ii. Saroj Khemka v. Indu Sharma[2]; iii. Sumitra Devi v. Raj Rani Sehdev[3]; iv. Harminder Singh Koghar v. Ramnath Exports Private Ltd[4].

49.1. In Hi-Bred (India) (P) Ltd. (Supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court was adjudicating upon a civil revision preferred on behalf Petitionertenant therein, assailing the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller against the latter. Arguments were advanced by the Petitioner-tenant therein, that bona fide requirement of the Respondent-landlord therein was a sham as he was a Green Card holder. The learned Single Judge of this Court had held that neither the Court nor the tenant, can dictate to the landlords not to come back to their own country and live in their own house. Relevant portion(s) of the said judgment is reproduced as under: -

49.2. Similarly, in Saroj Khemka (Supra), a civil revision was preferred by the Petitioner-tenant therein, against the order passed by the Rent Controller, thereby rejecting the leave to defend filed on behalf of the Petitioner-tenant therein. The learned Single Judge of this Court, while dealing with the issue of bona fide requirement of a landlord living abroad and visiting India for a short duration, had held and observed as under: - “Let us examine the plea of petitioner in the application for leave to defend. A statement made in the counter affidavit that the owner while staying in U.S.A. and the income of the husband of the owner-landlady was enormous and they are accustomed to the lifestyle of U.S.A. and respondent was only coming in a year for couple of days to meet its relatives and, therefore, the requirement of the petitioner for their stay in Delhi does not amount to bona fide requirement. It is not denied that the owner had not any other place to stay in Delhi or anywhere else except the house of the relatives/parents. Along with the petition, present respondent/owner landlady had filed on record before the Trial court bills from Hotel Vasant Continental showing that they had to stay in a Hotel. Respondent-landlady has also filed the letter from Centre for Policy Research dated 4.6.1995, inter alia, granting internship to the daughter of the respondent to start her assignment in or around September' 1994 wherein it was specifically mentioned that the daughter of the respondent would have to provide her own housing and transportation arrangements and as no accommodation was available to the daughter, Charunidhi Sharma, she could not join Centre for Policy Research. I do not see any force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the petitioner visits India, she cannot have her own house for her casual stay as her residence and she has to go to the house of the relatives or has to stay in a hotel in spite of the fact she has a flat of her own in Delhi. No Court can compel a person to stay in a house of a relative or a hotel and because the said person is staying abroad, he/she has no right to stay in his/her own premises. That will be totally negating the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. If a person is residing abroad, he/she owns a flat or a house in Delhi, he/she wants to spend a few weeks or a few months then he/she must be allowed to stay in his/her own house. I do not find any infirmity with the finding recorded by learned Additional Rent Controller on this score also.”

49.3. In Sumitra Devi (Supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court, while deciding a civil revision preferred by the Petitioner-tenant therein, assailing the eviction order passed against the latter, had categorically held that the desire of the landlord to come back to one’s own county gives rise to bona fide need. Relevant paragraph(s) of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-

9. A Single Judge of this Court in T.D. Dhingra v. Pritam Rai Khanna, 48 (1992) DLT 208 upheld the claim of bona fide requirement by a landlord-owner who had acquired British citizenship but was claiming eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for his stay in India. In the present case the respondentlandlady and her two sons have deposed on oath before the Trial Court that they intend to return to India. Nothing could be brought out in their cross-examinations to falsify them on this issue. The petitioner inspite of raising a plea that the respondent intends to sell the property in question has not produced any evidence to establish that the respondent has been negotiating with some one in regard to sale of this property. The fact that the respondent had never let out the first floor portion and had kept in with her sister for so many years fully corroborates her plea that she is not interested in any monetary gain and she genuinely intends to come back to India with her one or two sons and stay here. The respondent being an old lady and suffering from so many ailments and physical problems is unable to use the first floor portion and as such is in bona fide need of premises in possession of the petitioner. In view of the status, life style, habits, size of family of the respondent and her sons their need for the ground floor as well as first floor of the building in question for residential use is neither unreasonable nor exaggerated. This Court does not find any good ground for holding that the plea of bona fide need as raised by the respondent is a pretence only and the respondent does not require the premises in question for residential use.”

49.4. In Harminder Singh Koghar (Supra), the Petitioner-landlord therein had assailed the orders of dismissal passed in the eviction petitions filed by him before the Rent Controller. The Petitioner-landlord therein was nonresident Indian settled in Thailand, and was running his business from there. It was the case of the Petitioner therein that the suit property was bona fidely required by him and his family, as they had decided to set up their business in Delhi. The learned Single Judge of this Court, while holding that if the landlord is settled outside India, and was frequently visiting for his need and temporary stay, the same has to be judged as bona fide need. Further, the learned Single Judge, while relying upon Saroj Khemka (Supra), had dispelled the argument of the Respondents-tenants therein that temporary stay in Delhi for a person settled abroad would not constitute bona fide requirement. It was further held by the learned Single Judge that a mere belief/opinion that the landlord is well settled abroad and there is not even remotest chance of him and his family coming back and living in India is irrelevant. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under: -

50. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment relied upon by the Respondent, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.P. Kapoor v. Kamal Mahavir Prasad Muraka & Others[5], pertaining to the bona fide requirement of a landlord/owner of the premises in Delhi, despite being a permanent resident of Mumbai, whereby it was held and observed as under: -

51. Similarly, in Dr. Jain Clinic Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sudesh Kumar Jassal[6], learned Single Judge of this Court, while relying on the aforesaid judgment, S.P. Kapoor (supra), had observed and held as under: -

52. In view of the aforesaid judgments, as well as the observations rendered by the learned ARC, it is evident that the mere fact that the Respondent and his family members are residing abroad or are irregular visitors to Delhi, cannot, by itself, negate their bona fide requirement. The law is well-settled that neither the Court nor the tenant can dictate to a landlord as to where he should reside, and the desire of a landlord to return to India or to establish a residence here, constitutes a legitimate and bona fide need, unless shown to be a mere pretext. In the present case, no material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the requirement set up by the Respondent is sham or mala fide. Hence, even if it is assumed that the Respondent and his family members were not frequent visitors to Delhi in the past, the same does not dilute or discredit their bona fide requirement for the tenanted premises.

53. The other two pleas taken by the Petitioner before the learned ARC and in the written submissions filed before this Court was availability of alternate accommodation with the Respondent and of adverse possession. So far as the plea of availability of alternate accommodation is concerned, the learned ARC had dealt with the same in the following manner: - “25. One of the contentions raised by the respondent is that the petitioner has an alternative accommodation available in the form of one property at 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi. It has been claimed by the respondent that petitioner has been using the said property and therefore, has an alternate accommodation available for their use in Delhi. The same is disputed and denied by the petitioner who has claimed that except for demised premises, the petitioner and his family members do not have any other property in Delhi. The petitioner has explained that the said property no. 42 was owned by some other person known to the petitioner and he has consented to allow the petitioner to use the said property as a correspondence address only. In crossexamination of PW[1] also, this fact has been duly explained by PW[1]. He has deposed “.... and one of my friends was living at 42, Birbal road and therefore, with his permission I had used the said address for my correspondence in India. (VOL. I authorized my advocate to search from property records to establish that I am not owner of 42, Birbal road at any point of time). My advocate never found any document in my name as owner of 42, Birbal Road, New Delhi”.

26. On the other hand, in cross-examination of respondent witness, it has clearly come on record that the respondent never even bothered to find out about ownership of said property no. 42. RW[1] has deposed “I do not know in whose name the property bearing no. 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi-14 js registered. My knowledge regarding this property has been derived from the pleadings filed by the petitioner but I cannot specify in which Pleading has this Property been mentioned by the petitioner. I cannot produce any document to show property bearing no. 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi-14 belongs to the petitioner or their family members..... The respondent company did not carry out any documents search for the said Property before any authority. I cannot say if any other alternative Property in Delhi is available to the petitioner..... I have not made any online search regarding ownership of property bearing no. 40 & 42, Birbal Road, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi”.”

27. In light of above testimonies of PW[1] and RW[1], it is clearly established on record that petitioner has nothing to do with property no. 42.

28. The respondent has made a bald averment with respect to ownership of property no. 42. No document has been produced to substantiate the claim that an alternative accommodation is available to the petitioner. It is now well settled that respondent cannot resist his eviction only on allegations made in the pleadings, but only if some, cogent material is also produced by the respondent to show that he has material to non suit the landlord. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778. Reliance is also placed upon the judgments of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Ram Swaroop v. Viney Kumar Mahajan dated 24th July, 2017 in RC Rev. No. 112/2016 and Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram dated 2nd August, 2017 in RC Rev. No. 352/2017. When the tenant does not produce any document at all before the Court on the basis whereof there is any chance of the tenant proving what he has stated about availability of an alternative accommodation, the only inference is that the facts disclosed are not capable of being proved and/or not capable of dis-entitling the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act.” Nothing has been produced by the Petitioner before this Court to contradict the aforesaid findings of the learned ARC, and therefore, the said findings need not be interfered with. Reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the portion of the affidavit of the Respondent is misplaced, as the same has been explained by him in his cross examination, and even the crossexamination of the Petitioner’s witness as RW-1, demonstrates that the plea of alternate accommodation could not be substantiated by them.

54. So far as the issue of adverse possession is concerned, the same had been dealt with by the learned ARC in the following manner: - “19. The claim of adverse possession is also not tenable on account of categorical and clear admission of the respondent that initial possession was in the capacity of a tenant only. Once possession has been admitted to be in the capacity of a tenant, then without execution of any proper sale documents as per applicable laws, ownership cannot be claimed merely on the strength of long possession. Possession as a tenant is permissive possession only and can never be said to be hostile to the ownership of the actual owner. This is also Strengthened by the fact that there is no dispute qua the petitioner being one of the legal heirs of his deceased mother Sumitra Devi. Respondent has disputed ownership claim of the petitioner on the ground that there is no Will in favor of the petitioner by Sumitra Devi for the demised premises. As the demised premises is located in India, its devolution shall also be in accordance with the laws of succession applicable in India. In India, succession is in accordance with personal laws and succession for Hindus is governed by Hindu Succession Act. The respondent has not showed by any material that Hindu Succession Act would not be applicable on the deceased mother Sumitra Devi or the petitioner. Respondent has also not produced any material during the entire trial to show why the laws of succession as applicable in India, be not applied to the demised premises, As it is not disputed that petitioner is son of Sumitra Devi, then even without any Will in his favour, he is entitled to inherit share in the demised premises as per applicable laws of succession. Having so held, it is necessary to deal with objection of the respondent qua the general power of attorney issued by the other legal heirs in favor of the petitioner, at this stage itself. The petitioner has claimed to be authorized by the other legal heirs to deal with demised premises and to take all necessary steps in respect of the demised premises, by way of general power of attorneys executed in his favour by the other legal heirs. Even if it is presumed that no such general power of attorney was ever executed by the other legal heirs in favour of the petitioner, then also the maintainability of the present petition cannot be challenged. It is now well settled that an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act is maintainable even by one of the legal heirs/co-owners of the demised premises and consent/authority of other legal heirs/co-owners is not necessary. Reliance is placed upon Kanta Goel vs. D.P. Pathak, 1979 (1) RCR (Rent) 485; (1977) 2 Supreme Court cases 814, Pal Singh vs. Sunder Singh 1989 (2) RCR (Rent) 331; (1989) 1 Supreme Court cases 444; Seshasyana Rao & Ors Vs. Manuri Venkatesa Rao & Ors AIR 1954 Madras 531, Sri Ram Pasricha V. Jagannath & Ors (1976) 4 SCC 184. Infact, in M/s Indian Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRS Smt. Savitri Agarwalla & Oks., AIR 2004 1321, the Hon'ble Supreme Court went a step ahead and opined that even if no prior no objection is obtained from the remaining co-sharers then also the petition is maintainable.

20. In view of the above, it is clear that being son of Sumitra Devi, the petitioner has inherited co-ownership in the demised premises and is entitled to pursue the present petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act.

21. Even from the cross examination of RW-1, it is clearly coming on record that the respondent was never in hostile possession of the demised premises, after death of mother of petitioner. In his cross examination dated 14.12.2022, RW-1 has admitted one electricity bill for demised premises Ex.PW1/D[1], which is in the name of respondent. He further stated that he was not aware if any permission/NOC was taken prior to obtaining electricity connection as evidenced by Ex.PW1/D[1]. Thereafter, he goes on to state that in general course the general manager of respondent would have asked for such permission/NOC from the landlord. He has deposed: "I do not know if the respondent company had taken permission/NOC from land lady or her legal heirs prior to taking electricity connection at the demised premises as per energization date of 19.06.2015 in Ex.PW1/D[1]. In usual course the general manager of the respondent company would have asked for permission/NOC from the landlord".

22. In view of this testimony of RW-1, it is clear that some permission/NOC must have been sought from the landlord in the year 2015 by the respondent. If respondent is owner by way of adverse possession, then there would have been no requirement of seeking any permission/NOC. Furthermore, despite claiming that in usual course such permission/NOC would have been taken, the respondent has failed to disclose the name of the landlord from whom such permission/NOC was sought.

23. It is admitted case of the respondent that there is no ownership document in favour of the respondent for the demised premises. On the other hand, the petitioner has produced the ownership record in favour of his deceased mother, lease agreement between deceased mother and the respondent, admission of the fact that petitioner is son of the deceased mother who was the previous owner of the demised premises, are sufficient to establish a better title in favour of the petitioner than the respondent. It is well settled that in a petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act, the ownership of demised premises is not to be examined as in a title suit. Landlord merely has to show a better title to the demised premises to seek eviction of the respondent. Reliance is placed upon Dr. Jain Clinic Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sudesh Kumar Dass in RC Rev. No. 136/12, decided on 22.08.2013 (Delhi HC), Shanti Sharma Vs. Smt. Ved Prabha [AIR 1987 SC 2028], Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450, Sheela and ors Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Parkash, (2002) 3 SCC 375 and Sushil Kanta Chakarvarty Vs. Rajeshwar Kumar, 79 (1999) DLT 210.” Again, nothing has been brought on record by the Petitioner to contradict the aforesaid findings rendered by the learned ARC, and therefore, there is no ground to interfere with the same.

55. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.7, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[8], held that the scope of interference by this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, is limited. Such jurisdiction is confined to examining whether the impugned order suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record. The Revisional Court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view, unless the impugned order is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or vitiated by material impropriety. In the absence of such infirmities, there remains narrow scope for interference with the impugned order.

56. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, no interference with the impugned order dated 27.04.2023 passed by the learned ARC is called for, and the same is accordingly upheld.

57. Interim order dated 04.01.2024 passed by the learned Predecessor Bench of this Court, stands vacated.

58. The Petitioner-tenant is directed to vacate and hand over vacant, peaceful and physical possession of Plot No. N-197-A, Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi 110048, to the Respondent-landlord, forthwith, as the benefit of six months’ period as per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act has already lapsed.

59. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is dismissed and disposed of accordingly.

60. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

61. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA (JUDGE) APRIL 09, 2026/bsr/kr/db