Rajesh Gandhi v. Ajay Mittal

7. The Petitioner is present in Court today. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant submits that the Court must examine the matter on merits. Relying on a legal notice dated 16.12.2014, it is submitted that as per the legal notice sent, the Respondent/landlord had transferred the property in 2014 to a third party, thus, the bonafide need did not arise. 7.[1] Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant relies on paragraph 3(iv) of the Leave to Defend/Contest Application filed by the Petitioner/tenant. It is apposite to extract the said paragraph, which is below: “3….iv. That the petitioner has not replied to the query raised in reply dated 20.12.2014 or has filed any objection in D.R. No.28/2015.” [Emphasis supplied] 7.[2] As can be seen from the above, the paragraph above merely states that the Petitioner/tenant has not replied to the query raised in reply and has not filed any objection, does not raise any ground that the Respondent/landlord had transferred the property to a third party.

8. In response, the Reply to the Leave to Defend/Contest Application filed by the Respondent/landlord, states that he is not aware about the legal notice and that the Respondent/landlord is still the owner of the property. The relevant extract is below: “(iv) That the contents of para No.3 (iv) of the application for leave to defend is wrong and denied except those which are matter of record. It is not denied that the petitioner has not replied to the query raised in reply dated 20.12.2014 оr has filed any objection in D.R. No.28/2015. It is submitted herein that the petitioner had no knowledge about so called notice and the same was organized by the respondent in order to defeat the legal right of the petitioner. It is further submitted herein that the petitioner that the petitioner appeared in the said petition and informed the Hon'ble Court that he is still the owner of the property and has not sold the same to anyone. Moreover, as regards ownership of the suit property by the petitioner and the relationship of landlord-tenant between the petitioner and respondent, the same was never in dispute and thus no specific reply in this regard was required from the side of the petitioner.” [Emphasis Supplied]

9. The Court in Ashok Gupta case has held that once an Eviction Order has gained fruition and has been implemented through an Execution proceeding in accordance with law, the Revision Petition becomes infructuous. The Court has relying on the judgment in the Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[8] held that the jurisdiction of this Court in a Rent Revision matter is limited and circumspect to examine if there is an error apparent on the face of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The relevant extract of the Ashok Gupta case is set out below:

execution proceedings, it was not necessary to go into the further details since such a decision would be a purely academic question. The Supreme Court held as follows: “6. In view of the admitted position that pursuant to the order passed by the Rent Controller, possession has been taken on execution of the order permitting eviction, and absence of specific stand regarding implied consent it is, however, not necessary to go into the finer details and to examine the rival stand in the background of legal position as it would amount to rendering decision on a purely academic question. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, without any order as to costs.”

13. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma where on an averment by the Respondent/landlord that possession of the premises has already been taken over, the Supreme Court held that nothing further survives in the Appeal and disposed the Appeals filed as being infructuous. The order being brief is extracted below: “Leave granted. At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-respondent submits, on instructions, that the possession of the premises in question has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent. That being the position, these appeals have now become infructuous, which have been filed against the final judgment and order dt.25.02.2008 and 28.03.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No. 49 of 2007 and C.M. NO. 119 of 2008 (Review) in RCR No. 49 of 2007, by which the Revision Petition filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and order of eviction was affirmed. Since the possession has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent, in our view nothing survives in these appeals and accordingly, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs.”

14. Various Coordinate Benches of this Court have also similarly held that the tenant's Petition have become infructuous in view of possession being taken. Reliance is placed on Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan[4] and Bhawani Shankar v. Nand Lal. 14.[1] In Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana[6] while relying on the NC Daga case and several other cases, a Coordinate Bench held as follows:

15. This Court in various orders including Order dated 14.12.2023 passed in RC. REV. 335/2019 captioned Ajay Kumar v. Ranbir Singh, Order dated 06.12.2023 passed in RC. REV. 52/2023 captioned Govardhan Lal v. Smt. Vidya Rani (Deceased) Through Lrs dated 03.11.2023 passed in RC. REV. 104/2021 captioned Ram Avtar v. Smt. Anuradha Shukla has held that when a Revision Petition has been filed challenging an order of learned Trial Court which has now gained fruition and has already been implemented through execution proceedings, in such circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous. In addition, it was held that once possession was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with law, the Petition becomes infructuous.” 9.[1] It was further held in the Ashok Gupta case that Section 19 of the DRC Act gives a right to a tenant to recover possession from the landlord albeit in terms of the provisions of such Section. The relevant extract is set out below:

17.[1] The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam case has held that Section 19 of the Act gives a right of re-possession to the dispossessed tenant if landlord recovers possession under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and thereafter, the landlord does not use the subject premises for the purpose that it was intended and set out in such Eviction Petition on which basis, an order for eviction was obtained by the landlord. The relevant extract is set

19. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising revisionary powers is limited and circumspect. The Petitioner/tenant did not initiate civil proceedings for recovery of possession, instead the present Revision Petition was filed. The Petitioner/tenant has not contended that Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been violated. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the NC Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this Court finds that this Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.”

10. The record reflects that the present Petition was filed seeking to challenge the order dated 24.12.2018 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller-02, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. By the Impugned Order, the leave to defend Application filed by the Petitioner was dismissed in view of the fact that the learned Trial Court found no triable issue in the matter. Since no interim protection was granted to the Petitioner, the possession of the subject premises was recovered by the Respondent/landlord in the execution proceedings in accordance with law on 18.12.2019. 10.[1] Concededly, no proceedings alleging violation of Section 19 of the DRC Act has been filed by the Petitioner/tenant. Despite recovery of possession by the Respondent/landlord more than 6 years ago.

11. The Petitioner has only contended that the possession of the subject premises was recovered in violation of the order passed by the Court. This contention of the Petitioner is without any merit. The Petitioner did not enjoy any interim protection from this Court and subsequently, the Executing Court directed issue of warrants of possession in respect of the subject premises. The Bailiff subsequently filed a report stating that the possession of the subject premises was recovered by him on 18.12.2019. Thus, the recovery of possession of the subject premises is in accordance with law and pursuant to order dated 27.11.2019 passed by the Executing Court in Ex. No. 2073/2019 captioned Ajay Mittal v. Rajesh Gandhi.

12. The only other contention raised by the Petitioner has already been examined by the Court in paragraph 7 and 8 above and found to be without merit.

13. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Trial Court has found that the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act stood satisfied and had passed the Impugned Order. On the issue of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and ownership of the subject premises, the learned Trial Court has given a finding that the landlord-tenant relationship has not been disputed and the Petitioner had admitted in an ancillary proceedings between the parties that the Respondent is the owner and landlord of the subject premises, thus the learned Trial Court, based on the admission given a finding that there exists a relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. On the issue of availability of suitable alternate accommodation, it has been found that the Respondent has failed to file any documents in support of its averments.

14. On the aspect of bona fide need, it is the case of the Respondent that he is a senior citizen and is suffering from cancer and is not keeping very well and it is contended that he also has heart trouble and needs regular treatment. Thus, he requires to get better medical facility for which he needs to have a place in Delhi to shift from Lucknow to Delhi. 14.[1] The challenge to the bona fide need of the Respondent was that the Respondent should continue to reside in Lucknow to get treatment of his ailments as it is the capital of Uttar Pradesh and that the Respondent in addition has not filed any medical documents in support of its ailments. Thus, the ground raised by the Petitioner in the leave to defend Application is that no explanation has been given as to why the Respondent cannot continue to reside in Lucknow.

15. The learned Trial Court has in the Impugned Order relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satyawati Shivam v. Union of India and another[9] and given a finding that the Rent Controller is not required to conduct a full-fledged trial. The learned Trial Court found that the grounds raised by the Petitioner has not raised any triable issue and thus dismissed the Application for leave to defend.

16. The Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan10 has held that tenant cannot dictate the terms of use of a property to a landlord and that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements. It is not for the Courts to dictate in what manner and how a landlord should live. This Court while relying on the Prativa Devi case has in the R.S. Chadha v. Thakur Dass11 held: “13.[1] It is settled law that the tenant cannot dictate the terms of use of a property to a landlord and that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements. It is not for the Courts to dictate in what manner and how a landlord should live. It is also not for the Courts to adjudicate that the landlord has a bonafide need or not. The Courts will generally accept the landlords need as bonafide. The Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353] has directed: 148 (2008) DLT 705 (SC)

13.[2] In any event, it is only the Respondent/landlord and his family who can decide what is sufficient space as per their needs and requirements. Sufficiency of residential accommodation for any person would essentially be dependent on multiple factors, including his living standard and general status in society. In view of the fact that admittedly the Respondent/landlord has a large family, it is not open to the Petitioner/tenant to contend that requirement of 6 rooms as pleaded by the Respondent/landlord, is not bonafide. 13.[3] The Trial Court has dealt with the sufficiency of accommodation of the Respondent/landlord in the Impugned Order. This Court finds no reason to impugn these findings.”

17. As can be seen above, this matter has been pending before this Court for the last six years despite the fact that the possession of the subject premises has been restored to the Respondent/landlord on 18.12.2019. 17.[1] Concededly, the Petitioner/tenant has not taken any remedies available to him, in respect of his contentions that possession should be restored to him. All that the Petitioner/tenant has done is to repeatedly seek adjournments before this Court. 17.[2] The Petitioner has for the last four dates taken adjournments before this Court and despite directions for the appearance of the Petitioner, the Petitioner did not appear before the Court. In view of the above, it is appropriate to fix costs in the sum of Rs.15,000/- payable by the Petitioner/tenant to be paid to the “Bar Council of Delhi-Indigent and Disabled Lawyers Account” within four weeks. Proof of costs shall be filed by the Petitioner in the time frame as given.

18. In view of the aforegoing discussion, the Petition and all pending Applications are dismissed.

19. List the matter for compliance before the concerned Registrar on 03.03.2025.