Argha Chatterjee v. State Bank of India & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 29 Oct 2024 · 2026:DHC:3260-DB
C. Hari Shankar; Om Prakash Shukla
RFA(COMM) 272/2025
2026:DHC:3260-DB
civil petition_dismissed

AI Summary

The Court held that limitation for filing an appeal runs from the date of judgment when the party had knowledge of suit proceedings, dismissing the review petition seeking to compute limitation from a later date of actual knowledge.

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RFA(COMM) 272/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
RFA(COMM) 272/2025 & REVIEW PET. 177/2026
ARGHA CHATTERJEE .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Ritika Mitra, Advocate
VERSUS
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Jeewan Prakash Gupta and Mr. Ajitesh Shukla, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
ORDER (ORAL)
16.04.2026 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
Review Petition 177/2026
JUDGMENT

1. Ms. Mitra, who appears for the review petitioner, has advanced two grounds to seeks review of our judgment dated 12 February 2026.

2. Her first submission is with respect to para 14 of the judgment which reads as under:

“14. Clearly, therefore, the factual situation as it emerges from these orders is that the appellant was aware of the proceedings of the suit from 25 November 2020. If that is the case, the appellant is presumed knowledge of the judgment and decree passed in the suit on 15 April 2023. The appellant cannot, therefore, seek to compute delay in filing the appeal from April 2024.”

3. Ms. Mitra submits that this Court erred in presuming knowledge of the judgment and decree passed on 15 April 2023 as the appellant had acquired knowledge of the said judgment and decree only when he was informed of the passing thereof by the respondent on 23 March

2024.

4. We have specifically dealt with this submission in paras 11 to 13 of our judgment, which reads thus:

“11. In the present case, the basic error in the appellant’s prayer for condonation of delay is in the computation of delay from 23 March 2024, when the appellant claims to have attained knowledge of the passing of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 15 April 2023. 12. Such an argument would be available to an appellant who was unaware of the proceedings in the suit and, therefore, also remained unaware of the proceedings of the judgment and decree came to be rendered therein. 13. Though Ms. Mitra has fervently sought to contend that, in fact, her client was unaware of the judgment and decree passed in the suit as the appellant had never been served summons in the suit, this argument is clearly not available to her in view of the concurrent findings in the order dated 29 October 2024 of the learned Commercial Court and 4 March 2025 of the Division Bench of this Court in FAO(COMM) 66/2025 which, having not been challenged, have attained finality.”

5. We reiterate that a party cannot knowingly avoid participating during the suit proceedings even after receiving summons and thereafter plead ignorance of the final judgment and decree passed in the proceedings. In such a case, there would be presumption of knowledge of the judgment and decree on the part of the party who has himself chosen not to participate in the proceedings despite knowledge. Such a party cannot seek to compute limitation from a later date when he was informed in writing of the judgment and decree which was passed. As such, this argument has no substance.

6. The second submission advanced by Ms. Mitra is with respect to para 18 of the judgment under review, which reads as under:

“18. The Supreme Court was not, therefore, in Bhivchandra Shankar More1concerned with the situation in which, despite summons having been served in the suit, the unsuccessful litigant in the suit chose not to participate in the proceedings and remained quiescent after the judgment and decree in the suit were rendered and woke up only when, more than a year after the said judgment and decree, someone wrote to the said litigant about the passing of the judgment and decree.”

7. Ms. Mitra submits that the facts in Bhivchandra Shankar More were similar to those in the present case.

8. This, again, is an argument which was considered and addressed by us in para 19 of the judgment under review, which reads thus:

“19. The issue which is before us in the present application, which is the date from which the limitation is to be computed, was never an issue before the Supreme Court. Ms. Mitra’s contention is that limitation has to be counted from 1 April 2024. We have found that contention to be unsustainable. According to us, limitation would have to be computed from the date of the judgment and decree in the suit which was 15 April 2023, as the appellant was always aware of the proceedings in the suit from 15 November 2020.” (Emphasis supplied)

9. We have thus noted that Bhivchandra Shankar More did not deal with the issue of the date from which limitation was required to be computed. Ms. Mitra is not able to contest the correctness of this finding.

10. In that view of the matter, this again is an attempt to re-argue a point, which was considered and addressed in the judgment under view. It is trite that a review petition cannot be an attempt to re-argue points which were argued and decided in the writ petition.

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11. The review petition is bereft of merits and is dismissed without notice.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.