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$-10 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CRL.REV.P. 121/2011
MADAN LAL Petitioner Tlirough Mr. K.S. Tomar, Adv.
$-10 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CRL.REV.P. 121/2011
MADAN LAL Petitioner Tlirough Mr. K.S. Tomar, Adv.
VERSUS
STATE & ORS Respondents Tlirough Mr. Narender Sliarma ,Adv. for R-2,4 and 5.
Ms. Dimple Vivek with Mr. Deepak Sharma, Adv. for R-3.
Ms. Dimple Vivek with Mr. Deepak Sharma, Adv. for R-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
30.01.2013 By this petition filed under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482
Cr.P.C. the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 31.5.2010 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the order dated 24.12.2010 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge.
Arguing the present petition, counsel for the petitionersubmits that the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is ex facie illegal and perverse as learned MetropolitanMagistrate has sentenced respondent Nos. 2 to 5 for a period of six months although the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 were directed to be released on probation for tliree months under Section 4 ofProbation of Offenders Act, subject to furnishing probation bond and surety bond ofRs. 10,000/- each. Counsel further
2013:DHC:8466 5" submits that no direction was given by the learned Magistrate with respect to the remaining period of tliree months of the sentence and, therefore, the learned
Magistrate has committed an illegality in not dealing with the remaining period of three months sentence. Assailing the order of the learned Session Judge, counsel submits that the appeal was filed by the petitioner but the said appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Session Judge on the ground that the petitioner has not cited an appropriate provision in the subject of the appeal and also on the ground of limitation.
The present petition has been strongly opposed by counsels for respondent
Nos. 2 to 5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
In my view the learned counsel for the petitioner has misconstrued the order dated 31.5.2010 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi.
Noticeably the respondentNos. 2 to 5 were sentencedby the learnedMetropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi for committing an offence under Section 325/34 IPG and they were sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and the sentence of the accused was suspended during the period of probation and respondent Nos. 2 to 5, the accused, were released on probationunder Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 and the period stipulated for these respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 to remain on probation was tliree months. This period of tliree months
# probation of respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has been misunderstood by the petitioner as if their sentence was suspended for a period of three months. Under Section 4 of the
Probation of Offenders Act 1958, power is vested with the Trial Court to release certain offenders onprobation of good conduct when anyperson is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct.
In the facts of the present case the learned Trial Court has exercised the discretion in favour of the convicts by suspending their entire sentence and directing their release on probation for a period of three months, subject to their furnishing probation bond and surety bond for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each. This
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Court do not find any kind of illegality or perversity in the said order passed by the learned Magistrate. So far the challenge to the order of the learned Magistrate before the Appellate Court is concerned, it is apparent thatthere was a delay of 144 days in filing the said appeal and the Appellate Court found that no explanation was given bythe appellant explaining such delay and to this extent this Court does not find that there is any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Appellate
Court.
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So far the wrong labeling of the provision is concerned, this Court does not appreciate the finding of the learned Appellate Court that the wrong labeling of provision can deprive a party to maintain the appeal or any petition. However, the learned Appellate Court in its ultimate analysis did not find any illegality in the said order passed by the learned Magistrate as would be apparent from paragraphs
8 and 9 of the impugned order dated 24.12.2010 wherein the Appellate Court has clearly observed that he did not find any illegality in the order passed by the learned Trial Judge. The learned Appellate Court also observed that the said convicts during the period of probation did not violate the terms and conditions of the proposed bond and, therefore, the Appellate Court felt not to interfere with the order ofthe Magistrate.
In the light of the above position, this Court do not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the order passed by the Court below and also does not find any justifiable reason to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders.
There is no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby dismissed.
KADLASH GAMBHm, J JANUARY 30,2013 rkr
30.01.2013 By this petition filed under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482
Cr.P.C. the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 31.5.2010 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the order dated 24.12.2010 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge.
Arguing the present petition, counsel for the petitionersubmits that the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is ex facie illegal and perverse as learned MetropolitanMagistrate has sentenced respondent Nos. 2 to 5 for a period of six months although the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 were directed to be released on probation for tliree months under Section 4 ofProbation of Offenders Act, subject to furnishing probation bond and surety bond ofRs. 10,000/- each. Counsel further
2013:DHC:8466 5" submits that no direction was given by the learned Magistrate with respect to the remaining period of tliree months of the sentence and, therefore, the learned
Magistrate has committed an illegality in not dealing with the remaining period of three months sentence. Assailing the order of the learned Session Judge, counsel submits that the appeal was filed by the petitioner but the said appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the learned Session Judge on the ground that the petitioner has not cited an appropriate provision in the subject of the appeal and also on the ground of limitation.
The present petition has been strongly opposed by counsels for respondent
Nos. 2 to 5.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
In my view the learned counsel for the petitioner has misconstrued the order dated 31.5.2010 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi.
Noticeably the respondentNos. 2 to 5 were sentencedby the learnedMetropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi for committing an offence under Section 325/34 IPG and they were sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and the sentence of the accused was suspended during the period of probation and respondent Nos. 2 to 5, the accused, were released on probationunder Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 and the period stipulated for these respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 to remain on probation was tliree months. This period of tliree months
# probation of respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has been misunderstood by the petitioner as if their sentence was suspended for a period of three months. Under Section 4 of the
Probation of Offenders Act 1958, power is vested with the Trial Court to release certain offenders onprobation of good conduct when anyperson is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct.
In the facts of the present case the learned Trial Court has exercised the discretion in favour of the convicts by suspending their entire sentence and directing their release on probation for a period of three months, subject to their furnishing probation bond and surety bond for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each. This
)
Court do not find any kind of illegality or perversity in the said order passed by the learned Magistrate. So far the challenge to the order of the learned Magistrate before the Appellate Court is concerned, it is apparent thatthere was a delay of 144 days in filing the said appeal and the Appellate Court found that no explanation was given bythe appellant explaining such delay and to this extent this Court does not find that there is any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Appellate
Court.
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So far the wrong labeling of the provision is concerned, this Court does not appreciate the finding of the learned Appellate Court that the wrong labeling of provision can deprive a party to maintain the appeal or any petition. However, the learned Appellate Court in its ultimate analysis did not find any illegality in the said order passed by the learned Magistrate as would be apparent from paragraphs
8 and 9 of the impugned order dated 24.12.2010 wherein the Appellate Court has clearly observed that he did not find any illegality in the order passed by the learned Trial Judge. The learned Appellate Court also observed that the said convicts during the period of probation did not violate the terms and conditions of the proposed bond and, therefore, the Appellate Court felt not to interfere with the order ofthe Magistrate.
In the light of the above position, this Court do not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the order passed by the Court below and also does not find any justifiable reason to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders.
There is no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby dismissed.
KADLASH GAMBHm, J JANUARY 30,2013 rkr
JUDGMENT