Suresh Singhal v. Raj Kumar

Delhi High Court · 17 Apr 2026 · 2026:DHC:4276
Neena Bansal Krishna
RFA 207/2026
2026:DHC:4276
civil appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the Trial Court's decree for arrears of rent and mesne profits against a tenant who failed to prove forgery or jurisdictional objections, affirming the landlord's title and rent fixed by lease deed.

Full Text
Translation output
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 17th April, 2026
RFA 207/2026, CM APPL. 14064-14065/2026 & 14188/2026
SURESH SINGHAL
S/O SH. BHAGMAL SINGHAL, R/O M-1 2nd FLOOR CHANAKYA PLACE, PART-II 40 FEET ROAD, NEW DELHI. .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rinendra Kumar, Advocate.
VERSUS
RAJ KUMAR
S/O LATE RAMJI LAL R/O H. NO. 60, SECTOR-55, FARIDABAD, HARYANA. .....Respondent
Through: Appearance not given.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
JUDGMENT
(oral)
CM APPL. 14063/2026 (Seeking Exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

2. The Application stands disposed of. CM APPL. 14064/2026 (Condonation of Delay)

3. The present Application has been filed by the Appellant seeking Condonation of Delay of 24 days in filing the present Appeal.

4. For the reasons mentioned in the Application the same is allowed.

5. The delay of 24 days in filing the present Appeal is Condoned.

6. The Application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. CM APPL. 14065/2026 (Condonation of Delay)

7. The present Application has been filed by the Appellant seeking Condonation of Delay of 249 days, in re-filing the present Appeal.

8. For the reasons mentioned in the Application the same is allowed.

9. The delay of 249 days in re-filing the present Appeal is Condoned.

10. The Application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. RFA 207/2026

11. Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been preferred against the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 20.12.2024 of the learned District Judge-02, New Delhi, decreeing the suit in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent for recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs.3,00,000/- and mesne profits @ ₹30,000/- per month from 19.08.2016 till 22.03.2022, along with interest @ 5% per annum.

12. The Plaintiff/Respondent filed a Civil Suit bearing No.

CS DJ ADJ 381 of 2018 for possession, arrears of rent amounting to Rs.3,00,000/- and mesne profits, in respect of the Property admeasuring, 133 sq. yds. (approx. 1200 sq. ft.) bearing Plot No. 1-A, Khasra No. 651, Chanakya Place, Part-II, Block-L, New Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as “Suit Property”).

13. A preliminary decree for possession was previously passed by the Ld. District Judge on 30.03.2021. The physical possession of the suit premises was handed over to the Respondent through execution proceedings, on 22.03.2022.

14. The present appeal is, therefore, restricted to the adjudication of the arrears of rent and the quantum of mesne profits.

23,707 characters total

15. The facts in brief are that the Respondent/Plaintiff inducted the Appellant/Defendant as a tenant in the year 2006 in respect of a portion measuring 560 sq. ft. of the Suit Property bearing Plot No. 1-A, Chanakya Place, Part-II, Block-L, New Delhi, on an oral lease for a period of 11 months. The said lease was renewed from time to time and in the year 2014, a fresh lease deed was executed fixing the monthly rent at ₹14,000/-.

16. In July-August 2015, the Appellant approached the Respondent with a request to let out an additional portion of the property to expand his business. Consequently, on 19.08.2015, a Settlement Agreement Ex. PW1/3 was executed between the parties, and the parties entered into a fresh Lease Deed Ex. PW1/4 for a period of 11 months starting from 19.08.2015 to 18.07.2016. Under this new arrangement, a larger area measuring 133 sq. yds. (approx. 1200 sq. ft.) was leased to the Appellant at a monthly rent of ₹30,000/-.

17. The Respondent asserted that the Appellant initially honoured this Agreement, paying the rent for August and September 2015 by cheque, which was duly encashed on 30.09.2015 and 01.10.2015 respectively and reflected in the Respondent's Bank Passbook Ex. PW1/5.

18. The Appellant allegedly defaulted on rent payments from October, 2015 onwards. On 17.01.2016, the Appellant gave a written Undertaking to the Respondent stating that he would vacate the Suit Property by 15.04.2016 and clear all the arrears of rent. However, the Appellant failed to honour this commitment.

19. On 02.05.2016, the Appellant, in the presence of elder members of the Society, executed a Panchayati Faisla requesting further time till 30.06.2016 to vacate the Suit Property and clear all dues. The Panchayati Faisla specifically recorded that in case the Appellant failed to vacate, the Respondent would be entitled to take possession without any objection from the Appellant.

20. When the Appellant failed to honour these commitments, the Respondent formally terminated the tenancy vide Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016, Ex. PW1/8, calling upon the Appellant to pay the arrears of rent amounting to ₹3,00,000/- at the rate of ₹30,000/- per month, for 10 months and to hand over vacant physical possession of the Suit Property.

21. The Appellant in his Written Statement has asserted that he was inducted as a tenant in the year 2006 for the entire 200 sq. yds. open plot on an oral perpetual lease. It is claimed that he paid a sum of ₹5,00,000/-, to the Respondent as pagri (security money) and subsequently raised the boundary wall and constructed two rooms, at his own expense of approximately ₹1,50,000/-.

22. The Appellant has further asserted that the rent was gradually increased and he was paying ₹15,000/- per month by August 2015 in cash, for which no receipts were ever issued. The Appellant has categorically denied the execution of the Settlement Agreement Ex. PW1/3 dated 19.08.2015 and the Lease Deed Ex. PW1/4 dated 19.08.2015, claiming that his signatures and thumb impressions on the said documents were forged by the Respondent, and that his signatures were obtained forcefully on blank papers during an altercation.

23. The Appellant in his amended pleadings further raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Relying upon an RTI Application and Revenue Records (Khatoni), it was asserted that the Suit Property falls under "Gram Sabha Banjar" of Village Bindapur, thereby barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Delhi Land Reforms Act.

24. The Respondent in his Replication, reiterated the contents of the Plaint and denied the averments made in the Written Statement.

25. The following issues were framed, on 18.01.2023: i. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- along with pendente lite and future interest, as prayed for?...OPP ii. Relief."

26. PW-1 Sh. Raj Kumar, Plaintiff, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. The Electricity Bill and Senior Citizen Identity Card are Ex. PW1/1 and Ex. PW1/2 respectively; the Settlement Agreement dated 19.08.2015 is Ex. PW1/3; the Lease Deed dated 19.08.2015 is Ex. PW1/4; the Bank Passbook of Canara Bank is Ex. PW1/5; the Written Letter dated 17.01.2016 is Mark A; the Panchayati Faisla is Mark B; and the Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016 along with postal receipts are Ex. PW1/8 and Ex. PW1/9 respectively.

27. DW-1 Sh. Suresh Singhal, defendant, tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. DW1/A. The Written Undertaking dated 17.01.2016 is Ex. DW1/PX[1] and the Panchayati Faisla dated 02.05.2016 is Ex. DW1/PX[2]. The testimony and the documents in detail shall be considered subsequently.".

28. The learned Trial Court, vide the impugned Judgment dated 20.12.2024, rejected the defence of the Appellant on the question of jurisdiction. The Trial Court held that the Appellant having admitted the tenancy relationship, was estopped from challenging the title of the Respondent. The defence of Gram Sabha land was accordingly, dismissed.

29. On the question of the rate of rent and the alleged forgery, the Trial Court held that the rate of rent was ₹30,000/- per month, relying upon the entries in the Bank Passbook Ex. PW1/5 and the striking similarity of the Appellant's signatures on Settlement Agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4, with those on the Written Statement. The Trial Court further observed that the Appellant failed to lead any evidence to prove forgery of Settlement agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4, or the payment of ₹5,00,000/-, as pagri, or the alleged cash payments.

30. Accordingly, the Ld. Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the Respondent, holding the Appellant liable to pay arrears of rent of ₹3,00,000/- for the period 19.10.2015 to 19.08.2016 at the rate of ₹30,000/per month, together with mesne profits at the rate of ₹30,000/- per month from 19.08.2016 till 22.03.2022 and interest at 5% per annum.

31. Aggrieved by the said Judgment, the present Appeal has been preferred.

32. The grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant are that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the Suit Property belongs to "Gram Sabha Banjar" of Village Bindapur and that the Respondent failed to prove his ownership over the Suit Property.

33. Furthermore, the Trial Court erred in relying upon forged and unproved documents, Settlement Agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4 without examination of any attesting witness, and that the rate of rent was only ₹15,000/- per month. The Appellant has also asserted that his regular cash payments of rent and the security deposit of ₹5,00,000/- paid as pagri, were wrongly ignored.

34. Also, the mesne profits were granted arbitrarily at ₹30,000/- per month for a period of nearly six years, in violation of Order XX Rule 12 CPC, without any evidentiary basis, market valuation, or appointment of a local commissioner. Submissions heard and record perused

35. The present Appeal is confined solely to the challenge against the award of arrears of rent amounting to ₹3,00,000/- and mesne profits at the rate of ₹30,000/- per month for the period from 19.08.2016 till 22.03.2022, since the possession of the Suit Property has already been restored to the Respondent on 22.03.2022 pursuant to the Preliminary Decree dated 30.03.2021.

36. The first aspect for consideration is the Appellant's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the ground that the Suit Property belongs to "Gram Sabha Banjar" of Village Bindapur. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 unambiguously provides that a tenant, having been inducted by a landlord, is precluded from questioning the paramount title of the landlord during the subsistence of the tenancy.

37. The Appellant in his cross-examination as DW-1 has himself admitted that he had taken the Suit Property on rent in the year 2006 and continued in occupation till 22.03.2022. Having admitted the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, he cannot be permitted to challenge the very title of the Respondent, whose admittedly he was the tenant.

38. What makes this defense even more untenable, is that the jurisdictional challenge was raised for the first time in the amended pleadings long after the tenancy commenced in 2006, and long after the Written Undertaking dated 17.01.2016 Ex. DW1/PX[1] and the Panchayati Faisla dated 02.05.2016 Ex. DW1/PX[2] were executed by the Appellant in his capacity as a tenant, acknowledging his liability. The belated invocation of the Gram Sabha ground raised only after the Suit was instituted and possession was lost, exposes it as a convenient afterthought, rather than a bona-fide legal objection. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that this ground is legally unsustainable and is accordingly, rejected.

39. The second and central aspect for consideration is whether the Settlement Agreement Ex. PW1/3 dated 19.08.2015 and the Lease Deed Ex. PW1/4 dated 19.08.2015, fixing the monthly rent at ₹30,000/- per month, were genuinely executed by the Appellant or were these, as claimed by him, forged documents bearing fabricated signatures obtained under coercion.

40. This constitutes the principal issue in the present Appeal, as it is only upon establishing the rate of rent at ₹30,000/- per month that the decree for arrears of rent amounting to ₹3,00,000/- and the award of mesne profits at the same rate, can be sustained.

41. It is a settled proposition of law that while civil cases are decided on the principle of preponderance of probabilities, the burden to prove allegations of forgery or coercion rests heavily on the party asserting the same. Sections 101 and 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 make the position explicit that the burden of proving a particular fact lies on the party who wishes the Court to believe in its existence. The Appellant having alleged forgery of Settlement agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4, the burden to establish the same,lay squarely upon him.

42. It is further well settled that a bare denial in pleadings cannot displace a written document that is otherwise, proved on record. The party alleging forgery must substantiate the same through independent evidence, contemporaneous legal action, and corroborative proof. Further, under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the conduct of a party subsequent to the alleged event, is a relevant circumstance and the absence of any complaint, FIR, or forensic challenge, is a conduct from which the Court is entitled to draw an adverse inference from.

43. The Respondent established his case through documentary evidence. The Bank Passbook Ex. PW1/5 reflects two separate entries of ₹30,000/each credited on 30.09.2015 and 01.10.2015 respectively. The significant aspect is that these are two distinct entries of ₹30,000/- each, and not a single entry.

44. The Appellant sought to explain these entries by claiming in his volunteered statement during cross-examination, that the cheque of ₹30,000/- was issued for two months’ rent at ₹15,000/- per month. This explanation is wholly inconsistent with the Bank Passbook Ex. PW1/5. If the rent were ₹15,000/- per month, a single cheque for two months would reflect as one credit entry of ₹30,000/-. Two separate credit entries of ₹30,000/each in Ex. PW1/5 unambiguously establishes that each entry represents one month's rent at ₹30,000/- per month.

45. It would be pertinent to refer to the Affidavit of evidence of the Appellant Ex. DW1/A wherein he has categorically deposed that his signatures on the Settlement Agreement Ex. PW1/3 and the Lease Deed Ex. PW1/4 both dated 19.08.2015 were forged and obtained on blank papers under coercion. However, when specifically confronted in crossexamination as to whether he had ever filed any complaint or Application before any Court, police, or any competent authority in respect of the alleged forged signatures on Settlement agreement Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed Ex. PW1/4, the Appellant conceded as under: "I have never filed any complaint or application before any above said authorities in respect of using forged signatures."

46. The Appellant further admitted in his cross-examination, that he had not filed any Complaint or Application before any Authority, even after going through the contents of Settlement Agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Lease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4 filed by the Respondent in the present suit. The Appellant had full access to these documents throughout the pendency of the suit; yet chose not to initiate any forensic examination or Criminal Complaint at any stage of the proceedings.

47. Similarly, the Appellant claimed in his affidavit Ex. DW1/A that the Written Undertaking dated 17.01.2016 Ex. DW1/PX[1] and the Panchayati Faisla dated 02.05.2016 Ex. DW1/PX[2], were also signed forcibly. However, he immediately conceded in his cross-examination that he had filed no Complaint regarding the forceful execution of Written Undertaking dated 17.01.2016 Ex. DW1/PX[1] and Panchayati Faisla dated 02.05.2016 Ex.DW1/PX[2] either. The Panchayati Faisla Ex. DW1/PX[2] was executed in the presence of elder members of the community, which is a setting wholly inconsistent with the alleged coercion.

48. Interestingly, during cross-examination, the Appellant claimed that he had called the Police at 100, when the Respondent allegedly attempted forcible dispossession. However, he immediately conceded that no such assertion finds mention either in the Written Statement or in his evidence Affidavit Ex. DW1/A. Had such a material incident involving police intervention actually occurred, it would inevitably have been pleaded in the Written Statement and reiterated in Ex. DW1/A. Its complete absence from both, clearly renders the claim a belated afterthought and an improvement introduced during cross-examination.

49. On the aspect of the rate of rent, the cross-examination of Respondent-PW[1], is equally significant. The respondent admitted in his cross-examination as PW[1] that the initial rent in 2006 for 560 sq. ft., was ₹10,000/- per month. The appellant's assertion that the rent was only ₹3,000/- per month in 2006, therefore, finds no support in the testimony of the PW[1], plaintiff.

50. Further, as per the Lease Deed Ex. PW1/4, the area leased in August 2015 was 133 sq. yds. which is approximately 1200 sq. ft. more than double the earlier leased area of 560 sq. ft., for which the rent was ₹14,000/- per month in 2014. A rent of ₹30,000/- per month for more than double the area, particularly when the Appellant himself had approached the Respondent requesting additional space to expand his business, is entirely reasonable and proportional.

51. Admittedly, the Respondent served a Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016 Ex. PW1/8 upon the Appellant stating that the arrears of rent for 10 months at the rate of ₹30,000/- per month amounted to ₹3,00,000/-. The Appellant throughout claimed to have replied to Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016 Ex. PW1/8 vide Reply dated 06.08.2016 through his counsel. However, during his cross-examination, the Appellant himself admitted as under: "After going through the case file, witness states that no reply dated 06.08.2016 to the legal notice dated 26.07.2016 is on record."

52. Admittedly, the Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016 Ex. PW1/8 sent by the respondent through his counsel, which clearly stated that the arrears of rent were calculated at ₹30,000/- per month. It is thus, proved that Settlement agreement dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/3 and Legal Notice dated 26.07.2016 Ex. PW1/4 were genuinely executed by the Appellant and that the rate of rent for the Suit Property was ₹30,000/- per month with effect from 19.08.2015. It is settled law, as held by the Apex Court in Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman & Co. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 744 that if a tenant does not raise any objection to the quit Notice at the first available opportunity, the objection shall be deemed to have been waived.

53. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the defence of forgery was a belated afterthought unsupported by any contemporaneous legal action or independent evidence whatsoever.

54. The Appellant having failed to dispute the rate of ₹30,000/- per month, it has to be concluded that the rate of rent was Rs.30,000/- p.m. The Appellant defaulted in payment of rent from October, 2015 onwards and is accordingly, liable to pay arrears of ₹3,00,000/- for the period 19.10.2015 to 19.08.2016.

55. The third aspect for consideration is the Appellant's claim that he paid rent in cash on three occasions and also paid a security deposit of ₹5,00,000/-, as pagri at the time of his induction as tenant, in 2006.

56. It is a settled principle that the burden under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lies on the party asserting a fact to prove the same and a self-serving oral statement unsupported by any document, receipt, or independent witness cannot discharge this burden.

57. The Appellant claimed in his affidavit of evidence Ex. DW1/A that he paid ₹45,000/- in cash on 17.01.2016 in the presence of Sh. Anoop Jain, ₹60,000/- in cash on 25.04.2016 in the presence of Sh. Surinder Sharma, and ₹45,000/- in cash for May to July 2016. However, when confronted in his cross-examination as DW[1], the Appellant admitted that he had placed no document or receipt on record to corroborate any of these three payments and further admitted that he had never taken any Receipt from the Respondent, to show the payment of rent in cash at any point of time.

58. Interestingly, despite specifically naming Sh. Anoop Jain and Sh. Surinder Sharma as witnesses to the alleged cash payments in his affidavit Ex. DW1/A, the Appellant examined neither of them, in his evidence. Nothing prevented the Appellant from producing these named persons who would have been the only independent corroboration available to him. Their deliberate non-examination without any explanation, draws an adverse inference against the Appellant under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

59. On the question of the security deposit of ₹5,00,000/- claimed as pagri, the Appellant asserted in his affidavit Ex. DW1/A that he had paid this amount in 2006 after arranging loans from three named persons. However, when confronted in his cross-examination as DW[1], he admitted as under: "I cannot show any document in respect of the payment of Rs. 5 lakhs."

60. He further admitted that he did not even remember, whether he had filed any case for recovery of this amount from the Respondent. Even if the payment of pagri is assumed to have been paid, for the sake of argument, it is settled law that a tenant cannot resist a money decree on the ground that the security deposit has not been refunded. The remedy for recovery of pagri is an independent relief, creating no lien on the Suit Property.

61. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the Appellant's claims of cash payments and security deposit are self-serving assertions, entirely unsupported by any document, receipt, or independent witness. Accordingly, it is held that that the ld. District judge, rightly held the rent to be Rs. 30,000/- p.m.

62. The fourth aspect for consideration is the Appellant's challenge to the award of mesne profits at ₹30,000/- per month, for the period 19.08.2016 till 22.03.2022. The Appellant has claimed the mesne profits have been adjudged arbitrarily, without any evidentiary basis or market valuation, in violation of Order XX Rule 12 CPC.

63. It has already been established hereinabove, that the rate of rent for the Suit Property as per the ease deed dated 19.08.2015 Ex. PW1/4 was ₹30,000/- per month, with effect from 19.08.2015. The Trial Court awarded the exact same rate as mesne profits for the period of overstay from 19.08.2016 till 22.03.2022, when possession was finally restored to the Respondent through execution proceedings.

64. The significant aspect is that the Trial Court consciously refrained from applying any periodic enhancement to the rate of ₹30,000/- per month, despite the passage of nearly six years which would ordinarily be expected in a commercial property in New Delhi. This was a conservative and judicious exercise of discretion, in favour of the Appellant.

65. Nothing prevented the Appellant from leading any evidence regarding the prevalent market rate of the Suit Property or from seeking appointment of a Local Commissioner, if he genuinely disputed the rate of ₹30,000/- per month as the basis for mesne profits. The Appellant led no such evidence whatsoever, before the Trial Court.

66. The award of mesne profits at ₹30,000/- per month is fully justified on the facts and evidence on record and does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. Accordingly, this challenge is decided against the Appellant.

67. The jurisdiction of this Court in a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is to re-appreciate the evidence on record. However, interference with the findings of the Trial Court is warranted only where the impugned judgment suffers from perversity or illegality.

68. The learned Trial Court has decreed the suit on a correct appreciation of the documentary evidence on record, and no ground warranting interference, has been made out.

69. In view of the discussions hereinabove, the Appeal is held to be devoid of merits and is hereby, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of, accordingly.

JUDGE APRIL 17, 2026