Harmanpreet Kaur Dhir v. Pritam Singh Bhatia

17. I have heard the rival submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the record. Analysis

18. The contentious issues arising herein necessitate a delineation of the legal principles governing the constitution of an HUF and the accrual of coparcenary rights therein.

19. A joint Hindu family is an umbrella kinship structure comprising all males lineally descended from a common ancestor, their wives, and unmarried daughters. Under the Mitakshara School of Hindu law, a joint family unit not only shares a common deity in worship and a common kitchen for food but also holds joint assets. The dissolution of the family's joint status transpires only upon the separation of assets, while mere divergence in food and worship does not constitute a separation of the joint family status. The Karta is the head of the Hindu Joint Family and usually, the eldest male member, vested with extensive powers to manage the family‟s affairs and property. The Karta acts as the manager of joint family property and has the authority to make decisions with respect to the properties owned by the joint family.

20. As per the Black's Law Dictionary, coparceners are "persons to whom an estate of inheritance passes jointly and by whom it is held as a whole estate." In a coparcenary, the ownership of property is shared amongst family members, but the specific share of each member is not fixed as the interest of each coparcener changes over time due to the birth of new family members and the passing of existing ones. Until a separation happens, each coparcener only has a fluctuating and undetermined interest in the joint property.

21. A Hindu coparcenary is a more constrained entity than a joint family, only encompassing the propositus (original holder of the property) and three lineal descendants. For instance, if A is the holder of the coparcenary property, his son (B), grandson (C), and great-grandson (D) constitute the coparcenary. However, the great-great-grandson (E) does not attain coparcenary rights unless and until A‟s death, at which point his interest as a coparcener shall accrue.

22. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in SBI v. Ghamandi Ram[5] and further analyzed in CED v. Alladi Kuppuswamy 6, a Hindu coparcenary exhibits six fundamental attributes. First, lineal male descendants up to the third generation derive an independent interest in the coparcenary property by virtue of birth, rather than through inheritance. Second, a coparcener is vested with the legal right to seek partition and ascertain their quantifiable interest upon such division. Third, in the absence of partition, every coparcener retains ownership over the entire property in conjunction with other coparceners, precluding the precise determination of individual shares. Fourth, the coparcenary property is held in common, ensuring collective enjoyment of its benefits. Fifth, the property cannot be alienated without the unanimous concurrence of all coparceners, except in instances of legal necessity. Sixth, upon the demise of a coparcener, their interest merges into the surviving coparcenary estate rather than devolving as an individual inheritance.

23. The Act of 1956 was enacted by the Parliament of India to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. It classifies heirs into four categories- Class I heirs include immediate family like sons, daughters, widows, and mothers, who have the first right to inheritance; Class II heirs comprise distant relatives like siblings, grandparents, and uncles, who inherit only if no Class I heirs exist; Agnates, who are relatives through the male lineage; and Cognates, who are relatives through the female lineage.

24. Under the Act of 1956, a daughter was not recognized as a coparcener. However, she was classified as a Class I legal heir in the Schedule of the Act of 1956, thereby entitling her to inherit her father‟s estate alongside other Class I heirs, but only in cases where the father had died intestate.

25. Subsequently, the Parliament of India, through the enactment of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, (hereinafter „the 2005 amendment‟), amended Section 6 of the Act of 1956, thereby conferring coparcenary rights upon daughters across India, placing them on an equal footing with sons in matters of ancestral property inheritance.

26. Under the proviso to Section 6 of the Act of 1956, as it stood before the amendment introduced by the 2005 amendment, in cases where a coparcener passed away leaving behind a female relative classified as a Class I heir, or a male descendant claiming through such a female heir, the daughter was among the recognized heirs entitled to succession. However, Section 6, as substituted by the 2005 Amendment, presupposes the continued existence of the coparcenary and merely expands the scope of rights available to daughters.

27. The Supreme Court in Surjit Lal Chhabda, while analysing the concepts of Hindu joint family and coparcenary held as under:- ”Outside the limits of coparcenary, there is a fringe of persons, males and females, who constitute an undivided or joint family. There is no limit to the number of persons who can compose it nor to their remoteness from the common ancestor and to their relationship with one another. A joint Hindu family consists of persons lineally descended from a common ancestor and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. The daughter, on marriage, ceases to be a member of her father's family and becomes a member of her husband's family. The joint Hindu family is thus a larger body consisting of a group of persons who are united by the tie of sapindaship arising by birth, marriage or adoption: The fundamental principle of the Hindu joint family is the sapindaship. Without that it is impossible to form a joint Hindu family. With it as long as a family is living together, it is almost impossible not to form a joint Hindu family. It is the family relation, the sapinda relation, which distinguishes the joint family, and is of its very essence. [Per Beaman, J. in Karsondas v. Gangabai, (1908) 32 Bom 479, 493: 10 Bom LR 184. See also Hindu Law in British India by S.V.Gupte, 2nd Edn., p. 59] The Joint Hindu Family, with all its incidents, is thus a creature of law and cannot be created by an act of parties, except to the extent to which a stranger may be affiliated to the family by adoption.”

28. Furthermore, in Rohit Chauhan, the Supreme Court held that ancestral property remains a coparcener‟s separate property until the birth of a son, after which it becomes joint family property. A sole surviving coparcener has full rights to sell or alienate the property as his own, but once a son is born, the property transforms into coparcenary property, restricting absolute alienation except for legal necessity. The Court held that so long, on partition, an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener. Applying the aforesaid position, the Court held that the appellant‟s father had full ownership rights until his birth, but post-birth, the property became coparcenary. The relevant extract reads as under: - “..In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of ancestral property and a coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than the joint Hindu family and before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no definite share in the coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not static. We are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.

12. The view which we have taken finds support from a judgment of this Court in M. Yogendra v. Leelamma N. [(2009) 15 SCC 184: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] in which it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 192, para

29) “29. It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.”

13. Now referring to the decision of this Court in Bhanwar Singh [(2008) 3 SCC 87: (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 779] relied on by the respondents, the same is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the issue was in relation to succession whereas in the present case we are concerned with the status of the plaintiff vis-à-vis his father who got property on partition of the ancestral property.

29. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma[7] was considering a challenge to the applicability of the 2005 amendment by way of a reference. The Supreme Court, while extensively analyzing catena of judicial precedents, including the aforenoted, has held as under: -

effected) by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.

138. We understand that on this question, suits/appeals are pending before different High Courts and subordinate courts. The matters have already been delayed due to legal imbroglio caused by conflicting decisions. The daughters cannot be deprived of their right of equality conferred upon them by Section 6.”

30. The Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma also emphasized that a coparcener enjoys the right to claim partition and, upon doing so, the property ceases to be part of the coparcenary, with shares becoming ascertainable. The decision further clarified that along with sons and daughters, the wife of a coparcener is also entitled to an equal share upon partition. While undivided shares can be sold, specific property cannot be alienated without partition. The Court also discussed the provision of statutory fiction provided in Section 6 of the amended Act of 1956, establishing that mere determination of shares does not automatically disrupt coparcenary unless an unequivocal intention to separate is expressed. Several precedents were referenced in the aforesaid case to illustrate that a coparcener‟s share becomes definite upon partition but remains undetermined in an undivided family. It was copiously reiterated that expressing an intention to partition results in severance of status, but the actual division of property requires further steps. The Court also highlighted that the daughter as a co-owner has the right to seek partition and severance even prior to the death of the Karta. The relevant extract reads as under:-

cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration.

108. As to the effect of legal fiction, reliance was placed on CIT v. S. Teja Singh [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352], in which it was laid down that in construing the scope of legal fiction, it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, but the purpose of fiction is limited so as to work out the extent of the share of the deceased at the time of his death, and not to affect the actual partition in case it has not been done by metes and bounds.

109. When the proviso to unamended Section 6 of the 1956 Act came into operation and the share of the deceased coparcener was required to be ascertained, a deemed partition was assumed in the lifetime of the deceased immediately before his death. Such a concept of notional partition was employed so as to give effect to Explanation to Section 6. The fiction of notional partition was meant for an aforesaid specific purpose. It was not to bring about the real partition. Neither did it affect the severance of interest nor demarcated the interest of surviving coparceners or of the other family members, if any, entitled to a share in the event of partition but could not have claimed it. The entire partition of the coparcenary is not provided by deemed fiction; otherwise, coparcenary could not have continued which is by birth, and the death of one coparcener would have brought an end to it. Legal fiction is only for a purpose it serves, and it cannot be extended beyond was held in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory [State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, 1954 SCR 53: (1953) 1 SCC 826: AIR 1953 SC 333]; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661]; and CED v. S. Harish Chandra [CED v. S. Harish Chandra, 1986 SCC OnLine All 805: (1987) 167 ITR 230]. A legal fiction created in law cannot be stretched beyond the purpose for which it has been created, was held in Mancheri Puthusseri Ahmed [Mancheri Puthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver, (1996) 6 SCC 185] thus: (SCC p. 195, para 8) “8. … In the first place the section creates a legal fiction. Therefore, the express words of the section have to be given their full meaning and play in order to find out whether the legal fiction contemplated by this express provision of the statute has arisen or not in the facts of the case. Rule of construction of provisions creating legal fictions is well settled. In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. But in so construing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created, or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. It cannot also be extended by importing another fiction.”

110. It is apparent that the right of a widow to obtain an equal share in the event of partition with the son was not deprived under old Section 6. Unamended Section 6 provided that the interest of a coparcener could be disposed of by testamentary or intestate succession on happening of exigency under the proviso. Under the old law before 1956, a devise by a coparcener of Hindu Mitakshara family property was wholly invalid. Section 30 of the 1956 Act provided competence for a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary to dispose of his interest in the coparcenary property by a testament.

111. In Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal [Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal, AIR 1965 SC 1055], it was held that the shares of all coparceners should be ascertained in order to work out the share of the deceased coparcener, partition to be assumed and given effect to when the question of allotment comes, but this Court did not lay down in the said decision that the deeming fiction and notional partition brought an end to the joint family or coparcenary.

112. In case coparcenary is continued, and later on between the surviving coparceners partition takes place, it would be necessary to find out the extent of the share of the deceased coparcener. That has to be worked out with reference to the property which was available at the time of death of deceased coparcener whose share devolved as per the proviso and Explanation I to Section 6 as in case of intestate succession.

113. In Hari Chand Roach v. Hem Chand [Hari Chand Roach v. Hem Chand, (2010) 14 SCC 294: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 430], a widow inherited the estate of her husband and had an undivided interest in the property. The subsequent family arrangement was entered into whereby she exchanged her share for another property. This Court held that though her share was definite, the interest continued undivided, and there was a further family arrangement that will have the effect of giving her disposition over the property in question, which was given to her in the subsequent family arrangement. It is apparent that under an undivided interest, as provided under Section 6, the shares are definite, but the interest in the property can continue undivided.”

31. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the properties in the family can be categorized into self-acquired and ancestral. Self-acquired property refers to assets acquired by an individual through personal efforts, such as earnings, business profits, gifts, or a will, over which the owner has absolute control and discretion to sell, transfer, or bequeath as they wish. In contrast, ancestral property is inherited up to four generations through the male lineage in an undivided joint family, where every coparcener has an automatic right to a share by birth. Unlike self-acquired property, which can be disposed of at the owner's discretion, ancestral property cannot be sold or transferred without the consent of all legal heirs. Recently this Court, in the decision of Birbal Saini v. Satyawati 8, has held that an ancestral property is a coparcenary property, where legal heirs acquire an inherent interest by birth, and it remains undivided within a joint family, ensuring equal rights to all coparceners. Such property is governed by the laws of coparcenary succession, granting vested rights from birth.

32. After delineating the concepts of joint family, ancestral property, selfacquired property, and coparcenary, it is incumbent to define the “Hindu Undivided Family”.

33. A Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), though not statutorily defined, consists of a joint family that has not yet been divided. Under the Income Tax Act of 1961, it is a distinct legal entity and is treated as a separate person under Section 2(31) for taxation purposes. An HUF is formed automatically 2024 DHC 10044 by operation of law but does not require formal registration, though it can be officially recognized through the creation of an HUF deed. The membership of an HUF is not based on an act of volition, rather, one acquires membership of the HUF automatically upon birth in the family.

34. In Kalyanji Vithaldas v. CIT 9, the Privy Council noted that the phrase “Hindu undivided family” is used in the statute (Income Tax Act) with reference, not only to one school of Hindu Law but to all schools, and it would be erroneous to read it as equivalent to the narrower expression “Hindu coparcenary”.

35. Prior to the passing of the Act of 1956, an HUF could be brought into existence by a person inheriting property from his paternal ancestors up to four degrees and after the year 1956, an HUF can come into existence only if a person throws his property into a common hotchpotch. After the year 1956, merely on account of inheritance of ancestral property, an HUF does not come into existence as held by the Supreme Court in the judgments in the cases of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others v. Chander Sen and Others10, and Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar11.

36. This Court in the case of Surinder Kumar v. Dhani Ram and Others12, has extensively summarised the legal principles revolving around the HUF after taking into consideration the ratios of the cases of Chander Sen and Yudhishter. The Court held as under:- “5. The Supreme Court around 30 years back in the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567, held that after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the (1937) 5 ITR 90 traditional view that on inheritance of an immovable property from paternal ancestors up to three degrees, automatically an HUF came into existence, no longer remained the legal position in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Sen (supra) was thereafter followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204 wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the legal position that after coming into force of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, inheritance of ancestral property after 1956 does not create an HUF property and inheritance of ancestral property after 1956 therefore does not result in creation of an HUF property.

6. In view of the ratios of the judgments in the cases of Chander Sen (supra) and Yudhishter (supra), in law ancestral property can only become an HUF property if inheritance is before 1956, and such HUF property therefore which came into existence before 1956 continues as such even after 1956. In such a case, since an HUF already existed prior to 1956, thereafter, since the same HUF with its properties continues, the status of joint Hindu family/HUF properties continues, and only in such a case, members of such joint Hindu family are coparceners entitling them to a share in the HUF properties.

7. On the legal position which emerges pre 1956 i.e. before passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and post 1956 i.e. after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the same has been considered by me recently in the judgment in the case of Sunny (Minor) v. Sh. Raj Singh, CS(OS) No. 431/2006 decided on 17.11.2015. In this judgment, I have referred to and relied upon the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Yudhishter (supra) and have essentially arrived at the following conclusions:—

(i) If a person dies after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there is no HUF existing at the time of the death of such a person, inheritance of an immovable property of such a person by his successors-in-interest is no doubt inheritance of an ‘ancestral’ property but the inheritance is as a self-acquired property in the hands of the successor and not as an HUF property although the successor(s) indeed inherits ‘ancestral’ property i.e. a property belonging to his paternal ancestor.

(ii) The only way in which a Hindu Undivided Family/joint Hindu family can come into existence after 1956 (and when a joint Hindu family did not exist prior to 1956) is if an individual's property is thrown into a common hotchpotch. Also, once a property is thrown into a common hotchpotch, it is necessary that the exact details of the specific date/month/year etc. of creation of an HUF for the first time by throwing a property into a common hotchpotch have to be clearly pleaded and mentioned and which requirement is a legal requirement because of Order VI Rule 4 CPC which provides that all necessary factual details of the cause of action must be clearly stated. Thus, if an HUF property exists because of its such creation by throwing of self-acquired property by a person in the common hotchpotch, consequently there is entitlement in coparceners etc. to a share in such HUF property.

(iii) An HUF can also exist if paternal ancestral properties are inherited prior to 1956, and such status of parties qua the properties has continued after 1956 with respect to properties inherited prior to 1956 from paternal ancestors. Once that status and position continues even after 1956; of the HUF and of its properties existing; a coparcener etc. will have a right to seek partition of the properties.

(iv) Even before 1956, an HUF can come into existence even without inheritance of ancestral property from paternal ancestors, as HUF could have been created prior to 1956 by throwing of individual property into a common hotchpotch. If such an HUF continues even after 1956, then in such a case a coparcener etc. of an HUF was entitled to partition of the HUF property.” (emphasis supplied)

37. Thus, the Court in Surender Kumar held that if a person dies after the enactment of the Act of 1956, and there is no existing HUF at the time of his death, the inherited immovable property is considered to be selfacquired in the hands of the successor, even if the property inherited by the successor, was ancestral property. The Court further elaborated that after 1956, an HUF or joint Hindu family could only come into existence if an individual's property is voluntarily thrown into a common hotchpotch. For such a property to be recognized as HUF property, the exact details of its inclusion in the common hotchpotch, including the specific date, month, and year, must be clearly pleaded and stated, as per Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC. In other words, the cause of action must be laid out with specificity and with sufficient particulars. Consequently, if a property is so included, the coparceners are entitled to a share in the HUF property. An HUF can also exist if paternal ancestral properties were inherited before 1956 and the HUF status continued even after 1956, in which case the coparceners have the right to seek partition of the properties.

38. Moreover, the Court recognized that even before 1956, an HUF could come into existence without the inheritance of ancestral property, as an individual could create an HUF by throwing their self-acquired property into a common hotchpotch. If such an HUF continued post-1956, coparceners would be entitled to seek partition of the HUF property. This Court, in Surender Kumar also opined that to adjudicate on similar claims raised by the defendants by way of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the Court must peruse the pleadings wherein factual details of the HUF so pleaded, must be brought on record by the plaintiff. In paragraphs no. 12 and 13, the Court has held as under: -

13. In view of the above, actually the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in fact is treated as an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, inasmuch as, it is observed on the admitted facts as pleaded in the plaint that no HUF and its properties are found to exist. There is no averment in the plaint that late Sh. Jage Ram inherited property(s) from his paternal ancestors prior to 1956. In such a situation, therefore, the properties in the hands of late Sh. Jage Ram cannot be HUF properties in his hands because there is no averment of late Sh. Jage Ram inheriting ancestral property(s) from his paternal ancestors prior to

1956. There is no averment in the plaint also of late Sh. Jage Ram's properties being HUF properties because HUF was created after 1956 by late Sh. Jage Ram by throwing properties into a common hotchpotch. I have already elaborated in detail above as to how an HUF has to be pleaded to exist in the pre 1956 and the post 1956 positions and the necessary averments which had to be made in the present plaint. The suit plaint however grossly lacks the necessary averments as required in law to be made for a complete cause of action to be pleaded for existence of an HUF and its properties.”

39. For the present controversy, it is also incumbent to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Sunny v. Raj Singh13, wherein this Court was considering a suit for partition and rendition of accounts filed by two plaintiffs, against their grandfather and three uncles. The plaintiffs claimed a 1/5th share in various movable and immovable properties, arguing that these belonged to an HUF. The defendants therein, denied these claims, asserting that the properties were self-acquired by the grandfather. The Court, relying on the Supreme Court‟s decision in Yudhishter, held that properties inherited after the enactment of the Act of 1956, do not automatically acquire the character of an HUF property unless the HUF pre-existed or was explicitly created by throwing properties into a common hotchpotch. The suit was dismissed by the Court on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an HUF before 1956 or the creation of one afterward.

40. On the anvil of the aforesaid legal exposition, the following principles emerge: a. A Hindu Joint Family consists of lineal descendants from a common ancestor, including wives and unmarried daughters. b. Prior to the 2005 amendment to the Act of 1956, only male descendants up to three generations from the common ancestor were coparceners. The amendment granted equal coparcenary rights to daughters, ensuring parity with sons. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma that marriage does not alter the status of the daughter as a coparcener. Further, it has also been reiterated that coparcenary rights are acquired by birth, not inheritance, and persist irrespective of the father's survival on the amendment's enactment date. c. An HUF is primarily created for taxation purposes and the properties inherited after 1956 do not automatically assume the HUF status unless an HUF pre-existed or was explicitly created by placing property into the common hotchpotch. Once the existence of an HUF is established, rights in the HUF property accrue as if the property is jointly owned by all coparceners. d. While filing a suit for partition on the ground of coparcenary rights, the mere assertion of an HUF's existence is insufficient. The claimant is required to plead detailed pleadings establishing particulars like ancestral lineage, mode of inheritance, and specific fundamental events leading to the formation or continuation of an HUF. If the claim is based on an act of throwing the property in a common hotchpotch, the factual details of such a positive act must be delineated with sufficient clarity.

41. It is seen from the bare perusal of the plaint that the parents of the plaintiff, after the birth of their son i.e., defendant no. 2, established their residence at the Shalimar Bagh property. It is also averred that the said property was acquired by defendant no. 1 with financial assistance from both the maternal and paternal grandparents of the plaintiff. The plaint further discloses that defendant no. 1, upon the sale of the Shalimar Bagh property, utilized the proceeds thereof to purchase the Pushpanjali Enclave property.

42. More importantly, the plaint clearly states that defendant no. 1, while acting in the capacity of Karta of the P.S. Bhatia (HUF), entered into a transaction for the purchase of the Suit Property for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-. As per the plaint, in furtherance of this transaction, various documents were executed to effectuate the sale, in the favour of PS Bhatia (HUF), namely:

(i) a receipt dated 31.05.1995 acknowledging the transfer of the sale consideration by PS Bhatia (HUF);

(ii) a Deed of Sale Agreement in favor of P.S. Bhatia (HUF) dated

31.05.1995;

(iii) a Deed of Will of the Original Allottee in favor of P.S. Bhatia (HUF)

(iv) a General Power of Attorney issued by the Original Allottee in favor of

(v) a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Smt. Bhupinder Kaur.

43. Furthermore, the plaint asserts that the suit property was acquired from the proceeds of the sale of the Pushpanjali Enclave property, which, in turn, was purchased using the proceeds derived from the sale of the Shalimar Bagh property, which was purchased from the financial assistance by paternal and maternal grandparents of the plaintiff.

44. In addition to the aforesaid, the documentary evidence submitted by the plaintiff indicates that defendant no.1, through an express act of entering into a conveyance deed dated 13.11.1997 issued by DDA in his favour, designated the suit property in the name of "P.S. Bhatia (HUF)". Therefore, the aforesaid, prima facie, suggests an intention on behalf of defendant No.1 to integrate the property into the corpus of an HUF, thereby, relinquishing its status as exclusive self-acquired property as claimed by defendant No.1. The character, nomenclature, and form of the property as well as the of the documents pertaining to the property are relevant indicators and in the present case, the indicators are stated with a reasonable clarity in the plaint.

45. The stringent rigors of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC are intended to act as a safeguard against vexatious litigation by preventing claims that do not disclose a cause of action or are otherwise barred by law from proceeding to trial. The rule mandates that the Court must examine the averments in the plaint as they stand and determine whether the suit is maintainable, without delving into the merits of the case or the defence raised by the defendant.

46. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal 14, the Supreme Court held that the Courts should "nip in the bud" the cases that are manifestly meritless or legally untenable. Similarly, in Dahiben, the Supreme Court held that mere clever drafting cannot circumvent statutory bars, and a plaint that appears meritless on its face must be struck down without subjecting the defendant to prolonged litigation.

47. Furthermore, this Court in Surender Kumar noted that Courts are flooded with litigations wherein plaintiffs merely assert the existence of HUF and coparcenary rights, without adequately pleading the legally requisite factual details necessary to establish the formation of the HUF. It was held to be essential that the pleadings explicitly contain all factual ingredients constituting the cause of action as post the Act of 1956, mere assertions of a joint Hindu family or HUF and coparcenary rights are insufficient without detailing as to how the HUF and its properties came into existence.

48. The Court, having examined the factual matrix and legal position explicated hereinabove, finds that defendant no.1 has voluntarily registered the suit property in the name of P.S. Bhatia (HUF) which is prima facie evident from the plaint. The nomenclature is important, as noted above, and in light of the facts pleaded in the plaint, it could not be said at this stage that there was no intention to integrate the suit property in the common pool.

49. However, it be noted that whether the suit property is actually an HUF or not is a triable issue, to be dealt with after both parties have led evidence to that effect. The same cannot be effectively looked into at this stage when there are rival claims with respect to the status of the suit property. While exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the Court must remain alive to the fact that the invocation of this power amounts to a summary dismissal of the suit, merely on the basis of the pleadings, and without affording an opportunity to prove a case. It is a patent dismissal and this power must be exercised only when it is absolutely certain from the pleadings that no cause of action arises or a legal bar is unequivocally apparent from a reading of the pleadings. If the plaint gives rise to issues of a triable nature, it could only be determined upon a thorough appreciation of evidence and not in a summary manner, as sought in the instant case.

50. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that no valid grounds have been established to warrant the rejection of the plaint at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, the instant application stands dismissed.

51. Consequently, the civil suit shall proceed for adjudication on its merits.

52. Needless to state, the observations made herein are strictly confined to the consideration of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and would not influence the trial.

53. List the civil suit before the Joint Registrar on 05.05.2025 for taking further steps in accordance with extant rules.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV) JUDGE