Thomas, Mr. Ritwik Saha and Mr. Maulik Khurana, Advocates v. MAHESH AGGARWAL & ANR .....Defendants

16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central PRATEEK Excise, Jamshedpur, reported as (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, which contains similar provisions, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

17. After referring to the above decision, in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, reported as (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as under:

18. We may also profitably refer to Bengal Chemists and Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury, reported as (2018) 3 SCC 41, where while examining the provisions of the Companies Act, the Supreme Court made the following observations:

4. A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation different from that provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply “as far as may be”. In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.

5. Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time-limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature.” (emphasis supplied) PRATEEK

19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, reported as (2019) 13 SCC 445, while construing the phrase, “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, the Supreme Court held thus: “32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase “but not thereafter” reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an award. xxxx

33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months' period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, “but not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not thereafter” shows that the 120 days' period is the outer boundary for challenging an award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase “but not thereafter” would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605], Assam Urban Water Supply & SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board PRATEEK v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178: (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141].)

34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an “express exclusion” of Section 17 of the Limitation Act.” (emphasis supplied)

20. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hili Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited, reported as (2020) 5 SCC 757, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 that provides for the respondent/opposite party to file its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not extending 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory i.e. whether the District Forum would have the power to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. The Supreme Court has answered the said question in the following words:

21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above leaves no manner of doubt that where ever the phrase “but not thereafter” has been used in a provision for PRATEEK setting a deadline, the intention of the legislature is to treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule 15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication within a period of 30 days reckoned from the date of receipt of the written statement, with an additional period of 15 days provided and that too only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing the replication be extended for a further period not exceeding 15 days in any event, with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase “but not thereafter” used in Rule 15 must be understood to mean that even the court cannot extend the period for filing the replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the said period, the plaintiff's right to file the replication would stand extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be bestowed on the above provision, would make the words “but not thereafter”, inconsequential.

22. The next contention of Mr. Mehta that the words “the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the court” used in Rule 5 of the DHC Rules indicates that the court would still have the power to accept a replication filed beyond a period of 45 days, is also untenable. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the answer to the problem as to whether a statutory provision is mandatory or is directory in nature, lies in the intention of the law maker, as expressed in the law itself. The words “replication, if any, shall be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the written statement” and further, the words “further period not exceeding 15 days, but not thereafter” used in Rule 5 will lose its entire meaning if we accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that even if the timeline for filing the replication cannot be extended by the Registrar, there PRATEEK is no such embargo placed on the court.

23. The court must start with the assumption that every word used in a statute, has been well thought out and inserted with a specific purpose and ordinarily, the court must not deviate from what is expressly stated therein. The period granted for filing the replication under Rule 15 of the DHC Rules is only 30 days and on expiry of 30 days, the court can only condone a delay which does not exceed 15 days over and above 30 days and that too on the condition that the plaintiff is able to offer adequate and sufficient reasons explaining as to why the replication could not be filed within 30 days. As observed earlier, since the terms „Court‟ and „Registrar‟ have been defined in the DHC Rules, Rule 5 requires that the court alone can extend the time to file the replication beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written statement. Even the discretion vested in the court for granting extension of time is hedged with conditions and the outer limit prescribed is 15 days. If the replication is not filed within the extended time granted, the Registrar is required to place the matter back before the court for closing the right of the plaintiff to file the replication.

24. A reading of the relevant provisions of the DHC Rules shows that it is a special provision within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (for short „the Act‟), that contemplates that where any special or local law prescribes a time limit that is different from the one provided for under the Limitation Act, 1963, then Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be expressly excluded. It is well settled that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by an express provision or reference, then too, if it is clear from the mandate or the language of the statute, the scheme of PRATEEK the special law will exclude the application of Section 4 to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (Ref: Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, reported as (1974) 2 SCC 133).

25. It is equally well settled that when the provision of a law/statute prescribes specific provisions, then those provisions cannot be sidestepped or circumvented by seeking to invoke the inherent powers of the court under the statute. The principles required to be followed for regulating the inherent powers of the court in the context of applying the provisions of Section 151 CPC, have been highlighted in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Roshan Singh, reported as (2008) 2 SCC 488, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under:

28. In our opinion, reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on Desh Raj (supra), is also misplaced. No doubt, the Supreme Court has held that a reading of proviso 2 appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII would show that the said Rule is only directory and not mandatory, ultimately the Supreme Court has refused to condone the delay in that case. In fact, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case for the reason that in the said judgment, there was no occasion to deal with the scope and effect of Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the DHC Rules. In any event, the DHC Rules will have an overriding effect on the CPC. Notably the Code does not provide for filing of any replication. Order VI, PRATEEK Rule 1 describes “pleadings” to mean plaint or written statement. It is the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that provides a time limit for filing the replication and since the said Rules regulate the procedure, the same will have to prevail over the Code. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of this court in DDA v. K.R. Builders (P) Ltd., reported as (2005) 81 DRJ 708 and relied on in HTIL Corporation, B.V v. Ajay Kohli, reported as (2006) 90 DRJ 410, where it was observed as under:

8. In view of this amendment, the Delhi High Court (Original Side Rules) give the same time schedule for filing a written statement. Written statement, therefore, can be filed within 30 days and thereafter on sufficient ground for such extension being shown on an affidavit but such extension shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service.” PRATEEK

7. Though the said Judgment only deals with the filing of replication, however, the same analogy would apply to written statement also.

8. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Amarendra Dhari Singh v. R.C. Nursery Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 84, has taken a view that this Court has power to condone the delay. However, the said position has been further explained by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ms. Charu Agarwal Vs. Mr. Alok Kalia & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1238, wherein the co-ordinate Bench, while holding that the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani (supra) holds the field, has held as under:

31. The Court, on a foundational plane, firstly deems it apposite to advert to the principles which govern the theory of precedents. Our jurisprudence is based upon certainty and the hierarchy of courts. The law evolves based upon judgments which enunciate the law and lay PRATEEK down principles which the courts are bound to follow. Judgments rendered by coordinate benches or benches of a larger composition bind a court irrespective of doubts or views that may be harboured by individual judges. The mere fact that a particular contention may not have been urged or there be an angular argument which gives birth to a doubt with respect to the correctness of a decision have never been understood or accepted to be adequate to tread a line contrary to what may have been held in a decision which binds and compels a court to follow a rule which has held the field. A court would be entitled to take a contrary view if it were sitting in a Bench of a larger composition or where it comes across a judgment which permits it to review or doubt a decision. These could be situations where a judgment doubts the correctness of a decision or where a judgment of a superior court permits a court to review and reconsider a previously decided case. A novel argument or a mere fresh review of what a statutory provision entails or should mean has never been accepted as being sufficient ground to discard a binding precedent.

32. It must be borne in mind that the principle of binding precedent bids each Court to adhere to the principles that may have been enunciated by either Coordinate Benches or those of a larger coram. The ratio as flowing from those decisions can neither be doubted nor brushed aside merely upon a fresh interpretation or a review of the relevant provisions. A precedent would continue to bind Benches of a smaller coram as well as Coordinate Benches notwithstanding a new argument being canvassed and which may appear to be attractive. It becomes equally important to observe that if a judge sitting singly were to doubt the correctness of a precedent delivered by a bench of superior strength on it being perceived that a latter decision of a Bench of coordinate strength takes a PRATEEK contrary view, the only recourse open to be adopted would be to refer the matter for the consideration of a larger Bench in terms of Chapter II Rule 2 of our Rules.

33. The binding nature of verdicts was explained by a Full Bench of our Court in Deepak Kumar v. District and Sessions Judge, Delhi16 in the following terms:—

34. A more lucid enunciation of the legal principles governing the theory of precedents appears in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh17;

10. Finally, in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane, ((1989) 3 SCC 396: AIR 1990 SC 261) it was held “One must remember that pursuit of the law,‟ however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multijudge court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority.”

14. The Full Bench in Pritam Kaur's case, AIR 1984 P&H 113 (supra), on its part, held, “It is equally necessary to highlight that the binding nature of precedents generally and of Full Benches in particular, is the king-pin of our judicial system. It is the bond that binds together what otherwise might well become a thicket of individualistic opinions resulting in a virtual judicial anarchy. This is a self-imposed discipline which rightly is the envy of other Schools of Law.” The Bench further added “The very use of the word „binding‟ would indicate that it would hold the field despite the fact that the Bench obliged to follow the same may not itself be in agreement at all with the view. It is a necessary discipline of the: law that the judgments of the superior Courts and of larger Benches have to be followed unhesitatingly whatever doubts one may individually entertain about their correctness. The rationale for this is plain because to seek a universal intellectual unanimity is an ideal too PRATEEK Utopian to achieve. Consequently, the logic and the rationale upon which the ratio of a larger Bench is rested, are not matters open for reconsideration. Negatively put, therefore, the challenge to the rationale and reasoning of a larger Bench is not a valid ground for unsettling it and seeking a re-opening and reexamination of the same thus putting the question in a flux afresh.”

15. The reference was answered in these terms, “it would follow as a settled principle that the law specifically laid down by the Full Bench is binding upon the High Court within which it is rendered and any and every veiled doubt with regard thereto does not justify the reconsideration thereof by a larger Bench and thus put the law in a ferment afresh, The ratios of the Full Benches are and should be rested on surer foundations and are not to be blown away by every side wind. It is only within the narrowest field that a judgment of a larger Bench can be questioned for reconsideration. One of the obvious reasons is, where it is unequivocally manifest that its ratio has been impliedly overruled or whittled down by a subsequent judgment of the superior Court or a larger Bench of the same Court. Secondly, where it can be held with certainty that a co-equal Bench has laid down the law directly contrary to the same, and, thirdly, where it can be conclusively said that the judgment of the larger Bench was rendered per incuriam by altogether failing to take notice of a clear-cut statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent. It is normally within these constricted parameters that a similar Bench may suggest a reconsideration of the earlier view and not otherwise. However, it is best in these matters to be neither dogmatic nor exhaustive yet PRATEEK the aforesaid categories are admittedly the well accepted ones in which an othewise binding precedent may be suggested for reconsideration”.

16. On this aspect another relevant judicial pronouncement comes in Ambika Prasad v. State of U.P. ((1980) 3 SCC 719: AIR 1980 SC 1762). There, in the context of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961, while dealing with the question as to when reconsideration of a judicial precedent is permissible. Krishna Iyer, J. so aptly put it “Every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent”.

17. Further, “It is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority „merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned‟ (Salmond Jurisprudence, page 215, 11th Edition)”.

18. Implicit, thus, in the disregard by a single Judge or a Division Bench of a binding judicial precedent of a larger Bench or seeking to doubt its correctness for reasons and in circumstances other than those spelt out in Pritam Kaur‟ s case AIR 1984 P&H 113 (supra) is what cannot but be treated as going counter to the discipline of law so essential to abide by, for any efficient system of law to function, if not it virtually smacking of judicial impropriety. In other words, it is only within the narrow compass of the rule as stated by the Full Bench in Pritam Kaur's case, AIR 1984 P&H 113 that reconsideration of a judgment of a larger Bench can be sought and as has been so PRATEEK expressively put there, such judgments are not “to be blown away by every side wind”.”

35. It must with due respect be observed that neither Order VIII as originally standing in the Code nor its provisions as adopted by the 2015 Act employ the phase “but not thereafter”. The said expression stands enshrined in both Rules 4 and 5 of 2018 Rules. It was the adoption of the aforesaid phrase which was understood by the Division Bench in Ram Sarup Lugani to be of critical and vital significance. The Court is further constrained to observe that once the Division Bench had on an extensive review of Rule 5 come to conclude that the usage of the expression was indicative of a terminal point having been constructed, it would have been impermissible to take a contrary view. Ram Sarup Lugani had tested the provisions of Rule 5 based on a textual interpretation, the adoption of a special period of limitation, the recognition of the Order VIII principles not being applicable and even the inherent power not being liable to be invoked in light of the emphatic language of the provision itself. Ram Sarup Lugani had also noticed the earlier Division Bench judgments in DDA v. K.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd.18, HTIL Corporation B.V v. Ajay Kohli19 as well as in Print Pak Machinery Ltd. v. Jay Kay Papers Converters20. all of which had consistently upheld and recognised the primacy of the Rules over the provisions of the Code. The Court in Ram Sarup Lugani had also duly noticed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Desh Raj. The former decision thus constituted a binding precedent on the scope of the Rules, the mandatory nature of the timelines prescribed thereunder and that neither Order VIII nor the inherent powers of the Court being liable to be invoked to extend the period of limitation as stipulated in Rule 5.

36. While the aforesaid discussion would have been PRATEEK sufficient to lay the controversy at rest, since Amarendra Dhari Singh also proceeds on a perceived distinction between Rules 4 and 5, the Court deems it apposite to observe as follows. As was noticed in the preceding parts of this decision, both Rules employ the phrase “but not thereafter”. Both the phrases “not exceeding” and “but not thereafter” must clearly be accorded due weight and consideration. This was an aspect which was duly noticed in Ram Sarup Lugani.

37. Regard must also be had to the fact that while the penultimate part of Rule 4 is not replicated in Rule 5, that too would be of little significance when one holistically reads Rule 4. It becomes pertinent to note that the obligation to file a written statement in 30 days is originally placed by Rule 2 falling in Chapter VII. Rule 4 deals with the extension of time for filing a written statement. As is manifest from a plain reading of that provision, it confers a power on the Court to condone the delay that may have been caused and a written statement having not being filed within 30 days if it be satisfied that the Defendant was prevented by sufficient cause and for exceptional and unavoidable reasons to file the same within the prescribed period. Rule 4 then and upon such satisfaction being arrived at empowers the Court to extend the time for filing a written statement by a further period not exceeding 90 days but not thereafter.

38. The penultimate part of Rule 4 talks of the power of the Registrar to close the right of a Defendant to file a written statement if it be found that the same has not been tendered within the extended time. The use of the phrase “extended time” cannot possibly run beyond the maximum period of 120 days. In any case, the said provision as made in Rule 4 cannot possibly be countenanced or interpreted to recognise the Registrar being empowered to additionally extend time beyond PRATEEK the period of 120 days. The reliance which has been placed on various decisions noticed above and delivered in the context of Order VIII as found in the Code would have to be duly understood bearing in mind what had been held by the earlier Division Benches of our Court in K.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd., HTIL Corporation as well as in Print Pak. The said judgments had consistently held that the Rules as adopted by the Court would clearly prevail over and above those which may find place in the Code. All the four decisions noticed above, had been rendered prior in point of time to Esha Gupta and had neither been noticed nor considered in the said judgment. Ram Sarup Lugani while relying on the aforenoted decisions, had drawn sustenance from those decisions in support of its ultimate conclusion that Order VIII and the principles underlying the same would not apply to Rule 5.

39. The Court also deems it necessary to observe that the Rules directly fell for consideration of the Division Bench in Ram Sarup Lugani as well as the learned Judges who authored Gautum Gambhir and Harjyot Singh. The facial distinction between Rules 4 and 5 which appears to have weighed with the Court in Amarendra Dhari Singh would, in any case, not justify taking a contrary view. The Court notes that both Gautum Gambhir and Harjyot Singh were decisions rendered directly in the context of Rules 4 and 5 as enshrined in Chapter VII. This Court thus finds itself unable to accord an interpretation upon Rule 4 or 5 which would run contrary to what had been held in the earlier decisions and which necessarily bind this Court.

40. In conclusion, this Court is of the considered opinion that Gautam Gambhir, Ram Sarup Lugani and Harjyot Singh are binding precedents on the PRATEEK scope of Rules 4 and 5 as falling in Chapter VII of the Rules. The mere fact that the argument of a perceived discretion vesting in the Registrar in Rule 4 was not specifically raised or addressed would not justify the judgment of the Division Bench being either ignored or doubted. The Court has already noticed the issues that arise out of the judgment of the Division Bench in Esha Gupta. The earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the Court in K.R. Builders, HTIL Corporation, and Print Pak do not appear to have been cited for the consideration of the Bench. Ram Sarup Lugani was a judgment which came to be rendered upon an exhaustive analysis of the earlier precedents rendered in the context of the Rules and the Code, the peremptory language in which Rule 5 stood couched, of how the creation of a special rule relating to limitation would exclude the permissibility of condonation or extensions being granted. While the order of the Division Bench in Tushar Bansal was based on a concession that was made, the judgment in Jamaluddin came to be pronounced with neither side having drawn the attention of the Court to the decision in Ram Sarup Lugani. The said decision proceeded on the principles which underlie Order VIII of the Code and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kailash and Bharat Kalra rendered in the context of that provision. The Court notes that the adoption of Order VIII principles already stood negated by the earlier Division Benches in K.R. Builders, HTIL Corporation, Ajay Kohli and Print Pak. Those decisions too do not appear to have been cited for the consideration of the Court in Jamaluddin.

41. The Court thus comes to conclude that the principles enunciated in Ram Sarup Lugani would continue to bind and govern the interpretation liable to be accorded to the Rules. The Court has firstly PRATEEK found that there exists no distinction between Rules 4 and 5 which may be countenanced in law as justifying Rule 4 being interpreted or understood differently. In any case the binding decisions rendered on the subject constrain the Court to desist from treading down this path. The Court, bound by the rule of precedent, is of the considered opinion that such a review or a reconsideration would be impermissible in law. Since the Court has found that both coordinate Bench as well as Benches of a larger coram have conclusively settled all issues that stand raised, no reference is also warranted.” (emphasis supplied)

9. Applying the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani (supra) to the facts of this case, this Court does not have the power to condone the delay in filing the Written Statement beyond 120 days.

10. Learned Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 2 vehemently contends the delay in filing the written statement was only of six days beyond the outer limit of 120 days, and as such, this Court ought to be liberal in adjudicating the instant Application seeking condonation of delay.

11. Learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 2 further submits, while relying on Rule 3 under Chapter II of the DHC OS Rules, that the power to take decisions inter alia of an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the written statement lies with the learned Joint Registrar, and against such an order of the learned Joint Registrar, an appeal can be maintained under Rule 5 under Chapter II of the DHC OS Rules, before the Judge in Chambers. Apart from this reason, learned Counsel for the Defendant No.2 also states that the provision should be construed liberally as it has an effect PRATEEK on the legal rights of the Defendants.

12. This Court is of the opinion that sending the matter back to the learned Joint Registrar would only be a use-less formality in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup Lugani (supra) and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the Defendant No.2.

13. This Court also does not find any force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Defendant No. 2, that since there was a delay of only six days beyond the outer limit of 120 days, the same ought to be dealt with liberally, permitting the written statement to come on record.

14. Rules 2 and 4 under Chapter VII of the DHC OS Rules make it clear that even for the period of 90 days beyond the 30 days prescribed therein for filing of the written statement, „sufficient cause‟ needs to be shown and only then does the Court have power to condone the delay. However, beyond the period of 120 days, the Court is powerless when it comes to condoning the delay in filing the written statement, more so when the reasons such as the ones provided in the instant Application, are vague and do not depict a case of „exceptional‟ and „unavoidable‟ circumstances.

15. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any reason to condone the delay of 126 in filing of the written statement of the Defendant No. 2.

16. The Application is, accordingly, dismissed. CS(OS) 725/2022 & I.A. 19377/2022, I.A. 19378/2022, I.A. 19382/2022, I.A. 6448/2024, I.A. 5571/2026

17. List before the Court on 16.04.2026 for framing of issues and PRATEEK considering the application being I.A. No. 6448/2024 filed by the Plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC.

18. It is made clear that the hearing of application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC shall not deter the trial proceedings.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J FEBRUARY 27, 2026 Prateek PRATEEK