GOVT. OF NCT DELHI v. RAJESH KUMAR BHARDWAJ

(iv) Pass any order(s) as this Hon’ble Tribunal deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case.”

13. The Tribunal, vide order dated 05.04.2016, quashed the charge sheet and the departmental enquiry, holding that the respondent was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and any error in his decision could only be challenged through a statutory appeal, not through disciplinary action. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of mala fide intent or extraneous consideration and considered the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India[1], which held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasijudicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. The concluding paragraphs of the order are reproduced as under:

14. On 22.06.2016, the petitioner no. 2 submitted before the Lt. Governor of Delhi that the administrative department to review the order dated 05.04.2016 passed by the Tribunal and explore the aspect of challenging the said order in consultation with the Law Department of GNCTD (hereinafter “Law Department”). Thereafter on 27.07.2016, the file was sent to the Law Department by the Revenue Department.

15. However, on 09.08.2016, the Law Department opined that there was no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal. Despite this, internal deliberations continued between the petitioner no. 2, Revenue Department, and Law Department regarding the feasibility of an appeal.

16. On 08.08.2017, the Lt. Governor of Delhi directed that an appeal be filed against the order passed by the Tribunal. After further discussions and consultations, the present writ petition was filed on 17.01.2019 before this Court, where the following reliefs are sought: “(a) Quash and set aside the per-se perverse the order dated 05.04.2016 in O.A No. 1307/2015 passed by the Ld. Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, (b) Pass any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case

17. Upon careful consideration of the arguments advanced by both parties and the documents placed on record, it is evident that the primary contention in the present case revolves around the ownership of the additional land measuring 75.224 square meters, revealed following the TSM demarcation. The records and orders annexed by the respondents, including the order no. 145 dated 04.06.2013, contain mere assertions regarding the land being Gram Sabha land without any conclusive proof establishing the same. The relevant portion of the order no. 145 dated 04.06.2013 is reproduced as under: “Now, considering the above applicant and the report of the revenue field staff of Sub-Division (Saket), I, K P Suhag, SDM (Saket) do hereby allow to construct the boundary wall and the applicant intends to include the newly revealed piece of land measuring 75.224 meters in the already existing boundary wall at Khasra No. 40, Village Bhaati, subject to the following conditions:-

4. That if the land is ever acquired by the government, then this permission shall stand null & void.”

18. In the present case, no substantive material was placed before any court that could validate the claim that the additional land was, in fact, Gram Sabha land, and in the absence of such evidence, it will ultimately be a futile exercise to have any proceedings against the respondent.

19. Furthermore, there were ample opportunities for the authorities to initiate proceedings under Section 84 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, which provides a mechanism for the ejectment of persons occupying land without title, but they failed to do any such thing and had the government been confident in its claim, it ought to have followed the due process of law by instituting proceedings under the said provision. The absence of such a crucial step indicates a lack of substantiation in the claim that the additional land belonged to the government.

20. A similar controversy was adjudicated by one of us, [Justice C. Hari Shankar] in Akshay Bipin v. Union of India[2] of this court, where it was held that disciplinary proceedings initiated in the absence of legally sustainable grounds ought to be quashed. It was held in Akshay Bipin that the mere issuance of charges without substantive basis would not justify prolonged proceedings against an officer in the absence of any evidence of corrupt motives. The relevant portion of 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11624 the judgment is reproduced as under:

21. The Division Bench of this court in Union of India v. Akshay Bipin[3] subsequently upheld this decision, thereby reinforcing the principle that disciplinary proceedings cannot be allowed to continue when the foundational allegations themselves are unsubstantiated.

22. Following the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Duli Chand[4] by placing reliance on Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan[5], the court in Duli Chand clarified that the immunity to a quasi-judicial authority is not absolute and must be examined on a case-by-case basis. The relevant portion of Duli Chand is reproduced as under: “5. The law on the subject was considered in, extenso in the three-

Judge Bench decision of Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan ((1993) 2 SCC 56), wherein it was noted that the view that no disciplinary action could be initiated against an officer in respect of judicial or quasi-judicial functions was wrong. It was further said that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial-powers acting negligently or recklessly could be proceeded against byway of disciplinary action. The Court listed six instances when such action could be taken: "28.

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;

(v) if he had acted in, order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great."

6. The Court, however, made it clear that ultimately the matter would, have to depend upon the facts of a particular case. The present case would fall squarely within the fourth instance listed above.”

23. In Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad & Anr.6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a High Court cannot initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer solely based on a complaint, particularly when it does not find the contents of the complaint to be true. The Court held that for a High Court to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there must be strong grounds to suspect the officer's bona fides, and the order itself must be actuated by malice, bias, or illegality. The Supreme Court has consistently disapproved of disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers merely because the judgments or orders passed by them are wrong. It has reiterated that the appellate and revisional courts exist to address such errors, and that the High Court must exercise extra caution before initiating any disciplinary action based on judicial orders.

24. Similarly, in Krishna Prasad Verma (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. State of Bihar and Ors.7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that while a judicial officer passing a wrong order is not immune from action, such action should be administrative in nature and should not result in disciplinary proceedings unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, or gratification of any kind. The Court held that wrong or illegal orders should be recorded in the service record of the judicial officer and taken into account for promotions and career progression. However, unless there is a persistent flow of such orders indicative of gross incompetence or misconduct, compulsory retirement or administrative action is the more appropriate recourse rather than disciplinary proceedings.

25. The principles laid down in the above judgments establish that disciplinary action can only be justified under exceptional circumstances, such as cases where the officer in question acted with mala fide intent, recklessness, or for personal gain.

26. In the present case, it could be understood that the petitioners have nothing to substantiate the allegations, thereby rendering the initiation of proceedings against the respondent unjustified.

27. The extant legal position is that judicial and quasi-judicial officers must be given the freedom to exercise their discretion independently. If every decision made in an official capacity were to be questioned through disciplinary proceedings, it would create a chilling effect on governance, deterring officers from making decisions in good faith for fear of retributive action. In the present case, the respondent exercised his quasi-judicial authority in a manner that was neither arbitrary nor tainted with mala fides.

28. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the well-reasoned decision of Tribunal in O.A. No. 1307/2015. The present writ petition is dismissed.

29. No orders as to costs. AJAY DIGPAUL, J. C.HARI SHANKAR, J. FEBURARY 28, 2025 sk Click here to check corrigendum, if any