(Through: Mr. Prashant Mehta ,Mr. Varun Gupta and Mr.Ronak v. JUDGMENT

9. In Damomal Kauromal Raisingani v. Union of India,[3] it was contended that since the order impugned in that petition was passed from Delhi, the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that without doubt, a part of a cause of action would lie at the place the effect/consequence of an order is felt. Thus, the Bombay High Court would also have jurisdiction to entertain the lis, despite the order having been passed from Delhi.

10. Further, in New Horizons and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.[4] which was also later relied upon in Kusum Ingots (supra), a Division Bench of this Court dealt with a factual matrix, where, a tender was issued for, inter alia, the making and delivery of a directory to respondent no. 3 located at Hyderabad, and respondent no. 4 a company situated in New Delhi, was declared the successful bidder. Assailing the said decision, a writ was filed in this High Court seeking quashing of the award of the contract to respondent no. 4, and a direction for the respondents to accept the petitioner’s bid. While the Division Bench entertained the matter on grounds that substantial arguments were heard, it was, importantly, also observed that: “We could certainly have directed the petitioners to approach the Andhra Pradesh High Court which also has jurisdiction in the matter since the telephone directories were required for Hyderabad Telecom District and the contract was to be entered into there and the records were also maintained there in Hyderabad. We could decline to exercise jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution in such a matter in spite of the fact of our having jurisdiction in the matter.”

11. Following the said decisions, the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots (supra) while invoking the concept of Forum Conveniens (or Forum Non Conveniens as it is more popularly called), declared that the mere fact that a part of the cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court would not be determinative factor compelling a High Court to decide the matter. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise the inherently discretionary writ jurisdiction. The material portion of the judgement reads as under:

30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. [See Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney [AIR 1941 Cal 670: ILR (1941) 1 Cal 490], Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal [(1945) 49 CWN 357: AIR 1949 Cal 495], Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Jharia Talkies & Cold Storage (P) Ltd. [1997 CWN 122], S.S. Jain & Co. v. Union of India [(1994) 1 CHN 445] and New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1994 Del 126]”

12. In ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu,[5] a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was moved to answer the question as to whether the Calcutta High Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition where, the petitioner has pleaded that:

13. While reversing the judgement of the Calcutta High Court, which had exercised jurisdiction on grounds that a part of cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in strong words held as under: ―12. …Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd., this Court observed: “We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.” In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.‖

14. A Division Bench of this Court in Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. and Anr. v. UP State Industrial Development Corporation and Anr.,[6] a company set up in U.P. had entered into an agreement with the said State. Thereafter, a demand notice issued by the State of U.P was received by the petitioner, and the same was assailed by the petitioner before this Court on grounds that — first, the impugned notice was received in Delhi; and second, the petitioner had its head office in Delhi. This Court relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties,[7] declined to entertain the writ petition and importantly held: ―The mere fact that the registered office of the appellant is in Delhi where the two communications dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1996 were received, will not be an integral part of cause of action for such a petition.‖ [Emphasis supplied]

15. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.,[8] the writ petitioner had challenged the denial of benefits under an import-export scheme (hereinafter ―Passport Scheme‖) before Gujarat High Court, which had entertained the writ petition, and the same was assailed before the Supreme Court. The different factual indicia, prima facie, appearing to favour the jurisdiction of different High Courts were: Facts supporting the jurisdiction of Gujarat High Court Facts supporting the jurisdiction of Madras HC

1. The petitioner carried out business of export and import from Ahmedabad;

2. Non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook was to affect the business at Ahmedabad.

3. The orders of export and import of the petitioner are placed from and are executed at Ahmedabad;

4. Documents and payments for export and import are sent/made at Ahmedabad; and

5. Credit of duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad

1. Passbook in question was issued by an authority at Chennai;

2. Designated authority, which is the competent person in respect of matters concerning the Passbook Scheme is at Chennai;

3. The entries in the passbook under the scheme are to be made by authorities at Chennai.

4. The export of prawns made by the petitioner and the import of the inputs, benefit of which the petitioner is seeking, will also have to be made through the

16. The Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis, and it was the Madras High Court, before which the writ petition should have been filed. It was re-iterated by the Supreme Court that each and every fact pleaded in the petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.

17. A Division Bench of this Court in Okhla Enclave Plot Holders Welfare Association v. State of Haryana and Ors.,[9] importantly, observed at para. 24-26 ―the residence or location of the petitioners is not relevant‖ to determine whether a Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a given petition.

18. Unequivocally, the Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim,10 held that not every fact pleaded constitutes a part of the cause of action. The Court must consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. The material portion of the decision reads as under: ―37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a “part of cause of action”, nothing less than that.‖

19. The same principle was also upheld in the case of Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,11 wherein, this Court ruled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the doctrine of forum conveniens can be applied. Also, the Court observed that the situs of the authority passing the order impugned in a petition cannot be the sole determinative criteria requiring this Court to entertain a writ. Further, the Court laid down that the cause of action depends upon the factual matrix of each case and cannot be totally based on the situs of the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority while completely ignoring the concept of forum conveniens. In paragraph nos. 32 and 33 of the said decision, this Court held that:

20. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee,12 the Supreme Court, again, declared that merely because the head office of a given corporation is situated within the jurisdiction of given High Court would not confer jurisdiction about that Court to entertain a given lis.

21. It may also be noted that parties cannot, through the means of a private agreement, require a writ Court to exercise jurisdiction in a case where it would not otherwise entertain a given petition. The Constitutional Court cannot be moulded to suit the fancies of parties expressed in their contract. In this connection this Court in Durgapur Freight Terminal Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India,13 has held:

22. A converse situation emerged in Mahrashtra Chess Association v. Union of India & Ors.,14 where the By Laws of the second respondent therein i.e., the All India Chess Federation provided as under: ―21. Legal Course

(i) The Federation shall sue and or be sued only in the name of the Hon.

(ii) Any Suits/Legal actions against the Federation shall be instituted only in

Civil Appeal No. 5654 of 2019, order dt. 29.07.2019. the Courts at Chennai, where the Registered Office of All India Chess Federation is situated or at the place where the Secretariat of the All India Chess Federation is functioning‖

23. The Bombay High Court in light of the aforenoted Clause 21 declined to its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming its jurisdiction had been ousted. The Supreme Court negativing this finding, in strong words, declared: ―25. In the present case, the Bombay High Court has relied solely on Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to hold that its own writ jurisdiction is ousted. The Bombay High Court has failed to examine the case holistically and make a considered determination as to whether or not it should, in its discretion, exercise its powers under Article 226. The scrutiny to be applied to every writ petition under Article 226 by the High Court is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the Constitution in the relevant territorial jurisdiction. It is not open to a High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely due to the existence of a privately negotiated document ousting its jurisdiction.‖ [Emphasis supplied]

24. In the case of Shristi Udaipur Hotels v. Housing and Urban a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court has also dealt with the question of whether the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court when the registered office of the respondent is situated in Delhi. The Court noted that the most vital or significant part of the cause of action arises outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and thus, mere presence of the registered office in Delhi will have no implication to determine the pertinent question of jurisdiction of the Court. The relevant part of the said decision is reproduced herein for reference: “30. In the present case, the mere location of the registered office of the respondent/Corporation in Delhi, cannot be a ground to canvass that the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, unless and until the petitioner has been able to point out that some material decision had been taken at the office of the respondent that would have a bearing on the present petition. A bald submission made to the effect that ordinarily a decision to recall a loan from a client is taken at the head office of the respondent/Corporation would not be of much assistance to the petitioner. As would be apparent from a bare perusal of the writ petition, the petitioner's grievance is directed against the act of the regional office of the respondent/Corporation in issuing the impugned loan recall notice dated 20.01.2014 and admittedly, the said regional office is not located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, but is based at Jaipur. Similarly, the Sub-Lease Deed dated 11.1.2008 in respect of the project land was executed by the petitioner with”

25. The Court in the case of Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India16 has considered the application of the doctrine of forum conveniens and has held as under:

26. It is to be noted that the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Bharat Nidhi (supra) was carried in appeal, and the Division Bench of this Court in its final decision reported in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Ors.,17 affirmed the view taken in Bharat Nidhi and held as under: ―21. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain a writ petition, in addition to examining its territorial jurisdiction also examines if the said Court is the 2024:DHC:426-DB. forum conveniens to the parties. The issue of forum conveniens is seen not only from the perspective of the writ petitioner but it is to be seen from the convenience of all the parties before the Court. In the facts of this case, as is evident from the record that the forum conveniens for the both the parties is Mumbai. The Appellants since the year 2020 have been appearing in Mumbai before SEBI in the SCN proceedings. In W.P.(C) 15556/2023 (as well as the other writs) the writ petitioner has sought a direction for summoning the records of SEBI for examining the legality and validity of the Impugned Revocation Order. In these facts, therefore, the objection of SEBI that Mumbai is the forum conveniens for the parties has merit. The obligation of the Court to examine the convenience of all the parties has been expressly noted by the Full Bench of this Court in Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. (supra)…‖

27. Furthermore, in Riddhima Singh v. Central Board of Secondary Education18 a Division Bench of this Court reiterated the settled proposition of law that where only a small part of the cause of action arises in the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, the Court is obligated to follow the doctrine of forum conveniens. Importantly, relying on the Division Bench decision in Udaipur Hotels v. Housing and Urbam Development Corp.,19 the Court declared that where the ―most vital parts of the cause of action‖ have arisen elsewhere, the mere presence of the registered office of the Respondent in Delhi would be irrelevant in determining territorial jurisdiction as it amounts to a miniscule part of the cause of action. The material portions of the judgement read as under: ―9. It is a settled position of law that where only a small part of the cause of action arises in the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, the same cannot automatically clothe the Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, the Court is obligated to follow the doctrine of forum conveniens. The doctrine of forum conveniens was elucidated by a full bench of this Court in Sterling Agro (supra) where it was held as follows: ―31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means that it is obligatory on the part of the court to see the convenience of all the parties before it. The convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the existence of more appropriate forum, expenses involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of certain facts which are necessitous for just adjudication of the controversy and such other ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience is also to be taken note of. Be it noted, the Apex Court has clearly stated in the cases of Kusum Ingots (supra), Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) and Ambica Industries (supra) about the applicability of the doctrine of forum conveniens while opining that arising of a part of cause of action would entitle the High Court to entertain the writ petition as maintainable.

32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens…” …

11. More significantly, a Division Bench of this Court in Shristi Udaipur Hotels v. Housing and Urban Development Corp 3 dealt with a similar issue and observed that where the most vital parts of the cause of action have arisen elsewhere, the mere presence of the registered office of the Respondent in Delhi would be irrelevant in determining territorial jurisdiction as it amounts to a miniscule part of the cause of action. …‖

28. Reference can be made to the decision of this Court in the case of H.S. Rai v. UoI & Anr.,20 wherein, the issue of territorial jurisdiction was raised. In the said case, the petitioner therein belonged to the State of Jharkhand and assailed the order of the PDIL, Noida. This Court in the said decision as well while applying the doctrine of forum conveniens has held that since the material, essential and integral part of cause of action did not arise within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the petition was not maintainable. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision read as under:

29. Pertaining to the same issue, a Co-Ordinate bench of this Court in Michael Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. National Medical Commission and Ors.21 while relying on a pronouncement of the Division Bench in Vemparala Srikant v. General Secretary, India Bulls Centrum 2024:DHC:7146. Flat Owners Welfare Co-Operative Society, Hyderabad22 held as under:

30. In Smt. Manjira Devi Ayurveda Medical College and Hospital v. Uttarakhand University of Ayurveda and Ors.,23 the Division Bench of this Court, declared that the mere presence of the office of a respondent being within the jurisdiction of this Court would not cloth the Court with the jurisdiction to entertain the lis. The material portion of the judgement reads as under:

31. Relying upon the observations in Smt. Majira Devi Ayurveda Medical College (supra), the Co-Ordinate bench in Michael Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), importantly, declared as under:

32. This Court in Shri Siddhi Vinayak Medical College and Hospital Sambhal UP v. Union of India & Anr.,24 while deciding upon the contention as to whether the dominus litis has an indefeasible right to approach the forum of his/her choice where jurisdiction is conferred upon more than one forum by virtue of cause of action arising at different places, has held that the said liberty granted to the dominus litis is circumscribed by the judicial oversight which has to be undertaken in each case. The relevant paragraph of the discussion on the concept of dominus litis is reproduced as 2024:DHC:7943. under:

33. While surveying a catena of decisions passed by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the Court delved into the analysis of settled jurisprudence on the doctrine of forum conveniens to reach the following conclusions in Shri Siddhi Vinayak Medical College (supra): “Driving home the contours of forum conveniens

68. The salient aspects which emerge from the line of precedents discussed above can be delineated as under:a. The litigant initiating a legal proceeding in the capacity of dominus litis is entitled to approach the jurisdiction of his choice if the cause of action arises in two different jurisdictions, however, the same shall remain subject to judicial scrutiny by the Court. The Court shall find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. b. While determining jurisdiction to hear a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court must consider two key factors i.e., whether any part of the cause of action falls within its territorial jurisdiction and whether the Court serves as a suitable forum, ensuring convenience and fairness for all the parties involved in the case. c. The mere situs of any authority, original or appellate, would not be a sole determinative factor in conferring jurisdiction upon a High Court. d. The Court has to adjudicate the objection raised on the territorial jurisdiction bearing in mind the overarching principle of comparative conveniens i.e., the Court must not only be satisfied that it is a nonconvenient forum, rather it must also be reckoned that the other forum is more convenient. e. The doctrine of forum conveniens is applied to identify the most suitable forum for resolving a dispute, taking into account not only the convenience of the parties but also ensuring that the interests of justice are served. The question as to which would be the determinative or nondeterminative factors to be considered in arriving at a conclusion about the forum conveniens or non-conveniens, will depend upon the facts of each case. However, a standalone factor would not weigh in determining the same, rather a cumulative result of the bundle of facts having nexus to the lis deserve to be appreciated. The following illustrative aspects, though not exhaustive, may be borne in mind while determining the applicability of the principle of forum conveniens or non-conveniens:i. The location of the parties; ii. The convenience of the parties; iii. The interest of other relevant stakeholders; iv. The place of the decision as well as the situs of the effect felt thereto; v. The decision making authority has a pan-India jurisdiction or otherwise; [Emphasis Supplied]

34. In the case of Pune Buildtech (P) Ltd. v. Bank of India,25 it was contended that since the loan agreement was signed in Delhi, the respondent bank has its head office in Delhi, therefore, this Court can exercise the territorial jurisdiction. This Court, while applying the doctrine of forum conveniens took a view that the substance of a matter is significant in determining the material, essential or integral part of the cause of action and the Constitutional Courts are saddled with a duty to prevent the abuse of jurisdiction by the parties. In the said case, the petitioners therein had approached the Court primarily on the ground that certain agreements with respect to the loan transaction in question were allegedly executed in Delhi. It was, however, observed that the essential, material and integral facts i.e., 2023:DHC:9156. place of declaration of fraud, initiation of complaint, registered offices of the parties etc. were all present outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision read as under: ―56. Considering the discussion hereinabove, it is crystallised that in order to confer jurisdiction to the constitutional courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action must arise within their jurisdiction. To determine a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action, it is the substance of the matter that becomes relevant. Also, the objection to the jurisdiction of this court can be raised at any stage of proceedings, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Health Services, Haryana.

57. It is to be noted that the germane issue in both the petitions is the decision of the petitioners' accounts being declared as “fraud‟. It is seen that the impugned action is taken from the respondent-BOI's Mumbai branch. Also, the communication of the said decision to the RBI regional office in Bengaluru also occurred outside the jurisdiction of this court. Furthermore, all the consequent actions under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act were also taken from the Mumbai branch of the respondent- BOI. ***

62. It is pertinent to mention that as per the legislative intent and constitutional scheme enshrined under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is crystallised that the cardinal duty imposed on the constitutional courts is to prevent the abuse of their jurisdiction by the parties and relegate back the parties to the forum where a material, essential or integral part of cause of action has arisen.‖

35. From the conspectus of authorities detailed above, and the discussion of law contained therein, it can unequivocally be concluded that the writ remedy, which is, at its core, an extra-ordinary discretionary remedy exercisable by Constitutional courts, cannot be left to the mercy of the litigants’ subjective will. The Court must, while adjudicating upon a writ petition, consider and account for the aspect of forum conveniens. This includes, not merely the conventional considerations of where the evidence, parties or their head offices are located; but also includes concerns pertaining to the conveniens of the Court, the administration of law and, most importantly, the dispensation of justice.

36. A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision of an authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for the said decision lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make this High Court a mini-pan- India Superior Court exercising jurisdiction over all events which take place throughout this Country. There is no gainsaying with the proposition that every High Court is competent to adjudicate upon a lis which arises from events or actions taking place within its territory. Merely because the ultimate order, which is based on events taking place outside Delhi and takes cognizance of actions outside of Delhi, is passed within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition ought not be entertained by this Court.

37. Naturally, being the capital of the Country, various authorities and bodies having pan-India jurisdiction would be located within the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the decision making authority happens to be in Delhi, ought not to be the sole reason to entertain a lis in this Court. The decision, no doubt, may be passed in the national capital, but it is usually against persons situated outside Delhi; and even more importantly, for actions which took place beyond the borders of this Court. The act of giving a hearing in Delhi, or the passing of an order in Delhi, is merely a result of a body/authority being situated in the national capital, it has nothing to do with the lis, the offending action, the legal injury or the foundational facts on the basis of which action is being taken.

38. The case-law cited above, makes repeated reference to ―dominant facts‖, and facts which are ―material, essential and integral‖ to the lis in question. In most cases, the fact that the order is passed, or the head office is located, or that opportunity of hearing was afforded, within the jurisdiction of this Court is completely immaterial, non-essential, and non-integral to the dispute in question. Any of the aforenoted three aspects could very well have taken place in another part of the Country, it is for the sole reason that Delhi is the national capital, that, in most cases these factors get connected to the jurisdiction of this Court. From another lens, it may be seen that regardless of what the underlying facts or legal injury/infringement may be, the order impugned would, in an overwhelming number of cases be passed from Delhi. If this be the case, can this constant factum, which shall remain present in each case, be considered a ―dominant fact‖ or a ―material, essential and integral‖ fact? The answer must be in the negative.

39. The scheme of the Constitution empowers every High Court to pass directions against any authority situated throughout the territory of India, if the cause of action wholly or in part arises within its territorial jurisdiction. If this Court were to routinely exercise jurisdiction solely on the ground that the order or notification being assailed has been passed in Delhi, or that the opportunity of hearing was given at the national capital, then the extraordinary power conferred upon different High Courts would be rendered nugatory and otiose. The purpose of conferring the aforenoted power on each and every High Court would stand defeated.

40. Another facet of this issue pertains to predictability and the rule of law. A citizen must know where to agitate his grievance. It cannot be a situation of laissez-faire, where for a given grievance which affects a number of individuals/corporations, part of them approach this Court on grounds that the order assailed has been passed within the jurisdiction of this Court, while the others knock the doors of the High Court where the underlying facts, whose cognizance was taken by the authority in Delhi, had arisen. Arguably, in these cases, judicial deference and discipline, may well demand that the Court already seized of the matter may be allowed to proceed with the same. In such cases, merely because an individual/corporation approaches a given High Court first, another party, which had justifiably moved the Court most proximately and dominantly connected with the facts, would be forced to pursue its remedies before another Court. In these circumstances, no party would know with certainty, which Court to approach; where would its lis actually be entertained; and to which Court would all other High Courts, assuming a recalcitrant litigant files petitions there, relegate the parties to.

41. Conflict of decisions is also a serious possibility in cases where writs are preferred before different High Courts and are entertained simplicitor on grounds that purported cause of action had partly accrued within the jurisdiction of a Court. The 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in SG Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors.,26 while discussing the rule of law and predictability in the actions of the executive noted the following: ―14. In this context it is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or (1967) 65 ITR 34. without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the Rule of law. (See Dicey — Law of the Constitution — 10th Edn., Introduction ex). “Law has reached its finest moments,” stated Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich, “when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler…. Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered”. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, “means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by Rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful”.‖ Predictability and certainty are, also, to be expected out of the Courts and not merely the executive. The extra-ordinary high prerogative writs must not become, at the end of the day, a race to the Registry of a given High Court.

42. It is the substance of the matter which the Court must consider in determining the connection with Delhi. An order being passed by an authority in Delhi is an unchanging constant. This static/uniform facet, which is unmoved by the nature of the lis, ought not to determine where territorial jurisdiction would lie.

43. The petitioner, in the instant case, may be correct in its contention that a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. However, the same would not be a determinative factor compelling this Court to entertain the petition.

44. In the instant case, the entire dispute was decided by the MSEFC at Agra, a Section 34 application is pending at Agra, purported execution steps have been taken at Agra and the recovery certificate has also been issued from Agra.

45. Under these circumstances, the material, essential and integral part of the cause of action has arisen outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the petitioner will have to pursue appropriate remedies before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

46. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the Court has granted a stay vide order dated 01.08.2025. Keeping in mind the aforesaid order, the stay order shall remain in force for a period of 45 days from today.

47. With the aforesaid observations, the instant petition stands disposed of along with the pending application.

48. All rights and contentions of the parties are left open.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J FEBRUARY 11, 2026 Nc/ksr