Full Text
Date of Decision: 1st March, 2013
SUMIT LAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Sharma, Adv.
Through: Ms. Rajdipa Behura, APP for the State.
JUDGMENT
1. The Petitioner invokes the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) for setting aside of the order dated 08.11.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’) whereby she dismissed the Appeal against the order dated 08.07.2011 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (‘MM’) whereby the Petitioner was directed to pay maintenance of `1500/- per month to the Respondent.
2. The facts leading to filing of the Petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act) are that the Respondent claimed to have married the Petitioner on 04.01.1997 at the Methodist Church, Idgah, Delhi according to Christian rites and customs. In the Petition, it was averred that the Respondent and the 2013:DHC:1140 Petitioner lived as husband and wife since the year 1997 upto 2008. The Respondent alleged certain acts of violence and harassment at the hands of the Petitioner, particularly in October, 1998 and in November, 2001. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner started administering slipping pills to her and compelled her to have sexual relations with his (Petitioner’s) friends for his financial benefits. This was objected to by the Respondent. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioner contracted a second marriage with a lady named Pearl on 28.01.2008.
3. In reply to the Petition, the allegations of any marriage with the Respondent as also the allegations with regard to her ill-treatment, administering any pills, etc. were controverted by the Respondent.
4. By order dated 08.07.2011, the learned ‘MM’ held that there was a relationship in the nature of marriage between the parties. The learned ‘MM’ further held that the Petitioner was working as a driver with Queen Mary School and thus directed the Petitioner to pay maintenance @ 1500/- per month to the Respondent. The Petitioner challenged the order by preferring an Appeal under Section 29 of the D.V. Act before the learned ‘ASJ’. The Petitioner relied on some evidence recorded in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. of CW-1 and CW-2 to contend that Respondent was not legally married to the Petitioner. The learned ‘ASJ’ while dismissing the Appeal held as under:-
5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner urges that since there was no relationship in the nature of marriage, the learned ‘MM’ committed illegality in granting maintenance to the Respondent. The learned ‘ASJ’ also erred in not reversing the order passed by the learned ‘MM’. The learned counsel for the Petitioner urges that since the Petitioner failed to establish that there was a relationship in the nature of marriage, the learned ‘MM’ ought to have waited for the evidence to be recorded to pass an order under Section 20 of the D.V. Act.
6. Referring to D.Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 and Adil & Ors. v. State & Anr. 2010 (119) DRJ 297, the learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that simply because the Respondent had some photographs with the Petitioner, it would not establish that there was a relationship in the nature of marriage between the parties. In D.Velusamy, the Supreme Court held that merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a domestic relationship. Para 31 of the judgment reads as under:-
7. Similarly, in Adil & Ors. it was held that there has to be domestic relationship between the person aggrieved and the Respondent to invoke the provisions of D.V. Act.
8. There is no dispute about the proposition of law as laid down in D. Velusamy and Adil & Ors. However, in the instant case, the learned ‘MM’ as also the learned ‘ASJ’ found that there were number of photographs placed before the Trial Court and there were statements of witnesses recorded by the police who stated about the relationship between the parties as husband and wife or that they lived as husband and wife. The impugned order was passed only as an interim arrangement on a prima facie view of the matter.
9. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned order dated 08.07.2011 was illegal or that the learned ‘ASJ’ erred in not reversing the order passed by the learned ‘MM’.
10. In view of the consistent finding on the domestic relationship reached by the learned ‘MM’ and the learned ‘ASJ’, I am not inclined to interfere with the orders dated 08.07.2011 and 08.11.2011 passed by the learned ‘MM’ and learned ‘ASJ’ respectively. It has to be kept in mind that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. have to be used sparingly and in exceptional cases in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, which is not the case here.
11. In the circumstances, no interference is called for in the impugned order; the Petition is accordingly dismissed.
12. Crl.M.A.488/2012 also stands disposed of. G.P. MITTAL, J. MARCH 01, 2013 vk