Satpal Khurana v. Beerwati

1. The Petitioner/tenant and the son of the Respondent/landlady are physically present in the Court today.

2. The present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner/tenant impugning a judgment dated 01.10.2014 passed by Ld. SCJ-cum-RC, District Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [hereinafter referred to as ‘Impugned Judgment’]. By the Impugned Order, the Eviction Petition filed by the Respondent/landlady was allowed. The premises in issue is one shop situated at ground floor of Property No. 667, Jheel Khuranja, Delhi-110051 [hereinafter referred to as ‘subject premises’].

3. This Court had examined this matter briefly on three dates i.e. 24.10.2024, 28.11.2024 and 05.12.2024. The only ground that has been raised by the Petitioner/tenant was that another shop which is adjacent to the subject premises is available with the Respondent/landlady, and thus, the Impugned Judgment suffers from an infirmity.

4. A perusal of order dated 05.12.2024 reflects that this aspect of the matter was dealt with by this Court including on 24.10.2024 and on 05.12.2024. The record reflected that the other shop that was being referred to by the Petitioner/tenant was in the occupation of another son of the Respondent/landlady, and thus, was not available for the use of the Respondent/landlady. The relevant extract of order dated 05.12.2024 is reproduced below:

Kumar and it is argued that there is no requirement of shop in question and that is why the shop was let out to Sh. Chanchal Kumar. From the aforesaid arguments it is itself clear that the date of letting of said shop pertain prior to the date of filing of the present case and as such it does not make any big difference when it is claimed the said shop is in occupation of the other son of the petitioner as on the date of filing of the present case.”

5. Paragraph 25 of the Impugned Order however refers to the fact that the shop in issue is in occupation of the other son of the Respondent and thus it is not available to the Respondent.” [Emphasis supplied]

5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant today makes the same submissions. He submits that there is another shop available which was let out for a short period with the Respondent/landlady.

6. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/landlady submits that, as was submitted before and recorded in the order dated 24.10.2024, this issue has adequately been dealt with by the learned Trial Court in the Impugned Judgment. Learned Senior Counsel submits that paragraph 25 of the Impugned Judgment refers to the fact that the shop in issue is in occupation with the other son of the Respondent/landlady and thus is not available to the Respondent/landlady.

7. No new contention has been raised before this Court by the Petitioner/tenant.

8. On the aspect of landlord-tenant relationship and ownership of the subject premises, the same is not disputed. The bona fide need, as set out in the Eviction Petition, which is not disputed by the Respondent/landlady, is for the use of the son of the Respondent/landlady. On the aspect of availability of alternate suitable accommodation, the same has already been discussed above.

9. The Supreme Court Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[1] has held that the jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the said Act has held that this is a conscious omission. The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the fact of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. The relevant extract of the Abid-ul-Islam case is as follows: “Scope of revision “22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. xxx

25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107]: (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)