Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
SMT. PREM LATA SUREKHA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior Advocate, Ms. Sangeeta Vazirani, Mr. Sachin Yadav, Mr. Ajay Sabharwal & Mr. Pradip Kumar, Advs. (M:
8882122726)
Through: Mr. Kunal Kalra, Adv. for R-1 with R-
1 in person.
JUDGMENT
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2. This is an appeal filed by the Appellant- Smt. Prem Lata Surekha under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, ‘the Act’), challenging the order dated 21st February, 2025 (hereinafter, ‘the impugned order’) passed by ld. Single Judge of this Court in O.M.P. (COMM) 140/2023 titled Prem Lata Surekha versus Sh. Chakradhari Surekha & Ors.
3. Vide the impugned order, the ld. Single Judge dismissed the application filed by Smt. Prem Lata Surekha under Section 34 of the Act, seeking setting aside of the arbitral award dated 2nd January, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘the arbitral award’). Hence, the present appeal. Factual Background
4. M/s Sri Narayan Rajkumar (hereinafter, ‘the partnership firm’), a family run partnership firm is at the core of the present dispute. The said partnership firm was initially constituted in April, 1973, and was engaged in the business of trading, manufacturing, import exports, financing, dealerships. The partnership firm at its inception consisted of the following persons as partners: i. Shri. Nityanand Yadav, son of Shri Lalji Singh ii. Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, wife of Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha iii. Shri. Chakradhari Surekha, son of Shri Sita Ram Surekha.
5. The said three partners had started carrying on business from 2nd April
1973. In addition to the said partners, the following three minors had been admitted to be the beneficiaries of the partnership firm: i. Master Sudhir Kumar, son of Shri K.K. Surekha; ii. Master Sandip Kumar, son of Shri K.K. Surekha; iii. Kumari Rachna, minor daughter of Shri. Raj Kumar Surekha.
6. Thereafter, the partnership firm was re-constituted vide a partnership deed dated 22nd July, 1974 and it was agreed that the partnership would continue with all the three partners, however, it was decided that out of the three minors, only Kumari Rachna was to be retained as the beneficiary in the partnership firm.
7. In addition, the said partnership deed dated 22nd July, 1974, had an arbitration clause which reads as under:
8. One property namely ‘Plot No. Y-10, Naraina, New Delhi, admeasuring 450 Sq. Yards (hereinafter, ‘the subject property’) was acquired by the partnership firm by way of a perpetual lease deed dated 24th January,
1980.
9. In terms of the partnership deed dated 22nd July, 1974, the profit and loss of the partnership firm was to be shared in the following manner: Sr. No. Name Profit Loss
1. Shri. Nitya Nand Yadav 25% 30%
2. Smt. Premlata Sureka 30% 40%
3. Shri. Chakradhari Sureka 25% 30%
4. Ms. Rachna Sureka 20% PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LD. SOLE ARBITRATOR-
10. As per the Statement of Claim filed by Shri Chakradhari Surekha before the ld. Arbitrator, Shri. Nityanand Yadav had expired in June, 2003 and none of his legal heirs were inducted as partners in the partnership firm.
11. Before the ld. Arbitrator, the case of Shri. Chakradhari Surekha was that Smt. Prem Lata Surekha was not involving him in the business activities of the partnership firm during the lifetime of his father- Shri Sita Ram Surekha, as they were having cordial relationships - however, the father died in 2003.
12. Amongst the various allegations raised in the claim petition, Shri Chakradhari Surekha had alleged that Smt. Prem Lata Surekha and her husband had got various documents executed with the intention to usurp all the properties of the partnership firm.
13. It was also the case of Shri Chakradhari Surekha before the ld. Arbitrator that he had suffered from cancer in 2007 and was not keeping good health. Taking advantage of his ill-health, he was never provided the proper accounts of the partnership firm by his brother and the sister-in-law-Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha and Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, respectively.
14. According to Shri. Chakradhari Surekha, the subsequent documents including certain lease deeds, which have all been created by Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha and Smt. Prem Lata Surekha showing Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha as one of the partners of the partnership firm are all fabricated, as he i.e. Shri. Chakradhari Surekha had neither ever resigned from the partnership firm, nor was the firm ever re-constituted according to him.
15. The status of Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha, according to Shri. Chakradhari Surekha, is merely that of the husband of the partner i.e., Smt. Prem Lata Surekha.
16. Shri. Chakradhari Surekha claimed that on the basis of forged and fabricated documents, Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha had applied for mutation of the subject property in his own name.
17. The various partnership deeds which are alleged to have been fabricated are dated 7th February, 1985, 1st November, 1988, 24th March, 1993 and 1st April, 1999.
18. Shri Chakradhari Surekha also claims that he came to know that Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha had entered into an ‘agreement to sell’, with a third party and had accepted Rs.30 lakhs for selling 1/3rd portion of the subject property in respect of which, an FIR had also been registered by Shri Chakradhari Surekha.
19. Various documents are relied upon by Shri Chakradhari Surekha before the ld. Arbitrator to argue how there was a plan made to deprive him of the right in the subject property. According to Shri. Chakradhari Surekha, the business of the firm was never disclosed to him and was being run by Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha on his own. It was, further, learned by him that Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha had sold 155 sq. yds. of the subject property to one Smt. Lata Gupta illegally and without any authority.
20. Due to the said acts of Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha and Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, a notice was sent by Shri Chakradhari Surekha on 23rd March, 2015, in which it was alleged that since various disputes and differences have arisen, he wishes to dissolve the partnership, and he further invoked the arbitration clause in terms of the partnership deed dated 22nd July, 1974. In the said notice dated 23rd March, 2015, Mr. Puneet Budhiraja was nominated as an Arbitrator.
21. In response thereto, on behalf of Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, a reply was sent that she has no concern with the alleged partnership deed of 22nd July, 1974. It was also alleged that Shri. Nitya Nand Yadav was maintaining all the records of the partnership firm and since he had retired, she was not aware as to who was looking after the records.
22. According to Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, the partnership deed dated 22nd July, 1974 had come to an end and hence, even the arbitration clause was no longer valid. It was also claimed that Shri Chakradhari Surekha had himself retired from the partnership about 30 years back. Hence, the nomination of the Arbitrator was opposed by Smt. Prem Lata Surekha.
23. According to Shri. Chakradhari Surekha, Smt. Prem Lata Surekha and her husband Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha had connived with each other with an intention to take exclusive ownership of the subject property. They had applied for mutation and conversion of the subject property from leasehold to freehold.
24. Thus, as a follow up to the notice dated 23rd March, 2015, another notice dated 12th July, 2016 was issued by Shri Chakradhari Surekha. In the said notice, the stand taken by Shri Chakradhari Surekha was that in view of Shri Nityanand Yadav having expired and his legal heirs not having been inducted into the partnership firm, the only surviving partner of the firm, besides him, was Smt. Prem Lata Surekha.
25. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Fakhruddin, Retired Judge from the High Court of Chhattisgarh was nominated as the Arbitrator in notice dated 12th July, 2016 for the proceedings arising from the disputes amongst the parties.
26. However, since Prem Lata Surekha did not consent to the appointment of the Arbitrator who had been nominated by Shri Chakradhari Surekha, a petition under Section 11 of the Act, being Arbitration Petition No. 457/2017 titled Sh. Chakradhari Surekha &Anr. v.Smt. Prem Lata Surekha& Ors. came to be filed before this Court. A petition under Section 9 of the Act was also filed by Shri Chakradhari Surekha.
27. Vide order dated 1st August, 2018, in Arbitration Petition NO. 457/2017, Ms. Rekha Sharma, Former Judge of Delhi High Court was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator for disputes arising between the parties.
28. In addition, a restraint order was also passed, restraining Smt. Prem Lata Surekha and Shsri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha from creating any third party interest in the subject property. Relevant paras of the order dated 1st August, 2018, passed in Arbitration Petition No. 457/2017, are as under:
21. Accordingly, Ms. Rekha Sharma, Former Judge, Delhi High Court is appointed as an Arbitrator in the matter.
22. At this stage, counsel for the parties agree that arbitration proceedings be governed by rules and fee structure prescribed by the Delhi International Arbitration Centre. 22.[1] It is ordered accordingly.
23. Needless to say, it will be open to the respondents to take up all defences as may be available to them in law.
24. Insofar as the petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act)is concerned, Mr. Kalra says that this petition can be placed before the learned Arbitrator for passing appropriate orders in exercise of her power under Section 17 of the Act. 24.[1] Mr. Kalra, however, says that pending disposal of the petition Mr. Vishnu Kumar Surekha (who, as noted above, is the husband of respondent no. 1/Ms.Prem Lata Surekha) should be restrained from creating third party interest in the subject property.
25. I tend to agree with Mr. Kalra, Accordingly, till the time, the learned Arbitrator deals with the captioned petition filed under Section 9 of the Act, Mr. Vishnu Kumar Surekha, his agents, employees etc are restrained form creating third party interest in the subject property.
26. Needless to say, the learned arbitrator will give full opportunity to the respondents to have their say in respect of the said petition.
27. Furthermore, the learned Arbitrator, after hearing parties will be free to either affirm or vacate or even vary the interim order passed by this Court.
28. Consequently, the aforementioned petitions are disposed of in the aforementioned terms.” The claim of Shri. Chakradhari Surekha was that he and Smt. Prem Lata Surekha being the two remaining partners of the firm - the property is liable to be partitioned in equal shares between them. The prayers before the ld. Arbitrator were as under: “a) pass an award of declaration in favour of claimant no. l and against the respondents no.1 and 2, thereby declaring the alleged fake partnership deeds dated 07/02/1985, 01/11/1988, 24/03/1993 & 01/04/1999 executed by respondent no.1 and 2 and by Late Shri Nitya Nand Yadav or any other documents based upon the said alleged partnership deeds regarding sale with respect to Property no. Y-10, Naraina, New Delhi as null and void being forged, fabricated, sham and having no value in eyes of law and confer no right, title, interest or locus-standi upon respondents qua suit property. b) pass an award of permanent injunction in favour of claimant no. 1 and against the respondents thereby restraining them, their heir, agents, representatives, assignees and/or anybody else on his behalf create any third-party interest or part with the possession in the suit property on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. c) pass an award of partition ofthe property no. Y- 10,Naraina, New Delhi in two equal share of claimant no. l and respondent no. l herein by metes and bound, the possession of 50% of property no. Y-10, Naraina, New Delhi may also be handed over to the claimant no.1 by dividing the property no. Y-10 Naraina, New Delhi in equal share i.e. 50% each. d) pass an award for rendition of account in favour of the claimant no.1 and against respondent no.1 and 2 thereby directing them to render the true and correct accounts of the business activity run under the name and style of the claimant no.2. e) any other order which this Hon'ble tribunal may pass in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
29. Pursuant to the said order, arbitration proceedings were commenced before the ld. Arbitrator and the arbitral award was passed on 2nd January,
2022. The ld. Arbitrator, after examining all the documents and the pleadings filed by all parties, arrived at the following conclusions:
I. Both sides have relied upon various partnership deeds dated 1st April,
1981, 7th November, 1988, 24th March, 1993 and 1st April, 1999. The case of the Claimant is that these deeds are forged and fabricated, whereas, the Respondent- Smt. Prem Lata Surekha and her husband alleged that the partnership was reconstituted on several occasions, hence the subsequent partnership deeds. I(A) On this aspect, the ld. Arbitrator held that only photocopies of the said partnership deeds were filed by the parties and since in the order of the High Court dated 1st August, 2018, the partnership deed dated 27th July, 1974, which contains the arbitration clause, was the dispute referred to her, the Arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction in respect of any other partnership deeds which did not have the said clause. I(B) In any event, since neither of the parties had placed the original partnership deeds on record and only secondary evidence was laid by Smt. Prem Lata Surekha to prove the existence of the said deeds, the same could not be held to be proven. I(C) Smt. Prem Lata Surekha also did not file her affidavit-in-evidence before the ld. Arbitrator, nor did she enter the witness box. Only her husband- Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha filed an affidavit-in-evidence on the basis of a Power of Attorney issued by his wife. I(D) Thus, the ld. Arbitrator came to the conclusion that Smt. Prem Lata Surekha was only a partner on paper. The ld. Arbitrator then scrutinised in detail as to whether the other partnership deeds came into existence or not. The differences in the various forms which were relied upon by Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha was noted by the ld. Arbitrator and the same were contrasted from the ones which were finally produced by the official witness. I(E) The ld. Arbitrator also referred to the oral evidence which was adduced by Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha and held that the discrepancies were not acceptable. She also observed that the following testimony of Shri. Vishnu Kumar Surekha was evasive: “Q.7. Is it a fact that you have not placed on record any dissolution deed that Prem lata Surekha had resigned from the firm? Ans. I do not remember. Volt. This fact is evident from the registration of partnership firm reconstituted by C.D. Surekha and Nityanand Yadav, and filed with the Q.8. Is it a fact that you have not placed on record any dissolution deed showing that Nityanand Yadav had resigned from the firm? Ans. It is a matter of record. The same can be verified from the records of Registrar of Firms. The record used to be monitored by late Shri Sitaram Surekha during his Lifetime. It is correct that document filedby me with the written statement i.e., Form no.I is a differentdocument to the document mark-X are fabricated.”
II. The ld. Arbitrator held that Shri Vishnu Kumar Surekha was unable to produce any partnership deed executed between Shri Chakradhari Surekha and Shri Nityanand Yadav, as also the proof of any resignation of Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, Shri Chakradhari Surekha or of Shri Nityanand Yadav. II(A) The ld. Arbitrator thus held that ‘Document R-2’ dated 19th October, 1981, i.e. the proof of resignation of Smt. Prem Lata Surekha from the partnership firm was, therefore, not proven.
III. Coming to the partnership deed of 1st April, 1981, again, ld. Arbitrator observed that only a photocopy thereof was placed on record and this document was also held to have not been proved. III(A) Insofar as ‘Form C’ was concerned, the same was sought to be proved through an official from the Registrar of Firms. This ‘Form C’ was relied upon by the Respondent as evidence before the ld. Arbitrator for the following facts: “23.Lastly, the respondent placed reliance on Form-C filed with her statement of defence as annexure R-3. Needless to say that the claimant denied the same. It is a communication from the Registrar of firms to the firm M/S Narain Rajkumar acknowledging the receipt of documents mentioned therein which are being reproduced hereinbelow in verbatim:
1) Mr. Chakradhari Surekha has stand retired from the firm and Mr. Vishnu Kumar Surekha have joined the firm vide partnership deed dated 7/2/1985.
2) Mr. Nityanand Yadav has stand retired from the firm and Smt. Parmeshwari Devi Surekha have joined the firm partnership deed 1/11/1988 vide notice dt. 21/8/06” III(B) The contents of the said document showed that it relied upon certain partnership deeds of 7th November, 1988 and notice dated 21st August, 2006 to prove the facts, as stated above, however, none of the said documents were available on the official record of the
V. Another argument addressed by the ld. Arbitrator is that the claim petition filed by Shri. Chakradhari Surekha was very belated. In this regard, the ld. Arbitrator was of the opinion that the 1974 partnership deed remained alive till 23rd March, 2015. Under such circumstances, the Arbitrator came to the following conclusion: “31.Let us assume everything against the claimant. Let us assume that he was complacent and the partnership for all intents and purposes was dysfunctional, but inertia or inaction on his part does not take away from him his right to seek dissolution in the manner provided under the Act. The partnership of 1974 may have transacted no business, but it remained alive till it was formally dissolved. At worse, it can be said that it was on ventilator, and became dead only when the claimant pulled the plug on March 23, 2015.
32. Having held that the partnership remained alive till March 23, 2015 the only other question that remains, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition in respect of property no. Y-10, Naraina, New Delhi in two equal shares of 50% each between him and the respondent Smt. Premlata Surekha. It has not been disputed by the respondent that the property in question stands in the name of the firm M/S Narain Rajkumar vide perpetual lease deed executed between the firm, and the Land and Housing Department of Delhi Administration. As per the claimant, Vishnu Kumar Surekha did make an aborted attempt to get the property converted from leasehold to freehold, but on an objection from their other brother Rajkumar Snrekha who wrote to the DDA that the conversion was being sought on the basis of a forged partnership deed, the DDA reportedly declined conversion. The respondent, on the other hand, has stated that the plot was acquired in lieu of another property at Loha Mandi belonging to her father in law. Assuming it to be so even though no proof regarding the same has been furnished, it is now a thing of the past. The fact remains that, as of now the property stands in name of the firm. The respondent has also stated that the claimant did not contribute any money towards the capital of the firm, nor did he involve himself in the affairs of the firm. Since the property now is in the name of firm it is unnecessary to dig the past to know who contributed what and how much, towards the acquisition of the property. And as for the claimant not having involved himself in the affairs of the firm the same may hold true of the respondent too.”
30. It is this award dated 2nd January, 2022, that was challenged before the ld. Single Judge of this Court u/s 34 of the Act. Vide the impugned order dated 21st February, 2025, the said petition was dismissed by the ld. Single Judge with the following observations:
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT BEFORE THIS COURT:
31. In the present appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, ld. Senior Counsel has made submissions on behalf of the Appellant.
32. The following are the submissions made by Mr. Rao, ld. Senior Counsel: i. Firstly, the partnership deed of the firm had under gone several changes after it was initially executed, however, the changes in the constitution of the partnership firm and the final relief which is granted do not match. It is his submission that the Respondent No.1—Shri Chakradhari Surekha had already resigned from the partnership firm and was not entitled to any portion of the assets in the firm. ii. The second submission is that at the time when Smt. Rachna Kedia was shown as a beneficiary of 20 % of the profits, she was a minor and under Section 30 (2), (5) and (6) of the Partnership Act, she automatically, upon attaining majority, becomes a partner in the firm and her share has not been taken into consideration by the ld. Arbitrator.
33. According to the ld. Senior Counsel, both these issues have not been dealt with by ld. Single Judge, who has brushed aside the arguments and simply held that the arbitral award doesn’t deserve interference.
34. Further, it is submitted on behalf of the Appellant that insofar as Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav is concerned, his resignation prior to his demise and the letter issued by his legal heirs thereafter would not deprive them of the proceeds of the asset, if any sold, belonging to the firm, and hence, the arbitral award dividing the property 50-50 between Smt. Prem Lata Surekha and Shri Chakradhari Surekha is not tenable.
35. Further submission on behalf of the Appellant is that the re-constitution of the partnership firm was admitted by Shri Chakradhari Surekha in the cross – examination before the ld. Arbitrator. However, the same has not been considered by the ld. Arbitrator.
36. It is also submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the ld. Arbitrator had become functus officio and the same has been rejected on the ground that the parties had acceded to the Arbitrator’s jurisdiction after the Amendment Act, 2015 and had appeared before the Arbitrator.
37. The further submission is that certain officials from the Registrar of Firms had also appeared before the ld. Arbitrator and had tendered their evidence. However, due to some inconsistencies in one of the forms, the ld. Arbitrator had held against the Appellant.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THIS COURT:
38. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents submits that the onus of proving the re-constitution of the partnership firm was on the Appellant, which the Appellant has miserably failed to discharge. It is further submitted that on behalf of Smt. Rachna Kedia, counsels had appeared before the ld. Arbitrator but chose not to contest the matter at all. This is clear from a reading of the proceedings before the ld. Arbitrator which read as under: “Vide a separate order, the application of respondent no. 2 under section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been disposed of. Learned counsel for the claimant prays for 3 weeks time to file rejoinder to the statement of defence of respondent no.1. Learned counsels, namely, Mr. Abhinav Srivastava and Mr. Kshitij Bhardwaj appearing for respondent no.6 want to withdraw their Vakalatnama, on the ground, that they have not received instructions from the respondent. As prayed, the aforesaid advocates are allowed to withdraw from the proceedings.”
39. In addition, reference is made to the reply sent by the legal heirs of Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav in response to a notice of sent by Shri Chakradhari Surekha. The said notice dated 23rd March, 2015 was issued to Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav, in response to which in the reply, it is stated as under: We Shiv Kumar Yadav and Shiv Ratan Yadav have received your notice dated 23.03.201. Our father Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav expired on 03.06.2003. Our father during his lifetime informed us that initially he was a partner of a firm named Sri Narain Raj Kumar and he had retired from the said partnership firm very long back and the partnership was dissolved and his accounts stood settled in the said firm. We are not in possession of any paper pertaining to the said partnership firm and we are not aware as to whether our father was also in possession of the same or not. As far as we recall there was a severe termite attack about a year and half prior to our father’s death, in which all the papers pertaining to our father and our papers which were lying at home were destroyed. On the advice of the past controller all the paper which had been damaged by termites in which there were termites were burnt. We are not aware as to whether there was any document pertaining to the partnership firm in those papers or not. We have neither any knowledge with regard to the said firm as stated above nor we have any document with regard to the said firm. We deny all the allegation as stated by you as we have no knowledge about the same. After receipt of your notice we have thoroughly searched all the places including our houses where we usually keep papers but have not come across any paper pertaining to any financial dealings of our father or any paper related to the stated partnership Nor are we in any way responsible for keeping or preserving any documents pertaining to your client. Please do not involve us in any legal dealings in which your client might be indulging in as we are in no way concerned with the affairs and are also never were aware of the affaires of the said firm.”
40. Thus, it is submitted on behalf of Shri Chakradhari Surekha that since the partnership firm was dissolved long back and accounts stood settled, the legal heirs of Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav did not wish to claim any share.
41. However, it is highlighted by the ld. Counsel that despite taking this position in reply to the notice, the legal heirs of Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav took a stand to the contrary in the arbitral proceedings while filing a written statement, though not actively participated in the proceedings. In the written statement, the claim of legal heirs of Sh. Nitya Nand Yadav was that his share was sold to Sh. Vishnu Kumar Surekha and Smt. Parmeshwari Devi who are the husband and mother-in-law of the Smt. Prem Lata Surekha, respectively.
42. In any event, the submission on behalf of Shri Chakradhari Surekha is that, the scope of interference under Section 37 of the Act being very narrow, these are factual issues which did not fall within the ambit of Section 37 of the Act. So long as there is no perversity, in his submission, the arbitral award deserved to be given effect to.
43. It is also submitted that this fact has also been brought to the notice of the executing court where the matter is now pending.
44. On behalf of the Respondents, it is further submitted that invocation of this arbitration was done on 23rd March, 2015 prior to the Amendment Act, 2015, coming into existence. In terms of Section 21 of the Act, the arbitration commenced on 23rd March, 2015, just prior to the amendment itself, therefore, the Arbitrator was not rendered functus officio.
45. It is also submitted that the Appellant is, in fact, operating through her husband Shri Vishnu Surekha, who was instrumental in selling the middle portion of the subject property to a third party, who sought intervention before the Executing Court. The consideration from the said sale has also been usurped by the Appellant. Under such circumstances, the arbitral award, as also the impugned order of the ld. Single Judge is just and reasonable. The Executing Court is presently going into the question as to how the equities are to be balanced in terms of the Award.
46. It is further submitted on behalf of Shri Chakradhari Surekha that the partnership deeds which were relied upon by the Appellant have not been brought on record and this is clear from the evidence of ‘RW-2’ Mr. Manish Kumar, before the ld. Arbitrator.
47. Section 31 of the Partnership Act is relied upon to argue that no change in the partnership deed could have been brought about without the consent of Shri Chakradhari Surekha.
48. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent reiterates the findings of the ld. Arbitrator that Shri Chakradhari Surekha’s signature were not found in any further subsequent deed, and therefore, the 1974 partnership deed has to be considered as legal and valid. Finally, it is submitted that the Appellant’s conduct has been dishonest and, therefore, no interference is called for.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
49. The primary ground that has been urged on behalf of the Appellant is that the mandate of the ld. Arbitrator had come to an end, as, by the time the second invocation took place on 12th July, 2016, the timelines in terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (amendment Act of 2015) had come into operation.
50. Thus, according to the Appellant, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal came to end on 31st October, 2016. The short issue before the ld. Single Judge was that the initial notice invoking arbitration was given on 23rd March, 2015 and the said invocation was not accepted by the Appellant. Thereafter, the second notice of invocation was issued on 12th July, 2016. The ld. Single Judge, while addressing the said issue in the impugned order, observed as under. In respect of the said issue, ld. Single Judge, vide the impugned order, observed as under:
51. Insofar as the merits is concerned, the ld. Single Judge, observed as under:
52. In addition to this, the ld. Single Judge, who had made the reference of the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 1st August, 2018 in Arbitration Petition No. 457/2017, clearly noted that there were two notices for appointment of Arbitrator i.e., 23rd March, 2016 and 12th July, 2016. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted below: “20. The record shows that petitioner no. 1 had issued two notices for appointment of an arbitrator. These notices are dated 23.03.2015 and 12.07.2016. 20.[1] Respondent no. 1 resisted appointment of an arbitrator in the matter. 20.[2] Clause 15 of the partnership deed dated 22.07.1974 reads as follows: “15. Any dispute arising out of this partnership or as to it interpretation, operations or enforcements of terms of this partnership between parties or their legal representatives shall be referred for adjudication to the arbitrators.” 20.[3] As it would be evident upon perusal of the said clause, no one party has the right to appoint an Arbitrator. 20.[4] In any case, respondent no. 1 has lost its right to have a say in the matter.
21. Accordingly, Ms. Rekha Sharma, Former Judge, Delhi High Court is appointed as an Arbitrator in the matter.”
53. Under such circumstances, the arbitration clause having been invoked prior to the Amendment Act 2015 coming into existence, the time limits, as stipulated under Section 29A of the Act would not be applicable to the facts of this case.
54. Be that as it may, a perusal of the stamp paper with the arbitral award also shows that the same was purchased on 22nd December, 2022. The parties had thus, by consent, extended the mandate of the ld. Arbitrator and there is nothing to show the contrary. Under such circumstances it has to be presumed that the parties had, by consent, extended the mandate of the ld. Arbitrator.
55. In any event, in the present case, there is no doubt that since the invocation of arbitration is prior to the Amendment Act, 2015 coming into existence, the time limits prescribed therein would not apply.
56. Insofar as the other parties and their rights are concerned, i.e., Shri. Nityanand Yadav and Smt. Rachna Kedia, Shri. Nityanand Yadav’s legal heirs had clearly taken the stand in their reply before ld. Arbitrator that they are not involved in the affairs of the partnership firm and that their father, during his lifetime had settled his accounts with the firm.
57. Insofar as Smt. Rachna Kedia is concerned, she was initially represented before the ld. Arbitrator but, thereafter, chose to withdraw from the proceedings.
58. Thus, the submission of Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, ld. Sr. Counsel that the said parties had stakes in the partnership firm and, therefore, the division of the property in terms of the arbitral award is not valid, is a completely meritless argument inasmuch as, once the stand of both Shri. Nityanand Yadav and Smt. Rachna Kedia had been placed before the ld. Arbitrator and they had shown no interest in claiming any rights in the assets of the firm they could not have been forced to participate in the arbitration proceedings.
59. The next aspect is in respect of the various partnership deeds and their impact. The ld. Arbitrator has undertaken a detailed analysis of all the partnership deeds which were relied upon by the parties. While the Claimant- Shri Chakradhari Surekha had placed the same in support of his prayer for declaratory relief, the Respondent- Smt. Prem Lata Surekha was relying upon the same to argue that the initial partnership deed stood re-constituted.
60. However, the ld. Arbitrator unequivocally and categorically, after analysing all the documents and comparing the same with the official records of the Registrar of Firms, came to the conclusion that the said documents had not been proved. In any case, Shri. Chakradhari Surekha had never resigned from the firm, nor had he agreed for reconstitution.
61. The ld. Arbitrator has proceeded strictly in terms of the partnership deed and has held that since there are only two surviving partners i.e., Shri. Chakradhari Surekha and Smt. Prem Lata Surekha they are both entitled to 50% each of the suit property. The relief of partition in two equal shares is, therefore, just and valid.
62. This being the factual analysis done by the ld. Arbitrator and the same being upheld by ld. Single Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, the same does not warrant interference of this Court at the stage of Section 37 of the Act, as the grounds under Section 37 are limited.
63. The Supreme Court, in its decision titled MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited [2019 SCC OnLine SC 220] discussed that the authority of the Court under Section 37 of the Act is clearly restricted to the same grounds as set out in Section 34 of the Act, so that appeals do not exceed the limits of judicial interference established for first tier challenges to arbitral awards. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held as under:
64. Recently, the Supreme Court, in Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project [(2023) 9 SCC 85], while re-iterating the position on the scope of interference of Court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, held that the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not like a normal appellate jurisdiction and courts should not interfere with the arbitral award lightly in a casual and a cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle the courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal.
65. In view of the analysis made above, and in light of the settled legal position, this Court opines that the present appeal is bereft of any merit.
66. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed and disposed of. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.
67. Costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- are also imposed on the Appellant, to be paid to the Respondent- Shri Chakradhari Surekha, within a period of 2 weeks, considering that even in this appeal, all reasonable proposals for amicable resolution were refuted by the Appellant. Further, the Appellant has sold 1/3rd of the subject land without permission of the other partner of the firm. The conduct of the Appellant is thus, not bonafide.
68. List for compliance on 25th May, 2026.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE MADHU JAIN JUDGE APRIL 21, 2026 dj/ss