Meera Devi & Ors. v. The State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & Ors.

1. Both these petitions, being connected, have been taken up together.

2. There are two cross-FIRs i.e. FIR No.432/2014 and FIR No.433/2014 dated 24.05.2014, registered at P.S. Kalyanpuri. Both the abovesaid FIRs have been registered for commission of offences under Sections 308/34 IPC.

3. In Crl.M.C. 1642/2025, there are three accused persons i.e. Meera, Raj CRL.M.C. 1642/2025 & 2 Kumar and Sunder Lal and injuries were received by one-Sheikh Mohammad and Gulshan.

4. In cross-case i.e. CRL.M.C. 8137/2025, there are in all nine accused persons i.e. Sheikh Mohammad, Meena, Shahrukh Khan, Gulshan, Sharmila, Musraf Khan, Zareena @ Zina, Sunder Lal and Salman Khan whereas the injuries were received by five persons i.e. Meera Devi, Sunder Lal, Jitender @ Jeetu, Tara and Kirodi.

5. As per bare averments appearing in FIRs in question, there was discord between the two groups and during scuffle on the relevant date, bricks were hurled and rod, lathi, palta, sword, etc. were used. The scuffle between the two parties was for the reason that Sunita (daughter of Ms. Tara) had, voluntarily, gone with Nek Mohammad (son of his neighbor-Mr. Sheikh Mohammad).

6. It is apprised that parties have been able to bury their differences and now there is marriage between the abovesaid two persons i.e. Ms. Sunita and Mr. Nek Mohammad with the consent of family members and such couple is even blessed with a child.

7. Charge-sheets in both the aforesaid matters have been filed and charges have also been framed under Sections 308/34 IPC and both the cases are at the stage of prosecution evidence.

8. Both the sides have entered into settlement and have agreed to give their respective ‘no objection’ to the quashing of FIRs in question. Copy of such Compromise Deed has also been placed on record. As per the broad terms of settlement, accused Sheikh Mohammad has agreed to pay a sum of Rs.40,000/- to injured Meena.

9. The petitioners and injured, in both the matters, are present. Respective CRL.M.C. 1642/2025 & 3 counsel are also present. The Investigating Officer (I.O.) is present and identifies the parties/ injured.

10. They all have reiterated the terms of settlement and submit that since the matter has been amicably settled between them, they are no longer interested in pursuing their respective FIRs. All the injured also state that they have already recovered from the injuries in question. They claim that they have entered into settlement voluntarily and without any pressure or coercion. A sum of Rs.40,000/- has also been paid to injured Meena during course of hearing of the matters.

11. The affidavits of respondents in both the cases, giving their ‘no objection’ to the quashing of respective FIRs have also been placed on record and reliance is placed on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303.

12. Fact remains that the incident is of the year 2014 and parties have already undergone agony of trial for more than a decade.

13. In view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, continuing with criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Even otherwise, the MLCs which have been placed on record does not reveal any serious injury. Reference be made to Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466, wherein the Apex Court had observed that proceedings, even in non-compoundable cases, can be quashed on the basis of settlement provided that the Court is satisfied that there was no meaningful purpose in continuing with the proceedings, and that the scope of conviction was remote and bleak. Reference be made to the following observations made in Antonnette Promilla Fernanadez v. State NCT of Delhi and Another 2026 SCC OnLine Del 809:- CRL.M.C. 1642/2025 & 4 “15. It is now well settled that, even in the case of non-compoundable offences, the High Court may exercise inherent powers, recognised by Section 482 of the CrPC and Section 528 of the BNSS, to quash proceedings based on a compromise between the parties. However, the aforesaid power is discretionary, and certain principles have been laid down, which guide the Court in adjudicating an application of this nature.

16. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab referred to several earlier judgments, including some concerning Section 307 of the IPC, and summarised the law as follows: “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or CRL.M.C. 1642/2025 & 5 personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

17. Three later judgments of the Supreme Court specifically deal with proceedings under Section 307 of the IPC: a. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, after referring to the judgment in Gian Singh, and various judgments dealing with Section 307, the Court distilled the following legal principles: