Full Text
JUDGMENT
(Arising out of I.D. No.725/91 decided by the Labour Court on
07.10.1999)
MAHESH CHAND ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Advocate.
Through: Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Sanjay K. Shandilya, Advocate.
(Arising out of I.D. No.726/91 decided by the Labour Court on
SRI NIWAS ..... Petitioner
2013:DHC:2997
(Arising out of I.D. No.727/91 decided by the Labour Court on
RAMESH CHAND ..... Petitioner
Advocate.
1. This batch of writ petitions has been preferred to assail the awards passed by the Labour Court in respect of each of the petitioners, the details whereof have been mentioned hereinabove. By the impugned awards, the references made in respect of each of the workmen-with regard to termination of their services, have been answered against the petitioner workmen. The basis of the impugned awards is that the services of the petitioners, who were admittedly on probation, have been terminated in terms of the appointment condition; during the period of probation, and; that their discharge simplicitor is not stigmatic, or by way of punishment. It has been held that the termination of the services of the petitioners does not tantamount to retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act), since it is covered by clause (bb) of the said provision.
2. The petitioners placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Delhi Cantonment Board Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Others, 2006 (88) DRJ 75 (D.B.) in support of their plea that even a probationer is a “workman” and upon termination of the services of the probationer, Section 25-F of the Act has necessarily to be complied with, else the termination would be void ab initio.
3. When the petitions were taken up for hearing before this Court on 10.05.2013, this Court brought to the notice of the parties the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Sharp India Ltd. Vs. Labour Court No.1 Gwalior & Anr., (2002) 9 SCC 655, Escorts Limited Vs. Presiding Officer & Anr., (1997) 11 SCC 521, M. Venugopal Vs. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and Anr., (1994) 2 SCC 323, and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Management of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. Surya Prakash, (2011)
III LLJ 335 (Delhi), which had not been taken note of by the Court in the decision in Delhi Cantonment Board (supra). The matters were adjourned for 16.05.2013 to enable the parties to examine the issue further – when further arguments were heard and judgments reserved.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh & Others, (1990) 3 SCC 682 to submit that the termination of a probationer is covered by the definition of retrenchment. The Supreme Court was dealing with cases wherein the respondent workmen, who were on probation, were sought to be terminated on account of unsatisfactory service. The terminations were innocuous and not stigmatic. The Labour Court took the view that even in the case of probationers the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act were necessarily required to be complied with and, on account of noncompliance of the said provision, relief was granted to the workmen. The appeals of the management were dismissed. Mr. Aggarwal, therefore, submits that Punjab Land Development (supra) is an authority for the proposition that the termination of the services of a probationer during the period of probation also tantamounts to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act.
5. Mr. Aggarwal submits that this Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court has not been considered in later decisions of the Supreme Court – either in Kalyani Sharp India Ltd. (supra), or in Escorts Limited (supra), or in M. Venugopal (supra), or even in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Management of Apparel Export Promotion Council (supra).
6. Mr. Aggarwal submits that the expression „workman‟ is defined in Section 2(s) of the Act to mean any person, including an apprentice employed in any industry to do manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work. He submits that the intention of the Parliament could not have been to exclude a probationer -when even an apprentice, i.e., a trainee is included within the meaning of that term to accord the benefits and protections provided under the Act. He submits that the purpose of Section 25-F is merely to grant immediate succor to the workman whose services were retrenched. The right of the employer to terminate the services of the probationer by an innocuous termination order is preserved. However, he must comply with the provisions of Section 25-F as well while terminating the services of the probationer.
7. Mr. Aggarwal submits that clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) can be invoked only when the work is of temporary nature, i.e., where the workman is employed in a project or scheme of temporary nature. In this regard, he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.M. Nilajkar Vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27. Mr. Aggarwal submits that in case of a probationer there is no deemed confirmation. This means that an employer may continue to extend the probation from time to time for any length of time so as to avoid vesting rights in the employee, and if the interpretation advanced by the respondent were to be accepted, it would mean that services of the workman could be terminated even after a lengthy service - without any compensation to him.
8. Mr. Aggarwal submits that such conduct of the employee would tantamount to an unfair labour practice as defined in Section 2 (ra) of the Act read with entry at
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Sl. Petitioner‟s I.D. No. W.P.(C.) Date of Date of Date of │ │ No. Name No. appointment appointment termination │ │ (casual (Room │ │ Houseman) Attendant on │ │ probation) │ ├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 1. Mahesh 725/1991 5311/2000 01.03.1988 01.09.1988 22.07.1989 │ │ Chand │ │ 2. Sri Niwas 726/1991 5312/2000 08.02.1988 01.09.1988 22.07.1989 │ │ 3. Ramesh 727/1991 5345/2000 04.01.1988 01.09.1988 23.07.1989 │ │ Chand │ │ 46. The last pay drawn by each of the petitioners was Rs.750/- per month. │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
71. Analysing the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo) we find that termination by the employer of the service of a workman would not otherwise have covered the cases excluded in (a) and (b), namely, voluntary retirement and retirement on reaching the stipulated age of retirement. There would be no volitional element of the employer. Their express exclusion implies that those would otherwise have been included. Again if those cases were to be included, termination on abandonment of service, or on efflux of time, and on failure to qualify, although only consequential or resultant, would be included as those have not been excluded. Thus, there appears to be a gap between the first part and the exclusion part. Mr Venugopal, on this basis, points out that cases of voluntary retirement, superannuation and tenure appointment are not cases of termination ‘by the employer’ and would, therefore, in any event, be outside the scope of the main provisions and are not really provisos.” (emphasis supplied)
21. Punjab Land Development (supra) is an authority for the proposition that it is the ratio decidendi of the judgment rendered by a superior court which is binding. Reference was made to F.A. & A.B. Ltd. v. Lupton (Inspector of Taxes), 1972 AC 634: (1971) 3 All ER 948, wherein the House of Lords observed: “...what constitutes binding precedent is the ratio decidendi of a case, and this is almost always to be ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of the case—that is, generally, those facts which the tribunal whose decision is in question itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be material.”
22. Reference was also made to Osborne v. Rowlatt, (1880) 13 Ch D 774, wherein Sir George Jessel remarked that the only thing in a Judge‟s decision is binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge, is the principle upon which the case was decided. The Supreme Court also referred to Quinn v. Leatham, 1901 AC 495, wherein at page 506, Lord Halsbury observed: “...every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.”
23. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, it cannot be said that the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development (supra) is that the termination simplicitor of the services of a probationer, during the period of probation, even after the introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of the Act, tantamounts to retrenchment.
24. Mr. Aggarwal has placed great emphasis on the fact that the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the aforesaid three civil appeals i.e. C.A. No.686 (NL) of 1982, C.A. No.1817/1982 and C.A. No.1898/1982, the respondents wherein were probationers. The said dismissal of the civil appeals has to be viewed in the light of the definition of the expression „retrenchment‟ examined by the Supreme Court, which did not contain clause (bb) at the relevant time. The gist of the interpretation advanced by the Constitution Bench to section 2(oo) was that it covers termination of all kinds – whether volitional on the part of the employer, or not, except those which are: by way of punishment as a disciplinary measure; on account of voluntary retirement; on account of retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation in terms of a stipulation contained in the contract between the employer and the workman, and; termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.
25. The Supreme Court was not seized of, and did not consider the effect of introduction of clause (bb) in section 2(oo) – the result whereof was the narrowing of the scope of the expression “retrenchment” in the first part of the definition, to the extent that clause (bb) carved it out from the first part.
26. Mr. Aggarwal has sought to place heavy reliance on para 77 of the judgment in Punjab Land Development (supra), which reads as follows: “77. The last submission is that if retrenchment is understood in its wider sense what would happen to the rights of the employer under the Standing Orders and under the contracts of employment in respect of the workman whose service has been terminated. There may be two answers to this question. Firstly, those rights may have been affected by introduction of Sections 2(oo), 25-F and the other relevant sections. Secondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affected or taken away, but only an additional social obligation has been imposed on the employer so as to give the retrenchment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty. Looked at from this angle, there is implicit a social policy. As the maxim goes —Stat pro ratione voluntas populi; the will of the people stands in place of a reason.”
27. He submits that the right of the employer to resort to retrenchment is not taken away by treating the termination of the services of a probationer as retrenchment. All that the law requires is that the workman should be compensated for immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty that he would face on account of his being retrenched. Mr. Aggarwal submits that this is the social obligation the law imposes upon the employer.
28. I do not find merit in this submission, because to apply section 25-F in a given case of termination of service of the workman- it has, first, to be established that the said termination tantamounts to retrenchment as defined in the Act. If it does not tantamount to retrenchment, obviously, section 25F would have no application, and there is no obligation on the employer to comply with the mandatory requirements thereof.
29. The Constitution Bench in para 82 came to the conclusion that: “82. Applying the above reasonings, principles and precedents, to the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act, we hold that “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section.”
30. At the cost of repetition, I may observe that the Constitution Bench was not called upon to examine the issue whether the termination of the services of a probationer, in terms of a stipulation contained in the contract of employment, tantamounts to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act in the face of clause (bb) thereof. The decision in Punjab Land Development (supra), therefore, does not advance the petitioners case in any away. The said issue, namely, whether the termination of the services of a probationer amounts to retrenchment, or not, in the light of the definition of the expression “retrenchment” as is now contained in the Act, has squarely been considered and answered in Kalyani Sharp (supra), Escorts Ltd. (supra), M. Venugopal (supra) and Management of Apparel Export Promotion Council (supra).
31. In M. Venugopal (supra) the services of the petitioner were terminated, while he was on extended probation, on account of nonfulfillment of the condition of achieving minimum business target stipulated in the order of appointment. Termination was effected under the stipulation contained in the appointment letter, read with Regulation 14(4) of the L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 – which provides for discharge during probation. Vide amendment introduced in Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (LIC Act), the provisions of the Act were excluded from application in so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2) (cc) of the LIC Act. The result thereof was that termination of the services of the workman was not deemed to be “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act even in respect of the period prior to introduction of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo). The Supreme Court held that in termination – even if the provisions of the Act were applicable in the case of the appellant workman, was not “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo), having been covered by the exception contained in clause (bb). The non-compliance of the requirements of Section 25-F was held not to vitiate or nullify the order of termination of appellant workman.
32. Escorts Limited (supra) was a case of temporary appointment for a specified period of two months. The terms of appointment enabled the employer to terminate the services at any stage without assigning any reason. The Supreme Court held that in such circumstances, the termination of services under the said terms – even though effected before the expiry of the specified period, did not amount to retrenchment. Consequently, Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act did not come into play. The Supreme Court in this decision observed as follows: “4. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the workman had worked for 240 days in a year and whether Sundays and other holidays should be counted, as has been done by the Labour Court, because, in our opinion, Shri Shetye is entitled to succeed on the other ground urged by him that the termination of services of the workman does not constitute retrenchment in view of clause (bb) in Section 2(oo) of the Act. Clause (bb) excludes from the ambit of the expression “retrenchment” as defined in the main part of Section 2(oo) “termination of the services of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein”. The said provision has been considered by this Court in M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC [(1994) 2 SCC 323: 1994 SCC (L&S) 664: (1994) 27 ATC 84]. The appellant in that case had been appointed on probation for a period of one year from 23-5- 1984 to 22-5-1985 and the said period of probation was extended for further period of one year from 23-5-1985 to 22-5-
1986. Before the expiry of the said period of probation, his services were terminated on 9-5-1986. It was held that since the termination was in accordance with the terms of the contract though before the expiry of the period of probation it fell within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and did not constitute retrenchment. Here also the services of the workman were terminated on 13-2-1987, as per the terms of the contract of employment contained in the appointment letter dated 9-1-1987 which enabled the appellant to terminate the services of the workman at any stage without assigning any reason. Since the services of the workman were terminated as per the terms of the contract of employment, it does not amount to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act and the Labour Court was in error in holding that it constituted retrenchment and was protected by Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.”
33. Kalyani Sharp (supra) was a case where the respondent workman was appointed as a Trainee Service Technician. He had to undergo training to the satisfaction of the appellant management and if his work was not found satisfactory during that period, the facility could be withdrawn at any time. He was to be regularized only on completion of his training, i.e, he was placed on probation. The services of the respondent workman were terminated before the expiry of the probationary period. The Labour Court as well as the High Court were of the view that Section 25-F was attracted as the termination amounted to retrenchment. The Supreme Court reversed the views of the Labour Court and the High Court. The Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “6. The order of employment itself clearly sets out the terms thereafter which makes it clear that the facility of providing training to him could be put to an end at any time without assigning any reason whatsoever and his services could be regularised only on satisfactory completion of his training. If these clauses are read together, it is clear he was under probation during the relevant time and if his services are not satisfactory, the same could be put an end to. It is clear that the respondent had been appointed as a Trainee Service Technician and for a period he had to undergo the training to the satisfaction of the appellant and if his work was not satisfactory during that period the facility could be withdrawn at any time and he would be regularised only on completion of his training. Thus the respondent's services were terminated before expiry of the probationary period. In such a case, question of issue of notice before terminating the service as claimed by the respondent does not arise. Escorts case [(1997) 11 SCC 521: 1998 SCC (L&S) 235] is identical with the present case. Following the said decision and for the reasons stated therein these appeals are allowed. The order made by the High Court affirming the award made by the Labour Court is set aside and the claim made by the respondent is dismissed.”
34. From the above, it would be observed that the Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that the termination of the services of a probationer in terms of a stipulation contained in the contract of employment does not tantamount to “retrenchment” within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Act, as it is covered by clause (bb) of section 2(oo).
35. Since the judgment in Punjab Land Development (supra) is not an authority for the proposition decided in Kalyani Sharp India Ltd (supra), Escorts Limited (supra), M. Venugopal (supra), Management of Apparel Export Promotion Council (supra), the ratio of the judgment in Punjab Land Development (supra) does not render the subsequent decisions referred to above, per incuriam. It has already been noticed, Delhi Cantonment Board (supra) does not even refer to the judgments Kalyani Sharp India Ltd (supra), Escorts Limited (supra), M. Venugopal (supra), Management of Apparel Export Promotion Council (supra). I, therefore, prefer to follow the view taken in Kalyani Sharp India Ltd (supra) etc. over the view of the Division Bench in Delhi Cantonment Board (supra).
36. The submission of Mr. Aggarwal that since an apprentice is included in the definition of the expression “workman”, as defined in section 2(s) of the Act, the intention of the Parliament could not have been to exclude a probationer – has no merit.
37. What is of relevance is the stipulation for termination contained in the contract of employment and not the capacity in which the workman is employed, i.e., whether as a trainee, apprentice, on casual basis or against a temporary or permanent post. Even an apprentice could be appointed on probation. The expression “apprentice” has not been defined in the Act. However, the said expression is defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to mean “a learner of a craft, bound to serve, and entitled to instruction from, his or her employer for a specified term”. It is also defined to mean “a beginner, a novice”. Apprenticeship is defined to mean “the position of an apprentice; service as an apprentice; initiatory training” and “the period for which an apprentice is bound”. Therefore, it is the objective of employment, i.e., the employment of a learner of a craft or skill which distinguishes an “apprentice” from other workmen. If the appointment of apprentice is for a fixed term under the contract of employment, even that may fall under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and termination of the services of an apprentice – like that of any other workman working on a fixed term contract, would not amount to retrenchment.
38. I may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mukesh K. Tripathi Vs. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Others, 2004 (8) SCC 387, wherein the Supreme Court held that: “27. The expression “apprentice” has been included in the definition of “workman” contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but by reason of a subsequent parliamentary legislation, namely, the Apprentices Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act), the term “apprentice” has been defined in Section 2(aa) to mean “a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship”. Section 18 of the 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as otherwise provided in the Act. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 18 of the 1961 Act read thus:
28. The term “employee” under various labour laws has been defined by different expressions but Section 18 of the 1961 Act carves out an exception to the applicability of labour laws in the event the person concerned is an apprentice as contradistinguished from the expressions “worker”, “employee” and “workman”, used in different statutes.
29. “Apprentice” under the general law means a person who is bound by a legal agreement to serve an employer for an agreed period and the employer is bound to instruct him. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16, it is stated:
30. “Apprentice”, as noticed hereinbefore, is defined to mean a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training pursuant to a contract of apprenticeship. How a contract of apprenticeship would be entered into is to be found in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 1961 Act. The embargoes placed in this regard are: (i) entering into a contract of apprenticeship with a minor in which event the contract must be executed by his guardian; and (ii) on such terms or conditions which shall not be inconsistent with any provision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder.
31. Furthermore, the apprentice must satisfy the statutory requirements as regards qualification to be appointed as an apprentice.
32. Training of apprenticeship by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 4 shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which the contract of apprenticeship has been entered into under sub-section (1) thereof. x x x x x x x x x x
34. The definition of “workman” as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 includes an apprentice, but a “workman” defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must conform to the requirements laid down therein meaning thereby, inter alia, that he must be working in one or the other capacities mentioned therein and not otherwise.”
39. Therefore, it is not that every apprentice enjoys the protection granted to a workman under the Act. The submission of Mr. Aggarwal that clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) can be invoked only when the work is of a temporary nature, i.e., where the workman is employed in a project or a scheme of temporary nature – also has no merit. He has placed reliance on paragraph 13 of the judgment in S.M. Nilajkar (supra) in support of this submission which reads as follows: “13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project;
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment.”
40. A perusal of the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court shows that the Supreme Court was specifically commenting on the aspect of termination of the service of a workman who is engaged in a scheme or a project. The Supreme Court observed that even such termination may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo), unless the conditions mentioned in the aforesaid paragraph are satisfied. S.M. Nilajkar (supra) is certainly not an authority to the proposition that only where the project or scheme is of a temporary duration, sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) could be invoked.
41. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that where the employer resorts to repeated extension of the probation period only with a view to exploit the workman, it may tantamount to an unfair labour practice. However, that is a matter to be examined in the facts of each case and that exercise shall be undertaken a little later. But mere extension of the probationary period would not raise a presumption against the employer – that the employer has resorted to an unfair labour practice. The decision in Head Master, Lawrence School Lovedale Vs. Jayanthi Raghu & Another, (supra) does not support the case of the petitioners in any way.
42. Reliance placed on Section 25-J of the Act, in my view, is of no avail. Section 25-J opens with the words “The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law [including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 (20 of 1946)]”. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter V-A have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. The section does not say that the provisions of Chapter V-A will have overriding effect even in respect of the other provisions contained in the Act. Consequently, Section 2(oo) is applicable to Chapter V-A which contains Section 25-F as well.
43. Section 25-F specifically deals with the aspect of retrenchment of the workman by the employer in certain circumstances. The expression “retrenchment” used in Section 25-F, obviously, carries the meaning given to that expression in Section 2(oo). That being the position, a termination which does not tantamount to “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo), would not attract Section 25-F of the Act.
44. The decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Presiding Officer, CGIT & Another (supra) too has no application in the facts of the present case. That was a case dealing with appointment on temporary basis under the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The services of the workman were terminated by resort to Rule 5 of the said rules. This Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Management of MCD Vs. Prem Chand Gupta, AIR 2000 SC 454, held that Section 25-F is attracted even while terminating employment of a temporary workman in exercise of powers contained under Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules,
1965. There is no discussion in the judgment to indicate that the appointment made under the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 was a fixed term appointment, or that the appointment was made on probation and the termination of the service took place during probation. The present set of cases do not relate to appointment on temporary basis under the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
45. I now proceed to consider the submission of the petitioner that the continuation of the services of the petitioners on probation amounted to an unfair labour practice in the light of the facts of each of these cases. The dates of appointment on casual basis as houseman of each of the petitioners; the dates of appointment as Room Attendant on probation; the dates of termination in respect of each of the petitioners are tabulated hereinbelow: Sl. No. Petitioner‟s Name I.D. No. W.P.(C.) No. Date of appointment (casual Houseman) Date of appointment (Room Attendant on probation) Date of termination
1. Mahesh Chand 725/1991 5311/2000 01.03.1988 01.09.1988 22.07.1989
2. Sri Niwas 726/1991 5312/2000 08.02.1988 01.09.1988 22.07.1989
3. Ramesh Chand 727/1991 5345/2000 04.01.1988 01.09.1988 23.07.1989
46. The last pay drawn by each of the petitioners was Rs.750/- per month. The aforesaid tabulation clearly shows that each of the petitioners was initially appointed as casual Houseman. These appointments were on casual basis. Not long after the said initial appointment on casual basis, the petitioners were appointed as Room Attendants on probation on 01.09.1988. These appointments were made between 6 to less than 8 months of the initial appointment on casual basis. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appointment as Room Attendant on probation was done so as to defeat any right that the petitioners may have got vested with – as causal Houseman. Within less than 11 months of the said appointment on probation, and during continuation of the probation, the services of the petitioners have been terminated. Their terminations have not been claimed by the petitioners to be stigmatic. The letters of appointment clearly state that the petitioners would be treated as under probation until such time the petitioners have been confirmed by a special order confirming them in service, irrespective of the expiry of the period of probation stipulated in the offer of appointment. The period of probation in the letters of appointment of each of the petitioners was stated to be one year. The termination of the petitioners has taken place within the initial period of probation itself. Consequently, there is no basis for the petitioners to claim that the respondent resorted to adoption of an unfair labour practice in the aforesaid factual background.
47. For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in these writ petitions and dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their respective Costs.
JUDGE JULY 01, 2013 BSR