Puri v. AFTAB & ANR

9. The doctors who conducted the post-mortem were examined as PW-14 and PW-27, namely Dr. Arun Kumar and Dr. Juthika Debbarma. The cause of death as per the post-mortem report, was suicide and in the cross-examination, both these doctors have distinguished between suicide and strangulation in their deposition as under: “Dr. Arun Kumar S, Jr. Resident Cause of death:- Asphyxia as a result of antemortem hanging. However, the viscera has been preserved as requested by the IO. The time since death was about 3/4th of a day. The detailed P.M. report is Ex.PW14/A which bears my signatures at point A and signatures of Dr. Juthika Debbarma are at point B. XXX Dr. Juthika Debbarma Court question: How do you make a distinction between the case of strangulation and case of hanging. Ans. Firstly, in cases of hanging there is presence of salivary stains from the mouth. Secondly, there is difference in the situation of the ligature mark and other internal findings of the neck. In cases of hanging the ligature mark is oblique incomplete and situated higher up on the neck and in cases of strangulation usually the ligature mark is horizontal, complete and situated either on the thyroid cartilage or below that on the neck. On the internal findings in cases of hanging the subcutaneous tissues are pale, dry and glistening and there is no bruising in the soft tissues and muscles of the neck. In cases of strangulation, the subcutaneous tissue, soft tissues and muscles of the neck show bruising and usually there is associated fracture of the thyroid and hyoid bone.”

10. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the ld. Trial Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish any specific, credible or proximate evidence of dowry demand or cruelty “soon before death”, which is a sine qua non for attracting the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. The ld. Trial Court further held that the allegations were purely general in nature and did not meet the threshold of proof required in criminal trials. Consequently, the ld. Trial Court, on the basis of the aforesaid findings, acquitted the accused persons vide the impugned judgment.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

11. Mr Bahri, ld. APP appearing for the State has taken the Court through the testimonies of PW-1, PW- 2, PW- 3, PW- 21 and PW- 25. It is his submission that the facts which have emerged clearly establish that this is a typical case of dowry death. He contends that even if the medical evidence indicates suicide as the cause of death, the same would not dilute the applicability of Section 304-B IPC, since the death occurred within seven years of the marriage, thereby mandating the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

12. He further submits that the ld. Trial Court has completely erred in holding that there were no particulars of demands of dowry. According to him, the testimonies of PW-1, PW- 2 and PW-3 corroborate each other with respect to the demand for a motorcycle, a car, and payment of cash. He also places reliance on the testimony of PW-2 (father of the deceased), who deposed that on 20th December, 2010, he received a telephonic call from his daughter informing him about a renewed demand for dowry and money made once again by the accused and his family members. This according to Mr. Bahri constitutes a live link between the demand of dowry and the death of the deceased, which occurred by way of suicide. It is, therefore, his submission that the acquittal in this case is completely unjustified and untenable.

13. Mr. Bahri further reiterates the following facts: i. The date of marriage is not disputed; ii. The date of death is not disputed; iii. Soon before the death, the PW-2 (Father) received a telephonic call relating to the demand of dowry i.e. three days before the suicide; iv. The death occurred within Seven months of the marriage; v. The past conduct of the accused is also tainted as it is evident from the testimonies of PW-21 and PW-25.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

14. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Tarun, ld. Counsel appearing for both the accused i.e., R-1 and R-2 submits that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act though a deemed presumption is still a rebuttable presumption. He contends that the plain language of the provision makes it abundantly clear that there must exist cogent evidence to establish that the death of the woman was caused by or was in connection with a demand for dowry.

15. The ld. Counsel submits that the first and foremost fact operating in favour of the accused is that the accused Aftab himself was present at the time of the incident. He immediately informed the mother of the deceased and was also responsible for taking the deceased to the hospital. This conduct, according to the ld. counsel, is wholly inconsistent with any guilty mind and clearly demonstrates bona fide conduct on the part of the accused in discharging his marital obligations. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dashrath v State of M.P., 2010(12) SCC

198.

16. The ld. Counsel further submits that the initial version of the complainant merely casts a vague suspicion upon the accused and does not disclose any prima facie offence. In support thereof, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl) 825/2001 dated 1.11.2004 titled Deepa Bajwa v. State & Ors., wherein it has been held as under: “ After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that a complaint, on the basis of which the complainant seeks registration of an F.I.R., must disclose essential ingredients of the offence and in case a complaint lacks or is wanting in any of the essential ingredients, the lacuna or deficiency cannot be filled up by obtaining additional complaint or supplementary statement and thereafter proceed to register the F.I.R. If such a course is permitted, it would give undue latitude as well as opportunity to unscrupulous complainants to nail others by hook or by crook in spite of the fact that their initial complaint does not make out the offence complained of. Such a course would be utter abuse of the process of law. First version as disclosed in a complaint is always important for adjudicating as to whether an accused has committed or not an offence.”

17. He further places reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Narendra Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 171 to contend that notwithstanding any statutory presumption, the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, namely, the presumption of innocence, always operates in favour of the accused.

18. He submits that the most important evidence is the medical testimony of PW-14 and PW-27, both of whom have categorically opined that the cause of death was suicide by hanging and not asphyxiation by any other means. The distinction drawn by the medical experts between hanging and strangulation, based on both external and internal findings, leaves no manner of doubt that the deceased had committed suicide.

19. With regard to the testimonies of PW-21, PW-24 and PW-25, ld. counsel submits, that the former wife of the accused was admittedly known to the family of the deceased and has been deliberately introduced by the prosecution only to portray the accused in an adverse light by referring to alleged past conduct. It is contended that once the medical evidence conclusively establishes the case as one of suicide by hanging, the burden squarely shifts upon the prosecution to establish a proximate and live link between the alleged dowry demand and the act of suicide. According to the ld. counsel, no such nexus has been established on record.

20. The Ld. Counsel further submits that even in the initial statement of PW-1, recorded at digital page 272, it is clearly admitted that the accused himself informed the mother of the deceased and took the deceased to the hospital. The said statement merely expresses a suspicion regarding dowry and does not disclose any specific allegation. However, subsequent testimonies of the complainant are materially improved and embellished, thereby revealing glaring contradictions between the first version and the later deposition before the Court, which renders the prosecution case inherently unreliable.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

21. We have considered the submissions advanced by the ld. counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

22. The issue that arises for consideration is whether the ld. Trial Court committed any perversity or manifest error in acquitting the respondents of the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and in not returning a finding of guilt on the alternative charge under Section 302 IPC so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 378 of the CrPC, particularly in the context of the statutory presumption contained in Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

23. It is well settled that an order of acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Though an appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded, interference is warranted only where the view taken by the ld. trial court is perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court ought not to disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court, as held by the Supreme Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, para 42.

24. In the present case, the medical evidence is clear and unequivocal. PW-

14 Dr. Arun Kumar and PW-27 Dr. Juthika Debbarma, who conducted the post-mortem examination, have categorically opined that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of antemortem hanging. Both experts explained the forensic distinctions between hanging and strangulation and stated that in cases of hanging the ligature mark is oblique and situated high up on the neck, with pale and glistening subcutaneous tissues and without bruising of the neck muscles or fractures of the hyoid or thyroid cartilage. Several of these features were present in the deceased, while some internal findings were not classically consistent with a typical case of hanging. However, the final medical opinion of both experts remains unequivocal in favour of suicide by hanging. Any atypical internal findings were considered by the experts and did not detract from their final opinion. There is thus no medical basis to suspect homicidal strangulation, and the charge under Section 302 IPC was rightly rejected by the ld. Trial Court. The relevant testimonies of PW-14 and PW-27 is reproduced hereinbelow: “PW-14 Dr. Arun Kumar S, Jr. Resident, Forensic Medicine Department, GTB Hospital, Delhi. ON SA. On 24.12.2010, I was posted as Jr. Resident in Forensic Medicine Department, GTB Hospital. On that day, at about 12.40 p.m., I alongwith Dr. Juthika Debbarama had conducted the postmortem upon the dead body of deceased Ruby vide P.M. Report No.1748/2010. Dr. Juthika Debbarama has now left the services of the hospital. General Observation: Dead body of an adult female of average built wearing pink coloured half sleeve embroided kameez, green coloured half sleeve T shirt, orange coloured brassier, brown coloured salwar with pink patch on the hip area and a purple and green coloured printed dupatta (synthetic) were lying beside the body. All the clothes were intact. The inner surface of the salwar was soiled with fecal matter. Dried salivary stains were present on the left angle of mouth. Eyes and mouth were closed. Rigor mortis was presented well developed stage. Postmortem staining was present on the back and fixed. No signs of decomposition seen. (1) External Antemortem Injuries: Reddish-brown colour, dry, hard, parchment like ligature mark was present incomplete and obliquely around the neck above the thyroid cartilage. The neck circumference is 35 cm. In the midline on the anterior aspect of the neck, the mark was 3 cm in length and 1.[5] cm wide, 3.[5] cm below chin and 14 cm above the suprasternal notch. It was then absent for a distance of 10 cm on left side of neck. It then reappears 6.[5] cm below and 3 cm behind the tip of mastoid process (left side) where it was 1.[5] cm wide and was continuous on the back of the neck, in the midline. On the back of the neck, the mark was 1.[5] cm wide and 10 cm below the occipital protuberance. On the back of neck, the ligature mark was faint. On right side the mark was 1.[5] cm wide and 4.[5] cm below the tip of right mastoid process. Further the mark was absent for a distance of 8 cm on the front of right side of neck. (2) Internal examination:- Head and neck: Scalp: NAD, Skull: NAD, Brain: 1154 gms, congested. Neck: Extravasation of blood present in the soft tissue and muscles of neck. Bruising present on carotid sheath on left side. Hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage were intact. Chest: Ribcage: NAD, Lungs: left lung 330 gms and right lung 476 gms, congested and edematous. Left lung was adherent to the chest wall and pleura was thickened. Multiple petechial haemorrhages present on the right lung and inter lobar surface of left lung. Heart: 202 gms, coronaries: NAD. Abdomen & Ors.: Stomach: Empty, walls congested. Intestines: Distended with gases of decomposition and contains fecal matter, walls congested. Liver: 1208 gms. Congested, Spleen: 177 grams, congested and enlarged. Kidneys: left 167 gms, congested, right missing from the anatomical site. Bladder: Empty walls NAD, Uterus: Empty Bicornuate uterus, with two separate cavity and cervical opening into the vagina. Bilateral fallopian tubes were dilated and filled with clean fluid. Ovaries on both the sides were thickened and multiple clear fluid filled cyst seen on cutsection of ovaries. (3) Viscera preserved for chemical analysis during autopsy under the seal of JD, as requested by the I0. The clothes of the deceased were also seized and sealed in a parcel with the seal of JD. The said pullandas and sample seal of JD were handed over to the I0. Cause of death: Asphyxia as a result of antemortem hanging. However, the viscera has been preserved as requested by the IO. The time since death was about 3/4th of a day. The detailed P.M. report is Ex.PW14/A which bears my signatures at point A and signatures of Dr. Juthika Debbarma are at point B. Further examination in chief of the witness is deferred for want of FSL (viscera) report.” XXX PW-27: Dr. Juthika Debbarma, Assistant Professor, Agartala Govt. Medical College, Tripura. On S.A. On 24.12.2010, I was working as Sr. Demonstrator at GTB hospital. On that day, I along with Dr. Arun Kumar

25. In the absence of forensic evidence, the prosecution based its case on Section 304-B IPC read with the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Section 304-B IPC deals with dowry death, which reads as follows: “304B. Dowry death - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

26. Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows: “113B. Presumption as to dowry death. ––-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. –– For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]”

27. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the statutory presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is not to be applied mechanically, but only upon proof of the foundational facts contemplated by the statute. In Karan Singh v. State of Haryana 2025 INSC 133, the Supreme Court has held as under:

28. Similarly, in M. Srinivasulu v. State of A.P. (2007) 12 SCC 443, the Supreme Court has authoritatively held as under:

29. In the present case, although the death occurred within seven months of marriage and was an unnatural death, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to trigger the statutory presumption. The testimony of PW-1, the mother of the deceased, when examined in its earliest form on 23.12.2010 before the SDM on the date of death, contains general allegations without particulars or incidents of any demand of dowry or acts of harassment. The said statement dated 23.12.2010 is reproduced hereinbelow: “म कसाना प ी ी रज़वान पाशा िनवासी म. नं. 895, गली नं. 1, लोनी गोकलपुरी िद ी, आज िदनांक 23/12/2010, रात 11.30 बजे, SDM सीलमपुर क े सामने बयान करती ँ िक मेरी लड़की बी उ 19 वष की शादी िदनांक 31/05/2010 को आफ़ताब पु अरशद अली िनवासी मकान नं. 320, गली नं. 16, पुराना मु फाबाद क े साथ ई थी। आज शाम करीब 5 बजे मेरे दामाद आफ़ताब ने बताया िक बी की तिबयत खराब है और म उसे अ ताल ले जा रहा ँ और आप आ जाओ। म तुर अपने पड़ोस क े लड़क े रा ल क े साथ आई तो आफ़ताब मेरी बेटी बी क े साथ यमुना िवहार म एक अ ताल म खड़ा था जहाँ डॉ र ने उसे GTB Hospital ले जाने को कहा। उसे वह GTB Hospital ले गया, जहाँ डॉ रों ने उसे देखने क े बाद मृत घोिषत कर िदया। मेरा दामाद आफ़ताब, उसकी मां ज़रीना व मामा फा ख नौशाद उसे ब त तंग करते थे। आफ़ताब व उसकी माँ दहेज क े िलए बी को ब त तंग करते थे। मने शादी पर Motor Cycle दी थी पर ु वह कार और पैसे की मांग करते थे जो मेरी हैिसयत म नहीं था। मुझे पूरा शक है िक मेरी बेटी की मौत क े िलए उपरो सभी ससुराल वाले िज़ ेदार ह। बयान सुन िलया ठीक है। यह बयान म अपने होश-ओ-हवास म िबना िकसी दबाव क े दे रही ँ।“

30. Even the statement of PW-1 recorded before the court on 21.01.2012, though containing expanded allegations regarding demand of a car, harassment, beatings, denial of food and payment of Rs. 70,000/-, does not disclose any specific incident, date or proximate act of cruelty relatable to the period immediately preceding the death. The allegations remain general and unparticularised in material respects and are unsupported by independent corroboration, thereby limiting their evidentiary weight for establishing cruelty “soon before death”. The relevant statement is reproduced hereinbelow: “Deceased Ruby was my daughter. She was married with accused Aftab on 30.05.2010. In the marriage, accused Aftab, his maternal uncles Farukhi and Naushad and his mother Zarina had quarreled with us on account of less dowry given in the marriage as they were demanding car. After marriage, when my daughter came to my house, she told me that her husband, mother in law and abovesaid maternal uncles used to harass her and demand dowry and ask her to bring car or money to purchase the car from us. They also used to beat her for the same. My daughter Ruby had also made complaint to me that she was not being given food. I had given motorcycle make ‘Discover’ in the marriage of my daughter to accused Aftab but he was not satisfied with the motorcycle but accused Aftab had demanded the motorcycle make ‘Pulsur’. Hence, I gave him cash Rs. 70,000/- to purchase the motorcycle make Pulsur and he returned back motorcycle make Discover to us. The all said accused persons i.e. Aftab, husband of my daughter, Zarina, mother in law of my daughter and Naushad and Farukh had killed my daughter as they were not satisfied with the dowry articles given in the marriage. On 23.12.2010, I received a telephonic message from Aftab that Ruby is ill and he called me to come to his house. Therefore, I alongwith Rahul who is residing in my neighborhood left for matrimonial house of my daughter at Mustafabad on the motorcycle of Rahul. Aftab met us on the way sitting in TSR near Yamuna Vihar near the nursing home whose name I do not remember and I found that my daughter Ruby was lying in the TSR on the lap of one lady and the Aftab. My daughter was in unconscious condition and on seeing her, I started weeping. In the meantime, public persons gathered there and they advise us to take her to GTB hospital. Therefore, we took my daughter to GTB hospital where after examining her, doctor declared her brought dead. Rahul had informed my family members and relatives and they reached at GTB hospital. Accused Aftab and his maternal uncles Naushad and Farukh tried to run away but my relatives and family members apprehended the accused Aftab whereas Naushad and Farukh ran away. We informed the police and police of PS Gokalpuri reached there and we alongwith accused Aftab were taken to PS Gokalpuri. Police officials had called SDM concerned. Accordingly, SDM reached at PS Gokalpuri and in a separate room he made inquiries from me and recorded my statement Ex. PW1/A which bears my signatures at point A. I narrated entire facts to the SDM. I was crying before the SDM. On the next day, postmortem on the dead body of my daughter Ruby was conducted. I had identified her dead body at Mortury, GTB hospital and my statement in this regard was recorded by IO which is Ex. PW1/B which bears my signatures at point A. After the postmortem, I received dead body of my daughter for last rites vide Ex. PW1/C. All the four accused persons i.e. Aftab, Zarina, Naushad and Farukh had killed my daughter Ruby as we could not fulfill their demand of car and for the same, they used to harass and give beatings to my daughter. Accused persons Aftab and Zarina are present in the court today. Accused Farukh had given me threat to on my mobile phone from his mobile phone to withdraw the case otherwise they will kill my another daughter in the same way. I had noted the said mobile number of Farukh and gave the same to the IO of this case. Now I do not remember the said mobile number. Accused Aftab was already married with Gulshana and this fact was concealed from us. We met with Gulshana who told us that accused Aftab alongwith his both the abovesaid maternal uncles had also harassed her for illegal demands of dowry. The brother and uncle of Gulshana had also told this fact to me. Gulshana had also given me CD and photographs of her marriage with accused which I had handed over to IO of this case.”

31. A comparative reading of the two statements of PW-1 indicates significant elaboration in the later version which was absent in the earliest account recorded by the SDM on 23.12.2010. While the initial statement contains general allegations of harassment and dowry-related demands, it does not disclose any specific incidents, particulars or proximate acts of cruelty. In contrast, the subsequent statement under Section 161 CrPC introduces detailed assertions relating to beatings, denial of food, payment of Rs. 70,000/-, threats by co-accused and the alleged prior marriage of the accused. These constitute material improvements over the contemporaneous version and, in the absence of independent corroboration, diminish the evidentiary weight of the later narrative. Viewed cumulatively, although allegations of dowry-related harassment are brought on record, the evidence suffers from material improvements, lack of particulars and absence of proof of any proximate act of cruelty preceding the death. The prosecution has therefore failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to attract the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. In the absence of such presumption, and the evidence being insufficient to independently sustain guilt, the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

32. Sh. Rizwan (PW-2) i.e. the father of the deceased similarly made general and omnibus allegations without disclosing dates, occasions or specific acts. The relevant statement of PW-2 is reproduced hereinbelow: “Deceased Ruby was my daughter. She was married with accused Aftab on 30.05.2010. According to my position, I had given motorcycle make Discover and other dowry articles in the marriage of my daughter to the accused persons. The accused Aftab had returned the motorcycle by stating that it was not a motorcycle of his choice and he demanded the motorcycle make Pulsur. Hence, I gave Rs. 70,000/- to him to purchase the motorcycle make Pulsur and he returned back the motorcycle make Discover to me. On 19/20.12.2010, I received telephone call from my daughter at Balrampur, where I was present for the job work. She told me that her in-laws are not good persons and that accused Aftab-her husband, Zarina - her mother in law and Naushad and Farukh-maternal uncles used to harass her and demand car and money from her. She also told me that if their demand is not fulfilled, they will kill her or leave (ghar se nikal denge) her. She called me at earliest to speak with the accused persons. I could not come back early due to financial problem and on 23.12.2010, I received a telephone call from Rahul my neighbor informing that my daughter had already died and was at GTB hospital. On next day, I came back to my residence, and by that time my daughter was brought at my residence after postmortem was conducted on her body at the hospital. My wife Ruksana, one Smt. Munni-my neighbor and Rahul-my neighbor told me that inlaws of my daughter had killed her. The accused Aftab had telephonically informed my wife on phone that my daughter was ill and my wife should reach there at her matrimonial home at earliest. My wife accompanying Rahul reached near Yamuna Vihar where they saw my daughter motionless in a TSR and accused Aftab and one lady were sitting in the said TSR from there my daughter was taken to GTB hospital where doctor declared my daughter brought dead.”

33. The alleged telephone call said to have been received by PW-2 three days prior to the death is not reflected in any contemporaneous document, including the earliest statement recorded before the SDM or in any prior version of PW-2 and was rightly treated with circumspection by the ld. Trial Court. Even assuming the telephonic call of 19/20.12.2010, the same lacks corroboration, was never mentioned in the earliest version, and does not by itself establish cruelty of such intensity as to constitute a proximate cause for suicide.

34. In State v. Naresh & Ors. 2014:DHC:760-DB, this Court cautioned that vague and general allegations, without particulars of dowry demand and cruelty, are insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC. The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

35. The complete absence of any contemporaneous complaint, message, or grievance by the deceased to her parents, relatives, or any authority prior to her death is a highly relevant circumstance. Where cruelty is of such gravity as to drive a woman to suicide, some reflection of it would ordinarily surface in the form of a complaint or communication. The silence of the deceased and her family until after the death is a relevant circumstance which lends support to the finding of the ld. Trial Court that the possibility of the subsequent allegations being an afterthought cannot be ruled out. In such a case, a mere speculation that there could have been demands of dowry would not be sufficient to convict the accused.

36. The progressive embellishment in the testimony of PW-1 to PW-3, moving from vague suspicion in their earliest statements to specific allegations of dowry demand during trial, strikes at the root of the prosecution case. Improvements of such nature, going to the core of the statutory ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, render the evidence unsafe to rely upon.

37. Equally important is the absence of a proximate and live link between any alleged demand and the death. In Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2003) 8 SCC 80 and M. Srinivasulu (supra), the Supreme Court has explained that the expression “soon before her death” requires that the cruelty or harassment must not be too remote in time and must have a direct nexus with the death. In the present case, there is no contemporaneous complaint, no independent corroboration and no specific incident close in time to the death which would suggest that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of dowry demands. On the contrary, it is an admitted fact that the husband himself took the deceased to the hospital and informed her family; such conduct, though not conclusive of innocence, is inconsistent with the theory of culpable dowry-related harassment.

38. Apart from the above deficiencies in establishing dowry-linked cruelty, the reliance placed by the prosecution on the testimony of PW-21 and PW-25 regarding alleged conduct of the accused in a previous marriage also does not advance its case. At best, it appears to disclose some prior matrimonial discord involving the accused in an earlier relationship, but such past conduct, unrelated to the deceased and unconnected in time, place or circumstance with her death, cannot substitute for proof of the statutory ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. The law requires proof that the deceased herself was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with dowry soon before her death. Evidence of alleged behaviour in a previous marriage, howsoever discreditable it may appear, does not establish a proximate or live link between any dowry-related cruelty and the death of the deceased. To rely upon such remote and collateral evidence would amount to permitting conviction on the basis of character or propensity, which would not be permissible in criminal law. The ld. Trial Court was therefore correct in holding that the testimony of PW-21 and PW-25 was legally irrelevant for establishing the offence of dowry death in the present case.

39. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the view taken by the ld. Trial Court that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC is a plausible and a legally sustainable view. It cannot be said that the findings suffer from perversity or that material evidence has been ignored or misread. CONCLUSION:

40. In these circumstances, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not arise, and the acquittal of the respondents does not call for any interference by this Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment of acquittal dated 15th December, 2024 is hereby affirmed. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. The personal bonds and surety furnished by the respondents, if any, shall stand discharged.

MADHU JAIN JUDGE PRATIBHA M. SINGH, JUDGE FEBRUARY 17, 2026