Shree Laxmi Trading Corporation Export (India) & Ors. v. PEC Ltd

Delhi High Court · 30 Jan 2013 · 2013:DHC:482
Sunil Gaur
Crl.M.C. No. 2588/2011
2013:DHC:482
criminal appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the summoning of petitioners under Section 138 NI Act, holding that vicarious liability and defenses like security cheque are to be decided at trial, not at the summoning stage.

Full Text
Translation output
Crl.M.C. No. 2588/2011 Page 1 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CRL.M.C. 2588/2011 & Crl.M.A. No. 9252/2011
SHREE LAXMI TRADING CORPORATION EXPORT (INDIA) & ORS ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr.Garvesh Kabra, Advocate
VERSUS
PEC LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.Sanjeev Narula, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR O R D E R 30.01.2013
Summoning of petitioner as an accused in criminal complaint under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Annexure F) is assailed in this petition.
Learned counsel for petitioners at the very outset submits that the plea of cheque in question being a security cheque is a plea which is required to be determined at trial and permission be granted to petitioner to raise this plea before the trial court.
However, learned counsel for petitioner insists that mere bald allegations against petitioners No. 3 to 5 of being in-charge of the firm in conduct of its business by itself is not sufficient to call upon them to face trial of these proceedings.
2013:DHC:482 Crl.M.C. No. 2588/2011 Page 2 Learned counsel for petitioner contends that essential averments in the complaint to make petitioners No.3 to 5 vicariously liable are lacking and so, proceedings qua petitioner
Nos.3 to 5 deserves to be quashed. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed upon the following decisions:-
Central Bank of India vs. Asian Global Limited and Others,
JUDGMENT

(2010) 11 SCC 203; National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal and anr., (2010) 3 SCC 330; K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K.Vora and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 48; N.K. Wahi vs. Shekhar Singh and Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 481; Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2007) 3 SCC 693; Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. vs. R.B.S.Channabasavaradhya, (2006) 10 SCC 581; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 89; and Monaben Ketanbhai Shah and Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 15; State of Orissa vs. Nalinikanta Muduli, (2004) 7 SCC 19; Smt. Saraswathy Amma & Anr vs. M/s. Swil Limited & Anr., 83 (2000) DLT 75; Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. vs. M/s. Sarin & Co., 83(2000) DLT 79 (DB); K.P.G.Nair vs. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., (2001) 10 SCC 218. Learned counsel for respondent – complainant draws attention of this Court to paragraph nos.[2] and 3 of the Complaint (Annexure-F) to assert that the essential ingredients to fasten vicarious liability upon petitioner No.3 to 5 are very much there in the complaint filed and the pre-summoning evidence and so no case for quashing these proceedings is made out. Reliance is placed upon decisions in R.L.Verma vs. Crl.M.C. No. 2588/2011 Page 3 J.K.Verma, 2007 (4) JCC 410; Ramaswamy Athappan vs. Bharti Infotel Ltd., 148(2008) DLT 79; and Nipam Kotwal vs. Dominos Printech India Pvt. Ltd., 146 (2008) DLT 747 to maintain that the question whether a person is in-charge of affairs of the company or the firm at the relevant time can only be determined during the course of trial and not at this pre-mature stage of summoning the accused. Upon hearing and on perusal of the impugned order, the material on record and the decisions cited, I find that when it is averred in the complaint that petitioner No.3 to 5 had also approached the complainant for availing the financial facilities and had actively participated, so prima facie it cannot be said that they were not responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm of which they were partners. However, the question vicarious liability of petitioner No.3 to 5 is required to be determined at trial after the evidence is led and therefore, this question is left open to be considered at the trial. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find it a fit case to quash the impugned summoning order. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed while refraining to express any opinion on the merits lest it may prejudice petitioners at trial. (SUNIL GAUR) Judge JANUARY 30, 2013 pkb