Sunil Bailwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Another

6.4. He states that Respondent no. 2 had approached the local police on 13.10.2020 at Tehri, Garhwal, Uttarakhand for securing her goods and articles from her matrimonial home in the almirah; however, at that time she did not make any complaint of harassment or dowry demand to the police at Tehri, Garhwal, Uttarakhand. He states that there is a delay of 3 years and 5 months in registration of the FIR which raises a suspicion on the veracity of the allegations made by Respondent no. 2. Submissions of the Respondent No. 2/Complainant

7. Mr. Pandey, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 states that on 13.10.2020 she had called her brother to take her away from the matrimonial house and she had reported that she was leaving to the local police so that no untoward incident happens to her. She states that, however, on the said date she did not take away her jewelry or stridhan. She states that she chose to leave the matrimonial home due to the cruelty met out to her by the Petitioners. 7.[1] She states that the money from the joint account held with the Petitioner/husband was withdrawn on the instructions of the father-in-law and handed over for household expenses. 7.[2] She states that Petitioner/husband has failed to pay maintenance awarded by the Mahila Court. Submissions of the Respondent No.1/ State

8. Learned ASC states that during the pendency of this petition the charge-sheet has since been filed and the Petitioners can raise the contention with respect to lack of territorial jurisdiction before the Trial Court as well. He states that all these pleas will be available before the Trial Court which can examine the pleas in the context of the evidence placed on record with the chargesheet. He states that during investigation Respondent No. 2 has provided bills of jewelry worth Rs. 6.[3] lakhs approximately and she has also furnished medical documents to prove that she is receiving treatment for depression due to her married life. Findings

9. This Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10. In the Court’s considered opinion, the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner(s) cannot be considered at the present stage. Based on the investigation, the prosecution has already filed a chargesheet. All the contentions that are now being raised before this Court can also be raised before the learned Trial Court at the stage of framing of charges. A perusal of the FIR shows that the basic facts which are necessary for making out the offences have been pleaded. The factual foundation for the offence has been made out in the FIR with respect to monetary demands prior to the wedding including urging the bride’s family to bear the entire expense of the wedding functions followed by the alleged cruelty met out to Respondent no. 2 in her matrimonial home by her in-laws. Whether these abovementioned allegations relating to dowry made by Respondent No.2/wife are true or have been maliciously made, is a matter of fact which will need appreciation of evidence adduced in this regard. In this regard, averments at paragraph nos. 4, 7 and 11 of the translated copy of the FIR are relevant.

11. In addition, pursuant to the registration of FIR No. 514/2022 and petition under Section 125 CrPC filed by Respondent No.2, Respondent No.2 has claimed, in her written statement filed before this Court, that the Petitioner(s) have filed the present writ petition only to harass her and the Petitioner/husband is also not duly paying the maintenance awarded by the learned MM, which is again a matter a fact required to be examined.

12. In this regard it would be relevant to refer to the observations made in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (supra) wherein the Supreme Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observation is a sound reminder which reads as under:

13. The Petitioners have denied the allegations levelled by the complainant in the FIR. It is a well settled law that disputed questions of fact cannot be adjudicated while exercising writ jurisdiction. This Court cannot adjudicate these disputed facts on the bare pleading of the parties and the Trial Court would be better suited to adjudicate the rival contentions on the basis of the material placed before it. In this regard it would be apposite to refer to the observation made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Avneesh Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi[3] which reads as under:

facts is not to be entertained. The moment there is a debatable area in the case, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot adjudicate the matter where the foundational facts are disputed. Rival contentions of the parties cannot be decided in a writ proceeding as held in Himmat Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 256; Mukesh Kumar Aeearwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 693; Bhagavat Singh and etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1998 Cr. LJ 3513. This Court is not required to embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the petition which are controverted by the respondents are correct or not. It cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint which culminated in registration of FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie set out any offence or make out a case against the accused. The investigation is still at threshold and petitioner no. 1 has not even joined the investigation. Under the circumstances, it is not a case where the Court should exercise its discretion by quashing the FIR.” (‘Emphasis Supplied’)

14. As far as the lack of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it has been alleged by the Petitioner that Respondent No. 2 rarely stayed with the Petitioner during the subsistence of their marriage, and she mostly stayed at her parental house in Delhi. The Petitioner states that no cause of action has arisen in Delhi, rather the incidents had occurred in the matrimonial home at Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand and thus, no part of the alleged offences in FIR No. 514/2022 were committed in Delhi and therefore it is contended that, Respondent No. 1 has no jurisdiction to entertain the FIR No. 514/2022. However, the complainant in the FIR has specifically pleaded that demands for dowry were raised with her family at Delhi and were complied with. All these rival allegations need to be considered by the learned Trial Court after hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[4] has held that the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or being driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband would also have the requisite jurisdiction for trying the offence under Section 498A IPC. The relevant portions of the same are extracted as under: “15……The provisions contained in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental home though on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at the parental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at the parental home.

16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. (‘Emphasis Supplied’) Thus, if in the facts of this case, the Trial Court is satisfied that the complainant was subjected to cruelty by her in-laws in her matrimonial home which led her return to Delhi, the Courts at Delhi would have requisite jurisdiction to try the offence.

15. This Court at this juncture cannot undertake a detailed examination of each and every piece of material produced before it in a summary manner to ascertain as to whether or not the Petitioners are guilty of the charges or not. The Petitioners will have sufficient opportunity to place their entire case before the learned Trial Court at the time of framing of charges given that the charge-sheet has already been filed before the Trial Court.

16. As narrated above, under these facts and circumstances, it is not a case where the Court should exercise its discretion by quashing the FIR. Accordingly, there are no merits in the present petitions and the same are dismissed.

17. Pending applications (if any) are disposed of as infructuous.

18. It is made clear that any observation made in the present order is for deciding the present petition and shall not, in any manner, influence the learned Trial Court during adjudication of the further proceedings emanating from the FIR No. 514/2022 registered at P.S. Lajpat Nagar, Delhi including while hearing arguments on framing of charge.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J JANUARY 14, 2025/mt/AM/MS