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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 1919/2013
SEPOY BHIM SINGH RAWAT Petitioner
Through Mr. K. Ramesh, Advocate
W.P.(C) 1919/2013
SEPOY BHIM SINGH RAWAT Petitioner
Through Mr. K. Ramesh, Advocate
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIAANDORS Respondent
Through Mr. Ankur Chibber, Adv.
Through Mr. Ankur Chibber, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
22.03.2013 The petitioner is aggrieved by a part of the order of the Armed Forces
Tribunal which had set aside the court martial proceedings on the ground that the mandatory cautionary certificate under Army Rule 115(2) did not inspire confidence as to its authenticity and consequently, quashed the penalty of dismissal. The petitioner had been charged as a deserter; apparently his service record indicated seven red ink entries. The Tribunal, however, instead of directing reinstatement of the petitioner with full consequential benefits, confined the relief to a direction to treat the petitioner as in service till he attains the minimum pensionable service to enable his entitlement to pension and other benefits in accordance with the rules.
Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that having held and declared that the summary c.ourt martial proceedings were vitiated and illegal, and also having relied upon the decisions of this Court, the Tribunal
2013:DHC:7183-DB should not have restricted the relief. Learned counsel also sought to rely upon ccrtain otherprecedents where more serious offences had been alleged and upon setting aside of the courtmartial proceedings, the personnel were directed to be given reinstatement with all consequential benefits. This
Court has considered the submissions and tlie material on record. The impugned order pertinently in paragraph 6 lists out in tabular form the prior misdemeanour which earned red inlc entries to the petitioner; they were not less than 7 in numbers.
Over and above this, the petitioner was charged with as a deserter and ultimately directed to be dismissed from service. It is a fact that the Tribunal quashed the dismissal; however, its reasoning and discussion leaves in no manner of doubt that the dismissal and court martial proceedings were quashed on a narrow ground ofnon-compliance with Army Rule 115(2).
Having regard to the over all conspectus of the fact that the petitioner was not in employment for more than 15 years and also apparently having regard to the background of his admitted record the
Tribunal deemed it appropriate to confine the relief
This Court is of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted as leading to a unreasonable or inequitable results. Concededly, the petitioner could not have been reinstated as he attained the age of superannuation/attained the end ofhis tenure of service.
In these circumstances the Tribunal, instead of relegating him to facc trauma of a fresh enquiiy or trial directed that his service be reckoned in such a manner that he be restored to such service as would entitle him to minimum pension. This, in turn, meant that the petitioner's service would be deemed to have been for a period of 15 years. There is no infirmity or illegality in approach ofthe Tribunal as to warrant interference under Article
226 of the Constitution. Consequently,the petition is dismissed.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J MARCH 22,2013 SUDERSHAN KUMAR MS^RA, J
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
22.03.2013 The petitioner is aggrieved by a part of the order of the Armed Forces
Tribunal which had set aside the court martial proceedings on the ground that the mandatory cautionary certificate under Army Rule 115(2) did not inspire confidence as to its authenticity and consequently, quashed the penalty of dismissal. The petitioner had been charged as a deserter; apparently his service record indicated seven red ink entries. The Tribunal, however, instead of directing reinstatement of the petitioner with full consequential benefits, confined the relief to a direction to treat the petitioner as in service till he attains the minimum pensionable service to enable his entitlement to pension and other benefits in accordance with the rules.
Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that having held and declared that the summary c.ourt martial proceedings were vitiated and illegal, and also having relied upon the decisions of this Court, the Tribunal
2013:DHC:7183-DB should not have restricted the relief. Learned counsel also sought to rely upon ccrtain otherprecedents where more serious offences had been alleged and upon setting aside of the courtmartial proceedings, the personnel were directed to be given reinstatement with all consequential benefits. This
Court has considered the submissions and tlie material on record. The impugned order pertinently in paragraph 6 lists out in tabular form the prior misdemeanour which earned red inlc entries to the petitioner; they were not less than 7 in numbers.
Over and above this, the petitioner was charged with as a deserter and ultimately directed to be dismissed from service. It is a fact that the Tribunal quashed the dismissal; however, its reasoning and discussion leaves in no manner of doubt that the dismissal and court martial proceedings were quashed on a narrow ground ofnon-compliance with Army Rule 115(2).
Having regard to the over all conspectus of the fact that the petitioner was not in employment for more than 15 years and also apparently having regard to the background of his admitted record the
Tribunal deemed it appropriate to confine the relief
This Court is of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted as leading to a unreasonable or inequitable results. Concededly, the petitioner could not have been reinstated as he attained the age of superannuation/attained the end ofhis tenure of service.
In these circumstances the Tribunal, instead of relegating him to facc trauma of a fresh enquiiy or trial directed that his service be reckoned in such a manner that he be restored to such service as would entitle him to minimum pension. This, in turn, meant that the petitioner's service would be deemed to have been for a period of 15 years. There is no infirmity or illegality in approach ofthe Tribunal as to warrant interference under Article
226 of the Constitution. Consequently,the petition is dismissed.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J MARCH 22,2013 SUDERSHAN KUMAR MS^RA, J
JUDGMENT