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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 17.04.2026
DOLLY RAGHAV .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, Adv.
Through: Appearance not given.
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order dated 03.09.2024 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, South West District, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in HMA No. 3668/2023 titled Uday Singh v. Dolly Raghav, whereby the learned Family Court declined to take on record the written statement filed by the appellant and, consequently, struck off her defence on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the prescribed period.
2. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the marriage between the parties was solemnised according to Hindu rites and customs on 25.02.2006 and disputes thereafter arose between them, resulting in them living separately. The respondent/husband instituted a petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter ‘HMA’) before the learned Family Court.
3. In those proceedings, as per the report of the process server, summons was served upon the appellant/wife on 29.03.2024. Thereafter, on 04.05.2024, the learned Family Court directed filing of the written statement within a period of four weeks. The appellant ultimately filed her written statement on 02.09.2024.
4. However, by the impugned order dated 03.09.2024, the learned Family Court declined to take the written statement on record and struck off the appellant’s defence on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the permissible period reckoned from the date of service of summons. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
5. Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant had appeared with her counsel only on 04.05.2024, on which date the learned Family Court directed her to file the written statement within a period of four weeks. It is further submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and unfamiliar with legal procedure, was under the bona fide impression that the written statement was required to be filed pursuant to such direction and was not aware that the same ought to have been filed earlier on the first date of appearance.
6. It is submitted that the written statement came to be filed on 02.09.2024, which, according to the appellant, fell within the period of 120 days counted from 04.05.2024, which is the day, the learned Family Court directed filing of the written statement within a period of four weeks. It is submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and unfamiliar with legal procedure, had no knowledge of the requirement of filing of written statement, and therefore, the period of limitation ought to be computed from the date of such direction rather than from the date of service of summons.
7. It is submitted that the closure of appellant’s right to file the written statement would result in irreparable prejudice, inasmuch as the appellant would be effectively deprived of placing her defence on record in a matrimonial dispute and any adjudication in the absence of such defence would seriously affect her rights. In these circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant prays that the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
8. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the learned Family Court has rightly declined to take the written statement on record and proceeded to strike off the appellant’s defence as the written statement was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed period of 120 days from the date of service of summons. It is submitted that the appellant was duly served and had sufficient opportunity to file her written statement within time but failed to do so without any cogent explanation.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
10. At this stage, it becomes necessary to examine the legal position governing the timeline for filing of a written statement and the extent of the Court’s discretion. In Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 480, the Supreme Court held that though the timeline prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter ‘CPC’) must ordinarily be honoured and extensions cannot be granted in a routine manner, the provision is nevertheless procedural and directory in nature.
11. The Court emphasized that departure from the prescribed schedule is permissible only by way of exception, upon reasons being assigned by the defendant and recorded by the court, where the circumstances are shown to be exceptional, beyond the party’s control and where refusal of extension would result in grave injustice. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
The Court further held:
12. The Supreme Court further held that the Court may impose costs for dual purpose, firstly, to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for the asking and secondly, to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.
13. Having emphasized that the timeline for filing of a written statement must be ordinarily observed, the Court went on to clarify that procedural law cannot be interpreted so rigidly as to defeat substantive justice. The court held as under:
28. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar [(1975) 1 SCC 774] are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6) “The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. … Justice is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as substantive.”
14. While the Family Court may draw upon the procedural framework of the CPC, it is not rendered powerless to adopt a less formal and more facilitative procedure suited to the nature of family disputes. Section 10(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 makes the provisions of the CPC applicable to proceedings before the Family Court. However, Section 10(3) also clarifies that nothing in subsections (1) and (2) shall prevent the Family Court from laying down its own procedure in order to arrive at a settlement or at the truth of the facts alleged by one party and denied by the other. Section 20 of the Family Courts Act strengthens this position by giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Act. The abovementioned sections are reproduced hereinbelow: