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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
(i) CRL.REV.P. 508/2013 & Crl.M.A. No.13447/2013
MAHESH BHATT Petitioner Tiirough; Ms. Jyotika Kalra, Advocate
(i) CRL.REV.P. 508/2013 & Crl.M.A. No.13447/2013
MAHESH BHATT Petitioner Tiirough; Ms. Jyotika Kalra, Advocate
VERSUS
STATE Respondent
Through: Ms.Nishi Jain, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
(ii) CRL.REV.P. 510/2013 & CrLM.As. No.13475-46/2013
SHAMBHU DUTT BHATT Petitioner
Through: Ms. Jyotika Kalra, Advocate
Through: Ms.Nishi Jain, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
(ii) CRL.REV.P. 510/2013 & CrLM.As. No.13475-46/2013
SHAMBHU DUTT BHATT Petitioner
Through: Ms. Jyotika Kalra, Advocate
VERSUS
STATE Respondent
Through: Ms.Nishi Jain, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
Through: Ms.Nishi Jain, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
09.09.2013 Petitioners of above captioned two petitions arethe father andson, who have been called upon to face trial for the offence under Section406 of IPC and under Section 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with Section 34 of IPC vide order of 8^ July, 2013. Petitioner-
Shambhu Dutt has been additionally charged for the offence under
Section 506 ofIPC.
Crl.Rev.P.508&510of2013 Page 1 2013:DHC:8499 Impugned order andthe charge framed forthe aforesaid offences is assailed by learned counsel for petitioners in the above captioned two petitions on more or less similar grounds and therefore, both the petitions were heard together and by this common order, they are being disposed of.
At the hearing, learned coimsel for petitioners had contended that there was no marriage ceremony nor any marriage has taken place andiso petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the aforesaid offences. It is asserted on behalf of petitioners that their prosecution for the offence under
Section 406 ofIPC and also for the offences under Section 3 and 4 of The
DowryProhibition Act, 1961c,msQsdov^D\Q]Qo^^vdiy.
Impugned order is assailed by learned counsel for petitioners by pointing out that it erroneously notes that petitioner-Mar/ze^/j had gone to the house of complainant whereas from the complaint/FIR, it becomes evident that complainant had come to the house of petitioners' and at the time of alleged demand or acceptance of dowry, petitioner-MarAe^/z was not present there but still he has been chargedwith the aid of Section 34 of IPC although in the FIR of this case, Section 34 of IPC has not been invoked. It was pointed by learned counsel for petitioners that there was no common intention and petitioner-<Sta3/2M Dutthas been charged for the offence under Section 506 of IPC although neither in the FIR nor in the charge-sheet, ^Q\i\ionQv-Shambhu Dutt is accused of aforesaid offence.
Lastly, attention ofthis Court was drawn to Section 3 and 4 of The
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to point out that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as
Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510of2013 ^ Page2 well as for the offences under Section406 or 506 ofIPC are lacking and so, petitioners ought to be discharged. To contend so, reliance is placed by learned counsel for petitioners upon decision in Virendra Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh 2010 (4) Crimes 136 (SC); Syed Yousuf
Hussain v. State ofAndhra Pradesh AIR 2013 SC 1677; Pandurang and othersv. StateofHyderabad AIR 1955 SC216; Pradeep Goyal and Ors.
V. State and Anr. 2012 [2] JCC 841; State ofMaharashtra and Others v.
Som Nath Thapa and Others (1996) 4 SCC 659; Ms. Archana Kumar v.
State (Govt. ofNCT ofDelhi) 2007 [2] JCC 1594 and Onkar Nath Mishra
& Ors. V. State (NCTofDelhi) &Anr.
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor supports the impugned order andsubmits thatupon bare perusal of the charge-sheet (Annexure P-4), it becomes clear that the prosecution of petitioners for the offences in question is well deserved and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for petitioners haveno application to the facts of this case.
Upon hearing both the sides and onperusal ofthe impugned order and the charge-sheet filed and the decisions cited, I fmd that at the stage of framing of charge-sheet, a prima facie case is to be seen. On this aspect, pertinent observations made by Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chanderand Another (2012) 9 SCC 460 are as under: -
"At the initialstage offraming ofa charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, ifput to trial, couldprove him guilty. Allthat the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test ofguilt isnotto be appliedat the stage."
Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510of2013 Page 3 u Whether petitioners had gone to the house of complainant or complainant had come to the house of petitioners', is the factual aspect which is required to be tested at trial and merely on account of such discrepancy, petitioners-accused persons cannot be discharged. Upon bare perusal of the charge-sheet (Annexure P-4), it prima facie appears that petitioner-Ma/je^/? tacitly agreed with his co-accused in the commission of the offence in question. Impugned order notes the factual aspects, which need not be reproduced herein, and deals with the submissions advanced on behalf of petitioners'. Trial court has rightly proceeded to put petitioners on trial for the offences in question as it cannotbe said that the ingredients ofthe offence alleged are lacking. The decisions cited have no application to the facts ofthe instant case.
Finding no illegality or infirmity in the impugnedorder, both these two petitions and the applications are dismissed while refraining to comment upon merits lest it may prejudice petitioners at trial.
(SUNILGAUR)
Judge ^ SEPTEMBER 09,2013 s Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510 of2013 Page 4
09.09.2013 Petitioners of above captioned two petitions arethe father andson, who have been called upon to face trial for the offence under Section406 of IPC and under Section 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with Section 34 of IPC vide order of 8^ July, 2013. Petitioner-
Shambhu Dutt has been additionally charged for the offence under
Section 506 ofIPC.
Crl.Rev.P.508&510of2013 Page 1 2013:DHC:8499 Impugned order andthe charge framed forthe aforesaid offences is assailed by learned counsel for petitioners in the above captioned two petitions on more or less similar grounds and therefore, both the petitions were heard together and by this common order, they are being disposed of.
At the hearing, learned coimsel for petitioners had contended that there was no marriage ceremony nor any marriage has taken place andiso petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the aforesaid offences. It is asserted on behalf of petitioners that their prosecution for the offence under
Section 406 ofIPC and also for the offences under Section 3 and 4 of The
DowryProhibition Act, 1961c,msQsdov^D\Q]Qo^^vdiy.
Impugned order is assailed by learned counsel for petitioners by pointing out that it erroneously notes that petitioner-Mar/ze^/j had gone to the house of complainant whereas from the complaint/FIR, it becomes evident that complainant had come to the house of petitioners' and at the time of alleged demand or acceptance of dowry, petitioner-MarAe^/z was not present there but still he has been chargedwith the aid of Section 34 of IPC although in the FIR of this case, Section 34 of IPC has not been invoked. It was pointed by learned counsel for petitioners that there was no common intention and petitioner-<Sta3/2M Dutthas been charged for the offence under Section 506 of IPC although neither in the FIR nor in the charge-sheet, ^Q\i\ionQv-Shambhu Dutt is accused of aforesaid offence.
Lastly, attention ofthis Court was drawn to Section 3 and 4 of The
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to point out that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as
Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510of2013 ^ Page2 well as for the offences under Section406 or 506 ofIPC are lacking and so, petitioners ought to be discharged. To contend so, reliance is placed by learned counsel for petitioners upon decision in Virendra Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh 2010 (4) Crimes 136 (SC); Syed Yousuf
Hussain v. State ofAndhra Pradesh AIR 2013 SC 1677; Pandurang and othersv. StateofHyderabad AIR 1955 SC216; Pradeep Goyal and Ors.
V. State and Anr. 2012 [2] JCC 841; State ofMaharashtra and Others v.
Som Nath Thapa and Others (1996) 4 SCC 659; Ms. Archana Kumar v.
State (Govt. ofNCT ofDelhi) 2007 [2] JCC 1594 and Onkar Nath Mishra
& Ors. V. State (NCTofDelhi) &Anr.
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor supports the impugned order andsubmits thatupon bare perusal of the charge-sheet (Annexure P-4), it becomes clear that the prosecution of petitioners for the offences in question is well deserved and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for petitioners haveno application to the facts of this case.
Upon hearing both the sides and onperusal ofthe impugned order and the charge-sheet filed and the decisions cited, I fmd that at the stage of framing of charge-sheet, a prima facie case is to be seen. On this aspect, pertinent observations made by Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chanderand Another (2012) 9 SCC 460 are as under: -
"At the initialstage offraming ofa charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, ifput to trial, couldprove him guilty. Allthat the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test ofguilt isnotto be appliedat the stage."
Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510of2013 Page 3 u Whether petitioners had gone to the house of complainant or complainant had come to the house of petitioners', is the factual aspect which is required to be tested at trial and merely on account of such discrepancy, petitioners-accused persons cannot be discharged. Upon bare perusal of the charge-sheet (Annexure P-4), it prima facie appears that petitioner-Ma/je^/? tacitly agreed with his co-accused in the commission of the offence in question. Impugned order notes the factual aspects, which need not be reproduced herein, and deals with the submissions advanced on behalf of petitioners'. Trial court has rightly proceeded to put petitioners on trial for the offences in question as it cannotbe said that the ingredients ofthe offence alleged are lacking. The decisions cited have no application to the facts ofthe instant case.
Finding no illegality or infirmity in the impugnedorder, both these two petitions and the applications are dismissed while refraining to comment upon merits lest it may prejudice petitioners at trial.
(SUNILGAUR)
Judge ^ SEPTEMBER 09,2013 s Crl. Rev.P. 508 &510 of2013 Page 4
JUDGMENT