Mohd. Shadab v. The State of NCT of Delhi

12. As can be seen from the above, the ld. Trial Court has held the Appellants are guilty under Section 302/34 IPC and has convicted them accordingly. In terms of the impugned order on sentence, the Appellants were directed to undergo imprisonment for life. The impugned order on sentence reads as under:

13. The appeals against the impugned judgment were filed on behalf of the Appellants, and on 14th October, 2025, the appeals were admitted. Vide order dated 19th December, 2025 the Predecessor Bench had granted interim suspension of sentence from 01st January, 2026 to 31st January, 2026, in CRL.A. 1427/2025, on account of advance stage of pregnancy of the wife of the concerned accused. The relevant portion of order dated 19th December, 2025 is reproduced hereinbelow: “7.Keeping in mind the overall facts and circumstances, particularly the advanced stage of pregnancy of the appellant’s wife and the absence of immediate family support, and considering the present application on humanitarian grounds, the appellant is granted interim suspension of sentence from 01.01.2026 to 31.01.2026, on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/-, with one surety of the like amount, one of whom shall be a close family member of the appellant, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court/CMM/Duty Magistrate, subject to the following conditions:-

(i) Appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, before the learned Trial Court. In case he does not possess a passport, he shall so state before the learned Trial Court by way of an affidavit.

(ii) Appellant shall provide his residential address, contact details and mobile numbers to the learned Trial Court.

(iii) Appellant shall not indulge in any criminal activity and shall no communicate with or come in contact with victim or her family, directly or indirectly.

(iv) Appellant shall also, along with bonds, file an affidavit stating about his clean antecedents and no involvement in any other criminal case.

8. The appellant shall surrender in jail on 31.01.2026 by 5.00 PM.

9. The present application, accordingly, stands disposed of.

10. A copy of this Order be immediately sent to the learned Trial Court and Jail Superintendent for information and necessary compliance.”

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE APPELLANTS i. Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for Shadab, the Appellant in CRL.A. 1427/2025, submits that the evidence on record, particularly the medical evidence tendered by the doctor from MAMC Hospital, clearly shows that the deceased was suffering from a serious coronary condition, with about 80% blockage in the arteries. It is submitted that there was no external injury or fracture on the body of the deceased, nor was any vital part injured. Even the post-mortem report records that the deceased had gone into shock, which may have caused the death. ii. It is further contended that the incident was at best a case of road rage, which occurred suddenly, in the spur of the moment and in a fit of anger, and that none of the accused had any intention to kill the deceased. Ld Senior Counsel also submits that no weapon of offence has been recovered in the present case. iii. Attention of this Court is further drawn to the fact that the place of incident was situated barely 100 metres from a police chowki, and despite the presence of the brother and other relatives of the deceased at the spot, no attempt was made either to stop the incident or to immediately take the deceased to the hospital, which renders the prosecution version doubtful. iv. It is further submitted that the eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution are all related to the deceased, and their testimonies do not inspire confidence. There is no prior animosity between the parties. The post-mortem report itself shows that the deceased had an enlarged heart, weighing about 400 grams, with complete blockage in the coronary arteries, thereby strengthening the submission that the deceased died due to a heart attack and not due to the alleged injuries.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY RESPONDENT i. On the hand, Mr. Bahri, ld. APP submits that although the incident arose out of a case of road rage, the manner in which the injuries were inflicted upon the deceased clearly shows that the accused subjected him to a merciless beating, which ultimately resulted in his death. ii. Ld. Counsel further submits that there are sufficient eyewitnesses on record to support the conviction and, in any event, the case would, at the highest, fall within the ambit of Section 304 IPC.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

14. We have heard ld. Counsels for the Appellants and the ld. APP for the State. The issue for consideration is whether the case of the Appellants has been rightly covered under Section 302 of the IPC.

15. A perusal of the evidence would reveal that the incident in question arose out of a sudden road rage altercation. The evidence on record establishes that the incident arose out of a unpredicted quarrel triggered by a minor traffic mishap. There is no material to indicate any prior animosity or pre-planning. The assault, as described by the prosecution witnesses themselves, was by fist and leg blows. No weapon of offence has been used or recovered.

16. The statements of PW-7 and PW-9, insofar as they claim to have reached the spot while independently proceeding to a baraat and a party respectively, appear improbable and raise doubts as to their natural presence at the scene of occurrence, and therefore, cannot be relied upon without corroboration.

17. It is apposite to refer to the post-mortem report of the deceased. The post-mortem report of the deceased mentions that there were internal as well as external injuries. There were injuries on the head with internal bleeding under the scalp, which indicate blunt force trauma to the head, as mentioned in the post-mortem report. Injury Nos. 5 and 6, as mentioned in the postmortem report, correspond to the internal injuries. Furthermore, in the abdominal region, the liver had sustained grievous injury. This is sufficient to conclude that the injuries suffered by the deceased were grievous in nature and were, to some extent, life-endangering. The relevant extract whereof is quoted hereinbelow: “EXTERNAL EXAMINATION

5. A reddish contusion measuring 2.[5] cm × 1.[4] cm was present on the occipital region of the scalp, situated just to the left of the occipital protuberance.

6. A reddish contusion measuring 1 cm × 0.[8] cm was present on the left parietal eminence. Xxx

X. INTERNAL EXAMINATION

A) Head: The scalp showed extravasation of blood in areas measuring 2.[2] cm × 1.[4] cm and 1 cm × 0.[5] cm, corresponding to injury Nos. 5 and 6, respectively. The brain weighed 1316 grams. Subarachnoid haemorrhage was present over the right parietal region. The brain was found to be oedematous, with flattening of gyri and obliteration of sulci. XXX D) Abdomen Liver weight was 1240 grams. Lacerations measuring 2 cm and 1.[8] cm in length were present on the anterior surface of the left lobe of the liver, with subcapsular bleeding over areas measuring 5 cm × 3.[5] cm and 6 cm × 4.[5] cm respectively, each containing about 5 ml of blood. On cut section, the surface lacerations were found to extend into the parenchyma, with disruption of the parenchyma of the entire left lobe and the adjacent part of the right lobe, involving about 30% of the liver, with the presence of bleeding amounting to approximately 150 ml.”

18. At the same time, this Court cannot lose sight of the findings in the very same post-mortem report concerning the condition of the heart. The report clearly records the presence of pre-existing cardiac disease. The heart was enlarged, and the right coronary artery showed 100% blockage. The relevant portion has been extracted hereinbelow:

19. During her testimony, PW-10, Dr. Jyoti Barwa, Assistant Professor, Department of Forensic Medicine, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Shahnawaj, deposed that the deceased was already suffering from heart disease with significant coronary blockage, and that a person with such blockage is at a higher risk of suffering a heart attack. The relevant portion has been extracted hereinbelow: “It is correct that when a patient is brought to the Emergency, the attending doctor observes most of the external injuries found on the body of the patient and the same are reflected in the MLC. It is correct that I have not mentioned in my post-mortem report Ex. PW10/A that the external or internal injuries reflected between points A to A and B to B were either sufficient to cause death or were likely to cause death. It is correct that the deceased was having 80% blockage in the left anterior artery and 100% blockage in the lumen of the right coronary artery. It is correct that once a person has this kind of blockage in the arteries of the heart, he/she is a high-risk case for a heart attack. Volunteered: even a lesser percentage of blockage of the arteries can be subject to a heart attack, and it is also a known fact that patients with 100% blockage can survive due to the development of collateral circulation. It is correct that during the post-mortem conducted in this case, I did not observe any development of collateral circulation of blood. Again said, it is not possible to observe this during post-mortem examination. Volunteered: I preserved the tissues for obtaining the histopathological report. The normal weight of the human heart is between 250 grams to 300 grams, depending upon the build of the person. It is correct that in this case, I found that the heart of the deceased was enlarged, weighing about 400 grams. It is correct that during the post-mortem examination, I found that the coronaries of the heart were hard and calcified, gritty throughout their course, with atherosclerosis showing blockage of the lumen, which means that there were deposits known as plaques throughout the arteries of the heart, blocking the supply of blood to the heart. It is correct that in the histopathological report it is recorded that the coronary vessels showed complex atheromatous plaques with evidence of focal revascularisation, recanalisation, medial calcification and patency, which means that the deceased had earlier suffered from a heart attack and was in the healing process. Volunteered: this also implies that the patient had not suffered any acute ischaemic episode. It is correct that the deceased had also earlier suffered a heart attack.

20. These findings clearly show that the deceased was suffering from severe and advanced coronary artery disease, which made him highly vulnerable to cardiac failure or shock, especially during physical exertion or emotional stress. The death, therefore, cannot be attributed solely to the assault, as the pre-existing cardiac condition was a substantial contributing factor. The medical evidence, therefore, weakens the direct causal link between the blunt force injuries and the death, since it cannot be conclusively established that the injuries, by themselves, were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

21. For a conviction under Section 302 IPC, two essential ingredients are required to be proved, namely mens rea (intention) and actus reus (the act done). The facts and circumstances of the present case do not satisfy the test of murder, as the Appellants did not have the intention to cause the death of the deceased. No weapon was used, nor any recovery effected of any weapon. The whole incident shows that it was a spur of the moment occurrence, as the motorcycle of the deceased touched the car of the accused persons, and in a fit of anger they started beating the deceased without even having an iota of intention or any inkling that he had a heart condition or that this may led to his death. Furthermore, the medical record clearly shows that the deceased was already suffering from a serious pre-existing heart condition. In these circumstances, the acts attributed to the Appellants cannot be said to be sufficient, by itself, to cause the death of the deceased in the ordinary course of nature or any acts of the appellants done with an intention to cause death. Consequently, the essential ingredients of Section 302 IPC are not made out. The aforesaid legal position has been unequivocally reiterated by the Supreme Court in Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1960. The relevant portion has been reproduced hereinbelow:

22. The case of the Appellants would also not fall within the ambit of Section 304 IPC. As reiterated by the Supreme Court on several occasions, the applicability of Section 304 depends upon the presence of intention or knowledge in relation to causing death. Keeping the settled principles in mind, the present case does not attract liability under Section 304 IPC, having regard to the nature of the injuries, the absence of any weapon, and the pre-existing medical condition of the deceased. This Court may refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nandkumar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2374, wherein it has been reiterated that for an offence to fall within Section 304, there must be either an intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or at least knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow: “5.7. In other words, where the two ingredients namely that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased was caused intentionally and secondly that it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, are satisfied, the offence would amount to murder. There may be circumstances which may emerge from the facts and evidence of a given case that the offence becomes ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’.

5.8. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab[2] and further in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra[3], this Court stated that divided into two Parts, Section 304, IPC deals with the situations where ‘culpable homicide’ would not be a murder. The conceptualisation of the ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ were explained in the following way, as quoted in para 4 of the Kesar Singh[1], “If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no intention to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304 Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall under Part I but where no such intention is established and only knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part II.”

23. As observed by the Supreme Court in Sompal Singh v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 316, there exists a very thin and subtle line of demarcation between ‘hurt which endangers life’ and an ‘injury which is likely to cause death’. Consequently, in cases where death ensues, it often becomes difficult to determine whether the accused is liable under Section 325 IPC for causing grievous hurt or under Section 304 IPC for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

24. In the present case, however, keeping in view the fact that no lethal weapon was used, the Appellants had no knowledge of the deceased’s preexisting medical condition, and there was no intention to cause death, the essential ingredients required to attract liability under Section 304 IPC are not made out. The case, therefore, stands clearly outside the ambit of Section 304 IPC.

25. The case of the Appellants would in fact be covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mayandi v. State, (2010) 11 SCC 774. In the said case, the deceased was attacked with a sickle and sustained several injuries, and subsequently died. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 IPC and altered the conviction to one under Section 326 IPC, holding that the deceased was suffering from a serious heart ailment which was not within the knowledge of the Appellants, and that the medical evidence revealed that the deceased had earlier undergone angioplasty and had suffered a heart attack.

9. Keeping in mind the said facts the High Court observed that: “In view of the above categorical evidence of PW 8 and PW 13, we are of the considered view that though it had been stated in the post-mortem report that the death was due to the complications of myocardial infarction, such complication is directly attributed to the injuries inflicted by the accused which resulted in interruption of the free flow of the blood not only to the various vital organs but also the heart and therefore the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the accused is liable to be rejected and accordingly the same is rejected.”

10. We have considered the reasons given by the High Court and also considered the evidence abovereferred. It is the admitted fact that the doctors have not opined that the death was caused due to the injuries caused by the appellant. There is also no evidence to show that the injuries could have independently caused the death of the deceased even if the deceased had not been suffering from a heart problem. It is also the conceded position that the deceased had a serious heart problem which was a matter not within the appellant's knowledge and on the contrary the medical evidence reveals that he had undergone an angioplasty but had nevertheless suffered a heart attack thereafter.

11. In this background the High Court's assertion that the death was occasioned by complications on account of the injuries caused by the appellant is not quite accurate. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the case would fall within Section 326 IPC and not under Section 302 thereof.

12. Mr R. Sundaravardan's argument that this matter would nevertheless fall within Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC, is also rejected as there was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased nor could he be attributed with the knowledge that death would be caused.

13. We accordingly partly allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal and conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC, and alter his conviction to one under Section 326 IPC and award a sentence of 10 years' RI and a fine of Rs. 5000 and in default thereof, six months' RI. The sentence under the other provisions of IPC is maintained. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.”

26. At this stage, the Court deems it appropriate to refer to Section 320 IPC, which is reproduced hereinbelow: “S.320- The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”:

1. Emasculation.

2. Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

3. Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.

4. Privation of any member or joint.

5. Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.

6. Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

7. Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

8. Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”

27. Applying Section 320(8) IPC to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the injuries suffered by the deceased clearly fall within the category of ‘hurt which endangers life.’ The post-mortem report records subarachnoid haemorrhage consequent to blunt force trauma to the head, along with extensive laceration of the liver involving approximately 30% of the organ and internal bleeding of about 150 ml. The liver and brain are vital organs, and injuries to such organs, accompanied by internal haemorrhage and shock, are inherently life-endangering in nature. Even though no fracture was detected, the presence of internal bleeding, cerebral haemorrhage, and disruption of hepatic parenchyma establishes that the hurt caused was not superficial or simple, but one which endangered life within the meaning of Section 320(8) IPC. The medical evidence, therefore, supports the conclusion that the injuries suffered by the deceased constituted grievous hurt in law under Section 320(8) IPC, irrespective of the existence of any pre-existing cardiac condition.

28. From a perusal of the Nominal Roll, it emerges that the Appellants have already undergone nearly three years of incarceration. The same as per the latest nominal roll are as under:

1. CRL.A. 1427/2025 Mohd. Shadab 1st January, 3 years, 8 months, 15 days.

2. CRL.A. 1497/2025 Mohd. Waseem@Bhura 2nd January, 3 years, 9 months, 26 days.

3. CRL.A. 1499/2025 Saleemuddin@Salim 1st January, 3 years, 8 months, 18 days.

4. CRL.A. 1512/2025 Mohd. Atif Malik@Lala 29th December, 3 years, 10 months, 2 days.

29. The maximum punishment prescribed for the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 of the IPC extends up to seven years.

CONCLUSION

30. Accordingly, the conviction of the Appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC stands set aside and is converted into one under 325 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.

31. The Appellants are sentenced to undergo the period of imprisonment already undergone by them. They shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

32. The bail bonds and surety bonds furnished by the Appellants shall stand discharged. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

33. Copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, for information and compliance.

MADHU JAIN JUDGE PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE FEBRUARY 9, 2026/ys/rm