Nathu Ram Jain v. Akhil Bhartiya Agrawal Sammelan Through National General Secretary Gopal Goyal & Ors.

17. He vehemently contends that election matters are inherently nonarbitrable as they involve rights and actions that are in rem. Substantiating on this proposition, he submits that a dispute regarding an election is not mere private dispute in personam between two individuals. Rather, the outcome of an election dispute affects the rights of the entire electorate, and any adjudication thereon binds one and all who are involved in the institution. Therefore, given the collective nature of the rights involved and the specific boundaries of Clause 43, the present dispute is fundamentally non-arbitrable and cannot, under any circumstances, be referred to an arbitral tribunal.

18. Additionally, he submits that an alternative and efficacious forum is already in place for the adjudication of the present dispute. In this regard, he refers to sub-clauses (14) and (15) of Clause 19 [identically worded in pre and post amendment of the Constitution of Sammelan], which states that after the election process begins, any complaint regarding the election must be made in writing to the Election Officer, and if the complainant is not satisfied with the decision, then he can file an appeal to the Tribunal of the Sammelan/Conference after the elections. Sub-clauses (14) and (15) of Clause 19 from the constitution (Hindi version) of Sammelan has been reproduced below in Extenso in Hindi, alongwith its English translation:

19. Election of Office Bearers

14. After the commencement of the election process, any complaint related to the election shall be made in writing to the Election Officer. If the complainant is not satisfied with their decision, an appeal can be made to the Tribunal of the Conference after the election.

15. A three-member Tribunal shall be formed by the President, in consultation with the General Secretary, from among the members of the Executive Committee of the Conference at the same time as the appointment of the Election Officer. (emphasis supplied)

19. He submits that a specific Tribunal has been constituted in terms of above quoted sub-clauses of Clause 19, exclusively to address and resolve grievances pertaining to the election process. Consequently, any such dispute must, in the first instance, be brought before the said Tribunal before approaching this Court. In support of this contention, the respondents place strong reliance on three official notifications of even date 28.01.2026, which were handed over in the Court, to establish appointment of three members who would constitute the Tribunal. Illustratively, one such notification dated 28.01.2026 is reproduced below in extenso:

20. Mr. Sumit further contends that the election process has already been set into motion with the issuance of the formal notification and Programme of Election has been notified by the Chief Election Officer on 16.03.2026. In this backdrop, it is submitted that once the election machinery has been activated, this Court ought to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction to interfere with the ongoing election process.

21. He submits that this established legal embargo on judicial interference after the election process has commenced, is not merely confined to statutory or constitutional elections, but applies with equal force and vigour to the elections of governing bodies of societies registered under the Societies Registration Act.

22. He further contends that the petitioner himself is an active participant and a contesting candidate in the impugned election, as evidenced by the fact that he formally filed his nomination on 28.03.2026. He submits that having voluntarily submitted to the election machinery by filing his nomination, and thereafter having waited for 25 days before approaching the Court, the petitioner has acquiesced to the process. Consequently, the petitioner is now legally estopped from turning around and challenging the validity of the election process at this belated stage.

23. To buttress his contentions, he has placed reliance on the following decisions – (i) Utkarsh vs. Delhi bar Association, 2014 SCC Online Del 878; (ii) Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 532; (iii) The Yachting Association of India vs. Boardsailing Association of India & ors., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3235; (iv) Supreme Court Bar Association and ors. vs. B.D Kaushik, (2011) 13 SCC 774; (v) Jyoti Basu and Ors. vs. Debi Ghosal and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 691;

(vi) Kiran and Anr. vs. Shantilal Bhagchand Kocheta Jain & Ors., 2017

24. In rejoinder, Mr. Dahiya, learned counsel for the petitioner, clarifies that the petitioner is not presently pressing for an absolute stay on the ongoing election process. However, he vehemently urges that, as an interim measure to protect the petitioner‟s interests, the opening of the ballot boxes and the subsequent counting of votes ought to be stayed, and any final declaration of results must be made strictly subject to the final outcome of the present petition.

25. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length, and having carefully perused the pleadings and material placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that before delving into the merits of the alleged irregularities in the election process, the threshold issue of the maintainability of the present petition must first be determined.

26. A plain reading of the arbitration clause i.e. clause 43 of the Constitution of the Sammelan, reveals that it strictly contemplates the resolution of mutual disputes between members and the Sammelan/Conference, or disputes concerning the “activities” of the Sammelan/Conference, such as membership etc. through arbitration. There is no specific mention of “election disputes” in the arbitration clause, suggesting that such disputes are non-arbitrable.

27. Even if one were to attempt a broadest interpretation of Clause 43, the fundamental nature of the dispute presents an insurmountable barrier to arbitrability. It is a well-settled legal proposition that arbitration is inherently a private dispute resolution mechanism designed to adjudicate rights in personam. An election of a society comprising approximately 1,20,000 members involves collective rights. A challenge to the election process, the appointment of a Chief Election Officer, or the validity of the voter list is not a private dispute between two individuals; it is an action in rem. The outcome of such a challenge affects the democratic rights of the entire electorate and the governing structure of the society as a whole. To put it differently, the disputes pertaining to election, which bind not only the contesting candidates but all those in the electoral roll, are inherently nonarbitrable.

28. At this stage reference may beneficially be had to the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court Booz Allen (supra), wherein the Court expounded on the three facets of arbitrability, relating to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. The relevant extract from the decision reads thus:

A dispute, even if it is capable of being decided by arbitration and falling within the scope of arbitration agreement, will not be “arbitrable” if it is not enumerated in the joint list of disputes referred to arbitration, or in the absence of such joint list of disputes, does not form part of the disputes raised in the pleadings before the Arbitral Tribunal.

35. The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora chosen voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place of courts and tribunals which are public fora constituted under the laws of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or non-contractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunals is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not expressly reserved for adjudication by public fora (courts and tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under Section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement of such disputes.

XXX XXX XXX XXX

37. It may be noticed that the cases referred to above relate to actions in rem. A right in rem is a right exercisable against the world at large, as contrasted from a right in personam which is an interest protected solely against specific individuals. Actions in personam refer to actions determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject-matter of the case, whereas actions in rem refer to actions determining the title to property and the rights of the parties, not merely among themselves but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property. Correspondingly, a judgment in personam refers to a judgment against a person as distinguished from a judgment against a thing, right or status and a judgment in rem refers to a judgment that determines the status or condition of property which operates directly on the property itself. (Vide Black's Law Dictionary.)

38. Generally and traditionally all disputes relating to rights in personam are considered to be amenable to arbitration; and all disputes relating to rights in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals, being unsuited for private arbitration. This is not however a rigid or inflexible rule. Disputes relating to subordinate rights in personam arising from rights in rem have always been considered to be arbitrable.

39. The Act does not specifically exclude any category of disputes as being not arbitrable. Sections 34(2)(b) and 48(2) of the Act however make it clear that an arbitral award will be set aside if the court finds that “the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force”.

29. Likewise, in Vidya Drolia and Ors. vs. Durga Trading Corporation,

30. Similar view has been taken by the High Court of Madras in Madras Sporting Youngsters Football Club v. Tamil Nadu Football Association, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 460. In this case as well, the Court was considering an application filed under Section 11(6) seeking appointment of an arbitrator as well as a separate petition under Section 9 of the Act praying for interim measures. The question with which the Court was confronted was that whether a dispute pertaining to election of office bearers of a Society in terms of its bye laws is arbitrable. The Court after examining the decisions in Booz Allen (supra) and Vidya Drolia (supra) held that election dispute is non arbitrable, and resultantly both the petitions were dismissed.

31. Besides above noted inherent non-arbitrability of election disputes, this Court also notes that sub-clauses (14) and (15) of Clause 19 provides an alternative efficacious internal mechanism for the redressal of electionrelated grievances. Sub-clause (14) states that after the commencement of the election process, any complaint related to the election shall be made in writing to the Election Officer. If the complainant feels aggrieved with the decision of the Election Officer, an appeal may be preferred to the Tribunal of the Sammelan after the election. Sub-clause (15) of Clause 19 mentions that a three-member Tribunal shall be formed by the President, in consultation with the General Secretary, from amongst the members of the Executive Committee of the Sammelan, while making an appointment of the Election Officer.

32. As noted above, by way of notification dated 28.01.2026 a threemember Tribunal, exclusively empowered to adjudicate upon election disputes, has already been constituted and is in place. As argued by Mr. Dahiya the petitioner has already approached the Election Officer by way of representation dated 10.04.2026. In case the petitioner‟s grievance has not been redressed, as claimed, he has unhindered right to approach the Tribunal after the elections are over.

33. Conjoint reading of Clause 43 and sub-clauses (14) and (15) of Clause 19 clearly shows that the dispute challenging the election of the office bearers of the Sammelan have been kept outside the purview of arbitration clause, and separate mechanism has been provided for the same, therefore, for this reason as well, the election dispute is non arbitrable.

34. Reference in this regard may be had to the decision in Utkarsh (supra), wherein a coordinate bench of this Court while dealing with clause 35 in the bye laws of Delhi Bar Association [DBA], which provided for arbitration to adjudicate the disputes and differences between members and members; members & association, held that the election dispute is not covered within the sweep Clause 35, hence, not arbitrable. The Court also held that the bye laws/constitution of the DBA is a complete code and it separately provides for mechanism for election process and such disputes are to be treated distinctly from that of all other disputes and they would not fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause provided in the constitution.

35. There is another crucial facet of the controversy. Undisputedly, the election machinery was set into motion with the issuance of the formal notification and programme of election on 16.03.2026. The law is well settled that once the election process has commenced, courts should exercise strict judicial restraint and normally decline to pass any orders that would stall or interdict the election. This principle applies with equal force to the elections of governing bodies of societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. Reference may usefully be made to a recent decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mandeep Singh and Anr. vs. Collector and Ors. dated 06.11.2024 [SLP No. 26170/2024], wherein the Hon‟ble Court while dealing the challenge to the elections of a Society registered under M.P. Society Registration Act, 1973, made following pertinent observations: “The law is settled in such cases in view of judgments of this Court in “N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency And Others” reported in (1952)S.C.R.218 and Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. reported in (1978)1 SCC 405, which is that when the election process has begun, no order should normally be passed by the courts interfering with the election. The logic being that, if in such election matters, an interference is made by the Courts, then in all likelihood, no election can take place ever. The remedy, which is always available to the other side, is by way of an Election Petition or a Civil Suit, whatever the case may be, after the elections are over. In the present case also, we are of the opinion that both the writ petition and the writ appeal have been disposed of in accordance with law, as the logic of the court being that, once the elections have been notified, the Courts should not interfere with the matter. In these circumstances, we see absolutely no reasons to interfere in the matter.”

36. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that in any institution governed by democratic principles, no individual member possesses an absolute right to seek an injunction that would effectively stall the formation of the governing body. The collective democratic will of the electorate and the smooth functioning of the association cannot be held to ransom by the grievances of a few individuals. Rather, the prudent approach is to leave the internal electoral machinery to be strictly governed by the established Rules and Regulations of the Association. Any judicial intervention at an intermediate stage would not only defeat the very purpose of the democratic exercise but also cause undue administrative paralysis within the society. In this context, reference may be had to the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in B.D Kaushik (Supra), wherein it was observed as under:

37. Similarly, in Jyoti Basu (supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that right to elect or to be elected is a statutory right, and outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Therefore, statutory creations are subject to statutory limitation. These observations are equally applicable to the elections of a Society, and the same have to held, and challenge thereto has to be entertained, strictly in terms of the provisions provided in that behalf in its bye laws or the constitution. The relevant observations from said decision reads thus:

38. Moreover, the conduct of the petitioner warrants strict scrutiny on the touchstone of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct and acquiescence. It is an admitted position that the petitioner actively participated in the ongoing electoral process by formally filing his nomination on 28.03.2026. Having voluntarily submitted to the election machinery and having taken a calculated chance to contest the elections under the impugned notification, the petitioner has unequivocally acquiesced to the process. Now just when the election is going to be held, this court does not find it to be justified to entertain the petitioner‟s prayer for stay of election or other events incidental thereto. The petitioner is legally estopped by his own conduct from turning around and challenging the validity of the election process at such a highly belated stage, especially considering that he chose to approach this Court only on 23.04.2026, a mere two days prior to the scheduled elections.

39. The reliance placed by the petitioner on various judicial pronouncements is entirely misplaced, as the said decisions are clearly distinguishable on respective facts and do not come to the aid of the petitioner. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner are distinguishable for the following reasons: (a) The reliance on Gautam (Supra) is misplaced. Pertinently, the said case did not pertain to an individual grievance, and crucially, the matter proceeded on an expressly admitted position by the respondents therein that the names of certain advocates appeared on the electoral rolls of more than one Bar Association. It is in this factual backdrop, the Court interfered with the election process. (b) Likewise, reliance placed on Big Charter (Supra) is also misconceived, as the said judgment deals with a purely contractual dispute and has no bearing whatsoever on the present controversy.

(c) The decision in Pradeepsinh Chandrasinh (Supra) is equally inapplicable. In that case, the overarching election process was never stalled or interdicted by the Court; rather, the judicial intervention was strictly limited to restraining a few specific respondents from participating in the elections.

(d) Lastly, the decision in Jammu and Kashmir National Conference

(Supra) pertained to an allotment of symbol. The learned Single Judge vide an interim order had directed for notifying a reserved symbol for the writ petitioner-party and allow candidates set up by it to contest on the said reserved symbol. The said interim order was assailed by the UT of Ladakh and the Hon‟ble Division Bench dismissed the appeal, against which UT of Ladakh carried the challenge to the Supreme Court. However, despite Courts‟ order the said symbol was not allotted to the writ petitioner. In meanwhile elections were held. It is in this backdrop the Hon‟ble Supreme Court set aside the entire election inter alia on the ground that the courts‟ orders ought to have been complied with by the UT of Ladakh. It was not a case where the Court stayed the election process, rather in the said decision there is a specific observation to the effect that Courts have usually maintained a hands-off approach with the sole salutary objective of ensuring that the elections, which are a manifestation of the will of the people, are taken to their logical conclusion, without delay or dilution thereof.

40. In view of the comprehensive analysis undertaken hereinabove, this Court inevitably concludes that the present petition is fundamentally misconceived and fails at the very threshold of maintainability, therefore, there is no occasion to examine the merits of the petitioner‟s allegations.

41. In view of the aforesaid findings, the present petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is held to be not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the accompanying application for interim relief, I.A. 11217/2026 under Section 9 of the Act, also fails and stands disposed of.

42. Order dasti under the signatures of the Court Master.

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J APRIL 24, 2026