Full Text
CRL.A.555/1998
JAGDEEP GUPTA ..... Appellant
Through: Ms.Diya Kapoor, Advocate
Through: Ms.Rajdipa Behura, Advocate for State along with Inspector Ram Niwas, SHO
P.S. Keshav Puram
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P. MITTAL O R D E R 30.08.2013
None is present on behalf of the appellant. Ms.Diya Kapoor, Advocate, who is present in Court, is appointed as an Amicus Curiae in the matter. The matter was passed over once to enable the Amicus Curiae to go through the file.
At the second call, Ms.Diya Kapoor, learned Amicus Curiae submits that during the pendency of this appeal an application
[Crl.M.No.6934/2004] was filed by the appellant to bring on record the birth certificate of the appellant and to show that the appellant was minor on the date of commission of the offence. Counsel further submits that by an order dated 15.3.2005 the said application was allowed and the appellant was permitted to take the ground with regard to appellant being covered under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 being less than 16 years.
Counsel further submits that the original birth certificate placed on record shows the date of birth of the appellant to be 02.11.1980 and in view thereof the appellant would have been 15 years of age on the date of commission of the offence.
2013:DHC:4293-DB Ms.Kapoor, has relied on an order passed by this court in the case of
Akram Vs. State (GNCT of Delhi) [Crl.A.No.1398/2010 decided on
9.7.2013] in support of her submission that in view of the fact that the appellant has been in custody for more than 6 years, he is liable to be released.
We have heard counsel for the parties. Paragraphs 4, 6 to 14 of the
JUDGMENT
“4. Reliance is placed by Mr.Charak on Amit Singh v. State of
Maharashtra and Another, reported at (2011) 13 SCC 744, and
Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported at (2012) 9 SCC 750, in support of his plea that since the appellant has already undergone sentence of more than eight years he is liable to be released forthwith without any decision on the merits in the appeal.
5. xxxxxxxxx
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submissions. We find no force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent for the reason that in the facts of the present case it is not in dispute that the appellant has already undergone more than three years of sentence, which is a maximum sentence, which could have been awarded to the appellant under the Act.
7. Section 20 of the Act contains special provision in respect of cases where the juvenile in conflict with the law was alleged to be involved in commission of any offence before coming into force of the Act. In the instant case, the offence was allegedly committed on 06.08.2004, that is, much after the date of coming into force of the Act on 01.04.2001. Thus, Section 20 has no application. Moreover, Section 20 does not deal with a situation where an appeal is pending before an Appellate Court.
8. As per provision of Section 14 of the Act wherever a juvenile is alleged to have committed an offence an inquiry is to be conducted by the Board and which is to be completed within a period of four months. Section 15 of the Act provides for the orders which may be passed by the Board regarding a juvenile who on inquiry is found to have committed the offence. Section 15 of the Act is extracted hereunder:- CRL.A.555/1998 2/5
9. Thus, as per Section 15(1)(g) of the Act the maximum period for which a juvenile can be sent to a special home for three years. CRL.A.555/1998 3/5
10. Normally, whenever any order is passed by any Court in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law without any jurisdiction it has to be set aside as it is only the Board which can conduct an inquiry under Section 14 and make an order under Section 15 of the Act. The question for consideration is whether the impugned order should be set aside and the case should be remanded back to the Board for its inquiry in terms of Section 14 or the Appellant should be released forthwith.
11. Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) is an answer to the question raised. In concluding para of the report, the Supreme Court set aside the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court and directed the High Court to place the record before the Juvenile Justice Board for awarding appropriate sentence in accordance with the provisions of the Act with a rider that if the Appellant had already undergone the maximum sentence of three years prescribed under the Act, he has to be set free. In the instant case admittedly the Appellant is in custody for a period of over eight years.
12. Similarly, in Amit Singh (supra) again the Supreme Court ordered the Petitioner (juvenile in conflict with law) to be set at liberty as he had already undergone a sentence of twelve years although the maximum period for which a juvenile could be detained in a special home under Section 15 was only three years. Para 21 and 22 of the report are extracted hereunder:-
13. The remand of the case for an inquiry by a Juvenile Justice Board is not going to serve any purpose in a case where a juvenile in conflict with law has already served the detention of over three CRL.A.555/1998 4/5 years as according to Section 19 of the Act, a juvenile shall not suffer any disqualification on account of any conviction in pursuance of an inquiry under the Act.
14. Learned counsel for the State urges that the decision in Amit Singh (supra) was rendered in a writ petition. Our attention is also drawn to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Satish @ Dhanna v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2009) 14 SCC 187 wherein the accused who was a juvenile was released because the order of conviction was not disputed. The eventuality where an order of conviction is disputed did not come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Satish (supra) which was considered in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) and Amit Singh (supra).” In view of the date of birth certificate, which has been placed on record and the fact that the appellant has already undergone more than 6 years, we do not deem it appropriate to remand the case to the Juvenile Justice Board for making an inquiry under Section 14 of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is stated to be on bail. The appellant is directed to be released in this case forthwith. The personal bond and surety bond of the appellant is cancelled and the surety is discharged. Appeal stands disposed of, in above terms. G.S.SISTANI, J G.P. MITTAL, J AUGUST 30, 2013 ssn /