Meet Bhadresh Shah v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences

15. This Court vide Order dated 19.01.2026, reserved the judgment and directed the respondent to not to allot the seat in question until the judgment is pronounced.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

16. Ms. Anushree Kapadia, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that the impugned action of the respondent No. 1 Institution is baseless, arbitrary and also violates the principles of natural justice as the rejection was made without any reasons, formal or official hearing or show cause notice. Thus, the action violates Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

17. Ms. Kapadia, additionally submits that the petitioner has completed the required medical residency experience from three different institutions in piecemeal i.e. 15, 54, and 1026 days respectively. It is contended by the petitioner that there is no rule or regulation contained in the prospectus or the PGME regulations, 2023 or any circular, which states that the requisite experience has to be from a single institute and failing which the same will not be considered under Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus. It is also submitted that the petitioner transitioned institutions in accordance with the counselling procedure and all 3 institutes are duly recognised by the NMC.

18. The change of institutes is only because of the unprecedented overlap of counselling due to COVID-19 and Stay Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and is not attributable to the petitioner. Moreover, the NMC has not objected to many students completing their residency period cumulatively because of reshuffling.

19. Further, Ms. Kapadia, states that there is no intelligible differentia between the petitioner and other candidates and there is also no rational nexus between the rejection letter and the object for which INI-SS exam is conducted.

20. It is also submitted that the respondent No. 1 is estopped from raising issue of purported ineligibility of the petitioner for the subject seat at the final stage of selection by operation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The petitioner was not declared ineligible at any stage of the proceeding until the admission process culminated. In this regard reliance is placed on Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India[1] and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation[2].

21. In accordance with regulation 11.[1] of the PGME regulations, 2023, only the NMC is empowered to make any addition, deletion, or any kind of amendment to the regulations. Further, the 3 years requirement emanates from regulation 2.[1] of the PGME regulations, 2023. The interpretation adopted by the respondent No. 1 Institution amounts to an additional requirement to the PGME regulations, 2023, added by the respondent No. 1 Institution.

22. It is also submitted that this Court in its another decision titled Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences[3], has taken a liberal view and a similar view may be adopted in the instant petition as well.

23. Ms. Kapadia, also submits that the prospectus states 1095 days from the date of joining and does not state that it has to be from a single institute. Thus, once a degree certificate has been issued by the University, the respondent No. 1 Institution cannot do academic supervision by going behind the degree, it can only prescribe eligibility condition. The University has accordingly issued a certificate certifying 1095 days of required training. The relevant certificate is reproduced as under:

24. She also contends that there is no such rule that on each reshuffling the period commences afresh. The respondent No. 1 Institute cannot go behind the degree, it can prescribe eligibility standards but cannot reinterpret or nullify any academic determination.

25. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner has additionally completed 96 days as a Senior Resident in the GCS Medical College in the Anaesthesiology department from 11.03.2025 to 14.06.2025, i.e. for a period of 96 days, and it being a higher qualification, fulfils the said eligibility criteria.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1

26. Mr. Varma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 Institution, states that the petitioner is seeking to read between the Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus, to urge that the tenure at different institutes can be considered as one.

27. Further, it is stated that the prospectus provides for a Clause namely 3.3, whereby the respondent No. 1 retains its discretionary powers to decide any question. Moreover, the candidature of all candidates were provisional in nature and can be cancelled by the respondent No. 1. Mr. Varma, further contends that the sought interpretation will have grave consequences on standard medical training, whereby candidates can collate their piecemeal training to satisfy eligibility.

28. It is also contended that the Court should not interfere in academic policy matters, which are the domain of subject matter experts.

29. It is also submitted that the demanded interpretation if accepted would create havoc because students will then claim to have completed their training from several institutes during separate academic sessions. Further, the purpose of ensuring single institute is that it ensures a minimum threshold of knowledge and skill being imparted by the institute. It is also the contention of the respondent that the petitioner cannot challenge the admission process after having duly participated in the said process.

30. Mr. Varma, further states that the respondent No. 1 Institution is not bound by the certificate issued by the Gujarat University for completion of degree, when it does not align with the AIIMS prospectus or PGME regulations, 2023. In this regard, the learned counsel heavily relies upon the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court delivered in Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar (Supra).

31. With regards to the certificate of Senior Residency dated 16.06.2025, it is submitted that the said certificate is issued in a very different capacity, wherein the petitioner was not completing his academic training but rather working as a professional. It is further submitted that the aspect of equivalence cannot be judicially reviewed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

32. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the documents placed on record.

33. It is pertinent to refer to Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus, which is the bone of contention between the parties in this matter, the said Clause reads as under: “4.3.2. The candidates must have completed the requisite qualification, degree and tenure by 31.01.2026. The candidates who are likely to complete their “3 years (365 ×

3) = 1095 Days” tenure, qualification or degree after 31.01.2026 will not be eligible to appear in this examination.”

34. At the outset, it is clear that the core controversy in the present petition is with respect to the question, whether the mandatory requirement of 1095 days in total can be considered as satisfied when the tenure is completed in piecemeal at different institutions.

SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE IN ACADEMIC MATTERS

35. This Court is vested with the duty to protect fundamental and legal rights of the individuals but at the same time at some instances the Courts are required to exercise judicial restraint not as a matter of abdication but as a rule of prudence such as in cases involving policy matters or those requiring subject expertise. The scope of interference or judicial review of decisions in academic matters is well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically discussed this scope and made the following observations in the judgment of All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra[4]:

34. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale, etc. However, this does not mean that courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law [Also see: Medical Council of India v. Sarang [Medical Council of India v. Sarang, (2001) 8 SCC 427: 5 SCEC 183] ]. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits, which is the case we have in hand.” (Emphasis added)

36. Further, a Coordinate Bench of this Court has addressed the pertinent scope of interference in the case of Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar (Supra), the relevant paragraph reads as under: “41. A bare perusal of the aforenoted judicial precedents would lead to an inexorable conclusion that Courts are not the domain experts to deal with academic matters, rather the powers vest in the expert body to ascertain the bona fide requirements of any course, more importantly, professional courses. It cannot be gainsaid that the dilution of academic standards, particularly in the case of professional education, is at all impermissible and there exists a selfimposed fetter on Courts to not interfere in the decisions concerning the academic matters...”

37. From a conspectus of the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the Court must be slow and reluctant to interfere in education matters as a rule of prudence, but at the same time the Court retains its power of judicial scrutiny when any arbitrary decision is in question.

38. I am of the view that before arriving at a conclusion on whether this Court has to interfere with the decision of the respondent No. 1 Institution, it is necessary to examine the nature and justifiability of the decision in the light of peculiar facts of the case.

INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES & REGULATIONS

39. The Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus is based on the premise that regulation 2.[1] of the PGME regulations, 2023 also provides a similar framework for Qualifications, Duration of the Course and Components of Post-Graduate Training, and the regulation reads as under:

40. A plain and conjoint reading of both, the Clause 4.3.[2] and the regulation 2.1, to my mind, shows that it requires “requisite qualification, degree and tenure” being 3 years by the prescribed date. The aforesaid Clause is totally silent on the fact that the 3 year requirement has to be from a single institute or the same can be considered when fragmented in durations. The respondent’s argument that such a requirement is implicit and in the interest of ensuring professional competence is bereft of reasoning. Any eligibility condition must be clear, explicit and uniformly applicable. This condition is treated as fulfilled by the prior educational Institutes, however the same is not considered as applicable for the purpose of the aforesaid admission process to the respondent No. 1 Institution.

41. The respondent No. 1 Institution issued prospectus to all the candidates with no special clause or condition which explicitly excluded such candidates, who have completed their residency tenure from different institutions in fragmentations. Moreover, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the delay in commencement of the prior PG Course was triggered by several factors including COVID-19 pandemic and Stay order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The delay or even the transitional inconsistency is not attributable to the petitioner.

42. The respondent No. 5, namely, GCS Medical College and Research Centre has considered the three periods of training by the petitioner at three institutes, and thereafter granted an MD (Anaesthesiology) degree. The respondent No. 4, namely, Gujarat University has also certified that as per the PGME regulations the petitioner has completed 3 years i.e. 1096 days of residency programme in the department of anaesthesiology. The said certificate is recognised, valid and has not been set aside. However, the same is not considered as applicable for the purpose of admission process to the respondent NO. 1 institute.

43. The Clause 4.3.[2] of prospectus issued by the respondent no. 1 Institution, only requires 1095 days of residency requirement and not that the same has to be continuous and from one recognised institution only. Once the language of prospectus is clear and unequivocal, it cannot be left to the discretion of the respondent No. 1 Institution to add words and interpret in a way which is not borne out from the plain reading. To my mind, there is no doubt that the impugned rejection letter has been issued by the expert body which is the respondent NO. 1 Institution, but the same does not meet the restricted test of judicial scrutiny in education matters.

ADDRESSING THE 1095 DAYS CONUNDRUM

44. Essentially, it is the mandate of Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus that as on the cut-off date there has to be a completed tenure of possessing experience of 1,095 days as MD (Anaesthesiology). In the instant case, the following distribution of dates is pertinent for arriving at a conclusion: Institute Relevant Dates No. of days of training Affiliated University Pramukhswami MedicalCollege, Gujarat. 01.02.2022- 15.02.2022 15 days Bhaikaka University.

AMC MET Medical College. 08.03.2022- 30.04.2022 54 days Gujarat GCS Medical College, Hospital and Research Centre. 02.05.2022- 21.02.2025 1026 days Gujarat

45. To buttress his submission that the respondent no. 1 is entitled to interpret the prospectus, Mr. Verma has heavily relied on the observations of the Coordinate Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar (Supra), wherein the Court has denied to interfere with the decision of the respondent No. 1 Institution in a matter pertaining to interpretation of a term of the prospectus and has categorically held that it is the Institution which is the best judge in terms of any eligibility condition and the said Course being a skill based course, the minimum requirement is a sacrosanct condition, which needs to be complied with and no dilution of the condition can be permitted. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment heavily relied by the respondent No. 1 Institution read as under:

46. The judgment of the Coordinate Bench relied upon by the respondent is fundamentally distinguishable from the facts of the instant petition on the basis that the core issue involved in that case was regarding the delay in joining the postgraduate course and the subsequent authorised adjustment against the sanctioned leaves by PGIMER, Chandigarh i.e. whether the unavailed leaves by the petitioners could be utilised to shorten the mandatory training period required.

47. On the other hand, in the facts of the instant case the Court is not dealing with any relaxation or any adjustment accorded by the prior educational Institutes. It was only in pursuance of the counselling norms that the petitioner transitioned between different institutions in his post-graduation training period. The core controversy in the present case is only concerned with whether the completion of training of 1095 days has to be from a single institution or that can be considered as completed when pursued from different institutions in fragmentations, that too in light of no clear and specific exclusion of such fragmented completion of training from different institutions.

48. Thus, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from the judgment of Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar (Supra) as relied upon by the respondent No. 1 Institution. Also, in the present case the core issue is substantially different, as the petitioner has duly undertaken the required training of 1095 days.

49. In the present case the petitioner has not concealed or hidden his experience/tenure, the same were duly available with the respondent No. 1 Institution. The application for the said entrance examination was duly accepted by the respondent No. 1 Institution on 18.11.2025, in pursuance thereof an admit card was also issued. Thereafter on 11.12.2025, a list of ineligible candidates was published in which the name of the petitioner was not included. Consequently, the petitioner was interviewed on 12.12.2025 and his name was included in the declaration of final result dated 19.12.2025. The issue concerning his residency experience was not raised in the first round of counselling conducted on 29.12.2025. The respondent No. 1 Institute did not object at any time prior that the residency experience of the petitioner was violative of Clause 4.3.[2] of the prospectus. In similar circumstances in the case of Dr. Deepak Suresh Kumar (Supra) the Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as follows:

50. Moreover, in the aforementioned judgment as relied by the respondent No. 1, the Court has also highlighted the aspect that mechanical considerations should not be allowed to prevail over meritocracy. In this regard the Court observed: