Prabhati Lal v. Neetu Nanda

8. On the aspect of landlord-tenant relationship and ownership of the subject premises, the learned Trial Court had examined the entire chain of ownership through which the Respondent/landlord had obtained title over the subject premises and has held that the Respondent/landlord has clearly derived co-ownership in the subject premises and that the Petitioner is a tenant of the Respondent/landlord.

8.1. Further, the contention of the Petitioner/tenant that one Sh. Mohanlal had inducted the father of the Petitioner as tenant in the subject premises was also examined by the learned Trial Court and it was held that once the sale deed in favour of Sh. Mohanlal was cancelled subsequently, Sh. Mohanlal could not have retained any right over the subject premises. 8.[2] A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the judgment of M.R. Sahni v. Dorris Randhawa[1], which was also referred to and relied upon in the judgment of Hari Gopal Manu v. B.S. Ojha[2], has held that a tenant continues to remain a tenant unless there is change in status by contract or by operation of law. The relevant extract of the M.R. Sahni case is reproduced below: “12. What are the consequences of a suit for ejectment suffering a dismissal in default? Does the tenant become a tenant in perpetuity? Does he become the owner of the tenanted premises? Does the landlord loose the right to regain possession for all times to come?

13. Ex facie, once a tenant always remains a tenant unless the status changes by contract or by operation of law.”

9. The Petitioner/tenant, in the first instance, has submitted that the Respondent/landlord is not the owner of the subject premises. Thereafter, it

2016 SCC OnLine Del 985 has been contended that the Petitioner is not the tenant. However, clearly from an examination of the paragraph 2 of the leave to defend/contest Application, the Petitioner/tenant has admitted to being a tenant. The relevant extract of the leave to defend/contest application is reproduced below: “2. That the father of the respondent is/was under the tenancy of Late Mohan Lal Khandelwal. That the Late Mohan Lal Khandelwal was the landlord/owner of the suit property in question. The rent receipt filed by the petitioner in the present petition as admitted.”

9.1. The provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872/Section 122 of The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 provides for an estoppel on a tenant to challenge the ownership of a landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is reproduced below:

9.[2] The Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones,[3] has held that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if such tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord, it will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and hence the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature.

The relevant extract of the Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra case is reproduced below: “13. The underlying policy of Section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.

14. The principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppel is attracted.

15. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time.” 9.[3] It is also settled law that the Petitioner/tenant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate with his contentions. The subject matter of examination before this Court is the grounds taken by the Petitioner/tenant in his Application for leave to defend/contest. Those, as stated above, have already been examined by the learned Trial Court and the Respondent/landlord has been found entitled to an eviction order.

10. It is also settled law that a title dispute cannot be adjudicated by this Court in rent revision petition. The Supreme Court in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das[4], has held that the question of title to a premises is not germane to the decision of the eviction suit. “11.1. First, in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (landlord) against the defendant (tenant) under the State Rent Act, the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties. In other words, in a tenancy suit, only two persons are necessary parties for the decision of the suit, namely, the landlord and the tenant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

11.3. Third, the question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The reason being, if the landlord fails to prove his title to the suit premises but proves the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises and further proves existence of any ground on which the eviction is sought under the Tenancy Act, the eviction suit succeeds. Conversely, if the landlord proves his title to the suit premises but fails to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises, the eviction suit fails. (See Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal, (1995) 6 SCC 580].)

11.4. Fourth, the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. (See Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee [Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee, (2005) 8 SCC 140].)

11.6. Sixth, if there are co-owners or co-landlords of the suit premises then any co-owner or co-landlord can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. In other words, it is not necessary that all the owners/landlords should join in filing the eviction suit against the tenant. (See Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan [Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan, (2016) 3 SCC 296: (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 331].)

13. In our considered opinion, Respondent 1, who claims to be the co-sharer or/and co-owner with the plaintiff-appellants herein of the suit property is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the eviction suit of the appellants against Respondents 2 to 5. In other words, such eviction suit can be decreed or dismissed on merits even without the impleadment of Respondent 1.” 10.[1] In addition, the Supreme Court in the case of Tribhuvanshankar vs Amrutlal[5] has held that in case where a landlord initiates eviction proceedings against the tenant based on landlord-tenant relationship the scope of the proceedings are very limited and the question of title cannot be adjudicated. It was further observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord’s title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant’s contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant’s denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case. The relevant extract is set out below:

incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship between the litigating parties.

29. In the said case the learned Judges referred to the authority in LIC v. India Automobiles & Co. [(1990) 4 SCC 286] wherein the Court had observed that: (Ranbir Singh case [(1995) 6 SCC 580], SCC pp. 585-86, para 9) “9. … in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant's contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case.”

11. The bona fide need as set out by the Respondent/landlord in the Eviction Petition is for her own residence. On this aspect learned Trial Court has held that the Respondent/landlord being the co-owner of the subject premises cannot be stopped from using the subject premises just because the subject premises is in possession of the tenant. The Petitioner/tenant was not able to controvert the bona fide need of the Respondent/landlord before this Court.

12. So far as concerns the availability of alternate suitable accommodation with the Respondent/landlord it has been held by the learned Trial Court that the Petitioner/tenant had only made a reference that there is alternate suitable accommodation available with the Respondent/landlord, however, no details as such have been provided by the Petitioner/tenant.

12.1. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram[6], has held that for a tenant to seek leave to defend on the ground that the alternate suitable accommodation is available with the landlord then the onus is on the tenant to provide specific particulars. The burden on the tenant falls between mere vague allegations and conclusive documentary proof, and its extent depends on the facts of each case. The relevant extract of the Lalta Prasad Gupta case is reproduced below: “18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement having alternate premises, having not used the same and instead having commercially exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of the pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and, (e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved. I say that it is essential to place such material before the Rent Controller because the purpose of trial, resulting from grant of leave to defend, is to prove the said pleas and if the tenant has nothing from which he can possibly prove the said pleas, the trial also will not result in the landlord being “disentitled from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of premises on the ground specified in Clause (e) of proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 14” of the Act, within the meaning of Section 25B(5) supra. This is not to say that the tenant should file fool proof documentary evidence at the stage of leave to defend. However there must be placed on record all the requisite particulars. The onus on the tenant, at the stage of seeking leave to defend, is thus somewhere in between fool proof documentary evidence and a totally vague, bereft of any particulars plea. Where, in between the said onus lies, depends on facts of each case.”

13. The jurisdiction of this Court is only revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua[7] while interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages of Appeal that were earlier provided in the Act has held that this is a conscious omission. It was held that the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an error apparent on the face of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. This has been elucidated at length by Supreme Court in Abid- Ul-Islam case in the following manner: “Scope of revision

22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. 25…It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]

14. The learned Trial Court has examined the contentions as raised by the Petitioner/tenant and has found that no triable issue has been raised. The examination by this Court does not show anything to the contrary. As stated above, the revisionary jurisdiction of this Court is limited and circumspect. All that the Court is required to examine, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam case, is whether there is absence of adjudication for interference by this Court or any error apparent on the face of the record. This Court finds that no ground for interference has been made out by the Petitioner/tenant.

15. In view of the discussions above, this Court finds no merit in the present Petition. The Petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending Application also stand closed.