National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shehnaj Begum & Ors.

6. Loss of Estate Rs.10,000 /-

7. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000 /- Total Compensation Rs.18,01,864/- Interest 9% Submissions made by parties

11. Appellant/Insurance company raised the issue that the rickshaw was hit from the opposite side in the middle of the road, therefore, it could not be concluded that it was the negligence of respondent no.4. It was stated that no eyewitnesses were examined, nor was the IO examined, and therefore such a conclusion could not have been drawn.

12. Reliance was placed on the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428, to contend that a summary procedure does not mean that a Tribunal should ignore basic principles of law in claims for compensation. Further, there was a challenge to the application of minimum wages, since there was no evidence that the deceased was gainfully employed. ` `

13. On the deduction, towards personal expenses, it was contended that 50% ought to have been deducted, considering that the wife/respondent no.1 was the only dependent.

14. Penal interest at 12% was awarded for the default period, for which reliance was placed on National Insurance Company Ltd. v Keshav Bahadur and Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 370.

15. Counsel for the respondent, however, stated that as per the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1700, since there was no rebuttal and no complaint by the driver, the reliance on the FIR was wholly legitimate.

16. Mr. Pankaj Seth, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, contented that principle of “res ipsa loquitur” ought to be applied and assessment should be made on the basis of the principle of ‘preponderance of probabilities’, rather than merely relying upon the principle laid in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana (supra), on the basis of the FIR and the chargesheet. It was submitted that the Tribunal had not applied its mind and had only made a cursory assessment based on the FIR. Analysis

17. In this regard, it is important to assess the extent to which the Tribunal is obliged, or ought to be persuaded, by the filing of an FIR and the filing of a chargesheet pursuant thereto. For the purpose of determining negligence a Tribunal navigates through some basic foundational principles to address pleas asserted by the parties on ` ` negligence. A more detailed examination of these foundational principles is being provided here under.

18. At the outset, there is no doubt that negligence has to be proved, as also stated in Meena Variyal (supra), and the relevant principles are extracted as under:

27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 & 3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis ` ` done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13], noted that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by the Tribunal.” 20.[4] Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC 510:

13. In that view of the matter, it is for the appellant herein to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking compensation on account of death of his son in the said accident. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid reasons. This is because the appellant herein is seeking compensation for the death of his son in the accident which occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on the said date. It is further observed that in the claim petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other passengers in the car who died in the accident, they have ` ` to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with law.” 20.[5] Geeta Dubey v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3779:

11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the position that the question regarding negligence which is essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident claim should be considered based on the evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into such documents for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible or inadmissible.” Inquiry Proceeding

21. Dovetailed with this aspect is the fact that Tribunal proceedings are not strictly governed by the rules of procedures or evidence, but are in the nature of an inquiry. For this also, reference may be made to the following opinion of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 and Anita Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 1 SCC 171. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgements are extracted as under: 21.[1] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (supra): “Nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ` `

10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death, by the dependent family members) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete code in itself. We may in this context refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the Tribunals and determination of compensation by the Tribunals:

(i) Proceedings for award of compensation in regard to a motor accident before the Tribunal can be initiated either on an application for compensation made by the persons aggrieved (the claimants) under Section 166(1) or Section 163-A of the Act or suo motu by the Tribunal, by treating any report of accident (forwarded to the Tribunal under Section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation under Section 166(4) of the Act).

(ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.

(iii) In a proceedings initiated suo motu by the

Tribunal, the owner and driver are the respondents. The insurer is not a respondent, but a noticee under Section 149(2) of the Act. Where a claim petition is filed by the injured or by the legal representatives of a person dying in a motor accident, the driver and owner have to be impleaded as respondents. The claimants need not implead the insurer as a party. But they have the choice of impleading the insurer also as a party-respondent. When it is not impleaded as a party, the Tribunal is required to issue a notice under Section 149(2) of the Act. ` ` If the insurer is impleaded as a party, it is issued as a regular notice of the proceedings.

(iv) The words “receipt of an application for compensation” in Section 168 refer not only to an application filed by the claimants claiming compensation but also to a suo motu registration of an application for compensation under Section 166(4) of the Act on the basis of a report of an accident under Section 158(6) of the Act.

(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. On receipt of an application (either from the applicant or suo motu registration), the Tribunal gives notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act, gives an opportunity of being heard to the parties to the claim petition as also the insurer, holds an inquiry into the claim and makes an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. (Vide Section 168 of the Act.)

(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. (Vide Section 169 of the Act.)

(vii) The award of the Tribunal should specify the person(s) to whom compensation should be paid. It should also specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them. (Vide Section 168 of the Act.)

(viii) The Tribunal should deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within 15 days from the date of the award. (Vide Section 168(2) of the Act.) We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an ` ` adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.” 21.[2] Anita Sharma v New India Assurance (supra): “21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyse the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true.”

22. Therefore, what remains in situations where there is no eyewitness that the Tribunal, in its inquiry process, based on the test of preponderance of probabilities, assesses the facts and circumstances placed before it. Every accident has its own peculiar circumstances; it could involve the nature of the vehicles, the location of the accident, and the extent of the collision.

23. For example, in cases where there might be two vehicles of similar sizes, say two heavy vehicles, which collide in the middle of the road, there could arise a situation warranting an assessment of contributory ` ` negligence. However, if a heavy vehicle collides with a lighter vehicle, in the middle of the road, the inquiry would lead to the question as to which of the vehicles was driving on the wrong side of the lane or carriageway. If that is also not established, an assessment needs to be made considering the location of the collision, the circumstances in which traffic moves in that particular area, and whether there was any indication of intoxication in the post-mortem of the deceased.

24. Other aspects which may arise include the time of the day, whether the offending vehicle was in a standing position, abandoned without flashing lights, or whether it suddenly braked. Many of these aspects would come to the fore if there is testimony of the driver of the offending vehicle, who, upon cross-examination, may reveal certain aspects relating to the nature of the accident. The predicament before the Tribunal is that if no such evidence is available, then what material it should rely upon. In such circumstances, the only material available is the first statement made to any authority, which is usually the FIR. FIR and Investigation

25. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Smt. Pushpa Rana & Ors. (supra), the Court held the filing of the FIR, chargesheet and accompanying police record constitutes sufficient material to sustain a finding of negligence in motor accident claim proceedings on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Relevant observations of this Court are extracted as under: ` ` “12. The last contention of the appellant insurance company is that the respondents claimants should have proved negligence on the part of the driver and in this regard the counsel has placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal; 2007 (5) SCALE 269. On perusal of the award of the Tribunal, it becomes clear that the wife of the deceased had produced (i) certified copy of the criminal record of criminal case in FIR No. 955/2004, pertaining to involvement of the offending vehicle, (ii) criminal record showing completion of investigation of police and issue of charge sheet under Section 279/304- A, IPC against the driver; (iii) certified copy of FIR, wherein criminal case against the driver was lodged; and

(iv) recovery memo and mechanical inspection report of offending vehicle and vehicle of the deceased. These documents are sufficient proofs to reach the conclusion that the driver was negligent. Proceedings under Motor Vehicles Act are not akin to proceedings in a civil suit and hence strict rules of evidence are not required to be followed in this regard. Hence, this contention of the counsel for the appellant also falls face down. There is ample evidence on record to prove negligence on the part of the driver.”

26. Once the FIR comes into play and the investigation proceeds, thereafter, there may be some material forming of the investigation which throws light on the nature of the accident and the aspect of the negligence.

27. In this regard, reference may be made to United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepak Goel and Ors. 2014: DHC:470, wherein this Court, following Pushpa Rana (supra), reiterated that where an FIR has been registered and a chargesheet filed against the driver of the offending ` ` vehicle, such material is sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, particularly in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the driver or owner. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

28. The Supreme Court in Ranjeet v. Abdul Kayam Neb, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 497 has recently reiterated its position on the said issue, where it stated as under: “4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the bus driver.

5. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal and the High Court both manifestly erred in law in refusing to grant any compensation to the claimants.” ` `

29. In Meera Bai v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. 2025:INSC:600, the Supreme Court has observed that in cases where the eyewitness was not examined, reliance on FIR and charge-sheet was enough for the finding of negligence to be established. In this regard, the relevant paragraphs are as under: “2. The claimants before the Tribunal have filed an appeal from the order of the High Court which allowed the appeal of the insurance company and dismissed the claim petition for reason of no eyewitness having been examined to prove the rash and negligent driving.

3. On facts, it needs to be stated that the accident occurred on 29.01.2015 when the deceased was travelling pillion in a motorbike driven and owned by the second respondent. The FIR was lodged against the owner driver of the vehicle for the offence of rash and negligent driving. A charge sheet was filed against the owner driver. The owner driver filed a written statement before the Tribunal denying the rash and negligent driving on his part, however he did not mount the box to depose that it was not due to his fault that the accident occurred.

4. As far as examining the eyewitness, such a witness will not be available in all cases. The FIR having been lodged and the charge sheet filed against the owner driver of the offending vehicle, we are of the opinion that there could be no finding that negligence was not established.”

30. In Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 636, the Supreme Court observed as under: “8. The accident occurred on 03.11.1999 upon which a First Information Report was registered produced as ` ` Annexure P-4. Annexure P-4 clearly indicates that the trailer was found to have been driven rashly and negligently; the owner of which was the 1st respondent before the Tribunal and the insurer, the 3rd respondent. The charge sheet has also been filed which is produced as Annexure P-9. After investigation, the charge sheet clearly found that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the trailer and arrayed him as the accused. PW 1 who was riding pillion also spoke of the rash and negligent driving of the trailer. …

11. In a motor accident claim, there is no adversarial litigation and it is the preponderance of probabilities which reign supreme in adjudication of the tortious liability flowing from it, as has been held in Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz is a case in which the rider, who also carried a pillion, died in an accident involving a pick-up van. There was a contention taken that the claimants who were the legal heirs of the deceased had not cared to examine the pillion rider and hence the version of the respondent in the written statement that the moving scooter had hit the parked pick-up van, was to be accepted. It was found, as in the present case, that the Police had charge-sheeted the driver of the pickup van which prima facie showed negligence of the charge-sheeted accused. Similarly in the present case also, the Police after investigation, charge-sheeted the driver of the trailer finding clear negligence on him, which led to the accident. This has not been controverted by the respondents before the Tribunal by any valid evidence nor even a pleading. In fact, the Tribunal, on a mere imaginative surmise, found that since the scooter collided with the tail-end of the trailer, it can be presumed that the driver of the scooter was not ` ` cautious, which in any event is not a finding of negligence.

12. Finding that the driver was not cautious is one thing and finding negligence is quite another thing. Prima facie, we are satisfied that the negligence was on the trailer driver as discernible from the evidence recorded before the Tribunal; standard of proof required being preponderance of probability as has been reiterated in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited” Res ipsa loquitur

31. Res ipsa loquitur means “the things speak for itself”, is a wellrecognised doctrine in the law of negligence. The doctrine enables a court to draw an inference of negligence from the very nature of the accident, where the occurrence is such that, in the ordinary course of events, it would not have happened without negligence. In such circumstances, the surrounding facts themselves constitute prima facie evidence of negligence, thereby shifting the evidentiary burden onto the person who had control over the instrumentality causing the injury to provide an explanation consistent with due care.

32. As noted in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 28, at p. 77, the doctrine represents an exception to the general rule that the burden of proving negligence lies upon the claimant; where the facts established are such that the natural inference arising from them is that the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence, the event itself may “tell its own story”, warranting an inference of negligence in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. ` `

33. The origins of the doctrine may be traced to the earlier decision in Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722, where the plaintiff was injured when a barrel of flour fell from the defendant’s premises onto a public street. The Court held that such an occurrence constituted sufficient prima facie evidence of negligence, thereby casting upon the defendant the burden of explaining that the accident had not occurred due to want of care on his part.

34. The doctrine received its classical formulation in the English decision of Scott v. London and St Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C 596, where it was observed that when the thing causing the accident is under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those having such management use proper care, the occurrence itself affords reasonable evidence of negligence in the absence of explanation by the defendant.

35. The Supreme Court has also recognised the relevance of this doctrine in accident cases. In Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) 1 SCC 690, the Supreme Court observed that negligence may, in appropriate cases, be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the accident itself where the facts reasonably indicate rash or negligent conduct. For ease of reference, relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

11. The plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. If the result, in the circumstances in which he proves it, makes it more probable than not that it was caused by the negligence of the defendants, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability. ………

13. It should be noticed that the defendant does not advance his case by inventing fanciful theories, unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with probabilities, and facts are required, not mere conjecture unsupported by facts. As Lord Macmillan said in his ` ` dissenting judgment in Jones v. Great Western [(1930) 47 PLR 39]: “The dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that it is a mere guess. An inference, in the legal sense, on the other hand, is a deduction from the evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal proof. The attribution, of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical certainty and reasonable probability. Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual observation there is necessarily a hiatus in the direct evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an inference from the facts actually observed and proved.” In other words, an inference is a deduction from established facts and an assumption or a guess is something quite different but not necessarily related to established facts.

14. Alternatively, in those instances where the defendant is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon him to advance positive proof that he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.

15. Res ipsa loquitur is an immensely important vehicle for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In practice, there are many cases where res ipsa loquitur is properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable precautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of the injury was not associated with negligence on his part. Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite overshadowed by its practical significance [ Millner: “Negligence in Modern Law”, 92].” ` `

36. Similarly, in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745, the Supreme Court emphasised that in claims arising out of motor accidents the court must examine the circumstances in which the accident occurred and determine whether the manner of the occurrence reasonably points towards negligence. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:

37. Thus, where direct evidence regarding the manner of the accident is unavailable, the Tribunal is entitled to examine the surrounding circumstances and assess whether the occurrence is of such a nature that negligence can reasonably be inferred. In such cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur operates as a rule of evidence enabling the Tribunal, on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, to determine whether the accident itself provides a reasonable basis to infer negligence. Summarizing

38. From the above discussion relating to the nature of inquiry before the Tribunal, the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the applicable standard of proof, three aspects emerge clearly.

39. First, that the proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are in nature of an inquiry and are not hemmed in by rules of ` ` procedure or evidence. The Supreme Court in Shila Datta (supra) [passages extracted in paragraph 20 (a) above], has elaborated on this aspect. Essentially, a claim under Section 165 of the MV Act, is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis.

40. Tribunal holds an inquiry and makes an award to determine compensation, which ought to be just and reasonable. The procedure to be followed is summarised in the best discretion of the Tribunal. It has the power under Section 169 of MV Act to summon persons possessing special knowledge of the matters relevant to the inquiry.

41. In Anita Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court emphasised that fault may not be found merely because Tribunals do not examine some of the best eyewitnesses, as in a criminal trial, but should do their best to analyse the material placed on record by the parties.

42. Having clearly sketched the contours of the procedure undertaken by a Tribunal, it brings us to the second issue, which is determination of negligence. The nature of the accident and the basic facts surrounding the same are presented before the Tribunal in the form of a DAR (Detailed Accident Report), or through an FIR, or a recording in a police diary, along with the claim for compensation. In order to arrive at an assessment of negligence and, therefore, consequential liability in tort law, the principle of res ipsa loquitur, particularly in accident cases, is often brought into play.

43. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constitutes an exception to the general rule that the burden of proving negligence lies upon the claimant. ` ` The facts, “tell its own story” and “speak for itself”. The fact of the accident itself sometimes constitutes evidence of negligence. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice, that would be caused to a plaintiff who would otherwise be compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and responsibility of the defendant, when the facts are unknown to plaintiff but lie only within the knowledge of defendant. The burden then shifts to the defendant, who can, by leading evidence, rebut the inference drawn by the Court based on the doctrine.

44. A notable line has been drawn in this inference to be drawn by the Courts, distinguishing between “mere conjecture” and “inference”. Conjecture leans more towards a mere guess, though plausible. However, inference in the legal sense is a reasonable deduction from evidence. A large part of defendant's defence would be to explain or provide proof that he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.

45. Therefore, for application of the principle, it must be shown that the offending vehicle was under the management of the defendant and that the accident was such that, in the ordinary course of things, it would not have happened if those who were in management had used proper care. Having reached a reasonable inference based on the facts of the accident and being presented with a defence raised by defendants that they exercised care to avert foreseeable harm, the issue before the Tribunal would be how to balance the two aspects and what parameter is to be applied in measuring this balance, or in assessing which side the scales tilt. ` `

46. This brings us to the third aspect, which is the test to be applied. It is well settled that the test or the burden of proof which applies is not that of beyond a reasonable doubt (as in criminal cases), but on the test of preponderance of probabilities.

47. The principle that negligence in motor accident claim proceedings is to be assessed on the touchstone of probability rather than strict proof did not emerge for the first time in Bimla Devi (supra), but rests on earlier jurisprudence recognising that proceedings before statutory tribunals are not governed by strict rules of evidence and that negligence in accident cases may be inferred from surrounding circumstances on a reasonable evaluation of the material placed on record. Evolution of this approach is also reflected in a previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. S.S. Makapur, AIR 1963 SC 375, wherein it was observed that “they can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure, which govern proceedings in court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it.”

48. This would effectively mean that the Tribunal is required to weigh the material placed before it, including the police record, evidence, testimonies, documentary evidence, to determine which way the balance tilts, i.e. “what is more probable?”. ` `

49. Probability is certainly a subjective notion, but draws within its fold various unquantifiable elements like common sense, judicial experience, demeanor of witnesses, strength of the police record, location and manner of accident, nature of vehicles involved, etc. To apply the test of preponderance of probabilities is not to pick out, in an arbitrary and ad hoc manner, some fragment from the mass of facts and evidence and reach a result, but to ultimately balance the whole set.

50. The Supreme Court in Meena Variyal (supra) provides a caution in the same spirit, for Tribunals to approach a claim for compensation, albeit in a summary procedure, without ignoring all ‘basic principles of law’.

51. The ‘basic principles of law’ are those that have been touched upon above, which can be usefully termed as the ‘three fundamental pillars’ for assessment of negligence (i.e. proceeding is in nature of inquiries, application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine and use of preponderance of probability as the balancing test).

52. These jurisprudential tools are to be used by Tribunals in a sensible and rational manner, and not cut short the process, merely because the larger canvas is summary in nature. Any Court assessing motor accident cases will run that risk, since the jurisprudence provides considerable scope for applying discretion. There can be no straitjacket standard beyond what has already been stated and reiterated time and again by various Courts, and there would be no point paraphrasing it yet again with more words and explanations. ` `

53. In the opinion of this Court, the core essence is for a Tribunal to marshal all facts and evidence before it, assess them on the basis of the principles stated above, and weigh them with common sense and judicial experience.

54. What is to be avoided is randomness, irrationality, absurd reasoning, conjecture, and illogic. Insurance Companies have often, as in this case, complained about the sketchy nature of Tribunal’s assessment on the aspect of negligence. While that is a matter of the individual style of judgment writing of a particular Presiding Officer of Tribunal, essence of what is stated above cannot be lost.

55. Sometimes, as an Appellate Court, one has to read between the lines of what has been stated by the Tribunal, the conclusion not being wrong, but the explanation inadequate or only partly articulated. What, therefore, needs to be followed by the Tribunals is a simple procedure of remaining conscious of the three fundamental pillars while assessing negligence, joining the dots and articulating the analysis in plain and simple language.

56. The reasons that inform a judge’s mind in reaching conclusion after meandering through an assessment have to be stated out there, and not left for guesswork. This does not mean unnecessary extension, amplification, and elaboration, but simply following a line, of recording the reasoning, the judicial sense which permits a judge to weigh the preponderance, and join the dots as it were. ` ` Conclusion

57. Keeping the above discussion in mind, this Court is not persuaded by the plea of the appellant/Insurance Company that the accident was not caused due to the negligence of respondent no.4, driver of the offending vehicle. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and, therefore, the principle of res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked. As per the post-mortem report, Sanjar Alam died due to “ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt force impact”, and the Mechanical Inspection Report reflects damaged parts on the front of the offending vehicle. Apart from that, an FIR had been registered against respondent no.4/ driver.

58. Moreover, notice is taken of the possibility that respondent no. 4 was most likely under the influence of liquor, considering the statement of the owner of the offending vehicle [R2W1], who stated that driver Ashraf [respondent no.4 herein] had been instructed to not consume liquor on duty and was warned not to consume liquor on duty or take any drugs. In the cross-examination, R2W[1], he stated that he was aware that the driver was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident.

59. Statement of the officer from the Insurance Company by way of affidavit [Exhibit R3W1/A], also stated that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol as per MLC No. 58261 of Hindu Rao Hospital, where he was admitted after the accident. The MLC is exhibited as Exhibit R3W1/6, as per which smell of alcohol was present, which the Insurance Company relied upon as a defence for violation of policy terms and conditions. However, R3W[1], in his cross examination, stated that he ` ` had no personal knowledge as to whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.

60. There is no other material which could displace the finding of negligence on the part of the driver based on preponderance of probabilities, in the inquiry conducted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal might have been slim in its reasoning and narrative; however, no other conclusion which could have been arrived at regarding the finding of negligence.

61. Deceased persons were traveling on a rickshaw when they were hit by a truck. It would be difficult to accept that a truck could not have avoided a slow-moving rickshaw rather than the other way around. Even on the facts of the accident, principal of res ipsa loquitur applies with full force. Compensation

62. Changes in the computation are made to following effect: i) Since deceased was 22 years of age, future prospects ought to have been taken at 40% in place of 50%, following the principles enunciated in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, as there was no evidence that he was employed in permanent employment. ii) Deduction towards personal expenses was taken at ‘1/3rd ’ by the Tribunal, whereas appellant/Insurance Company contends that it ought to have been 50%, on the ground that only the wife was treated as a dependent. Respondent no.1/wife of deceased, by way ` ` of affidavit [Exhibit PW2/A], stated that deceased was working as a rickshaw puller and was contributing towards the household expenses of the family. In her cross-examination, she reiterated that deceased used to provide financial support for household requirements when he visited the native place. Further, as reflected from memo of parties filed along with the claim petition, the father had already expired and petitioner nos.[2] and 3 [respondent no. 2 & 3 herein] were minor sisters of deceased. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence led by driver, owner or insurer to show that the deceased was not contributing towards their maintenance, the Tribunal cannot be faulted in treating the family structure as comprising more than one dependent. In these circumstances, deduction towards personal expenses was rightly taken in the category applicable to two to three dependents, i.e. ‘1/3rd ’ of the income, consistent with principles laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra). Though, the Tribunal seemed to grant ‘1/3rd ’ as deduction despite holding that there was no proof that minor sisters were dependents, in the opinion of this Court while the deduction of ‘1/3rd ’ was correct the reasoning was incorrect. iii) Loss of love and affection shall be ‘Nil’, in view of United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Satinder Kaur Alias Satwinder Kaur and Others (2021) 11 SCC 780. ` ` iv) Funeral expenses and Loss of estate shall be awarded at Rs. 15,000/- each as per the principles enunciated in Pranay Sethi (supra). v) Consortium shall be awarded Rs. 40,000/- each to the wife and the two sisters as per Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130, which will be Rs. 1,20,000/- [Rs.40,000/- x 3].

63. Accordingly, compensation is recomputed as under:

S. NO.

HEADS AWARDED BY THE TRIBUNAL AWARDED BY THIS COURT

1. Income of deceased (A) (less Income Tax) Rs.7254/- [unskilled] Rs.7254/- [unskilled]

2. Add Future Prospects (B) @ 40% 50% 40%

3. Less Personal expenses of the deceased (C) 1/3rd 1/3rd

4. Monthly loss of dependency [(A +B)-C = D] Rs.7,254/- Rs.6,770.40/-

5. Annual loss of dependency (Dx12) Rs.87,048/- Rs.81,244.80/-

6. Multiplier (E) 18 18

7. Total loss of dependency (Dx12xE = F) Rs.15,66,864/- Rs.14,62,406/- [Round of Rs.14,62,406.4/-]

8. Medical expenses (G) Nil Nil

9. Compensation for loss of consortium (H) Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.1,20,000/- [40,000x 3]

10. Compensation for loss of love and affection (I) Rs.1,00,000/- Nil

11. Compensation for loss of estate (J) Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/-

12. Compensation towards funeral expenses (K) Rs.25,000/- Rs.15,000/- TOTAL COMPENSATION [F+G+H+I+J+K] Rs.18,01,864/- Rs.16,12,406/- INTEREST 9% 9% ` `

64. In view of the above recomputation, total compensation payable to the claimants stands reduced to Rs.16,12,406/- along with interest @ 9% per annum as awarded by MACT.

65. Since 100% of the awarded amount had already been directed to be deposited before the Registry of this Court vide order dated 30th September 2013, out of which 80% was also directed to be released to claimants, remaining deposited amount shall be adjusted against the recomputed compensation. In case any excess amount has been deposited by the appellant, same shall be refunded to the appellant along with accrued interest thereon. The claimants shall be entitled to release of the entire amount in terms of the directions contained in the impugned Award.

66. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms and disposed of.

67. Pending applications (if any) are rendered infructuous.

68. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to Insurance Company, only if the order of deposit has been compiled with.

69. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.

ANISH DAYAL (JUDGE) APRIL 17, 2026/RK/tk